Harold Schultz

In State v. Hanson, the state appealed a pretrial order dismissing an enhanced felony charge of fifth-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 4(b), which applies when a defendant has two or more prior violent assault convictions within three years. The defendant had pleaded guilty to two such prior assaults arising from separate incidents but on the same day, and the trial court ruled that the statute required a specific sequence of convictions before the current offense could be charged as a felony. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the plain language of the statute does not require any particular sequencing of the prior convictions. The court reasoned that the statute merely uses the date of the first conviction as a benchmark for timing the current offense and contains no ambiguity or implied sequencing requirement.

criminal law

The case involved Meridian Aggregates Company's challenge to the City of Waite Park's denial of a conditional use permit to operate a rock quarry on property zoned for heavy industrial use, following annexation from a township. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, upholding the denial based on concerns about impacts on surrounding development, lack of demonstrated need, and inadequate controls for dust and vibrations. The appellate court reviewed the record before the city council and concluded that the denial was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious because the stated reasons lacked legal sufficiency and factual support in the evidence presented. The court reversed the judgment and ordered issuance of the permit.

business & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

The case concerned the City of Minneapolis's challenge to an arbitrator's award reinstating police officer Michael Sauro, who had been terminated following a federal jury verdict finding he used excessive force against an arrestee after the individual was handcuffed. The arbitrator concluded the city had not proven just cause for discharge under the collective bargaining agreement, upheld a 20-day suspension, and ordered reinstatement. The district court granted summary judgment confirming the award, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the arbitrator acted within the authority granted by the agreement, which did not define just cause or limit remedies, and that no well-defined public policy required automatic discharge of an officer found by a civil jury to have used excessive force.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, a landlord operating subsidized housing brought an unlawful detainer action to evict a tenant after her adult son, a co-tenant, was found in possession of crack cocaine on the premises in violation of the lease terms prohibiting illegal activity. The housing referee ruled for the landlord, and the district court affirmed that decision. The court held that the lease expressly permitted cancellation and eviction proceedings upon any resident's engagement in illegal conduct, and the landlord was entitled to enforce those terms rather than modify the lease. It rejected arguments that the tenant herself had not violated the lease or lacked control over her son, noting that her occupancy rights derived solely from the lease and that public policy supports removing drug-related violations to maintain safe housing. The court affirmed the eviction order.

propertyprocedurecriminal law

The case involved a petition to appoint the Commissioner of Human Services as public conservator for Holly Foster, an adult with moderate to severe mental retardation, schizoaffective disorder, and other disabilities, including the specific authority to consent to neuroleptic medication as part of general medical care decisions. The district court granted the conservatorship and general powers to consent to medical treatment but denied the power to consent to neuroleptic medication without additional court approval, specific written reports, review by an independent panel, and a determination of the conservatee's incompetence and the medication's necessity. On appeal by the Commissioner and Hennepin County, the court reversed, holding that once general authority to consent to necessary medical care is granted under the applicable statutes, no further individualized court procedures or approvals are required for neuroleptic medication. The decision rested on statutory interpretation of conservatorship powers and rejection of the district court's imposed extra requirements as unauthorized.

