The case involved a post-divorce contempt dispute between former spouses Pamela Demars and Gary Buntenbach over the division of marital MasterCard stock under their 2013 dissolution judgment. That judgment awarded each party half of Demars’s vested and unvested shares; Buntenbach received 96 unvested shares, which split 10-for-1 and vested in early 2014, producing 960 shares that Demars refused to transfer. The trial court found Demars in contempt and ordered her to convey the 960 shares; the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the stock split was merely a change in form of the same marital asset, so enforcing the original equal-division order required Demars to deliver the post-split shares rather than amending the judgment.
Ezell Roberts was convicted of multiple counts of statutory rape and sodomy against his step-daughter and later filed a timely pro se Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His appointed counsel filed an amended motion six days after the deadline set by Rule 29.15(g), but the motion court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief on the merits without addressing the late filing. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an untimely amended motion can constitute abandonment by post-conviction counsel, which triggers a duty for the motion court to conduct an independent inquiry into whether abandonment occurred. Because no such inquiry took place, the case was remanded so the motion court can determine whether to adjudicate the original or amended motion and proceed accordingly.
Cory Wagoner sought to intervene in a state lawsuit filed by Missouri’s Attorney General and the Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund against ConocoPhillips and Phillips 66, claiming the companies had wrongfully obtained money from the Fund; Wagoner had filed his own parallel suits in Greene County asserting similar claims as a taxpayer and Fund contributor. The trial court denied his motion to intervene, later approved a settlement between the State and Phillips 66, and Wagoner appealed that approval. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. The court held that Wagoner was never made a party because his intervention motion was denied, and his notice of appeal identified only the settlement judgment, not the earlier intervention ruling. Under Missouri rules, an appellant may seek review only of the judgment or order specified in the notice, so Wagoner had no standing to challenge a decision in a case to which he was not a party.
The case involved a dispute between the Monarch Fire Protection District and its board and a firefighters' union local, along with three top-ranked candidates on a promotional list, over whether the district was required under the parties' collective bargaining agreement to fill a vacant fire captain position by promoting one of those candidates before the list expired. The trial court granted the union's petition for a writ of mandamus and request for a permanent injunction, ordering the district to make the promotion. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the union failed to show a clear, unequivocal ministerial duty to promote under the agreement's management-rights and promotion provisions, that the candidates had an adequate alternative remedy through the CBA's grievance process, and that there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm or the lack of an adequate remedy at law to support either form of extraordinary relief. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.
In this Missouri Court of Appeals case, Buyers (affiliated aquaculture companies) appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in a breach-of-contract suit brought by Sellers (designers and manufacturers of air-supported structures) over the sale of six custom domes pursuant to an April 2013 non-disclosure/financing/supply agreement and later budget quotations. The court affirmed the denial, ruling that the quotations' dispute-resolution clause (Paragraph 14) superseded the earlier agreement's arbitration provision. That clause required any action to be brought in St. Louis County Circuit Court (or, at Sellers' option only, by arbitration) and contained language rejecting conflicting prior terms, thereby establishing the parties' intent for a judicial forum as the default.
Nathaniel Robinson appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, which sought to vacate his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and child abuse resulting in the death of his three-year-old son D.V. in 2007. He claimed his trial counsel was ineffective by eliciting prejudicial testimony during cross-examination of a witness and by deciding not to call a defense expert, Dr. Godfrey, who had reviewed the medical evidence. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's denial of relief. It held that counsel's cross-examination choices fell within reasonable strategy and that declining to call Dr. Godfrey was likewise strategic, because the expert agreed the death resulted from blunt-force trauma and offered only an "outside possibility" of accident that could have bolstered the prosecution's case rather than unequivocally supporting the defense.
The case involved Arizona Hall, Jr., who was convicted in a bench trial of four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under Missouri law (Section 571.070) after police found four rifles and shotguns at his home during an arrest warrant execution; his prior 1987 felony convictions for first-degree assault and armed criminal action formed the basis for the charges. Hall appealed, claiming that federal Gun Control Act provisions preempted the state statute because Missouri had restored his civil rights, and that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent ten-year terms. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding no plain error on the preemption claim because the record showed no substantial restoration of Hall’s civil rights under state law that would trigger the federal exemption. However, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing, holding that the indictment failed to allege persistent-offender status as required by court rules, so the enhancement beyond the standard class C felony range (maximum seven years) was improper.
