Mary W. Sheffield

This opinion addresses the State’s motion for rehearing or transfer after an appellate decision in State v. Burkett, which involved a criminal prosecution in which the defendant raised self-defense. The court denied the motion, rejecting the State’s argument that the prior ruling overlooked controlling precedent on waiver of instructional plain error. It found the cited case, State v. Jackson-Bey, inapplicable because it concerned waiver of an assault verdict director rather than a self-defense instruction. The court explained that self-defense is a special negative defense under Missouri law: the defendant must inject the issue into the evidence, but the State retains the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, and omitting a supported self-defense instruction improperly relieves the State of that burden.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Neil Burkett's convictions for first-degree assault and armed criminal action after a jury trial stemming from an altercation at a convenience store, during which Burkett pointed a gun at his brother-in-law and pulled the trigger. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The court held that the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, even though defense counsel did not request it. The ruling rested on the principle that substantial evidence—here, Burkett's testimony that the victim first aimed a shotgun at him—required the instruction to be given automatically, and its omission left the jury without a means to evaluate the defense, thereby relieving the State of its burden to disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case concerns an appeal by Holly Jessica Flood from a circuit court judgment dissolving her marriage to Brian Flood in Pemiscot County. After the Court of Appeals dismissed her appeal for failing to meet the briefing requirements of Rule 84.04, she filed a motion for rehearing or transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court, arguing that the dismissal conflicted with Rule 84.08(a) and Goldsby v. Lombardi. The court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 84.08(a) and Goldsby address only failures to perfect an appeal, such as untimely filings, and do not apply to briefing deficiencies. It explained that appellate courts may dismiss for inadequate briefs without first allowing a cure, as strict enforcement of Rule 84.04 maintains fairness among parties and does not require overlooking mandatory procedural rules.

family lawprocedure

In this dissolution of marriage case, Clay Wilkerson appealed a trial court judgment that awarded his ex-wife, Claire Wilkerson, maintenance, child support, sole physical custody with more parenting time, and designation of her address for the children's schooling after she sought to relocate with their three minor children. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of maintenance, parenting time, and the school address designation, finding they were supported by substantial evidence including the mother's primary caregiving role, financial needs, and the benefits of relocation to Fordland for housing, family support, and reduced travel. It vacated only the child support calculation, however, because it relied on the mother's outdated income figures rather than her expected gross monthly income at the time of trial. The court remanded the case with instructions to recalculate child support using accurate current income data and to explicitly state that the mother was awarded sole physical custody. All other aspects of the judgment were upheld under the standard of review for court-tried cases.

family law

In this Missouri divorce case, Holly Jessica Flood appealed the trial court's judgment dissolving her marriage to Brian Flood, challenging the division of marital property and debt, child support calculations, custody arrangements, and the failure to restore her former name or include an oral agreement in the judgment. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The court held that each of Wife's four points relied on violated Rule 84.04(d) by improperly combining multiple distinct claims of error—such as misapplication of law, abuse of discretion, and challenges based on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence—into single points, while also failing to explain in context why those legal reasons supported reversal. Because these deficiencies preserved nothing for appellate review, the appeal was dismissed.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In State v. Woods, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of felony stealing for taking nearly 6 million rivets valued at around $200,000 from a victim and selling them for scrap. The trial court imposed a suspended seven-year prison sentence with five years of probation and ordered Woods to pay $85,202.31 in restitution, an amount reduced from the victim's full loss due to insurance and settlements. On appeal, Woods argued that the restitution award was an abuse of discretion because of conflicting evidence and insufficient proof of the exact amount due to the offense. The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed the unpreserved claim only for plain error and affirmed, holding that the trial court could resolve any evidentiary conflicts in the state's favor and had statutory authority under section 559.105.1 to order restitution for losses supported by the record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a contract dispute in which Mike Seitz hired Advanced Welding to design, build, and install a custom gate on his cattle farm, similar to one built in 2017. After Seitz prematurely poured a driveway that required design changes, he paid a deposit but refused the remaining balance, then sued for breach of contract and violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), alleging undisclosed modifications and deceptive practices. Advanced Welding counterclaimed for the unpaid amount plus attorney's fees and interest under the Private Prompt Pay Act. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled for Advanced Welding on all claims, finding Seitz was a sophisticated business purchaser rather than a consumer protected by the MMPA, there were no actionable deceptive practices, and the Prompt Pay Act authorized the fees ($27,687.58) and 1.5% monthly interest on the $10,398 balance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence, the contract involved private construction work subject to the Prompt Pay Act rather than being governed exclusively by the UCC, and Seitz failed to follow the required analytical steps to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the estate of Ralph Orthwein, whose home and contents were destroyed by fire in 2017 while insured by CFM Insurance, Inc. After CFM paid policy limits for the dwelling but not the personal property (due to the decedent's failure to submit a required inventory), the estate sued for breach of contract, declaratory relief, vexatious refusal to pay, fraud, and emotional distress, arguing that CFM was not exempt from Missouri's valued-policy and vexatious-refusal statutes because it was not lawfully operating as a Chapter 380 mutual insurance company. The trial court granted CFM summary judgment on the first four counts and dismissed the fifth. The appeals court affirmed, holding that CFM held a valid Certificate of Authority to operate under Chapter 380, that its 2017 failure to file amended corporate documents did not automatically terminate that authority (as penalties under sections 380.571 and 374.046 require director action, which did not occur here), and that the estate therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding exemption from the challenged statutes.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

