Joseph A. Artl

In this case, homeowners sued a general contractor (Illes Construction Co.) in Cleveland Municipal Court for breach of warranty in home construction that allegedly caused a fire damaging the property. After a new Ohio third-party practice statute took effect, the contractor sought to implead its subcontractors (the Fruscellos) as parties potentially liable for the damages, but the trial court granted the subcontractors' motion to quash service and dismissed the third-party petition. On appeal, the court held that the statute was procedural and remedial, allowing its application to the pending action without retroactive effect on substantive rights, that the municipal court had ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party claims, and that service by mail was proper under applicable statutes and court rules. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case involved a dispute over possession of goods delivered on consignment by Sussen Rubber Company to Hillcrest Auto Parts, which were later seized and sold by defendant Hertz acting as trustee for a secured creditor (Lee Motor Products) under a security agreement with an after-acquired property clause. Sussen sued for conversion, claiming rights to the goods, but the court examined whether the secured party's interest attached to the consigned property under the Uniform Commercial Code. The appellate court reversed the municipal court's judgment in favor of Sussen and entered final judgment for the defendant, holding that the after-acquired clause was valid and attached to the goods, that Sussen had not filed any financing statements or checked for prior interests, and that there was no evidence establishing the reasonable value or specific identity of the goods converted. The decision turned on UCC provisions regarding attachment of security interests and the lack of evidentiary support for damages.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves an appeal from a Probate Court order denying an application to redetermine and refund Ohio inheritance taxes paid on the estate of M. Sylvia Kangesser, which was left in trust to her brothers for distribution to charitable, educational, and religious purposes. The initial tax determination treated the successors as trustees, leading to payment of over $80,000 in tax and interest, but a later declaratory judgment action established that the residue actually passed to the Robert E., Harry A. and M. Sylvia Kangesser Foundation, a tax-exempt Ohio corporation. The Probate Court ruled there was no error of fact in the original reporting and declined to address tax exemption. The appellate court reversed, holding that the lower court had not ruled on whether the Foundation qualified as tax-exempt and remanding for determination of that issue.

taxesproperty

This case involved the City of Mayfield Heights seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent a Probate Court judge from enforcing a prior judgment in a declaratory judgment action brought by Gastown, Inc. In that action, the Probate Court had ruled that the city's U-4A zoning classification was unconstitutional as applied to the company's property and ordered the city to issue a building permit for a gasoline station. The court held that the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because it is a court of limited and special jurisdiction under the Ohio Constitution and statutes, which confine it primarily to probate, testamentary, and related matters, while questions of municipal ordinance validity fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas. As a result, the declaratory judgment and related orders were deemed void, and the writ was granted to bar further enforcement proceedings.

