Bruce D. Willis

In State v. Ali, the defendant was convicted of first-degree assault after a confrontation in a Minneapolis convenience store during which he bit off the tip of a customer's finger while resisting restraint. On appeal, he argued that the district court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of fifth-degree assault, that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor’s law license was on restricted status. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the evidence of permanent injury supported the first-degree charge so no lesser-included instruction was required, that no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and that reversal was unwarranted without a showing of prejudice from the prosecutor’s license status.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the State of Minnesota challenging the district court's suppression of evidence seized during a no-knock search of Corey Lamont Holiday's home and vehicle pursuant to a warrant based on tips from confidential informants about drug sales. The district court had granted the suppression motion, finding insufficient probable cause due to the unverified reliability of one informant and inadequate corroboration. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause based on the detailed information from the first informant, corroboration of Holiday's details and vehicle, the suspicious refusal during the attempted buy by the second informant, and Holiday's criminal history involving narcotics and firearms. The core reasoning emphasized a practical, common-sense totality-of-the-circumstances approach and deference to the magistrate's determination, even in marginal cases favoring warrants.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Smith, the defendant was convicted of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm after police found a handgun during a search of his occasional residence. The district court admitted, over objection, Spreigl evidence consisting of the defendant's prior conviction for the same offense and a photograph showing him with handguns, which the prosecutor offered to prove identity and possession. The court of appeals held that this evidence was improperly admitted under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) because it was unfairly prejudicial and lacked proper notice, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. The court separately determined that the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, as most delays were attributable to the defense, occurred for good cause, and caused no prejudice. The opinion addresses the standards for admitting prior bad acts evidence and the Barker factors for speedy trial claims.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a negligence claim brought by a father on behalf of his three-year-old son, who was injured when an empty bookcase fell on him while visiting the defendants' home with his mother. The district court granted summary judgment to the homeowners, ruling that they owed no legal duty to protect the child from the bookcase or to warn him of the danger. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the special standard for dangers to child entrants does not apply when the child is accompanied and supervised by a parent, and that under ordinary negligence principles of reasonable care, the homeowners had no duty in these circumstances because the risk was obvious to the supervising adult. The court also rejected the plaintiff's spoliation claim regarding the bookcase as lacking any prejudice.

torts & liabilityproperty

In State v. Shriner, the state appealed the district court's suppression of blood-test results obtained from a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw performed on a driver suspected of impairment after a head-on collision. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order, holding that the presence of alcohol alone did not create sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the search under the Fourth Amendment and the parallel state constitutional provision. The court reasoned that a warrantless blood draw is per se unreasonable absent consent or specific evidence of urgency that precludes obtaining a warrant, and it noted the officer's testimony that there was no immediate concern about the suspect's blood-alcohol level dropping below the legal limit. As a result, charges requiring proof of a specific blood-alcohol concentration were dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ownership of a foreclosed Minnesota home, where Omega Financial, as assignee of a conciliation-court judgment against the original owner, attempted to redeem the property after the mortgagee's redemption period expired but before the judgment was docketed. C & M Real Estate Services, assignee of the sheriff's certificate of sale, challenged the redemption and sought ejectment, arguing Omega lacked a valid lien at the time it filed its notice of intent to redeem. The district court granted summary judgment to C & M on ownership and possession. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that under Minn. Stat. § 548.09, a judgment creates no lien until docketed, so Omega had no redemption rights under Minn. Stat. § 580.24 when it filed its notice an hour and a half before docketing occurred. The court rejected arguments for substantial compliance or public-policy exceptions, emphasizing strict adherence to statutory requirements for lien priority and redemption.