Giordanio A. Blackburn appealed the denial of his Rule 29.15 post-conviction motion, which raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel following his convictions for first-degree murder, kidnapping, and armed criminal action. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the motion court’s judgment and remanded the case. The appellate court determined that post-conviction counsel had filed the amended motion 31 days late without requesting an extension, and the motion court had never conducted the required independent inquiry into whether this untimely filing amounted to abandonment of Blackburn. Because the result of that inquiry dictates which motion the court must adjudicate, the case was sent back for the motion court to perform the abandonment inquiry and proceed accordingly.
The case involved a dispute between Century Motor Corporation, a Jeep franchise dealer, and FCA US LLC (Chrysler) over their Sales and Service Agreement. Century alleged that Chrysler breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by attempting to establish a new dealership in Century’s market area while refusing to fulfill Century’s vehicle orders, and sought a declaratory judgment on that claim (Count II of its petition). The trial court entered a declaratory judgment for Century on that count, while a jury found for Chrysler on the remaining claims alleging violations of the Missouri Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act and breach of contract. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the declaratory judgment, holding that Century had an adequate remedy at law through a breach-of-contract action and that declaratory relief is improper when the underlying claim is for breach of contractual duties. The court also reversed the denial of costs to Chrysler and remanded for further proceedings.
In this employment discrimination case, Antonio Bowers sued his former employer Plaza Lexus and a supervisor under the Missouri Human Rights Act, alleging race discrimination that led to his resignation as a service porter. The defendants moved to stay the lawsuit and compel arbitration, relying on an Agreement to Arbitrate that Bowers signed on his first day of work, which required legal disputes including discrimination claims to be resolved through binding arbitration under company rules. The trial court denied the motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. The court held that the agreement lacked valid consideration and was unenforceable because the company retained the unilateral right to modify the incorporated Arbitration Rules with only 30 days’ notice, allowing it to alter or eliminate an employee’s claims without mutual consent, which rendered its promise to arbitrate illusory.
Tanisha Ross-Paige, a police officer, sued the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and the Board of Police Commissioners under the Missouri Human Rights Act, alleging retaliation after she filed an internal complaint claiming sexual harassment and retaliation by her sergeant. Following a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in her favor, including on punitive damages. On appeal, the Board challenged the jury instructions and the denial of a new trial based on a juror’s independent Wikipedia research into punitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the instructions were proper and that the juror’s research did not create a presumption of prejudice because the information was consistent with the court’s instructions and Missouri law and did not relate to any disputed factual issues or witness credibility.
The case involved non-lawyer Salvator Grillo and his company suing attorney Dennis Bennett and Bennett’s Missouri law firm for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and an accounting, based on an alleged agreement to treat Grillo as a 50% partner entitled to half the firm’s profits after the parties relocated their prior business from Washington, D.C. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The appeals court held that the claimed profit-sharing arrangement was unenforceable as a matter of law because it violated Rule 4-5.4(b) of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees or forming partnerships with non-lawyers in a law firm; the court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain equitable relief because no such claim had been properly pleaded.
Lonnie Briley appealed the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to explain the terms “consecutive” and “concurrent” in connection with his guilty pleas to tampering, stealing, and burglary charges. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the plea hearing transcripts conclusively refuted Briley’s claims, as the trial court had repeatedly stated on the record that his two seven-year sentences would run consecutively for a total of fourteen years, and Briley had affirmed his understanding each time. Any alleged misunderstanding was deemed unreasonable in light of those explicit advisements, establishing that his pleas were knowing and voluntary.
Cletist Wright pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery in 2013 and was sentenced to twelve years in prison; after delivery to the Missouri Department of Corrections on July 3, 2013, he filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief on October 3, 2013, followed by an amended motion in April 2014. The motion court dismissed the motions as untimely under the rule’s filing deadlines, prompting Wright’s appeal. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that Wright’s pro se motion was filed within the 180-day limit after his delivery to custody and that his amended motion met the extended 60-day deadline after the transcript filing and appointment of counsel. The State conceded the error, and the court remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits.
