In Lombardo v. Seydow-Weber, a medical malpractice action was commenced alleging failure to detect fetal distress during birth, but the plaintiff did not serve the required affidavits of expert review or expert identification under Minn. Stat. § 145.682. The trial court granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(b). The appellate court reversed, ruling that the statute mandates dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance in the absence of excusable neglect and that a procedural rule cannot circumvent this substantive statutory requirement.
In this case, a husband sought a writ of prohibition after a Minnesota district court extended an ex parte temporary order for protection against him, which suspended his visitation rights, beyond the statutory 14-day limit without holding a full evidentiary hearing or making findings on domestic abuse allegations. The underlying facts involved a pending North Dakota divorce proceeding, with the wife and children having moved to Minnesota. The Court of Appeals held that the district court exceeded its authority under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 by continuing the order and denying visitation without the required hearing and findings, as the statute mandates expedited proceedings and does not permit extensions due to court scheduling constraints. The court issued the writ on those procedural grounds and declined to address the husband's UCCJA jurisdiction arguments.
In State v. Scott, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered a motion to accept a late notice of appeal from an order denying a motion to modify a criminal sentence. The appellant argued that his counsel did not receive notice of the denial order until several months after it was issued, providing good cause for the delay. The court decided that it lacked authority to extend the time for filing a sentencing appeal under the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permit such extensions only for appeals from convictions or postconviction orders, not direct sentencing appeals. The appeal could not be construed as timely from the original conviction because more than two years had passed, exceeding any allowable extension periods. Consequently, the motion was denied.
This case involved Gerald Rasinski, who pleaded guilty to gross misdemeanor DWI and received a one-year sentence; the issue was whether that sentence ran consecutively or concurrently with a prior felony prison sentence when the trial court did not state its choice on the record at sentencing. The court decided that the sentence must run concurrently under the statutory presumption and reversed the denial of Rasinski's motion to correct it, remanding for recalculation of his release date. Minnesota law requires the sentencing court to specify on the record whether multiple sentences are concurrent or consecutive, and if it does not, they run concurrently by default. The statute and court rules make the formal on-the-record pronouncement controlling, so off-the-record discussions, the warrant of commitment, or other indications of intent cannot override the presumption.
This case concerned whether Brian Fritzke was entitled to additional jail credit in his Dakota County felony theft case for time spent in custody on a separate Ramsey County offense before the Dakota County complaint was filed. The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion and remanded for calculation of credit from the date of Fritzke's January 3, 1993 arrest onward. The core reasoning was that the amount of credit awarded should not depend on when the prosecutor chose to file the complaint, as that timing is subject to manipulation and could result in unfair or de facto increased sentences. The court held that credit is required for all time in custody once probable cause to charge exists.
The case involved Duluth Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc. appealing the dismissal of its claim for relocation benefits under Minn. Stat. § 117.52 and an unlawful detainer judgment after the City of Duluth evicted it from leased premises. The court denied the city's motion to dismiss the appeals as untimely. It reasoned that because the district court had consolidated the two special proceedings, the longer 30-day appeal period applied to the final judgment; entry of judgment nunc pro tunc could not cut off appeal rights; and the city's service of copies of the writ and judgment did not qualify as proper notice of filing.