procedureproperty

This case concerned whether a police chief appointed while the municipality was a village retained civil service protections after it became a city and adopted a charter that placed the chief position in the unclassified service. The mayor removed the chief without written charges or a hearing under the charter, prompting a mandamus action to compel restoration under state statutes governing village executive powers and civil service removal procedures. The court held that the city charter controlled the removal process and that the relator had no civil service status. It reasoned that Ohio Supreme Court precedents establish charter provisions prevail over conflicting state laws on matters of local concern such as police department regulation, and that transition from village to city status does not automatically confer classified service rights on holdover appointees.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was an appeal from a second-degree murder conviction in which the defendant raised three assignments of error concerning the exclusion of psychological testing records and expert testimony on his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, as well as the admission of his statements to police. The court overruled the first two assignments but sustained the third, holding that the statements were obtained after the investigation had shifted to an accusatory stage and were used in the state's case-in-chief. Under Escobedo v. Illinois (applicable because the trial occurred before Miranda v. Arizona), the defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or provided counsel, and the state failed to prove the statements were voluntary; their use therefore constituted prejudicial error. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Salmon, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after shooting and killing Atlas Osborne in his home in 1964, with the jury recommending mercy and imposing a life sentence. On appeal, the defendant raised multiple assignments of error, including improper jury instructions on voluntary intoxication as a defense to premeditation and the admission of statements made during police interrogation. The court determined that the statements were obtained without informing the defendant of his right to remain silent, violating the requirements of Escobedo v. Illinois as interpreted in State v. Carder, rendering them inadmissible and prejudicial. Although other errors were examined and overruled, this constitutional violation required reversal of the conviction and remand for retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal by defendant Kenneth Swanson from his convictions in the Court of Common Pleas for assault with intent to rob and assault and battery following a joint trial with a co-defendant. The court reviewed multiple assignments of error, including claims that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to separate unsupervised during lunch breaks after the case was submitted and that it erred by permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about the voluntariness of a prior statement used for impeachment purposes. After reviewing the history of Ohio statutes on jury sequestration (such as R.C. 2945.33 and its predecessors) and relevant precedent like Emmert v. State, the court found no reversible error in the jury separation practices or most other assignments. However, it held that the cross-examination on the statement's voluntariness was prejudicial error because it exposed the jury to issues properly addressed in a voir dire outside their presence. The judgment was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Labarbera v. Batsch, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a 1959 car accident, filing his initial lawsuit on the final day of the two-year statute of limitations in 1961, though the summons reached the sheriff the next day. The trial court dismissed the case under then-existing precedent requiring delivery to the sheriff within the limitations period, a ruling affirmed on appeal in 1962; after the Ohio Supreme Court overruled that precedent in 1963, the plaintiff refiled under the savings statute within one year of the appellate affirmance. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant in the refiled action, holding that the original dismissal qualified as a failure otherwise than on the merits and that the one-year savings period ran from the date of affirmance rather than the initial dismissal.

proceduretorts & liability

James McRae was convicted by a jury of grand larceny, with the value of stolen property set at $125, and appealed the judgment and sentence. His assignments of error focused on the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's denial of motions for acquittal and a new trial, and especially the court's response to a jury inquiry about his decision not to testify, which involved reading portions of the Ohio Constitution and a related statute without additional curative instructions. The court also addressed challenges to the instructions on evaluating an accomplice's testimony. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the verdict was supported by the evidence including corroboration of the accomplice, that the instructions complied with Griffin v. California by avoiding any suggestion that silence indicated guilt, and that counsel's agreement to the response constituted a waiver of any claimed error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a union member and employee who sued the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen for lost earnings after the union president denied his request for reemployment, citing a violation of the union constitution for having filed a lawsuit against a vice-president. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages, but on appeal the court reversed the judgment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to exhaust internal union remedies by appealing the president's decision to the board of directors as required by the constitution, and the record contained no evidence that such remedies would have been futile or illusory.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case was a habeas corpus action brought by the natural mother of an infant born in 1963 seeking return of the child from respondents who had custody under a probate court placement order in a pending adoption case. The trial court found the probate court's order void but denied the writ on the ground that the child's best interests favored remaining with the respondents. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that the respondents were strangers to the record with no enforceable custody claim, that the common pleas court erred by deciding custody on best-interests grounds instead of deferring to the probate court's statutory role in adoptions, and that the mother was entitled to the writ pending further probate proceedings.

family lawprocedure

This case concerns a plaintiff's attempt to collect post-judgment interest from an insurer after obtaining a $60,000 verdict against the insured. The insurer, whose policy had a $10,000 limit, paid only that amount plus interest on it into court and moved for summary judgment, while the plaintiff sought interest on the full judgment under the policy's supplementary payments clause covering interest accruing after judgment until the insurer paid its liability limit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that the policy language and industry understanding obligated the insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the unpaid interest and certified a conflict with a prior appellate decision.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case is an appeal from a conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, where Harold L. Pigott was found guilty by a jury on two counts of first-degree murder for the 1961 killing of Linda McGee, one count alleging premeditated malice and the other alleging murder during an attempted rape; the jury recommended mercy on both counts, leading to a life sentence. The primary evidence consisted of the victim's body, similar acts by the defendant, and his confessions to police, with no direct eyewitness testimony linking him to the crime. Pigott challenged the trial court's decision to allow the jury to view the sites of the similar acts before any evidence was presented, arguing it violated the jury view statute (R.C. 2945.16) and was prejudicial, along with other claims regarding the admission of a knife and other procedural issues. The court held that the statute permits views of any places where material facts occurred, including those related to similar acts evidence under R.C. 2945.59, and that any errors in the trial were cured or non-prejudicial, resulting in a fair trial overall. The judgment and sentence were therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a trial court's order vacating a cognovit judgment entered in favor of Central National Bank against Standard Loan and Finance Company on a promissory note. The defendant had sought to vacate the judgment based on a claimed setoff from alleged forged checks charged to its account. The appellate court reversed the vacation order, holding that a counterclaim or setoff does not constitute a valid defense under the relevant Ohio statutes for vacating a judgment after term, and that the trial court failed to properly hear evidence on the grounds for vacation as required by law.

procedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit by plaintiff Lacy against defendant property owner Uganda Investment Corp. after Lacy tripped and fell over steps protruding onto a public sidewalk, sustaining injuries. A jury in Cleveland Municipal Court returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the defendant appealed on multiple grounds including improper statements by plaintiff's counsel, a jury view of altered premises, admission of evidence about post-accident changes to the steps, and flawed jury instructions. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that counsel's references in opening statements to a changed condition and jury view, combined with the court's handling of that evidence, were prejudicial, and that the instructions on contributory negligence failed to clearly state the applicable legal rules and burden of proof. The court rejected the defendant's claims that directed verdicts should have been granted. The decision focused on procedural and evidentiary errors at trial rather than the underlying facts of the fall.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved appeals by a bail bond surety company from municipal court judgments enforcing forfeited recognizances after defendants failed to appear in criminal cases. The core issue was whether the Cleveland Municipal Court had jurisdiction to enter civil judgments on forfeited bonds under Ohio Revised Code provisions that had replaced earlier statutory procedures. The court held that the municipal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render such judgments in its civil branch, rendering them void from the outset. It further ruled that neither the surety's payment of one judgment nor consent to the other could confer jurisdiction or validate the actions. The appellate court reversed the judgments and directed entry of final judgment for the defendants.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a personal injury action arising from an accident on April 8, 1960, in which the plaintiff, then a minor who reached majority on August 12, 1960, sued defendant Richard Dobies; the statute of limitations expired on August 12, 1962. The plaintiff filed the petition on August 10, 1962, and obtained issuance of summons, but initially served the defendant as an adult without noting his minority; after the limitations period, the plaintiff amended the petition and obtained proper service on the minor defendant and his father within sixty days of the original summons. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. The appellate court reversed, holding that under Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.17 the timely filing of the petition and praecipe, followed by diligent correction and service within sixty days, constituted a timely commencement of the action even though the initial service was defective due to the mistake about the defendant's minority status.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from the conviction of Max Bunin, a vice president of a drugstore chain, under Ohio's Sunday Closing Law (R.C. 3773.24) for opening a store on Sunday and permitting the sale of a non-prescription item, Vitalis Hair Tonic. The trial court convicted the defendant based on stipulated facts showing the store's regular Sunday operations, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that while operating a licensed drugstore qualifies as "work of necessity" exempt from the law for prescriptions and medicines, the necessity exception is narrowly construed and does not permit sales of incidental commodities not required for emergency or medical needs; any broader allowance would require legislative action rather than judicial expansion. The opinion explicitly declined to address the statute's constitutionality.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the validity of a widow's exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment under her deceased husband's will, which directed the residue of his trust estate to a charitable organization, The Cleveland Society for the Blind, rather than to his next of kin. The Probate Court upheld the appointment and ordered distribution to the charity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ohio's Mortmain Statute (R.C. 2107.06) did not apply to the grant or exercise of the power of appointment because the statute contained no prohibition against such a testamentary power and extending it would constitute improper judicial legislation. The court noted that all facts were stipulated and rejected the heirs' claims that the ruling violated the statute or was contrary to law.

property