Kevin G. Ross

In State v. Wiggins, the case involved a police officer who, during a lawful investigative stop of a car suspected of a drug transaction, ordered the defendant out, directed him to raise his hands, and pulled up his sagging pants, which led to the discovery of a handgun in his pocket. Wiggins, who had prior convictions, was charged with and convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person after the district court denied his motion to suppress the gun evidence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the pants adjustment was not a search under the Fourth Amendment and did not constitute an unreasonable seizure-related contact during the detention, as it was done for safety and to facilitate a pat-frisk without any pretextual motive. The decision rested on the facts that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion from observed marijuana, the officer's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, and the gun's discovery was inadvertent.

criminal lawgunscivil rights

This case involved whether a judgment for unpaid spousal maintenance could be renewed multiple times through successive civil actions, each filed within ten years of the prior judgment. The district court denied the creditor's 2008 action seeking renewal of the 1998 judgment, holding that spousal maintenance judgments could not be renewed more than once. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that a renewed judgment has the same force as any other judgment and that Minnesota Statutes sections 541.04, 548.09, and 548.091 permit a new action within ten years of each existing judgment. The court reasoned that common-law practice and precedent allow judgment creditors to obtain successive new judgments to extend the enforcement period, without any statutory bar specific to spousal maintenance.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Sterling, the defendant was charged with fourth-degree DWI after providing breath samples on an Intoxilyzer machine that failed to immediately display or print his alcohol concentration level; the officer then requested and obtained a urine sample showing a .15 alcohol concentration, which formed the basis for the charges. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the urine test was unlawfully requested once the breath samples were deemed adequate and reliable. The district court denied the motion, and after a stipulated-facts trial, the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that an officer may lawfully request an alternative urine or blood test when the Intoxilyzer does not promptly provide the alcohol concentration reading needed to determine impairment at the time of driving, and that the urine test results were admissible even after the breath results became available later. The court distinguished precedents like Young v. Commissioner of Public Safety as limited to their specific facts and found no error in using the urine test result for conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Dillon's challenge to his 240-month sentence for first-degree assault after he severely beat his wife, causing life-threatening injuries including broken ribs, liver laceration, eye fracture, and intestinal damage that required multiple surgeries and extended hospitalization. Dillon argued in postconviction proceedings that the upward departure from the 86-month presumptive sentence was excessive because it focused on the victim's injuries rather than his conduct, and that his prior appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. The court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, holding that the nature and extent of the victim's injuries supported severe aggravating factors justifying the departure and that counsel was not ineffective because the sentencing argument would not have succeeded. The decision rested on the district court's discretion in sentencing and the lack of prejudice from the omitted argument.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved no-fault automobile insurance policyholders who refused to submit to examinations under oath as required by their policy after the insurer questioned aspects of their claims for medical expenses and wage loss following a car accident, arguing they had already fully cooperated. The insureds took the reasonableness of the request to arbitration and obtained awards, prompting the insurer to seek a declaratory judgment that the refusal constituted a breach of contract as a matter of law. The district court treated the issue as an arbitrable question of fact and confirmed the awards, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the contractual duty to submit to examinations under oath raised only legal questions of breach and coverage outside arbitrators' authority, with no statutory reasonableness precondition applying as it does to independent medical exams.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a bank suing an individual guarantor to collect on a defaulted business loan after the borrowing company went bankrupt. The guarantor sought to amend his answer to add a fraud-in-the-execution defense and raised other affirmative defenses such as estoppel based on alleged oral representations about the loan. The district court granted the bank summary judgment and denied the motion to amend. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the fraud claim could not survive summary judgment because undisputed facts showed the guarantor had a reasonable opportunity to review the document he signed, that the remaining defenses were barred by a statute prohibiting enforcement of oral credit agreements, and that damages were properly calculated from the outstanding loan balance without crediting a prior interest payment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned appellant Remedan Mohamed's challenge to his 67-month prison sentence for malicious punishment of a child resulting in great bodily harm, which was an upward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.377. Mohamed had pleaded guilty after shaking his four-month-old son, causing severe brain injuries, and had stipulated to three aggravating factors justifying the departure: the victim's particular vulnerability due to infancy, the defendant's position of authority, and the offense occurring in the victim's zone of privacy. The court of appeals determined that only the vulnerability factor was a valid basis for departure in this context, while the authority and zone-of-privacy factors were improper, and it could not conclude from the record whether the district court would have imposed the same sentence without relying on the invalid factors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the use of the vulnerability factor but remanded for the district court to decide whether resentencing was warranted based solely on the valid factor.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Krenik, the defendant appealed her conviction for a first-degree controlled-substance offense, arguing that evidence of drug possession should have been suppressed because it was discovered during a pat search of her person and an inventory search of her vehicle after officers ordered her out of the car during a traffic stop for a lane-change violation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court properly denied the suppression motion. The court reasoned that under U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Mimms and Wilson, officers may lawfully order a passenger to exit a vehicle during a valid traffic stop as a matter of course without needing particularized suspicion, that the pat search was justified by officer-safety concerns arising from the defendant's actions and the presence of a bulky object, and that the vehicle search was a permissible inventory search because no licensed driver remained at the scene.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a traffic accident in which a semitruck jackknifed after rear-ending another vehicle, causing its semitrailer to swing into oncoming traffic and injure motorcyclist Randy Vee. Vee and a codefendant sued the semitrailer's owner, American President Lines, seeking to impose vicarious liability for the semitruck driver's negligence under Minnesota Statutes section 169.09, subdivision 5a. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing those claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that a semitrailer does not qualify as a "motor vehicle" under the vicarious liability statute because the applicable statutory definition in section 169.011 requires a vehicle to be self-propelled, which a semitrailer is not. The court rejected arguments to apply a broader definition from the no-fault insurance statutes, concluding that the chapter 169 definition controls after the statute's recodification.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Hemmingsen v. Hemmingsen, a divorced husband moved to terminate his permanent spousal maintenance obligation after claiming retirement at age 65 reduced his income from real estate work, while the ex-wife opposed the motion and sought attorney fees. The district court denied the motions to terminate maintenance or amend findings and awarded the ex-wife need-based and conduct-based attorney fees, finding the retirement was not genuine and income was self-limited to avoid the obligation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded, ruling that the district court did not make adequate findings to support its order on maintenance modification or fees. The court explained that additional findings were required for meaningful review of whether the retirement occurred in good faith and whether circumstances had substantially changed to render the original award unfair.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether medical assistance benefits paid to Lavina Grote before her 1996 death could be recovered from the estate of her surviving spouse Sylvester, who had held real property and bank accounts with her in joint tenancy. The district court allowed the county's claim for the full amount of those benefits from Sylvester's estate, using the stipulated value of the property at the time of Lavina's death. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Minn. Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1a permits recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of benefits paid to a predeceased spouse when the assets were jointly owned during the marriage, and that the entire value of such property is available rather than only a one-half share. The court declined to consider an untimely argument about using current property values and struck certain supporting documents from the record.