propertyprocedure

The case involved an employer, Paradigm Enterprises, suing its workers' compensation insurer, Westfield National Insurance, to recover an alleged overpayment of premiums for the 2004-05 policy year. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the appellate court affirmed. The dispute centered on whether the premium calculation could include compensation paid to two owner-executives who each owned at least 25% of the closely held corporation. Under Minn. Stat. § 176.041, subd. 1(g), such executives are exempt from mandatory coverage when the employer had fewer than 22,880 payroll hours in the prior calendar year and did not elect coverage. The court held that the insurance policy did not extend beyond the statutory minimum requirements, so the final premium could not be based on those executives' compensation, resulting in an overpayment that the insurer was required to refund.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Mastakoski v. 2003 Dodge Durango, the appellant challenged the forfeiture of his vehicle after an arrest for driving while impaired and refusing a chemical test, even though he pleaded guilty only to third-degree DWI and the refusal charge was dismissed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that the vehicle was lawfully forfeited. The court interpreted Minn. Stat. § 169A.63 to provide that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture if used in the commission of a designated offense, without requiring a conviction on that offense; a conviction creates only a presumption of forfeiture, and the undisputed facts established that the appellant had committed a designated offense. The court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, noting that the constitutional claim was not raised below and that the plain language resolved any inconsistencies in application.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case concerned a dispute in which Todd Glass obtained a city permit to build a private driveway across a platted but never-developed street dedicated to public use in 1902, portions of which were owned in fee by neighbors Michael and Deborah Bolen and Joseph Zajac. The district court found that Glass and the City of Duluth lacked authority to place the private improvement on the dedicated corridor and issued a permanent injunction requiring restoration of the property. On appeal, the court affirmed that a lot owner may not unilaterally improve land dedicated to public use when he does not hold fee title and that the city code does not authorize permits for private driveways on others' property, but it modified the injunction to apply only to the segments owned by the Bolens and Zajac.

property

The case involved an appellant denied General Assistance Medical Care benefits by Dakota County, whose appeal to the commissioner of human services was affirmed; he then mailed a notice of appeal to district court 34 days after the November 15, 2005 decision letter. The district court dismissed the appeal as untimely under Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, which requires filing within 30 days. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, ruling that Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.05 extends the appeal period by three days when notice is sent by mail because the civil rules apply to such district court appeals from agency decisions and the statute expressly permits service by mail.

