Linda M. McGee

In State v. Flood, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and felon-in-possession of a firearm after a jury found he killed Jerrod Watlington during a 2007 drug-related shooting at his apartment, relying on the theory of premeditation and deliberation as well as felony murder. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court erred by admitting detailed facts of the defendant's 1994 New Jersey homicide under Evidence Rule 404(b). The court reasoned that the prior shooting was not sufficiently similar to the charged offenses to prove identity, intent, or plan, and its admission was prejudicial because the remaining evidence—primarily conflicting eyewitness accounts from Rasheem Currie and Paul Lloyd, plus minimal forensic links—was not overwhelming, creating a reasonable possibility of a different verdict without the 1994 evidence.

criminal lawprocedureguns

The case arose after a fire destroyed a building owned by Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., and insured by North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company. The insurer denied the claim, suspecting arson and financial motive by the Volpes, then provided information to police that led to Ms. Volpe’s arrest for obtaining property by false pretenses; the criminal charge was later dismissed. Ms. Volpe and Cully’s counterclaimed for breach of the insurance contract, malicious prosecution, and unfair or deceptive acts under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Ms. Volpe damages for malicious prosecution and treble damages plus attorney’s fees on the § 75-1.1 claim tied to the prosecution, while denying recovery on the underlying insurance claim. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the insurer initiated the prosecution without probable cause and for the improper purpose of gaining leverage in the civil suit, that this conduct supported separate liability under § 75-1.1, and that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine did not apply.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Mynhardt v. Elon University, a twenty-one-year-old Elon student sued the university and Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity after he was paralyzed during a physical altercation while attending an uninvited, off-campus party at a house rented by fraternity members. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the negligence claims. The court held that no special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care, as the incident occurred at a private off-campus event unknown to the defendants and unrelated to any school-sponsored activity, and the general student-university relationship does not make institutions insurers of student safety. The court further rejected agency and joint venture theories, finding no legal basis to impose liability on the defendants for the actions of the individuals involved.

torts & liability

Antonio Dshawn Stowes was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a firearm by a felon, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and carrying a concealed weapon, based in part on a store manager’s identification of him from a pretrial photo lineup and an in-court identification. On appeal, Stowes argued that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, that police violated the Eyewitness Identification Reform Act by having the investigating officer present, and that the in-court identification should have been excluded as tainted. The Court of Appeals held that Stowes’s motion to suppress the lineup evidence was untimely, that the lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive because the filler photos were similar and the administrator did not know the suspect’s identity, and that the trial court had already provided all statutory remedies for the EIRA violation short of exclusion. The court therefore found no error in admitting the identifications or in the resulting convictions.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In State v. Lindsey, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the convictions of Jerry Lamont Lindsey for felonious eluding arrest and possession of cocaine and marijuana. The charges stemmed from a 2009 police pursuit of a van that fled at high speed after an officer attempted a traffic stop; the driver escaped on foot after crashing in a Wendy's parking lot, where officers later found the drugs near trash receptacles in an area open to the public. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. It held that the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of eluding or his constructive possession of the drugs, as the facts showed only suspicion rather than substantial proof linking him to the contraband found in a public space with no direct evidence of his control or connection to it.