civil rightshealthcarefamily lawprocedure

In AMCO Insurance v. Ashwood-Ames, the insurer appealed after the trial court confirmed a no-fault arbitrator's award of economic loss benefits to the claimant for injuries from an alleged car accident on Highway 62. AMCO had initially paid some benefits but later denied coverage and sought recovery, arguing no accident had occurred based on conflicting accounts from the claimant and the other driver. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred by deferring to the arbitrator on whether an accident occurred for purposes of coverage under the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. The court reasoned that arbitrators under the Act are limited to factual issues, while questions of statutory or contract interpretation regarding coverage and the meaning of 'accident' must be decided by courts, especially when they determine whether a legal claim exists.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Juanita Errico sued Southland Corporation for negligence after being assaulted by unidentified third parties in the parking lot of a 24-hour convenience store shortly after making a purchase inside. Her complaint alleged that Southland owed her a duty to ensure patron safety and security and to properly train and supervise employees to respond to criminal activity on the premises. The district court granted summary judgment to Southland, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that no special relationship existed between Southland and either Errico or her assailants that would create a legal duty to protect her from third-party criminal acts. The court explained that the existence of a duty depends first on such a special relationship, and without it the issue of foreseeability need not be reached.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Wagener v. McDonald, the Scherbers assigned their potential legal malpractice claim against attorney John McDonald to Wagener as part of settling a separate dispute, and Wagener then sued McDonald for negligence in handling a land registration matter involving a highway easement that affected the property's marketability. The district court denied McDonald's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was assignable because it survived the holder's death under Minnesota statute, and certified the public policy question to the appellate court. The court of appeals held that assignment of legal malpractice claims is contrary to Minnesota public policy. The core reasoning was that allowing such assignments would risk impairing attorneys' loyalty to clients, breaching confidentiality by placing control of sensitive information with third parties, and commercializing claims in ways that undermine the attorney-client relationship, outweighing the general rule favoring assignability of surviving non-personal-injury claims.

proceduretorts & liability

Daybreak Foods, a wholesaler of liquid eggs, sought coverage under its boiler and machinery insurance policy for approximately $110,000 in losses after egg product spoiled due to a refrigeration system failure at its Minnesota facility. The policy covered damage caused by an "accident" to an insured object but expressly excluded breakdowns due to depletion, deterioration, corrosion, erosion, wear and tear, or leakage at any valve. After a trial where expert testimony indicated that a rubber valve gasket had developed cracks over time before suddenly fracturing, the trial court directed a verdict for the insurer on the ground that the failure was not accidental as a matter of law. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the policy's definition of accident and its exclusions barred coverage even if the final breakage was sudden.

business & regulatoryproperty

Matthew Harrington and Mary Friberg were convicted of violating a restraining order issued under Minnesota's anti-harassment statute that barred them from picketing in front of the home of Jeri Rasmussen, director of a clinic providing abortion services. The order followed multiple incidents of anti-abortion protests outside the residence that caused Rasmussen to fear for her safety. The court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the appellants could not challenge the order's validity because they failed to appeal it in time, their conduct did not implicate the ex post facto clause, and the evidence established they had engaged in prohibited target picketing.

abortionfree speechcriminal law

The case involved an in-house labor attorney, Victor Michaelson, who sued his employer Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. after being reassigned from litigation work to developing training programs due to documented performance issues; he claimed breach of an alleged unilateral employment contract based on company manuals and assurances, defamation from internal performance letters, tortious interference, and related claims, though he was never terminated and remained on disability leave. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on all counts, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that Minnesota law treats such employment as at-will, allows clients to discharge attorneys at any time without breach, found no genuine issues of material fact supporting enforceable contract promises or malice in privileged internal communications, and held that the reassignment did not support the asserted tort or statutory claims.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

