This case involved a challenge to the denial of a claim for loss of support benefits under New York’s crime victims compensation program after the death of the petitioner’s partner. The petitioner, who had been in a same-sex relationship with the victim, sought review under CPLR article 78 of the administrative determination that he did not qualify as a surviving spouse or as someone receiving principal support from the victim. The court affirmed the denial, finding the agency’s interpretation of “surviving spouse” to exclude homosexual life partners reasonable and consistent with prior case law. It also upheld the agency’s factual findings that the petitioner’s own income exceeded the support received from the victim over the relevant periods, concluding that no fixed rule had been improperly applied and that no other circumstances justified an award.
The case involved Robert Kaplan and his law firm suing corporate officers Martin Heinfling and Leo Zelkin for fraud and tortious interference after the firm was terminated as general counsel to Englishtown Sportswear, Ltd. The complaint alleged that the defendants induced Kaplan to form the firm with false promises of a long-term retainer as part of a scheme to pressure his father into selling shares in the company, and then terminated the retainer when the father refused. The lower court had sustained the fraud and tortious interference claims, but the appellate court reversed and dismissed both. The court reasoned that under Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, public policy protects a client's absolute right to terminate counsel at will, precluding liability for fraud in inducing the retainer or for interference with the at-will relationship when the termination is effected through proper corporate authority.
This case involved multiple lawsuits arising from a 1977 head-on collision on the Major Deegan Expressway between a car driven by James Richardson and a taxicab driven by Gustavo Leyva, resulting in the deaths of both drivers and injuries to passengers. The plaintiffs sued the estates of the drivers, the cab company, and the City of New York, claiming negligence including the City's failure to properly sign an exit ramp. The jury apportioned liability among Richardson (75%), Leyva and the cab company (15%), and the City (10%), but the trial court set aside the verdict against the City and reapportioned the liability between the drivers. On appeal, the court upheld the dismissal of claims against the City, reasoning that Richardson's voluntary intoxication and disregard of warnings were a superseding cause that relieved the City of liability.
This case involved a wrongful death claim brought by Howard Randolph after his wife Bessie Randolph, a Jehovah's Witness, died from hemorrhage during emergency surgery following complications in a Caesarean section and hysterectomy at a city hospital. Mrs. Randolph had explicitly refused blood transfusions on religious grounds, and the jury found the anesthesiologist Dr. Foster and other defendants negligent for their handling of her care after she began losing blood. The Appellate Division reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, vacated the judgment, and dismissed the complaint, concluding that the evidence did not establish the defendants' liability under the circumstances where the patient's religious directive constrained treatment options until a voluntary intervention occurred. The core reasoning focused on whether Dr. Foster's actions after 12:45 P.M. constituted a breach of duty that proximately caused the death, ultimately determining there was insufficient basis to hold the defendants responsible.
The case involved a dispute over coverage under an accident insurance policy issued by Mutual of Omaha to plaintiff Bretton, which provided benefits for specified losses from accidental injuries occurring in listed circumstances such as while riding in a common carrier. Plaintiff was injured in a Hong Kong taxicab accident resulting in a herniated disc requiring surgery and sought damages including for pain and suffering and lost wages beyond the $5,000 medical expense limit; the insurer denied broader coverage. The trial court construed the policy as providing general accident coverage up to policy limits and awarded $105,000 plus interest, but the appellate court modified the judgment to reduce the award to $5,000 with interest. The core reasoning was that the policy's plain terms, including the legend identifying it as limited and the distinction in Parts A and B between covered injuries (qualifying only for medical reimbursement) and specified losses of life, limb, or sight (qualifying for fixed indemnity), established it as a narrow accidental death and dismemberment policy rather than general accident insurance.
In Dworman v. Lee, plaintiffs sued defendant accountants for damages after becoming sureties on an international construction contract in reliance on financial statements the defendants had prepared for prior years. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for insufficient particularity in pleading fraud. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the five causes of action—all sounding in negligence or fraud—were governed by the Ultramares v. Touche rule limiting accountants' negligence liability to parties in privity. The court found the fraud claims were essentially negligence allegations supported only by conclusory statements and that the plaintiffs were indeterminate members of the public rather than a specific class with a direct relationship to the accountants. Federal securities law was deemed inapplicable because the underlying transaction did not involve the issuance or sale of securities.