criminal lawprocedure

In Muteff v. Invacare Corp., the executor of Virginia Miller sued wheelchair manufacturer Invacare and seller American Mobility after Miller died from burns sustained when her house caught fire in 2006. Miller, who had multiple sclerosis and used the wheelchair, had called 911 reporting the chair was on fire; the plaintiff alleged product liability claims for negligence and breach of implied warranty based on a purported wiring defect and flammable materials, plus an unfair trade practices claim, while the defendants contended that Miller’s own actions—using a metal necklace to secure the charger cord—caused a short circuit and that any defect was not a proximate cause. A jury found for the defendants after the trial court instructed on insulating negligence and took judicial notice of a Texas Supreme Court opinion involving one of the plaintiff’s experts. The Court of Appeals held that the insulating negligence instruction was erroneous because it improperly allowed the plaintiff’s own conduct to insulate the defendants, but the error was not prejudicial; it also found no abuse of discretion in the judicial notice ruling because the instruction addressed only the opinion’s existence and left credibility determinations to the jury. The court therefore affirmed the judgment for the defendants.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Reynolds, the defendant entered a guilty plea to felony breaking and entering, felony larceny, and habitual felon status under a plea agreement specifying a 135-month sentence, in exchange for dismissal of other charges; the trial court accepted the plea after stating the maximum possible sentence was 168 months, though the correct maximum was 171 months under the sentencing grid. The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The court held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a)(6) requires the trial judge to personally inform a defendant of the correct maximum sentence before accepting a guilty plea, and the three-month discrepancy here was not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it called into question whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and understanding. The error affected all counts in the consolidated plea arrangement.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose after plaintiff William Carden was injured in a crosswalk near a tribal casino construction site and sued Harrah’s and Owle Construction in Durham County Superior Court for negligence. The superior court issued a consent order adding the Tribal Casino Gaming Enterprise as a defendant and “removing” the action to the Cherokee Tribal Court as a matter of comity while staying the state proceedings, after which the tribal court proceedings ended in a mistrial, settlement with some parties, and voluntary dismissals. Plaintiff later moved in superior court to lift the stay, arguing no mechanism existed to transfer a North Carolina case to tribal court and that nothing remained pending. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of that motion, holding that the parties were bound by the consent order’s language and effect, which transferred the single action and file to tribal court, leaving no case open in Durham County; any tribal-court jurisdictional questions were for the tribal courts to resolve.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved John Donald Matthews's appeal from his convictions for breaking or entering and larceny after breaking or entering a Charlotte gas station and convenience store, along with his habitual felon status; the State relied on DNA analysis of blood samples recovered from the scene that matched Matthews, plus evidence of his involvement in a similar prior break-in. The North Carolina Court of Appeals granted a new trial. It held that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel the right to make the final closing argument to the jury under Rule 10 of the General Rules of Practice. Because Matthews introduced no evidence at trial, the cross-examination of a responding officer about a report identifying another possible suspect did not constitute the introduction of new, irrelevant matter that would forfeit that right. The court rejected Matthews's other challenges to the admission of 404(b) evidence and the denial of his motion to dismiss.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute between Cambridge Southport, LLC and the Southeast Brunswick Sanitary District over whether a wastewater service allocation for an 88-unit subdivision, originally obtained by Town and Country Developers in 2006 after payment of $264,000 in impact fees, remained valid after the subdivision was foreclosed and sold to the plaintiff in 2009. The District argued that the allocation had expired under its three-year terms and that the plaintiff must reapply and pay new, higher fees of $648,000. The plaintiff contended that 2009 N.C. Session Law ch. 406 (the Permit Extension Act), enacted to address the economic crisis affecting real estate development, tolled the expiration date. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, ruling that the Act applied to the allocation as a qualifying government approval, that its expiration was therefore tolled, and that the plaintiff had standing to enforce the original terms because no material facts were disputed and only a question of law remained.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In State v. Cortez, sureties posted three appearance bonds totaling $600,000 for defendant Elder Cortez in 2008. After Cortez failed to appear in February 2009, the bonds were ordered forfeited; the clerk later set aside the forfeitures, the Board of Education appealed that ruling, and while the appeal remained pending the clerk and trial court issued and upheld a second forfeiture order based on Cortez’s November 2009 nonappearance using the same bonds. The Court of Appeals vacated the second forfeiture, holding that the Board’s November 2009 notice of appeal perfected under N.C.G.S. § 1-294 and divested the trial court and clerk of jurisdiction over any further action concerning those bonds. The court reasoned that the pending appeal kept the original forfeiture issues under appellate review, so additional proceedings risked imposing double liability exceeding the bonds’ face value and producing conflicting judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Heien, the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police on Interstate 77, pled guilty to drug trafficking charges after officers found cocaine during a consent search but reserved the right to challenge the stop. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding the stop valid based on an officer's observation of a non-functioning brake light. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because North Carolina law (N.C.G.S. § 20-129(g)) requires only one functioning brake light, making the officer's belief that the malfunction violated traffic laws objectively unreasonable and providing no reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the suppression motion and vacated the judgment.