In Grimm v. Commissioner of Public Safety, a driver's license was revoked under Minnesota's implied consent law after a blood test showed an alcohol concentration of .10, and the driver petitioned for judicial review. The trial court suppressed the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's blood test report because the analyst's signature was not notarized and rescinded the revocation. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that Minn. Stat. § 634.15, subd. 1 does not require notarization. The statute's plain language requires only that the analyst attest to the report by certifying it is true and accurate, and explicitly makes such reports admissible in implied consent proceedings without proof of the signature or official character of the signer.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Audrey Lecy appealing a summary judgment that dismissed her claim against Sage Company for involuntarily retiring her at age 63 in alleged violation of Minn. Stat. § 181.81, which prohibits discharging employees under age 70 on the basis of age. The trial court had interpreted the statute narrowly to require proof of a mandatory retirement policy and dismissed a related age discrimination claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act on statute of limitations grounds. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the statute applies to any involuntary age-based discharge before age 70 and that Lecy's evidence of the retirement notice and surrounding circumstances established a prima facie case.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Larry and Eloise Lozar, who were charged with possession of marijuana with intent to sell or distribute and possession without affixing state tax stamps after officers seized approximately 750 pounds of marijuana from their greenhouse, garage, and residence. Following an omnibus hearing, the trial court denied their motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and, after a bench trial in which they waived a jury, convicted them; the Lozars appealed the pretrial ruling. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, reasoning that although officers made an illegal warrantless entry into the greenhouse, the warrant affidavit established probable cause from an independent source consisting of informant information and lawful observations, and the evidence was sufficient to prove the wife's constructive possession and intent to distribute.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Melissa Woodin petitioned for a domestic abuse protective order under Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act against Daren Rasmussen, the alleged father of her unborn child, after he threatened her with harm; the parties had never been married, lived together, or had any other children in common. The trial court granted the order, reasoning that an unborn child qualified as a "child in common" under the statutory definition of family or household members. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Act's definition of "family or household members" does not extend to persons with an unborn child in common. The core reasoning was that the statute explicitly lists relationships supporting protective orders but does not include unborn children, other laws specifically designate when they apply to fetuses, and any expansion is a matter for the legislature rather than judicial interpretation.

family law

The case involved a dispute between the City of Willmar Municipal Utilities Commission and Kandiyohi Cooperative Electric Power Association over which entity could provide electric service to a newly annexed area previously assigned to Kandiyohi by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC). The district court issued an injunction allowing Willmar to serve the area without MPUC approval and barring Kandiyohi from serving without a city franchise, after determining that Kandiyohi had not previously furnished service there. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The court reasoned that state statutes under the Public Utilities Act give the MPUC primary authority to adjudicate such service conflicts in annexed areas, considering factors like existing facilities and long-term planning, rather than the courts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this marital dissolution case, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement during a 1988 hearing that reopened the 1985 divorce judgment, providing the former wife with a $68,000 property settlement paid in installments secured by a second mortgage, life insurance, and other protections, in exchange for waiving further spousal maintenance. After the husband faced business bankruptcy risks, the trial court added a finding to the amended judgment that the payment obligations were intended to be non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. The husband appealed, arguing this provision was not part of the parties' agreement and improperly modified it. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the finding merely clarified the underlying intent to ensure the payments' security without altering essential terms, as bankruptcy discharge would defeat the agreement's purpose. The court noted trial judges' discretion to protect parties' interests in stipulations before entry of judgment.

family lawproperty

The case involves a 1987 stipulated divorce decree between the parties, under which the husband was to provide health insurance coverage for the wife for at least three years (or longer as permitted by COBRA and state law) and each party was responsible for their own attorney fees. After the husband notified the wife of his remarriage, she moved to enforce the insurance provision, while he cross-moved for reimbursement of $1,500 she had withdrawn from a joint account to pay her attorney fees before the divorce. The trial court interpreted the decree to require the wife to pay her own insurance premiums upon the husband's remarriage and ordered her to repay the $1,500. On appeal, the court held that the decree required the husband to pay for the wife's 36-month COBRA continuation coverage regardless of remarriage and that the $1,500 debt was part of the final property settlement not subject to later modification. The appellate court reversed both orders.

family lawpropertyprocedurehealthcare

In Clapper v. Budget Oil Co., the plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful termination, age discrimination, and related claims after his employment ended. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on collateral estoppel from an unemployment compensation decision finding that the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned. The appellate court reversed, holding that collateral estoppel did not apply because the issues were not identical, the plaintiff lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and state law prohibits using confidential unemployment data in civil proceedings. The case was remanded for trial.

labor & employmentprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a railroad worker injured while performing electrical maintenance on a bucket wheel reclaimer at an ore dock and taconite storage facility used for loading cargo onto ships. The worker sued his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, but the employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy. The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the worker satisfied the LHWCA’s status test for maritime employment because his repair and maintenance duties involved equipment used in the traditional maritime activity of moving cargo between land and vessels, meeting the requirements established by the 1972 amendments.

labor & employment