Todd John Mayes was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and armed criminal action after shooting and killing a victim, with the sole trial issue being self-defense. On appeal, he argued that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the interviewing detective to testify and physically demonstrate the two ways Mayes had shown he held the gun during a recorded interrogation that had already been played for the jury. The appellate court held that the claim was not preserved because Mayes’s trial objection—that the video “speaks for itself”—differed from the theories raised on appeal (cumulative evidence, best-evidence rule, and improper bolstering). Finding no facial showing of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, the court declined plain-error review and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

Michael Eugene Sneed appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief after his convictions for multiple sex crimes, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for not renewing a request for a mental examination. Sneed had filed a premature pro se motion before sentencing in 2017, voluntarily dismissed it, and then failed to file any new motion within the 90-day deadline after the appellate mandate issued on November 16, 2018. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the motion court's order and directed dismissal of the case without reaching the merits of the ineffective-assistance claim. The court reasoned that Rule 29.15's filing deadlines are mandatory and non-waivable, so Sneed's failure to file a timely motion resulted in a complete waiver of all post-conviction claims.

criminal lawprocedure

In December 2023, a Price Cutter manager discovered that employee D.E.P. Jr. had processed $2,150.85 in fake refunds without customers present, pocketing cash or transferring funds to his debit card. The Greene County Juvenile Office charged the juvenile with conduct that would constitute the class D felony of stealing, and after a hearing the juvenile division found the allegations proven beyond a reasonable doubt and committed him to the Division of Youth Services. On appeal, D.E.P. Jr. argued the evidence was insufficient because his testimony established the affirmative defense of duress based on alleged threats by his manager. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the manager’s denial of any threats created a credibility question for the fact-finder and that, under the applicable standard of review, the evidence viewed favorably to the judgment supported the finding that the Juvenile Office met its burden.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In 2018, Robert J. Branson entered an Alford plea to first-degree child molestation charged as a class A felony, along with other counts, and received a life sentence, even though the 2006 statute made the offense a class B felony unless the State alleged specific enhancing facts such as a prior conviction, serious physical injury, display of a deadly weapon, or commission as part of a ritual. Branson sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The Missouri Court of Appeals granted the writ, vacated all convictions and the underlying plea agreement, and remanded Branson to custody, ruling that the claim was not procedurally defaulted because it challenged a sentence greater than permitted by law. The court reasoned that the charging documents and plea record contained no allegations or admissions of any enhancing facts that would have elevated the offense to class A, so the trial court lacked authority to impose a life sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State of Missouri v. Auguste H. Rohde, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possessing a forging instrumentality under Missouri law. The case arose when Rohde, who was on bond and subject to drug testing, was searched at a court hearing after providing a urine sample that tested positive for methamphetamine; officers found an opaque plastic squeeze bottle filled with body-temperature yellow liquid in his pocket, which testimony indicated was a common device used to substitute fake urine during tests. On appeal, Rohde argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the device with the purpose of committing forgery. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the circumstances permitted a reasonable jury to infer Rohde's intent to subvert the required drug test, consistent with precedent recognizing such devices as forging instrumentalities when used to create inauthentic items like urine samples.

