In Buzek v. Fife, home buyers sued the seller after discovering water in the basement immediately after purchase, alleging misrepresentation on the required residential property disclosure form regarding both water issues and structural integrity of the foundation. The trial court, after a bench trial, held the seller liable for misrepresentation only as to the structural issue and awarded damages. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the disclosure form treats water leakage and structural problems as separate and independent items under R.C. 5302.30(C), and that significant water entry does not automatically constitute a material structural defect. The court found no evidence or legal basis to equate the two and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that distinction. The topics addressed are property disclosure requirements, tort claims for misrepresentation, and appellate review of trial court findings.
In Meek v. Tom Sexton & Associates, Inc., a former employee sued his employer for unpaid sales commissions under Ohio Revised Code § 1335.11, claiming he qualified as a sales representative entitled to recovery. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the appellate court affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court reasoned that the statute's definition of "sales representative" explicitly excludes employees of the principal, and the undisputed facts showed the plaintiff was an employee paid a base salary plus commissions, with benefits, taxes withheld, and other employee indicators. The plaintiff therefore could not recover commissions under that specific provision.
Jason Fisher was indicted and tried on multiple drug-related charges, including illegal manufacture and possession of cocaine and marijuana, after police executed a search warrant at his apartment based on an informant's tip that was corroborated by a controlled buy. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and that nighttime execution was unjustified, and later challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his convictions on the possession counts. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, dismissed some charges, and the jury convicted Fisher of possessing cocaine and marijuana. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause from the four corners of the affidavit and that the evidence of drugs in plain view near Fisher, combined with proof of his occupancy, was sufficient to support the convictions.
The case concerned Gerald T. Sheaffer's convictions in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas on charges of illegal manufacture of drugs, aggravated possession of drugs, and illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs. He received concurrent non-minimum prison sentences and appealed, claiming that the sentences violated his constitutional right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington. The appellate court affirmed the sentences. It reasoned that the Blakely decision does not apply to Ohio's statutory sentencing scheme, as established by prior precedent in the district.
This case involved Preferred Capital, an Ohio-based company, filing breach-of-lease complaints in Ohio against multiple out-of-state business renters for defaulting on equipment rental agreements originally entered with NorVergence and later assigned to Preferred Capital. The trial court dismissed the suits for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the forum-selection clause was unenforceable because it failed to specify a particular venue in advance and was therefore unreasonable and unjust. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the clause was valid and enforceable in these commercial contracts and thus conferred jurisdiction on Ohio courts without requiring a separate minimum-contacts analysis.
The case involved William Cottrill, who was injured in his employer's parking lot by a co-worker's negligent driving. Cottrill sought uninsured motorist benefits from his insurer, Wayne Mutual, after the co-worker's insurer denied liability under the fellow servant doctrine. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wayne Mutual, finding that the co-worker was not an uninsured motorist under Ohio law because he had insurance coverage, even though immune from liability via R.C. 4123.741. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statutory definition of uninsured motorist does not include those with fellow servant immunity and rejecting the public policy argument that the insurer should pay benefits it did not contract to provide.
