This case involved a residential mortgage foreclosure action brought by Wilmington Savings Fund Society against defendants Joanne Matamoro and Andreas Jennings. The defendants moved under CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because it was not the holder of the note and the chain of assignments was defective. The Supreme Court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed and granted dismissal. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's certificate of merit and supporting documents failed to establish standing under UCC rules, as there was no proof the plaintiff possessed an indorsed note or that MERS had authority to assign it, and the plaintiff's opposition did not raise a triable issue of fact. The decision emphasized that CPLR 3012-b requires plaintiffs to provide all documentation supporting standing at commencement.
This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action brought by Wilmington Savings Fund Society against homeowners Joanne Matamoro and Andreas Jennings, alleging default on a note originally issued by Fieldstone Mortgage Company and secured by a mortgage later assigned through intermediaries to the plaintiff. The defendants moved under CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, primarily arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because it was not the holder of the note at commencement and the chain of assignments was defective, as MERS had no authority to assign the note. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's denial of the motion, holding that the plaintiff's own documents attached to the certificate of merit under CPLR 3012-b demonstrated a lack of standing, since there was no indorsement on the note payable to Fieldstone and no evidence that the plaintiff or its predecessors were holders within the meaning of the UCC. The court further reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely on post-commencement evidence or an opportunity to cure, as the statute required all supporting documentation of creditor status at the time of filing.
The case involved a construction worker who claimed injuries from a malfunctioning hoist elevator and sued the site owner, construction managers, and contractor for negligence and violations of Labor Law sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6). After his workers' compensation claim was denied by an ALJ—who found the alleged accident did not occur—and that denial was affirmed by the Workers' Compensation Board, the defendants sought and obtained leave to amend their answer to assert collateral estoppel and then won summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the administrative determination that no accident happened was identical to the core issue in the personal injury action and that the plaintiff had received a full and fair opportunity to litigate it through testimony, representation by counsel, cross-examination, and argument. The court concluded that these facts barred relitigation of the claim under collateral estoppel principles.
The case concerned a 2001 Civil Court judgment awarding B.Z. Chiropractic no-fault benefits from Allstate Insurance, which did not specify a postjudgment interest rate, and a subsequent effort by B.Z. to obtain a declaration that interest accrued at 2% per month compounded under Insurance Law provisions. Allstate had paid only the principal plus standard interest after an Appellate Term order noted that the CPLR 5004 rate applied instead, leading B.Z. to commence a hybrid turnover proceeding and declaratory action in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division addressed whether dicta in the Appellate Term decision had preclusive effect under res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case, holding that such dicta carries no binding force and that a final judgment cannot be collaterally attacked in a later proceeding to alter or declare its interest terms. The court therefore declined to issue the requested declaration in favor of the 2% rate.
This case was a residential mortgage foreclosure action brought by Wells Fargo against defendant Seema Kurian after she defaulted on her loan. The core dispute on appeal concerned whether the automatic stay under CPLR 321(c) was violated when the plaintiff's summary judgment motion was filed after the defendant's original attorney was suspended from practice but before any notice to appoint new counsel was served; new counsel for the defendant appeared shortly afterward and opposed the motion on the merits. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the defendant's later motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment, holding that the defendant had waived the protections of the statutory stay by retaining and appearing through new counsel while the stay was in effect and by failing to raise the stay issue in her opposition papers. The court distinguished prior precedent where no new counsel had appeared and the stay had not been waived.
This case involved a mortgage foreclosure action brought by Wells Fargo against Seema Kurian after she defaulted on her loan. The defendant's original attorney was suspended from practice, triggering an automatic stay under CPLR 321(c), but the plaintiff moved for summary judgment without first serving notice to appoint new counsel. The defendant later retained new counsel who opposed the motion and participated in the proceedings without raising the stay issue at the time. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment, holding that the defendant had waived the protections of the statutory stay through her affirmative conduct in hiring and using new counsel. The core reasoning focused on principles of waiver, distinguishing this case from prior precedent where no such participation occurred.