criminal law

In State v. Moore, the State appealed a trial court order dismissing allegations of receiving stolen property that occurred before January 1, 2017, in a case charging Moore with a continuing course of conduct from 2014 through 2018 under section 570.030. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without reaching its merits. The court held that section 547.200 requires the State to file a notice of appeal from such an interlocutory order within five days, but the State filed its notice on September 5, 2023—seven business days after the August 24 order—making it untimely. Because timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, the court concluded it lacked authority to proceed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State of Missouri v. Christopher W. Smith, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial of two class E felonies—resisting arrest and unlawful use of a weapon—after being found not indigent due to posting a $25,000 bond and then representing himself at trial. Smith had applied for a public defender, been denied, waived counsel through a written form and Faretta hearing, and proceeded pro se, resulting in concurrent sentences of one year in jail and a $5,000 fine per count. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the waiver was invalid because the written waiver-of-counsel form omitted the maximum range of punishment required by section 600.051 and the trial court never advised Smith of that information during the Faretta hearing, so his waiver could not be considered knowing and intelligent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a foreclosure sale on a home after borrowers defaulted on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. LoanCare, a junior lienholder whose interest was eliminated by the sale, filed claims including wrongful foreclosure and sought a declaratory judgment to void the sale conducted by successor trustee Martin Leigh, PC; the trial court granted summary judgment against LoanCare on these claims in an interpleader action over the sale proceeds. On appeal, LoanCare challenged the trial court's rulings on multiple grounds, including lack of proper notice and authority for the foreclosure. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. The court held that LoanCare's brief violated Rule 84.04(c) by failing to fairly and concisely state the uncontroverted material facts established in the summary judgment record and responses, which materially impeded appellate review.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved an appeal by C.R.A. ("Father") from a Greene County circuit court judgment terminating his parental rights to his child, P.S.A., on statutory grounds of parental unfitness, neglect, and failure to rectify conditions, after finding termination was in the child's best interest. Father did not challenge those substantive findings or the best-interest determination; his sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred by adopting verbatim the proposed judgment submitted by the Greene County Juvenile Office, allegedly without exercising independent judgment. The Missouri Court of Appeals (Southern District) affirmed the judgment, holding that a claim attacking the form of the judgment under Rule 78.07(c) must first be raised in a post-trial motion to preserve it for review, which Father failed to do. The court therefore reviewed only for plain error and found no facial showing of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice that would warrant such review, noting that verbatim adoption of a proposed judgment is not per se reversible error.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a grandmother had the right to intervene in her adult child's ongoing divorce modification proceeding to seek court-ordered visitation with her grandchild under Missouri law. The trial court denied Goldia Kranawetter's motion to intervene, finding she had not shown she was unreasonably denied visitation for the statutory period, and then approved the parents' new custody agreement. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 452.402.1(1) gives grandparents an unconditional statutory right to intervene in dissolution actions solely on the issue of visitation rights. Because Kranawetter filed a timely motion demonstrating that right, the trial court had no discretion to deny intervention and improperly conflated the threshold intervention question with the separate merits of whether visitation should be granted. The court remanded with directions to allow intervention and hold an evidentiary hearing on the visitation request.

family lawprocedure

In this case, divorced parents Brandon Schiesswohl (Father) and Bobbi Spain (Mother) each sought to modify the parenting schedule in their existing joint legal and physical custody decree for their child, with Father additionally requesting final decision-making authority over the child's healthcare when the parents disagreed. The trial court denied the motions after finding no "substantial" change in circumstances had occurred. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. Because the requests involved only changes to the custody arrangement (such as the parenting schedule or decision-making) and not the custody designation itself (joint versus sole), the statute required proof of a "change" in circumstances of the child or custodian, plus that the modification served the child's best interests, rather than a "substantial" change. The court clarified this distinction under § 452.410.1 and related precedent, rendering further review of other claimed errors unnecessary.

family law

In State v. Smith, Timothy Louis Smith was charged with possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia after a police officer found a bag with residue and a syringe cap in his backpack. Smith had called 911 for breathing difficulty; EMS responded, evaluated him, and left after he declined transport, but he later asked the officer for a ride and consented to a safety search that revealed the items. The trial court denied Smith's motion to dismiss under Missouri's Good Samaritan Law (§ 195.205), which grants immunity for certain drug offenses when evidence is obtained "as a result of" seeking medical assistance, and convicted him following a bench trial. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute requires the medical request to be the direct cause of the evidence's discovery rather than mere "but for" causation, and that a break in the chain—such as the end of any medical need followed by a consensual search for a ride—prevented immunity from applying.

criminal lawprocedure