criminal lawcivil rights

In State v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple drug offenses, including selling and delivering a schedule III controlled substance and trafficking in opium by transporting, selling, and delivering more than 28 grams of an opium derivative, following a police sting operation in which an informant purchased pills from the defendant in a parking lot while wearing a hidden camera. The trial court imposed consecutive prison sentences totaling 450 to 558 months and fines of $1 million. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in its handling of evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to failures to object to certain testimony and the manner in which a video recording was presented to the jury. The Court of Appeals held that there was no error, concluding that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice because the video evidence and testimony from multiple officers independently supported the guilty verdicts regardless of the challenged aspects of the trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a traffic stop initiated after an anonymous 911 report of erratic driving, during which officers observed a vehicle commit a wide turn and noted the driver was not wearing a seatbelt; the stop led to the discovery of drug paraphernalia and charges for possession. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, submitting an affidavit stating he had been wearing a seatbelt, and the trial court granted the motion after concluding there was insufficient probable cause for the stop. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, determining that the trial court had applied the incorrect legal standard because investigatory traffic stops require only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, and that the evidence must be reevaluated under the proper totality-of-the-circumstances test.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a 2003 title insurance policy issued by Chicago Title to BB&T covering a deed of trust on North Carolina real property. BB&T discovered an undisclosed prior lien (the Centura deed of trust) but delayed notifying Chicago Title until 2006-2007; Chicago Title denied the resulting claim, citing the policy's prompt-notice requirement and arguing prejudice from the delay. BB&T sued for breach of contract and negligence, and Chicago Title counterclaimed for reformation or a declaration of no covered loss. The trial court ruled for BB&T, finding Chicago Title suffered no prejudice because it still had time before the expiration of statutes of limitations and repose to pursue claims against the closing attorneys for negligent failure to disclose the lien. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the policy's notice provision did not bar coverage.

propertyprocedure

The case involved property owners challenging the City of Kinston's 2009 annexation ordinance covering 501.45 acres, including the Galaxy Mobile Home Park, under North Carolina statutes governing municipal annexations. Petitioners argued that the Annexation Report failed to adequately plan for street maintenance services and that the boundary lines did not comply with statutory requirements to follow recorded property lines and streets. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the report satisfied the service extension requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-47, as no public streets in the area would become city-maintained and existing DOT services would continue unchanged. However, it reversed on the boundary issue, holding that lines drawn parallel to Silverdale Road rather than on recorded property lines or streets violated the substantial compliance standard of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-48(e), and remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

The case arose after an underage woman, served alcohol at the High Tide Lounge, drove intoxicated and died in a single-car crash along with her two passengers, one of whom was the father of the minor plaintiff. Acting as guardian ad litem, the plaintiff sued the bar's owner under North Carolina's Dram Shop Act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-120 et seq.) for loss of support, and the bar filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from the driver's estate under the Act's joint-and-several-liability provision. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Dram Shop Act creates a cause of action solely against the permittee that sold or furnished alcohol and does not itself impose liability on the driver; therefore the statutory contribution provision could not apply where no independent theory of liability against the driver had been pleaded.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved former spouses disputing the validity and enforcement of a consent order entered during their divorce proceedings that divided the marital residence, personal property, debts including a home equity line and mortgage, and related obligations. Plaintiff sought to set aside the consent order and amended version under Rule 60, while Defendant sought enforcement; the trial court upheld the original consent order as reflecting the parties' intentions but voided the amendment, later ordering specific performance and interest payments. The appellate court affirmed the validity of the consent order based on the parties' stipulations and agreements, found supporting evidence for the findings of fact, but vacated the specific performance ruling for lack of subject matter jurisdiction while upholding other determinations by agreement of the parties.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority suing Robert Talford for $14,419.57 in unpaid medical bills following a three-day hospital stay, asserting claims for implied contract and quantum meruit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of damages, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the reasonableness of the charges because a bill alone is insufficient evidence and the defendant had contested the amount.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved Wayne Street Mobile Home Park, LLC suing North Brunswick Sanitary District over late payment fees charged on water bills, alleging that the defendant was a public utility subject to regulation by the North Carolina Utilities Commission under which fees could not exceed one percent of the balance. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and awarded attorneys' fees to the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sanitary districts are not public utilities regulated by the Commission based on statutory definitions and prior precedent, and thus no justiciable issue was presented.

business & regulatoryprocedure