Martha A. Geer

In State v. Davis, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual offense with a child and two counts of indecent liberties with a child based on allegations that he sexually assaulted his young son on two occasions. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and granted a new trial. The court held that the trial judge improperly admitted, under Evidence Rule 404(b), the defendant's handwritten composition-book entries describing forcible anal sex with an adult woman, and also erred by permitting the State to cross-examine the defendant about the results of a psychological evaluation—never introduced into evidence—that labeled him a “psychopathic deviant.” These errors were deemed prejudicial because the defendant had presented evidence of possible coaching by the child's mother and alternative explanations for the DNA found on the child's underwear, creating a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict absent the improper evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Shareef, defendant Abdullah El-Amin Shareef was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, and related assault and larceny charges after stealing a city van and later a pickup truck on April 14, 2004, and repeatedly striking five individuals with the vehicles while also stabbing one victim. On appeal, Shareef argued that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the specific-intent offenses because evidence of his mental illness established diminished capacity. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the State introduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that Shareef acted with the specific intent to kill. The court further concluded that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain lay-witness testimony about the defendant’s later mental-health history under Evidence Rules 401 and 403, and that any error would not have affected the outcome given the other evidence presented.

criminal lawprocedure

In In re T.W., a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent after admitting to indecent liberties between minors and being found responsible for three counts each of second-degree sexual offense and crimes against nature involving other minors with whom he attended school and karate class. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the second-degree sexual offense adjudications, holding that the trial court should have granted the juvenile's motion to dismiss those counts for insufficient evidence. The court reasoned that the State proved neither actual force nor constructive force, as the encounters involved no explicit threats and the relationships among the similarly aged minors—who shared some cognitive difficulties and a leader-follower dynamic—did not qualify for the constructive-force doctrine previously applied only to parent-child or equivalent authority relationships. The court affirmed the indecent-liberties admission and crimes-against-nature findings and remanded for a new dispositional order.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Tyson, the defendant was charged with robbery with a dangerous weapon; after his first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury, he requested a transcript of the prior proceedings before the retrial to assist with cross-examining the state's witnesses, but the trial court denied the request and he was convicted. The Court of Appeals held that the denial violated the defendant's equal protection rights and ordered a new trial. Under precedents such as Britt v. North Carolina and State v. Rankin, an indigent defendant is entitled to a transcript when it is necessary for an effective defense unless substantially equivalent alternatives are available. The trial court's oral findings were insufficient because they characterized the asserted need as mere speculation without case-specific reasons why no transcript was required and vaguely referenced unspecified "measures" or "means" to protect rights without establishing any adequate substitute. This failure to apply the required two-part test entitled the defendant to a new trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved defendant Demario Rollins's appeal of his second-degree murder conviction after he caused a fatal car crash while fleeing police following a shoplifting incident. Rollins, who had no driver's license, took over driving during a police stop, led officers on a high-speed chase exceeding posted limits, drove on the wrong side of the road and through fields, and ultimately collided head-on with the victim's car at over 65 mph, killing her. On appeal, he primarily argued that the State presented insufficient evidence of malice to support the second-degree murder charge. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was materially indistinguishable from that found sufficient in prior cases such as State v. Mack and State v. Lloyd, so the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. The court also rejected a challenge to the jury instructions on verdict unanimity, finding they were not coercive when read as a whole.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Waste Industries USA and Black Bear Disposal, who sought to develop a municipal solid waste landfill in Camden County, North Carolina, after obtaining a local franchise agreement in 2002. Following a state moratorium on new landfills and the enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-295.6, which imposed size and location restrictions, plaintiffs sued the State and intervenors, claiming the statute violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state waste, along with related state-law claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the law did not facially discriminate and that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence of discriminatory legislative purpose or effect. The court reasoned that the General Assembly’s stated goals—protecting public health, the environment, and financial security—were legitimate, plaintiffs’ evidence of hidden intent was sparse and unpersuasive, and any incidental burdens on interstate commerce did not outweigh the law’s benefits. The remaining claims were likewise rejected for lack of supporting evidence.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

In this case, parents petitioned a superior court for judicial review of a local school board’s decision assigning their child to an alternative learning center, alleging among other grounds that the board’s procedures violated the child’s federal due process rights. After prevailing on the due process claim in an earlier appeal, the parents moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; the trial court awarded $50,000. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the matter was an administrative appeal brought under state statutes (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-45(c)) rather than an action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore § 1988 provided no authority for a fee award; it remanded for consideration of fees and costs under applicable state law.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

