Naomi E. Morris

The case involved New Hanover County's efforts to enforce its zoning ordinance against defendants who were found by the zoning board of adjustment to be in violation. The court addressed whether the county could seek injunctive relief and an order of abatement under state statutes, and whether defendants could raise defenses like estoppel or challenge the violation finding in superior court. The court held that G.S. 153A-324 and G.S. 153A-123 authorize equitable remedies for zoning enforcement without needing specific ordinance provisions, and that defendants' failure to appeal the board's decision within 30 days made it final and immune from collateral attack. Summary judgment for the county was affirmed because the unappealed board ruling established the violation and precluded further challenges.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the defendant's convictions for two counts of armed robbery arising from an incident in which two men robbed a husband and wife at their home of guns, money, and jewelry belonging to each spouse separately, with the defendant allegedly aiding and abetting by hiring the perpetrators. On appeal, the defendant challenged the denial of her motion to suppress evidence from a search warrant, the admission of certain statements made during the robbery, the sufficiency of the evidence, the charging of two separate robbery offenses, and the consecutive sentences imposed. The court affirmed, holding that the search warrant application established probable cause through detailed information from the named victims and corroboration by other law enforcement officers, that the statements were admissible as made in the defendant's presence, that the evidence supported aiding-and-abetting liability, that property taken from two victims constituted distinct offenses, and that the presumptive sentences required no findings on mitigating factors.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs challenging a final tax decision issued by the North Carolina Department of Revenue, alleging that it was invalid because it was not signed by Howard Coble while he served as Secretary. Defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by a verified answer and Coble's affidavit confirming that he executed the decision on January 7, 1977, before resigning. Plaintiffs offered no evidence to contradict this and instead focused on irrelevant matters like property valuation, which was not raised in their complaint. The court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the sole ground alleged in the pleadings, and the appeals court affirmed.

taxesprocedure

This case involved challenges by intervenors including the North Carolina Textile Manufacturers Association to the North Carolina Utilities Commission's order in a general rate case for Carolina Power and Light Company. The appellants argued that the Commission erred by allowing a fuel cost increase via a separate expedited proceeding under G.S. 62-134(e) and then incorporating it into the general rate case without full inquiry into the reasonableness of those costs or management practices. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's order, holding that the statute expressly authorizes the separate fuel adjustment mechanism with opportunities for intervention and hearing, that the Commission was bound to recognize the utility's statutory right to use it, and that the resulting rates were supported by the record and presumed just and reasonable. The court found no error in declining to revisit the same fuel costs in the general rate case while noting that efficiency issues could be addressed there.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether a prior right-of-way agreement reserved direct access for property owners to highway ramps or only indirect access via service roads, and whether the owners were entitled to compensation after highway construction created a cul-de-sac and temporarily altered traffic patterns near their motel property. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings, holding that the agreement provided only indirect access to the ramps (treated as part of the main highway) and that reasonable alternative access via new connecting roads satisfied the agreement, so no compensation was due for circuity of travel or construction-related interference. The decision relied on similar precedent interpreting comparable language, the principle that mere inconvenience from changed access is not compensable when reasonable access remains, and the exclusion of expert testimony on contract interpretation as a legal question for the court. Evidence of temporary access issues was deemed irrelevant because total cutoff of access was not shown.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over ownership of the proceeds from a money market savings certificate issued after the death of Ranee K. Threatte. Plaintiff, the decedent's father, sought a declaratory judgment that a joint signature card created a right of survivorship in his favor, while defendant challenged the entry of summary judgment on that basis. The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the signature card signed by both parties expressly established a joint account with right of survivorship under G.S. 41-2.1 and controlled disposition of the certificate, even after its renewal in the decedent's name alone. The reasoning relied on the card's language matching the statutory form, its placement with the original and renewal certificates, and supporting affidavits showing the decedent's intent, with no genuine factual disputes requiring trial.

propertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Ralph Camp, who was charged under G.S. 14-196(a)(3) with repeatedly telephoning the Polk County Sheriff's Department and jail more than 500 times over two months to abuse, annoy, threaten, or harass employees. The court upheld the conviction and the revocation of a prior suspended sentence, finding that the warrant sufficiently alleged the statutory elements, that the evidence supported the jury's determination of intent, and that the statute is constitutional. The court reasoned that the law targets conduct rather than protected speech, as confirmed by precedents distinguishing repeated harassing calls from the communication of ideas, and that the defendant's actions fell squarely within the prohibited conduct. It further held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that the probation violation independently justified the sentence revocation.