In State of Missouri v. Carlton Porter, the defendant appealed his convictions for second-degree trafficking in drugs, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, which arose from police surveillance of him retrieving and selling PCP-dipped cigarettes from a hidden stash containing over 30 grams of the substance. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in full. The court rejected the double-jeopardy claim because the trafficking statute (section 195.223.5) and the possession-with-intent statute (section 195.211) contain distinct elements, with trafficking requiring only possession of a threshold quantity and the other offense requiring a separate intent-to-distribute mental state that trafficking does not. It also upheld the paraphernalia conviction, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict on that count.
Randolph Wilkins sued the Office of the Missouri Attorney General and Attorney General Chris Koster, alleging age and disability discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act after his 2010 termination from an investigator position, along with claims of wrongful discharge and violation of veterans’ hiring preferences. The trial court dismissed most claims and, before trial on the remaining MHRA count against the OMAG, granted the agency’s motion to quash Wilkins’ subpoena for Koster’s testimony. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because undisputed evidence from a corporate designee showed Koster had no involvement in or knowledge of the employment decisions, any testimony on statutory delegation had limited relevance and could be obtained through less burdensome means, and Wilkins did not demonstrate resulting prejudice.
Amy Johnson appealed the denial of her Rule 24.035 motion to vacate her guilty plea conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing that the conviction violated double jeopardy because she had already been convicted of second-degree assault for the same 1994 act of shaking an infant victim, and that collateral estoppel barred a finding she acted “knowingly” since the prior conviction established only reckless conduct. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court’s denial of relief. The court held that a homicide prosecution following an earlier assault conviction does not violate double jeopardy when the victim dies later, because death is a new and distinct element that was not known at the time of the first case. It further ruled that any collateral estoppel claim is not jurisdictional, is not cognizable under Rule 24.035, and was waived by Johnson’s voluntary guilty plea.
In State of Missouri v. Andre McAfee, the defendant appealed the denial of his presentencing motion under Rule 29.07(d) to withdraw his guilty plea to second-degree murder and armed criminal action. McAfee had been charged with first-degree murder after killing the victim with an iron skillet; following a mistrial, he agreed to plead guilty to the reduced charge in exchange for concurrent life sentences rather than life without parole. The trial court overruled the motion after reviewing the plea hearing record, finding the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record showed McAfee understood the charges—he had a college education, confirmed the prosecutor's factual recitation as correct, and had gained familiarity with the elements through his prior trial—and that no manifest injustice or extraordinary circumstances justified withdrawal.
In this Missouri divorce case, Stefanie O’Neill appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to set aside a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Matthew O’Neill, divided marital property, ordered child support, and awarded joint custody of their three children. After being served with the petition, Wife appeared at scheduled hearings and attempted to file a written answer on the due date, but the trial court refused to accept it, declared a default, and entered judgment based solely on Husband’s evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default judgment on all issues except the dissolution of the marriage itself. The court reasoned that default judgments are disfavored, especially in domestic cases involving child custody, and that Wife had shown good cause by promptly preparing and presenting her answer with minimal delay and no prejudice to Husband. The case was remanded for further proceedings on custody, support, and property division.
The case involved the State of Missouri charging Robert Metzinger with making a terrorist threat, a class A misdemeanor under Section 574.115.1(4), based on four tweets he posted during the 2013 World Series that referenced a pressure cooker, an Airbnb listing, the Boston Red Sox, and lyrics from a song about violence. The trial court dismissed the information with prejudice, concluding that the tweets did not constitute “true threats” and thus failed to allege the elements of the offense. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tweets expressed only sarcastic sports-related commentary rather than an express or implied threat to cause an incident involving danger to life, and that the information therefore did not charge a violation of the statute. The court further determined that dismissal with prejudice was proper because refiling an information based on the same tweets would be futile, distinguishing this from cases involving dismissal for failure to prosecute.