Linda Stephens

In State v. Carver, the defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder after a jury heard circumstantial evidence that he and his cousin were fishing near the site where a woman was found strangled beside her car, with DNA profiles matching both men recovered from the vehicle. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's denial of Carver's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The majority held that Carver's repeated false denials of any contact with the victim or her car, when combined with the DNA evidence placing him at the scene, permitted a reasonable inference that he committed the crime, following the logic of precedents such as State v. Miller. The court noted that motive is not required and that the evidence was adequate to submit the case to the jury.

criminal law

In this case, the minor plaintiff Jada Lampkin, through her guardian, and her father sued the owners, operators, and managers of her apartment complex for negligence after she was seriously injured in 2010. She passed through a broken chain-link fence on the complex’s common-area playground, walked onto a frozen pond on adjacent third-party property, fell through the ice, and suffered permanent brain damage; the complaint alleged that the defendants had a duty to maintain a suitable barrier to keep children from accessing the pond after receiving prior notice of the risk. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that a landowner’s duty of reasonable care to maintain its own premises does not extend to protecting against dangerous conditions on neighboring property, rejecting analogies to the attractive-nuisance doctrine and the voluntary-undertaking doctrine because the defendants neither created the pond nor undertook to repair the fence or use it as a security barrier. The court further noted that imposing such a duty would improperly shift responsibility for the hazard from the party who controls it to an adjacent landowner who has no control over the neighboring land.

propertytorts & liability

In 2001, Aaron Evans Hamilton pled guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child, received a suspended sentence with probation that included sex offender registration, and was discharged from probation in 2004 after completing all terms without further offenses. He petitioned the trial court in 2011 under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.12A to end his registration obligation, but the court denied relief based solely on a pre-printed finding that termination would not comply with the federal Jacob Wetterling Act and related standards. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court's lone finding was unsupported by competent evidence—since Hamilton had met all statutory criteria for relief—and that the trial court had failed to make required findings on the issues raised in the petition before exercising its discretion on whether to grant termination.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Jones, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder after a 2011 retrial for the 2006 killing of Sarah Slaton, following a series of proceedings in which he alternated between representation by appointed counsel and self-representation with standby counsel. On appeal, he contended that the trial court violated his rights by failing to direct counsel to follow his preferred defense strategy of alleging misconduct and conspiracy, and by allowing him to waive counsel without a proper inquiry. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the claims de novo and found no error, affirming the conviction. The court reasoned that counsel was not required to pursue the defendant’s meritless theories, that conflicts leading to counsel changes did not implicate the rule from State v. Ali, and that the trial judge conducted a thorough colloquy under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242—confirming the defendant’s competence, understanding of the charges and penalties, and the consequences of proceeding pro se—before accepting his written waiver.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Justice, defendant Tonya Justice was convicted of larceny from a merchant under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72.11(2) after evidence showed she removed anti-theft sensors from clothing at a Belk store and admitted intending to steal them due to a drug problem; she was also found to be a habitual felon. The North Carolina Court of Appeals arrested judgment on the larceny conviction, holding that the indictment was fatally defective and deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the indictment's description of the property as merely "merchandise" was too vague to satisfy larceny pleading requirements and that its language alleging an "effort to steal" charged only an attempt rather than a completed taking. Because the underlying felony conviction could not stand, the court also reversed the habitual felon judgment and remanded for dismissal of that indictment.