The Pattersons sued the City of Gastonia after it demolished their mobile homes under the city's Minimum Housing Code (adopted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-443), alleging violations of due process under the North Carolina Constitution and an inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted the city's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Pattersons' direct constitutional claim was barred because they had adequate alternative remedies, including a statutory right to appeal any order to a housing appeals board within 10 days and to petition superior court for injunctive relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-446(f) and the city's code. It further concluded that the city's authorized entry and actions under the housing code did not constitute a taking of property, as required for inverse condemnation.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

In Praver v. Raus, Ms. Praver sued to enforce a 2004 separation agreement requiring Mr. Raus to pay alimony, child support, orthodontic expenses, and maintain life insurance after he fell behind by over $130,000; Mr. Raus raised defenses including duress, unconscionability, and inability to perform. The trial court found that Mr. Raus had breached the agreement, possessed the ability to pay, and was not under duress, then ordered specific performance of both arrearages and ongoing monthly payments plus attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the duress and unconscionability claims and the order for future payments, holding that no finding on inadequate legal remedies was required for prospective obligations under controlling precedent, but reversed and remanded for the trial court to make findings on whether Ms. Praver had an adequate remedy at law for the arrearages before ordering specific performance of those amounts. It also reversed the attorney-fee award for additional findings on allowability and reasonableness.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Oakes, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and attaining habitual felon status after evidence showed he stabbed a neighbor during a dispute over a coat sale, causing injuries requiring over a week of hospitalization. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error by admitting testimony about his prior incarceration and associations with people involved in drugs. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that any error in admitting the challenged evidence did not amount to plain error because the State presented ample independent proof of each element of the offense and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, so the jury would not likely have reached a different verdict without it. The court further held that the trial judge acted within its discretion by selecting a sentence in the presumptive range after considering the seriousness of the crime and the defendant's record.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Cornelius, the defendant was tried twice after participating in an armed home invasion that resulted in the victim's death: a jury convicted him of first-degree burglary in the first trial but deadlocked on the related felony murder charge, leading to a mistrial on that count alone. In the second trial on felony murder only, the court applied offensive collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of the burglary element and admitted the defendant's hospital statements to police, resulting in his conviction and life sentence. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that precedent in State v. Dial permitted collateral estoppel in criminal cases and that the first jury's burglary verdict conclusively established the underlying felony. It also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding the statements voluntary because hospital records and testimony showed the defendant was alert, oriented, and capable of fabricating a false account despite medication.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Fields, defendant Curtis Leon Fields appealed his convictions for habitual driving while impaired and driving while license revoked, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed evidence from a traffic stop because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the stop was lawful and the motion to suppress was properly denied. The court relied on uncontested trial findings that the officer observed the defendant weaving constantly and erratically within his lane—described as “like a ball bouncing in a small room”—for three-quarters of a mile to a mile in heavy traffic, causing oncoming drivers to pull over, along with dim taillights on the vehicle. These facts, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, supplied the minimal objective justification needed for reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, distinguishing the case from prior decisions where isolated or minimal weaving was deemed insufficient.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Collins, the State appealed a superior court order granting a motion to suppress evidence obtained after a driver turned into a residential driveway to avoid a checkpoint set up by highway patrol troopers to check for revoked licenses. The trial court had found the checkpoint unlawful because it lacked the required written authorization under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.3A and concluded that the driver’s evasive action could not supply reasonable suspicion for the subsequent stop. The Court of Appeals vacated the order, holding that under controlling precedent the checkpoint’s validity was immaterial because the defendant never stopped there. The court remanded for further findings on whether the officer had independent reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant at the residence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hammonds, defendant Christopher Bernard Hammonds was convicted after a jury trial of felonious larceny of a firearm, misdemeanor larceny, assault on a government officer, and resisting an officer, based on evidence that he broke into a vehicle, stole a cell phone and handgun, and then struggled with police officers executing a knock-and-talk investigation. The sole issue on appeal was the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request, after the jury was impaneled, to use a remaining peremptory challenge to remove a juror who had recently had lunch with a friend employed in the district attorney’s office. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. It reasoned that, under the controlling precedents of State v. Holden and State v. Thomas, once a trial court exercises its discretion to reopen voir dire, each party has an absolute right to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges, and the trial court’s refusal to honor that right constituted reversible error.

