Sanford L. Steelman jr

The case involved the Surry County Department of Social Services' motion to terminate a father's parental rights to his son, J.E.M., Jr., on grounds including neglect and willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care, after the child had been adjudicated neglected and dependent and placed in DSS custody due to the father's inadequate housing, drug issues, and inability to provide care. The trial court terminated the father's rights following a hearing at which he did not contest the allegations in the motion, relying on a social worker's verification of the petition's facts plus evidence of the father's minimal engagement with his case plan. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported findings of past neglect and a probability of repetition—based on the father's failure to visit the child for five months, limited completion of parenting classes, and part-time employment—along with his total nonpayment of support, and that termination was in the child's best interest. The court rejected arguments that additional current-condition evidence was required or that the procedure was improper, noting the statutory framework for such proceedings.

family law

In Warren v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control & Public Safety, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the termination of a State Highway Patrol sergeant for unacceptable personal conduct after he drove a patrol vehicle to a party with an open bottle of vodka in the trunk and consumed alcohol beforehand, leading to his arrest. An administrative law judge found insufficient evidence for just cause to terminate but that lesser discipline was warranted; the State Personnel Commission disagreed and upheld dismissal, while the superior court reversed, concluding the conduct did not justify termination and remanding for lesser discipline. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order and remanded, holding that the superior court failed to make required findings of fact resolving conflicts—such as whether the sergeant drove with any alcohol in his system—and did not properly apply the just cause framework requiring that the specific misconduct warrant the specific sanction imposed.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. Montgomery, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after shooting and killing Charlotte-Mecklenburg police officers Jeffrey Shelton and Sean Clark during an unrelated confrontation following a domestic dispute response in 2007; he received consecutive life sentences without parole. On appeal, Montgomery challenged the trial court's rulings that he was competent to stand trial, the admission of evidence regarding the victims' good character, and the prosecutor's closing arguments about his actions and music on the night of the shootings. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the competency determination was supported by expert reports indicating the defendant's silence and non-cooperation were volitional and that he could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense if he chose; the victim character evidence did not rise to plain error; and the State's arguments drew reasonable inferences from the evidence presented and were not so grossly improper as to require the trial court to intervene.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Houseright, the defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, statutory sex offense, and statutory rape involving a child victim (B.F.), after a jury trial at which two other girls testified about similar sexual conduct by the defendant. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss one statutory sex offense count, correctly admitted evidence of the defendant’s uncharged sexual acts with another girl under Rule 404(b), and did not commit plain error by failing to exclude brief testimony about the defendant’s conduct with a third girl. The court reasoned that the victim’s testimony describing digital penetration before each incident of intercourse supplied substantial evidence for the challenged count when viewed in the light most favorable to the State; that the other acts were relevant to show plan, intent, or absence of mistake and were not offered solely to prove propensity; and that any error in admitting the brief reference to a third girl did not have a probable impact on the verdict given the substantial uncontested evidence of guilt. The court therefore found no error and upheld the convictions and sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved twelve consolidated North Carolina foreclosure actions under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16, in which borrowers (the Cornblums and Longbranch Properties) defaulted on promissory notes secured by deeds of trust and sought to compel arbitration of the foreclosures pursuant to arbitration clauses in those deeds. The superior court granted the motions to compel, the arbitrator ruled for the lenders on all claims including the statutory foreclosure requirements, and the court confirmed the award. The Court of Appeals held that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order arbitration or confirm the award in a § 45-21.16 proceeding, because foreclosure actions are special statutory proceedings that cannot be diverted to arbitration and jurisdiction cannot be created by party consent or waiver. However, the court dismissed as moot the borrowers' request to void the completed foreclosure sales, since the sales had already occurred, the parties' property rights were fixed, and no timely injunction had been obtained under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.34. The judgment confirming arbitration was reversed, but the transfers of title resulting from the sales were left undisturbed.