healthcarepropertyfamily law

In this case, a motorcyclist injured by an underinsured driver recovered $34,000 from the at-fault party and then sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from his own insurer under a $100,000 policy limit. The insurer applied a limits-less-paid clause in the policy to pay only $66,000 after deducting the prior recovery, leading the motorcyclist to sue and argue that Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act required the policy to be reformed to provide full damages-less-paid UIM coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the appeals court affirmed, holding that the Act does not mandate the damages-less-paid structure for motorcycle policies even when they provide some UIM coverage, unlike policies for other vehicles, and that the policy terms were enforceable as written. The court reasoned that motorcycle insurance is treated differently under the statute and that the reducing clause did not violate public policy or render coverage illusory. The decision upheld the insurer’s calculation based on the policy language and statutory distinctions.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In State v. Dressel, the defendant was charged with multiple felonies including criminal sexual conduct and assault after his three-year-old daughter suffered severe injuries while in his care, leading to an investigation that included a voluntary polygraph examination at the police station. The district court granted Dressel's motion to suppress his post-polygraph statements to officers, ruling that they should not have been obtained in connection with the polygraph beyond its original purpose. On the state's pretrial appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that the district court erred by suppressing the statements on that ground alone, as there was no agreement limiting the investigation's scope and no specific rights violation established. The matter was remanded for the district court to fully address the remaining issues of whether the statements were involuntary or obtained in violation of Miranda. The core reasoning emphasized that law enforcement officers may continue questioning suspects after a polygraph as part of their investigative duties, absent a constitutional violation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Patrick William Carey, who pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to a plea agreement that called for an executed prison sentence on the later offense followed by a stayed sentence on the earlier offense, contrary to the chronological order required by section II.F. of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Three years after sentencing, Carey filed a postconviction petition seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the non-chronological sentences were illegal. The district court denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the sentences, though inconsistent with the guidelines, were consistent with the plea agreement that Carey had knowingly accepted, and therefore did not create a manifest injustice warranting withdrawal of the plea. The court also rejected an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because Carey made no allegation that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the alleged deficiency.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Eagan Economic Development Authority's petition to condemn three commercial properties in the Cedar Grove Redevelopment District using eminent domain and quick-take procedures to enable redevelopment funded by tax increment financing. The property owners objected, contending that the EDA lacked authority because the city's 2001 resolution adopting the redevelopment plan required a binding development agreement before any acquisition by eminent domain, and no such agreement had been executed. The district court granted the petition, finding a public purpose and necessity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the EDA exceeded the limited condemnation powers transferred to it by the city resolution, which expressly restricted takings until the agreement condition was met. The core reasoning was that the EDA could not unilaterally ignore or expand the express limits in the city's plan and resolution.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Blohm v. Kelly, a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation sued the majority shareholder and the corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary duties through excessive compensation and misappropriation of funds both before and after the sale of corporate assets, as well as denial of access to corporate records. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, deferring to a special litigation committee's recommendation against pursuing claims and finding insufficient proof of damages on the records claim. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment on the pre-sale breach claims but reversed on the post-sale breach claims and the records-access claim, reasoning that the special litigation committee's determination did not bar the post-sale allegations and that shareholders may pursue equitable remedies for denied records access without always proving damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Farhia Basal, who was convicted after a bench trial of wrongfully obtaining MFIP public-assistance benefits by failing to disclose ownership of multiple vehicles on her recertification application, causing her assets to exceed eligibility limits and resulting in over $4,900 in improper benefits. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that under the applicable version of Minnesota Statutes section 256J.20, subdivision 3, the value of a vehicle for asset calculations is not reduced by any outstanding loans secured by the vehicle. The court also ruled that a 2007 statutory amendment expanding vehicle-value exclusions does not apply retroactively to Basal's 2005 conduct. The majority rejected arguments that the statute was unconstitutionally vague or produced absurd results.

criminal law

The case involved a juvenile offender designated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) whose probation was revoked by the juvenile court after he turned 21, based in part on an allegation that he possessed a TASER weapon in violation of his probation conditions. Although revocation proceedings began before his 21st birthday, the specific weapon-possession violation was not alleged until months afterward. The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court lacked authority to revoke probation on the basis of a violation alleged after the offender turned 21. It reversed the revocation order and remanded for the juvenile court to determine whether the earlier-alleged violations were sufficient to support revocation.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two law firms over $31,000 in settlement proceeds from a client matter. After the Howells retained Leffert Jay to replace Olson as counsel and settled their case for $115,000, Leffert Jay transferred most of the funds out of its trust account per the clients' instructions, despite Olson having filed an attorney lien petition. Olson sued Leffert Jay and its attorney for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the conversion claim because Olson had not perfected his lien by filing with the secretary of state as required by statute, making it unenforceable against the defendants. However, it reversed summary judgment on the other two claims, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the parties had agreed that the funds would remain in escrow pending resolution of the lien.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a boundary dispute between adjacent lakeside property owners in Minnesota, where one side's predecessors had built and maintained a driveway and boat ramp on land that surveys later showed belonged to the other side. The district court found that the plaintiffs had established the boundary by practical location through long-term acquiescence but instead awarded them only a prescriptive easement over the disputed area and ordered them to pay the defendants the full fee-simple value of the land as damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that once a court determines a boundary has been established by practical location, it must give that boundary full legal effect by recognizing fee-simple ownership rather than substituting a lesser easement remedy. The court further held that the damages award was improper because it compensated the defendants for land to which the plaintiffs were already entitled as owners under the established boundary. The decision rests on longstanding Minnesota precedent requiring courts to enforce proven boundaries by practical location and limiting equitable remedies when a legal right has been shown.

property