criminal lawprocedure

Elizabeth Dixon sued Randall and Laura Gist in 2011, alleging they tricked her into a joint bank account and conveyed her 16 acres of land through fraud, undue influence, and breach of trust, asserting claims including constructive fraud, conversion, and civil conspiracy after voluntarily dismissing a nearly identical 2010 action. The trial court granted the Gists judgment on the pleadings and dismissed all claims, but the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It upheld dismissal of the real-property claims as barred by the three-year statute of limitations for actual fraud, because Dixon was present at a July 2007 planning-board meeting where the Gists’ ownership of the land was openly discussed, so she should have discovered the alleged fraud with due diligence well before filing. The court reversed dismissal of the bank-account claims, holding they alleged constructive fraud arising from a fiduciary relationship and were therefore governed by a ten-year statute of limitations that had not expired.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a North Carolina State Bar grievance alleging that attorney Sybil H. Barrett knowingly misrepresented the source of a buyer’s down payment on a HUD-1 settlement statement during a 2007 residential real estate closing, by listing a seller-financed loan as the buyer’s own funds to conceal secondary financing from the lender. The Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC) found that Barrett had engaged in misconduct, including falsifying the HUD-1 and failing to comply with discovery orders, and ordered her disbarment. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the disbarment order in full. The court held that the DHC’s key findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the alleged misrepresentation were not supported by competent evidence, as the record showed the lender had approved the version of the HUD-1 Barrett used, while the conflicting version in the lender’s file was not shown to have been prepared or submitted by her. The sole remaining basis for discipline—noncompliance with a discovery order—was insufficient because the same DHC panel had previously determined in a sanctions order that the noncompliance did not prejudice the State Bar’s case.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Weathers, the defendant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and kidnapping, arguing that the trial court should have declared a mistrial after key witness Johnny Wilson became too distraught to finish testifying and the court allowed his prior testimony to stand. Wilson had been threatened by the defendant during transport to court and showed clear fear in the courtroom, leading the trial judge to find that the defendant had committed wrongful acts specifically intended to prevent Wilson from testifying. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the defendant forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which applies when a defendant procures a witness’s unavailability through intimidation. Because the trial court’s findings were supported by evidence and its denial of a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion, the court found no error and upheld the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned owners of several bars and nightclubs who were fined for violating North Carolina's statewide smoking ban and who challenged the ban's exemption for country clubs as a violation of equal protection, arguing that their establishments were similarly situated but received no exemption. The trial court agreed and held the relevant statutory provisions unconstitutional as applied to the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the distinction between country clubs and the petitioners' establishments is constitutional. The court reasoned that the statute expressly exempts all country clubs from the ban while requiring other private clubs to meet additional nonprofit and membership criteria, and that this classification survives rational-basis review because the legislature could rationally treat country clubs as a distinct category based on their unique characteristics and operations.

business & regulatorycivil rights

In State v. Blocker, the defendant pled guilty under an Alford plea to 2009 robbery charges and then moved under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-980 to suppress use of a 2007 conviction at sentencing, claiming it was obtained without counsel because she was indigent and did not knowingly waive her rights. The trial court summarily denied the motion, treating it as an improper Boykin-style collateral attack that should have been raised in the original case. The Court of Appeals vacated that ruling and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that a statutory motion to suppress a prior conviction’s use in sentencing is distinct from an attempt to overturn the conviction itself and therefore requires the trial court to address the factual claims about the waiver of counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Shaw, defendant Xavier Shaw was convicted by a jury of robbery with a dangerous weapon after a trial in Wake County Superior Court and sentenced to life without parole; other related charges were arrested. On appeal, Shaw argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the court wrongly denied his request to waive his presence at trial and because it required him to be restrained during proceedings. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected both claims and found no error. It held that defendants have no absolute right to be absent from trial, as precedents allow courts to require presence despite a waiver attempt, a constitutional argument was not preserved below, and a cited statute applied only to plea entries rather than trials. The court also noted that the trial judge had followed all applicable rules on restraints.

criminal lawprocedure

In St. John v. Brantley, plaintiff Judy St. John sought civil no-contact orders against sisters Tammy and Vicky Brantley after they allegedly harassed and intimidated her following her report to social services and her role as a witness in a misdemeanor assault case against Tammy. The trial court issued one-year no-contact orders, finding that the defendants' actions—including threats, door-pounding, following the plaintiff, and false accusations—constituted unlawful conduct by intimidating a witness and caused her reasonable fear for her safety. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the unchallenged findings of fact supported the statutory requirements under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50C-1 for unlawful conduct and emotional distress or fear, that evidence of the underlying assault was admissible to show motive under Rule 404(b), and that any unpreserved evidentiary objections were waived.

criminal lawprocedure

In Grimsley v. GEICO, an insured driver sued his auto insurer after an accident, seeking a declaration that his underinsured motorist coverage was $1,000,000 rather than the $100,000 policy limit, based on the insurer’s alleged failure to provide a proper opportunity to select or reject UIM coverage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insured, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the insurer’s timely mailing of the required selection/rejection form satisfied the statute even if the insured did not receive or execute it, so there was no “total failure” that would trigger the $1,000,000 default coverage. It therefore remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of GEICO.