procedurehealthcare

In State v. Coleman, the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping after committing sexual assaults during burglaries in two counties, and he was sentenced consecutively to prior sentences with an enhanced term based on his admission to being a patterned sex offender and other aggravating factors. The court affirmed the criminal-sexual-conduct sentence, holding that the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines permit multiple consecutive sentences for qualifying current and prior offenses and that the patterned-sex-offender statute is not facially unconstitutional when the defendant admits the aggravating facts. However, the court reversed the burglary sentence and remanded for resentencing because the 68-month term constituted an upward durational departure from the guidelines range without the district court stating reasons specific to that offense. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, the defendant's admissions during the plea, and Sixth Amendment requirements for fact-finding at sentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a juvenile, E.S.C., who was adjudicated delinquent for fourth-degree assault after biting a police officer and spitting in a probation officer's face during an arrest. The district court ordered E.S.C. to undergo an HIV test as part of the disposition, citing concerns for the victim's potential exposure, but sealed the results pending review. E.S.C. appealed, arguing lack of authority for the test. The court of appeals held that the district court lacked statutory authority under Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, which governs juvenile dispositions, or under Minn. Stat. § 611A.19, which authorizes HIV testing only for specific enumerated offenses and circumstances not present here. The appeals court reversed the order and remanded with instructions to destroy the test results without disclosure.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a police officer approached a car parked late at night with its engine running and found the driver, Brian Jean Overvig, apparently asleep or unresponsive inside. After knocking on the window multiple times without response, the officer opened the unlocked door, detected signs of intoxication, and arrested Overvig for driving under the influence, leading to revocation of his driving privileges. Overvig challenged the revocation, arguing that opening the door constituted an unlawful seizure, and the district court agreed, rescinding the revocation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the totality of the circumstances the officer did not seize Overvig by opening the door, as a reasonable person would have believed they remained free to terminate the encounter. The court further reasoned that even if a seizure occurred, it was justified by the officer's reasonable concern for the driver's physical well-being based on the circumstances.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved whether Chong Suk Perry, who had lived with Daniel Savage for seven years without marriage, qualified as a "dependent" entitled to survivor’s economic loss benefits under an auto insurance policy after Savage’s death in a 2004 car accident. The insurer denied the claim, and the district court granted summary judgment to the insurer in a declaratory judgment action, ruling that Perry did not meet the policy’s definition of dependent. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the policy’s unambiguous language limited dependents to a surviving spouse or child of the deceased, a definition that matched the Minnesota No-Fault Act and did not extend to unmarried cohabitants even if they received financial support. The court rejected arguments that the statute’s reference to questions of fact about support created a broader class of eligible dependents.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Jeffrey Mohs, who was convicted of a controlled-substance offense after police arrested him on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a scheduled pretrial hearing and jury trial on other charges; during the arrest, Mohs discarded methamphetamine and a pipe that police seized as evidence. Mohs argued that the bench warrant was constitutionally invalid under the Fourth Amendment and Minnesota Constitution because it lacked probable cause on its face, was not supported by a separate oath or affirmation, and did not specify bail, so the evidence should have been suppressed. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant was valid because the issuing judge had personal knowledge of Mohs's failure to appear in open court, which established probable cause without need for additional sworn statements, and that the state constitution does not require bench warrants to include a bail provision. The court noted that the warrant was issued under statutory authority after Mohs's counsel confirmed his absence, and bail was set shortly after his arrest. Core reasoning emphasized that a judge's direct observation satisfies constitutional requirements for warrants in this context.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved 31 Midwest banks that participated in loans for a casino project on a Native American reservation; the banks sued the law firm Dorsey & Whitney for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation after the tribe refused payments under an unapproved pledge agreement, leading to loan defaults and settlements. The district court granted summary judgment to Dorsey on all claims. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment on the negligent-misrepresentation claim because the banks' reliance on Dorsey's advice was not justifiable under the participation agreements, and it affirmed that the banks lacked standing under assignment or tort theories. However, it reversed on the legal-malpractice and breach-of-contract claims, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the banks were third-party beneficiaries of Dorsey's services or had an implied contract with the firm.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves an appeal from a Minnesota district court's judgment dissolving the marriage of appellant Alaa Esam Albaaj, an incarcerated U.S. armed forces member, and respondent Teri Joan Reed, while awarding Reed sole custody of their children and dividing marital property. Albaaj argued that the court erred by denying him protections under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, lacking personal jurisdiction, denying him counsel, and abusing discretion on custody, property division, and failing to appoint a guardian ad litem. The appellate court affirmed in part, holding that Albaaj was not entitled to SCRA relief because incarceration meant he was not in military service, that he had waived jurisdictional defenses, that he had no right to counsel in dissolution proceedings, and that the custody award and lack of guardian appointment were not abuses of discretion. It reversed in part and remanded, however, due to insufficient findings supporting the legal custody award and the award of nonmarital property to Reed without required statutory findings.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In Pierce v. DiMa Corp., an employer sought review of an unemployment agency decision finding that a former cashier was eligible for benefits after being fired for opening a cash register with an emergency switch rather than the required no-sale key while assisting a coworker. The court affirmed the determination that the employee did not commit employment misconduct disqualifying him from benefits. The core reasoning was that the statute excludes single incidents without significant adverse impact on the employer from the definition of misconduct, and here there was no theft, money mishandling, or other evidence of such impact.

labor & employment

This case involves a criminal prosecution of Edward Krasky for multiple counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct against his young daughters. The district court excluded from evidence statements made by one child victim during an interview and examination at a children's resource center, which occurred as part of a police investigation roughly two years after the alleged abuse. On remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion, holding that the statements were testimonial because the primary purpose of the interview was to establish past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. The decision applied U.S. Supreme Court precedent from Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, along with related Minnesota cases, to conclude that admission of the statements would violate the Confrontation Clause.

criminal lawprocedure

In this marital dissolution case, appellant Kelly Danielson challenged the district court's division of the parties' property, specifically the farmstead conveyed to the couple by quitclaim deed from respondent and his brother Mark Danielson. The district court admitted parol evidence that the deed was executed only for financing purposes and was not intended to transfer Mark's interest, found that the parties held half the farmstead in trust for Mark, treated respondent's half as marital property, and awarded the farmstead to respondent while dividing the equity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deed was unambiguous on its face and that the parol-evidence rule barred extrinsic testimony to alter its terms; it further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of the nonparty brother. The matter was remanded for proper determination of the marital interest in the farmstead without reliance on the improper evidence or adjudication of third-party rights.

family lawproperty