criminal lawfree speech

This case concerned a materials supplier's claim against a subcontractor and the surety on a payment bond required for a public construction project under North Carolina statutes governing such bonds. The trial court had held the surety liable for the full amount awarded against the subcontractor without submitting the surety's liability to the jury, but the appellate court found this was error because evidence suggested some materials may not have been furnished in good faith for the specific project. The court therefore ordered a new trial on the surety's liability under the bond. It also held that prejudgment interest was recoverable on the contract claim against the subcontractor from a reasonable time after the account was stated, and potentially against the surety from the date of demand, reversing and remanding on that issue while affirming the judgment against the subcontractor.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Fox, the defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a police officer stopped his vehicle without a warrant. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the stop was a valid investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that the officer observed specific facts, including the defendant driving slowly in a dead-end street of businesses with recent crime at a late hour, combined with the defendant's shabby appearance despite driving a new car and avoiding eye contact, which created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop. A dissent argued that these facts did not meet the articulable suspicion standard from Terry v. Ohio and Delaware v. Prouse.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether newly annexed residents of the City of Washington could vote in an August 11, 1981 sewer bond referendum after annexation but before the 60-day federal preclearance period under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had expired. Plaintiffs argued that state law and state and federal constitutional provisions entitled them to vote immediately upon annexation and that their exclusion violated fundamental rights. The court held that the plaintiffs were properly excluded from the election because the federal Voting Rights Act preempted conflicting state provisions and required that voting changes from the annexation receive Attorney General approval first. It reasoned that precedents such as Dotson v. City of Indianola established that annexed residents may not participate in municipal elections until preclearance occurs, and that any temporary exclusion did not abridge a fundamental right given the compelling interest in enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.

electionscivil rightsfederal power

The case involved a dispute over a note and deed of trust signed by a 70-year-old widow to secure her son's debt to Barrett after Barrett had warrants issued against the son for issuing bad checks. The trial court found that the documents were executed under duress and based on an implied agreement to suppress criminal prosecution, rendering them void. On appeal, the court upheld these findings, noting that the evidence supported conclusions of coercion through repeated threats and harassment that deprived the signer of free will, and that agreements to prevent criminal prosecution are contrary to public policy. The foreclosure proceeding was therefore dismissed, and the deed of trust was cancelled.

criminal lawpropertyfamily lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with trafficking in cocaine under G.S. 90-95(h)(3), who moved to dismiss after the State’s bill of particulars identified the substance as “cocaine which is a derivative of coca leaves,” arguing that this was not covered by the statute’s language or that the statute was unconstitutionally vague due to differences from the Schedule II definition in G.S. 90-90(a)4. The trial court denied the motions, and the defendant was convicted. The appellate court held that the statutory omission of certain definitional language was not deliberate and interpreted G.S. 90-95(h)(3) to include derivatives of coca leaves in order to effectuate the legislature’s intent to deter large-scale drug trafficking, while also rejecting challenges to the admission of evidence and a cross-examination question. The court found no error and affirmed the conviction.

criminal law

In Stickel v. Stickel, the defendant husband appealed from a trial court judgment awarding the plaintiff wife permanent alimony, a $30,000 lump-sum payment for arrearages during an 18-month separation, payment of real estate taxes and insurance on the marital home, medical insurance, and attorney's fees. The court addressed challenges to the admission of expense summaries under the best evidence rule, the sufficiency of findings supporting the alimony award and the defendant's ability to pay, the lack of a jury trial on dependency and alimony amounts, and related issues. The North Carolina Court of Appeals overruled all assignments of error, holding that the summaries illustrated the wife's independent knowledge of expenses rather than proving document contents, that the record contained ample evidence of needs and ability to pay supporting the award, and that dependency is a matter for the judge rather than a jury. The judgment was affirmed.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over a $10,000 deposit held by defendant J. Iverson Riddle as purported trustee for plaintiff Caroline H. Riddle at a savings and loan association. Plaintiff alleged the arrangement was a passive, inactive trust with no fiduciary duties, causing legal and equitable title to merge and entitling her to possession of the funds; defendant countered that the trust was active and being administered to support the couple's three children. The trial court ruled for plaintiff, concluding the donor intended a gift to her and that defendant had no duties beyond accounting for the funds, and the appellate court affirmed. The core reasoning was that defendant bore the burden to prove active trustee duties given his knowledge of the trust's creation but failed to do so, with evidence instead showing the settlor intended the money solely for plaintiff's use and benefit, rendering the trust passive under established principles.