propertyprocedure

In Estate of Browne v. Thompson, seven Wachovia shareholders sued the company, its former directors, Wells Fargo, and auditor KPMG, alleging that the defendants concealed the risks and losses from Wachovia’s 2006 acquisition of Golden West Financial, issued false public statements about the bank’s financial health, and thereby induced the plaintiffs to retain their shares until the stock collapsed in 2008; the plaintiffs asserted direct claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the claims were barred by the rule in Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks that shareholders may not bring individual actions for injuries that diminish corporate stock value, because the plaintiffs had not alleged either a special duty owed to them personally or an injury distinct from that suffered by the corporation and other shareholders. The court further ruled that North Carolina does not recognize “holder” claims for losses from retaining stock in reliance on misrepresentations and that it was bound by Barger rather than contrary Delaware authority. The same reasoning required dismissal of the negligent-misrepresentation claim against KPMG.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a petition alleging that twelve-year-old P.K.M. broke into and vandalized a vacant building, based in part on incriminating statements he made to a school resource officer and detective. The trial court granted P.K.M.’s motion to suppress those statements under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, and the State appealed, certifying that the evidence was essential to its case. The North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the State lacked any statutory right to appeal. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2604(b)(2), the State may appeal a suppression order in a delinquency proceeding only if the order terminates the prosecution, which did not occur here because the trial court did not dismiss the petition and the record showed the State could potentially proceed with other evidence. The court further noted that the State’s reliance on the criminal appeal statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c), was misplaced because that provision does not apply to cases under the Juvenile Code.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved New Hanover County Child Support Enforcement's action, on behalf of the child's mother, to establish paternity and obtain child support from Tommy D. Greenfield for a minor born in 1996. After multiple unsuccessful service attempts over several years, process was served on the defendant in Virginia in 2005; the trial court later entered orders determining paternity and setting support amounts. When the defendant moved in 2011 to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the server's affidavit showed he met Virginia's qualifications for service (age 18 or older and not a party), satisfying North Carolina Rule 4(a) for out-of-state service, and contained competent evidence that he personally delivered the documents to the defendant. Any ambiguity in the affidavit was resolved by the trial court's presumed factual findings supporting valid service.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Friend, the defendant was charged with driving while impaired in 2006; after multiple continuances and the denial of one more due to a missing witness, the State dismissed the charge and refiled it a week later, leading to the defendant's eventual conviction after further procedural challenges. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the dismissal and refiling did not violate separation of powers, due process, or speedy trial rights, and that the criminal summons was not fatally defective. The court reasoned that district attorneys function as judicial or quasi-judicial officers rather than purely executive ones, that the trial court retained control over its calendar, and that the two-year delay did not trigger full speedy-trial analysis given the misdemeanor nature of the charge and lack of prejudice. It further concluded that the summons adequately alleged the date and place of the offense in the statutory short form, without need for the precise hour or minute. The court therefore found no error in the conviction and sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In this summary ejectment case, Durham Hosiery Mill Limited Partnership sued tenant Inez Morris to terminate her lease and remove her from a Section 8 apartment, alleging she had allowed her daughter and grandson to reside there without permission in violation of the lease terms. The trial court dismissed the action after concluding that the landlord had not proven the unauthorized residents were “residing” in the unit, explicitly stating that the evidence did not meet a “clear and convincing” standard. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court applied the wrong burden of persuasion. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-30, a plaintiff in a summary ejectment proceeding must prove its case only by a preponderance of the evidence, and no prior case law had raised that standard. The matter was remanded for a new determination under the correct burden, with the trial court also directed to address the tenant’s waiver defense under the proper allocation of proof.

propertyprocedure

In Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Freeman, the plaintiff sought court confirmation of a 2008 National Arbitration Forum award of $2,386.35 against defendant Richard Freeman for unpaid credit card debt, based on the binding arbitration clause in the cardholder agreement. Freeman answered by challenging the award’s validity due to NAF’s alleged undisclosed conflicts and filed state-law class-action counterclaims on behalf of similarly situated North Carolina residents. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order confirming the award and dismissing the counterclaims, reasoning that Freeman had not contested the arbitration agreement’s existence before the hearing or moved to vacate within the three-month period required by 9 U.S.C. § 12, and that his counterclaims fell outside the narrow statutory grounds for relief under FAA §§ 10 and 11.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this North Carolina juvenile case, the Buncombe County Department of Social Services filed petitions alleging that four children were neglected, but the children were already living safely with maternal aunts and custody remained with their mother, who later executed a power of attorney for the relatives to handle medical and educational needs. The trial court adjudicated the children neglected by consent, denied the guardian ad litem's request to transfer custody to the relatives or DSS, and instead approved the continued kinship placement while leaving legal and physical custody with the mother. On appeal, the guardian ad litem argued that this arrangement violated the Juvenile Code's dispositional options under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903, citing In re H.S.F. as prohibiting placement with relatives without transferring custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion because the statute expressly permits custody with a parent, the mother had never lost custody and herself arranged the placement, and the disposition was distinguishable from In re H.S.F. as it created no inconsistency between custody and physical placement.