criminal lawprocedure

In Davis ex rel. Gholston v. Cumberland County Board of Education, a premises liability suit, plaintiff Betty Gholston sued the Cumberland County Board of Education after six-year-old Tyson Davis fell through an 18-to-24-inch gap in aluminum bleachers at a high school football game, striking his head on concrete and suffering severe injuries. The trial court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Board satisfied its burden by showing the bleachers complied with the North Carolina Building Code when built and later modified, were inspected twice yearly with no known prior problems or complaints, and required no repairs. Plaintiff offered no admissible evidence that a reasonable school board would have taken further steps, such as covering the gaps, or that other schools did so, and the mere occurrence of the injury did not establish negligence.

torts & liability

In Mauldin v. A.C. Corp., a former welder and pipefitter sued his employer and multiple insurance carriers for workers' compensation benefits, claiming that his laryngeal cancer, lung cancer, lymph node cancer, asbestosis, and pleural plaquing were occupational diseases caused by asbestos exposure on the job between 1971 and 1997. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the Industrial Commission's opinion and award, upholding the findings that Argonaut Insurance was the responsible carrier for the lung cancer, lymph node cancer, and pleural plaquing, but reversing the determination that Argonaut was liable for asbestosis because the record lacked evidence of last injurious exposure during its coverage period. The court also remanded for additional findings on whether Argonaut was responsible for the laryngeal cancer and for proper calculation of the claimant's average weekly wage under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57, holding that the Commission had not made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions on those issues.

labor & employment

In Universal Insurance v. Burton Farm Development Co., Universal Insurance appealed a trial court order declaring that it had a duty to defend Burton Farm (as an additional insured) in an underlying lawsuit brought by W.O. White, LLC, which alleged breach of contract, unfair trade practices, defamation, and related claims arising from a construction project. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Universal's summary judgment motion and grant of summary judgment to intervening insurer First Specialty Insurance, holding that Universal had a duty to defend and that its policy provided primary coverage while First Specialty's was excess. The court reasoned that the policy's separation-of-insureds provision limited the "knowledge of its falsity" exclusion to conduct by Burton Farm itself, which the underlying complaint did not allege, and that a second exclusion was likewise inapplicable. It further held that the policies' "other insurance" clauses were not mutually repugnant and unambiguously made Universal's coverage primary based on the differing definitions of "you" in each policy.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Ross, defendant Ray Lee Ross was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, one count of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of assault on a female, arising from a 2007 shooting at a mobile home where he entered under the pretense of a gun sale, shot the two residents, and struggled with them before being subdued. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that admission of one victim’s prior statements from a probable cause hearing did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the witness was unavailable and defense counsel had cross-examined the witness, while other statements to officers were properly admitted only for corroboration. However, the court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the trial court erred by submitting three non-statutory aggravating factors to the jury. The core reasoning was that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(a4) expressly requires such factors to be included in an indictment or charging instrument, and the State’s mere notice to the defendant was insufficient; prior precedent addressing constitutional requirements did not override this statutory mandate.

criminal lawprocedure

In White v. Cochran, Rebecca White sued Swain County Sheriff Curtis Cochran after he fired her shortly after she returned from a work-related injury for which she had filed a workers’ compensation claim. She alleged that the termination violated the Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA) and constituted wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted the sheriff judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the Department of Labor’s right-to-sue letter—which named the “Swain County Sheriff’s Department”—insufficient. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the letter was adequate because a suit against the sheriff in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the department, and that the common-law wrongful-discharge claim was independently viable regardless of any defect in the REDA notice. The court further determined, based on the complaint and proceedings, that the sheriff had been sued only in his official capacity.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Trogdon, defendant Alex Jerome Trogdon was convicted of second-degree murder after his girlfriend’s 16-month-old son died from head injuries while in his sole care. On appeal, Trogdon argued that the trial court plainly erred by admitting expert testimony, a death certificate, and an autopsy report that listed the manner of death as “homicide.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the experts used the term “homicide” only to indicate non-accidental injury rather than as a legal conclusion, which is permissible under State v. Parker. The court further ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support second-degree murder because the jury could find that Trogdon inflicted multiple blunt-force impacts to the child’s head during the brief period he was alone with the victim, and malice could be inferred from an attack by a stronger person on a much weaker child.

criminal law