business & regulatory

In this case, The VUE-Charlotte, LLC and The VUE North Carolina, LLC sued purchasers who had agreed to buy condominiums but defaulted, seeking to enforce the contracts through specific performance rather than just keeping the buyers’ deposits. The trial court ruled that the agreements limited The VUE to liquidated damages, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The court interpreted the “Default” section of the identical purchase agreements, which stated that upon a buyer’s default The VUE “may” terminate the contract and retain deposits as liquidated damages, while expressly granting buyers all available equitable and legal remedies if The VUE defaulted. Because the contracts addressed remedies for each side’s breach differently and were unambiguous, the court held that The VUE’s remedies were confined to the liquidated-damages provision and did not include specific performance.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Keeton v. Circle K, an employee injured in a 2008 work-related car accident received disability benefits after being diagnosed with a lumbar strain, disc protrusion, and related conditions that imposed lifting and driving restrictions. Circle K sought to end those benefits through a Form 24 application, arguing that Keeton had unjustifiably refused suitable employment as a Market Manager in Winston-Salem, a position she briefly visited before going on medical leave and ultimately being terminated for not returning. The Full Commission found the job fell within her medical restrictions, as confirmed by multiple physicians who reviewed her limitations and the role’s duties, and concluded her refusal was unjustified under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-32 because she made no reasonable effort to resume work or seek accommodations. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Commission’s findings were supported by the evidence and that an employee’s refusal cannot be deemed justified solely by her lay opinion of inability.

labor & employment

The case arose after Delbert and Carolyn Rikard were seriously injured in a 2008 car accident caused by an underinsured driver, leading them to seek additional underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage from their insurer, Unitrin, beyond the other driver's policy limits. Unitrin sued for a declaratory judgment that only the statutory default UIM limits ($25,000/$50,000) applied under the policy, while the Rikards argued they were entitled to the maximum $1,000,000 because Unitrin had failed to properly notify them of their option to select higher coverage. Following a bench trial, the court held that the default limits governed. The appeals court affirmed, reasoning that Unitrin had satisfied the Financial Responsibility Act's notice requirements by including a blank UM/UIM selection/rejection form (Endorsement AK3847) in each of the five annual renewal packets mailed to the Rikards before the accident; because the Rikards never selected different limits despite these opportunities, the statutory default applied rather than the higher amount triggered only by a total failure to notify.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Davenport v. D.M. Rental Properties, Inc., a tenant sued his mobile home park landlord and its president for negligence after suffering severe burns when another tenant, Tony Herrin, attacked him with gasoline and a lighter following a dispute on the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that even assuming the landlords owed a duty to protect tenants from foreseeable third-party criminal acts, the plaintiff failed to show that any breach proximately caused his injuries, as Herrin’s prior non-violent conduct did not make such an extreme assault reasonably foreseeable. It further ruled that the landlords had no duty to refuse to lease to Herrin or to evict him under either common law, the parties’ rental agreement, or state statutes, which grant landlords discretion rather than impose mandatory eviction obligations.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

Marie Salomon, a certified nurse’s assistant at a nursing home, sought workers’ compensation benefits after injuring her shoulder while changing a partially paralyzed resident alone; the resident unexpectedly pushed back, causing her to exert unusual force. The Industrial Commission awarded benefits after finding a compensable injury by accident and temporary total disability, but the employer appealed, arguing that solo changes had become routine due to understaffing and that disability was not proven. The Court of Appeals affirmed compensability, holding that the resident’s sudden push introduced an unexpected interruption outside normal work conditions, but reversed and remanded the disability award because the Commission’s findings were too conclusory to support that Salomon’s job search was reasonable yet unsuccessful and did not address whether a job search would have been futile due to her circumstances.

labor & employment

In this divorce case, Anne Louise Shaner sued her husband Clifford John Shaner in North Carolina for post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and related relief after their 2007 separation, following a marriage that began in New York in 1968. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that it had personal jurisdiction over him based on his limited time in the state. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to satisfy due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. The court found that his only relevant contacts—living in Mooresville for four months in 2003–2004 and making brief visits afterward—were too few and insubstantial, more like the insufficient contacts in Shamley v. Shamley than the sustained connections upheld in Sherlock v. Sherlock, so he could not reasonably anticipate being sued in the state.

family lawprocedure

This case arose from a 2008 residential break-in in Charlotte, where defendant Kenny Bowden was charged with felonious breaking and entering, larceny after breaking and entering, and resisting a public officer. Police responded to a witness report of a man in a hoodie removing items from the victims’ home; Bowden was later seen emerging from the backyard, fled when officers arrived, and was apprehended hiding nearby, though the other man escaped. The jury convicted Bowden on all counts and he admitted habitual felon status, but the trial court granted his motion to dismiss the felony charges for insufficient evidence while upholding the resisting conviction. On the State’s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence showed only Bowden’s presence on the property and flight, without proof he acted in concert with the other man, participated in the crimes, or had any connection to the stolen items—circumstances weaker than those found insufficient in the comparable case of State v. Gaines.

criminal law