family law

The case involved a funding dispute between Thomas Jefferson Classical Academy, a charter school, and the Rutherford County Board of Education over the amount the board owed the charter school under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-238.29H(b) for fiscal years 2006–2010. The statute requires local school units to transfer to charter schools a per-pupil share of their “local current expense appropriation.” The court held that restricted funds placed in the local current expense fund must be included in that calculation, that a budget amendment adopted more than five months after the 2008–09 fiscal year ended and after the funds were spent had no legal effect, and that a 2009–10 budget amendment transferring restricted funds to separate accounts was valid. The decision rested on the plain language of the statute and prior precedent holding that restricted monies left in the local current expense fund count toward the per-pupil amount owed, while local units may move such funds to separate accounts only during the current fiscal year.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Sartori v. North Carolina Department of Correction, inmate Robert Allen Sartori sued the Department of Correction and its officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that fees charged to inmates for disciplinary infractions and medical co-payments were invalid because the agency had not complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 12-3.1. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the plaintiff’s arguments regarding both types of fees had already been rejected in two prior decisions involving the same issues, Griffith v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., and adopted the reasoning of those cases without further elaboration.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved David Robinson, a disabled Medicaid recipient under North Carolina’s CAP-MR/DD waiver program, whose requested level of home and community-based services was reduced by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) after an initial review by its contractor found insufficient proof of medical necessity. An administrative law judge (ALJ) later vacated the reduction after hearing testimony from Robinson’s physician and an evaluating psychologist that was not presented to the agency beforehand, but the agency and superior court reversed, holding that precedent barred the ALJ from considering evidence unavailable at the time of the initial decision. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that neither the Britthaven precedent nor any statute then in effect precluded the ALJ from admitting and relying on such additional expert testimony regarding Robinson’s medical needs. The court reasoned that no legal authority supported limiting the ALJ’s review in this manner and that doing so would prevent recipients from correcting deficiencies in their case presentation. The matter was remanded to DHHS for proper application of the law.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved Deante Octario Howard’s conviction for robbing Sandra Pennington at gunpoint at an Archdale hotel, during which he took her laptop, camcorder, wallet, and credit cards; hours later, police linked him to a break-in at Daddy Rabbit’s gun store in Lexington and recovered Pennington’s items, store property, and Wal-Mart purchases made with her stolen card. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that evidence of the gun-store break-in was properly admitted under the course-of-conduct exception to show the full context of events, that Detective Shuler’s lay-opinion identifications and observations were admissible, and that authentication and best-evidence issues did not constitute plain error. The court further ruled that the trial judge correctly denied the motion to dismiss because the State presented overwhelming evidence of each element of robbery with a dangerous weapon and of Howard’s identity as the perpetrator, including the victim’s in-court identification, recovered property, matching clothing and receipts, and the tight timeline and geography of the crimes. Because no individual evidentiary or instructional error rose to plain error and the proof of guilt was strong, the court also rejected any claim of cumulative error.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In Bumpers v. Community Bank, two borrowers sued Community Bank of Northern Virginia and Title America over fees charged on second-mortgage loans obtained in 1999, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. The claims centered on a “loan discount” fee imposed despite the loans carrying undiscounted interest rates, plus allegedly excessive closing and title fees from Title America. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the discount-fee claim, holding that undisputed evidence showed the fee was charged without any corresponding rate reduction. It reversed summary judgment on the Title America fees, finding genuine issues of material fact about whether those charges were excessive based on conflicting testimony regarding reasonable costs, and it vacated the related damages award while remanding the case for further proceedings that may include class certification.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a challenge by competing adult care home operators to a 2007 settlement agreement between the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Carillon Assisted Living, under which Carillon received contractual rights to develop thousands of adult care home beds without certificates of need (CON). The dispute arose after earlier litigation and a 2000 settlement resolved challenges to a moratorium on new facilities and the subsequent application of the CON Law, with this Court previously holding that the CON requirements did not apply to Carillon's projects. The court affirmed summary judgment for DHHS and Carillon, holding that prior precedent established DHHS's authority to enter the agreement, that the settlements fell outside the CON Law so constitutional claims failed, and that petitioners had not shown substantial prejudice from the agency's actions. The Attorney General was not required to sign the agreement.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case arose after a patient suffered severe burns during surgery at Franklin Regional Medical Center due to an oxygen fire ignited by an electrosurgical unit; the patient sued HMA, Louisburg HMA, Dr. Yerby, his surgical practice, and an anesthesiologist. HMA and Louisburg HMA settled the suit and then sued Dr. Yerby and Triangle Surgical Associates for contribution, indemnity, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that HMA was judicially estopped from piercing the corporate veil, was not a licensed insurer, and had no standing for contribution; that the defendants were independent contractors rather than employees, defeating indemnity; and that the defendants had not consciously accepted any benefit from the unsolicited settlement, defeating unjust enrichment. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' post-judgment motions based on purported newly discovered evidence.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved a dispute over coverage under a commercial liability insurance policy issued to a welding contractor after his repair work on a grain elevator caused an explosion and resulting property damage and business losses. The insurer sought a declaratory judgment that the policy's "your work" exclusion barred all coverage for the underlying negligence claims. The court held that the exclusion must be narrowly construed to apply only to the specific faulty part of the property that had to be restored or repaired, and therefore did not eliminate coverage for damage to other components or for consequential losses such as trucking costs and business interruption. It affirmed the trial court's partial summary judgment granting coverage for those other items.

business & regulatorytorts & liability