family lawproperty

The case involved defendants convicted in North Carolina state court of conspiracy and trafficking in more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana, with sentences including a 16-year minimum prison term and a $200,000 fine. On appeal, the defendants raised multiple assignments of error concerning the trial judge's statements to prospective jurors, conflicting pretrial instructions, admission of evidence about their flight from arrest, exclusion of certain cross-examination testimony, and the constitutionality of the mandatory sentences under G.S. 90-95(h). The court held there was no error, finding that the judge's orientation of the jury was sufficient, any instructional conflicts were cured, evidentiary objections were waived or the evidence was properly admitted as relevant to guilt, and the sentences fell within statutory limits without violating the Eighth Amendment or state constitution. The court also noted that detailed explanations of charges occur after evidence presentation and that legislative determinations control the length of felony sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Lewis, the defendant was charged with being an accessory before and after the fact to disturbing graves. The trial court admitted a news film and two skulls into evidence to illustrate testimony, denied acquittal motions after finding sufficient evidence of the defendant's encouragement, assistance, and concealment, and instructed the jury on the elements of accessory after the fact. On appeal, the court held the film and skulls were properly authenticated under applicable evidentiary rules and remained admissible despite a stipulation to the underlying acts, that the evidence supported submitting the charges to the jury, that any jury instruction errors or omissions were nonprejudicial, and that the sentence was within the trial court's discretion without abuse. The appellate court concluded there was no error and upheld the judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves plaintiffs who obtained default judgments against Glenn for injuries from a car accident but could not collect because defendants, insurance agents, failed to procure the liability coverage they had contracted with Glenn to obtain. Plaintiffs sued the agents directly for breach of that contract. The trial court dismissed the action, reasoning that the lack of formal notice to any insurer violated due process and that a state statute governing notice for assigned-risk policies barred using the default judgments. The appellate court reversed, holding that the default judgments serve as evidence of the plaintiffs' loss caused by the agents' breach, that the notice statute applies only to insurers and not to breaching agents, and that the agents were not denied due process because the judgments establish only prima facie liability that they may challenge or defend against independently.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death claim brought by the plaintiff against the estate of Robert Wilson following a fatal automobile accident on April 16, 1976. The defendant contended that the claim was barred by the six-month limitation period under G.S. 28A-19-3(b)(2) as it existed at the time, which required claims arising after death to be presented to the personal representative within six months. The court held that the claim was not barred to the extent it sought recovery from the decedent's automobile liability insurance policy, which constituted an undistributed asset of the estate. This ruling followed precedent from Force v. Sanderson and In re Miles, which established that the time bar applies only to distributed assets and does not prevent actions against undistributed insurance coverage. The opinion also addressed evidentiary issues and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-appeal on punitive damages.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over modifying child support payments under a separation agreement between divorcing parents. The trial court reduced the father's monthly support obligation from $700 to $525 after finding that the oldest child had turned 18, but the appeals court reversed that reduction. The court reasoned that the separation agreement explicitly required payments of $700 per month until the youngest child reached 18 without any allocation per child, and the father's agreement to this amount contemplated the older children reaching majority. There was no evidence of changed financial circumstances for the parents, and courts cannot modify such agreements absent consent or changed conditions affecting the children's welfare. The order was modified to enforce the original support amount.

family law

In Shepherd v. Shepherd, the plaintiff sued the defendant in tort for fraudulently inducing her into a marriage ceremony while he was still lawfully married to another woman, seeking damages for loss of companionship and affection. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under G.S. 1-52(9) for fraud claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice as early as 1971 of the defendant's prior marriage through visits, lawsuits, and family discussions, triggering a duty to investigate with due diligence, which she failed to do despite the existence of a confidential relationship. Although the complaint was framed in tort rather than contract, both avenues would be subject to the same three-year limit, and the claim was untimely when filed in 1980.

family lawtorts & liabilityprocedure