Harriet Lansing

The case concerned a charge of reprisal discrimination brought by James Cannon against the Minneapolis Police Department after Cannon stated he would file a complaint about alleged racial discrimination during a 2006 incident at a towing facility where officers responded to a call. The Minnesota Commission on Civil Rights determined that the department had engaged in reprisal, awarded Cannon damages including $15,000 for mental anguish (which the commission doubled), imposed a civil penalty, and granted attorney fees. On appeal, the court affirmed the commission's finding of reprisal discrimination and its other rulings as supported by substantial evidence in the record, but modified the damages award because the applicable Minneapolis ordinance did not authorize multiplying mental-anguish damages. The court therefore reduced the mental-anguish award back to the original $15,000 amount while upholding the remainder of the judgment.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a lease offer from Seafood House to Starlite that included a strict six-day acceptance deadline, after which the offer would be void, along with a guaranty from Landry’s; Starlite accepted five days late, Seafood House occupied the premises and paid rent for years, but later stopped paying, prompting Starlite to sue Landry’s under the guaranty. The district court granted summary judgment to Starlite, ruling that Seafood House had waived the deadline through its conduct. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Minnesota law does not permit the waiver doctrine to extend the time for acceptance during contract formation, as this differs from waiving performance terms in an existing contract, and remanded for consideration of other potential theories such as a counteroffer.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a dispute over whether a receiver appointed during the foreclosure of a property owned by Kensington Equity Partners was obligated to pay Kensington's pre-existing delinquent utility bills to CenterPoint Energy. The district court granted summary judgment to the State Bank of Delano and the receiver, Swartz Brothers Associates, finding no such obligation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that under Minnesota's receivership statute for mortgaged property, a receiver must pay a mortgagor's debts only if they are necessary maintenance expenses or specifically required by the appointment order, and the past utility debt did not qualify as necessary for the property's continued operation since service was maintained without payment. Additionally, the receiver does not assume the mortgagor's contractual obligations or "step into its shoes" regarding pre-appointment debts.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a teacher who had attained continuing-contract status in a Minnesota school district, resigned, taught elsewhere for a year, and was rehired by the same district; the district then treated him as subject to a new one-year probationary period under Minn. Stat. § 122A.40, subd. 5(a) and declined to renew his contract at the end of that year. The teacher appealed, arguing that he retained continuing-contract status and could only be terminated for cause. The court affirmed the district's decision, holding that the statute's plain language requires a one-year probationary period in each district where the teacher is thereafter employed, including a district where the teacher previously completed the initial three-year probationary period, and that the teacher's resignation had terminated his prior continuing contract.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute over the duration of a father's child-support obligation after a Mississippi divorce decree was registered for enforcement and modification in Minnesota under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The parties' youngest child had turned 20, at which point Minnesota law would treat the child as emancipated and end support, but Mississippi law would continue support until age 21. The district court denied the father's motion to terminate support, and the court of appeals affirmed that ruling. The core reasoning was that Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(c) prohibits a Minnesota tribunal from modifying any aspect of a child-support order, including its duration, that could not be modified under the law of the issuing state. The matter was remanded for consideration of the father's additional requests for relief unrelated to the duration issue.

family lawprocedure

In Freeman v. Swift, former executives of a nonprofit operating a juvenile treatment facility sued a local activist for defamation based on blog posts and an email criticizing their conduct during efforts to relocate the facility. The defendants moved to dismiss under Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute, claiming immunity for speech aimed at procuring favorable government action in opposition to the project. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the communications were not genuinely aimed at government bodies because they targeted a university dean and personal blog audiences instead. The core reasoning centered on the purpose, audience, and nature of the statements, which failed to qualify for statutory immunity regardless of other defenses.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Johnson, Gary Johnson was convicted after a stipulated-facts trial of possessing child pornography under Minnesota statute based on a single image of an eleven- or twelve-year-old girl unclothed from the waist up. The district court found the image depicted sexual conduct because it was made or transferred for the purpose of the viewer's sexual stimulation. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction, holding that the plain statutory definition of sexual conduct requires the depicted act itself to show apparent sexual stimulation or gratification of a person in the image, not the response or intent of the possessor or viewer. The decision rests on statutory interpretation, emphasizing that the content of the material, rather than external context or the defendant's subjective reaction, determines whether the image meets the legal standard.

criminal law

In this case, a discharged salesman challenged the denial of unemployment benefits for certain weeks after his employment ended, during which he received commission payments for prior sales that exceeded his weekly benefit amount. The court affirmed the unemployment law judge's determination that the salesman was ineligible for benefits in those weeks. The core reasoning was that under Minnesota Statute § 268.085, subdivision 5(a), receipt of earnings equal to or greater than the benefit amount renders an applicant ineligible for that week, and the commissions were earned and paid during the weeks in question rather than being wages earned but unpaid at the time of discharge.

labor & employment

This case involved the City of Minneapolis imposing restrictive conditions on Gabby's Saloon and Eatery's existing Class B on-sale liquor license, including reduced occupancy, earlier closing times, and a management plan, based on neighborhood complaints about off-premises conduct by patrons such as littering, public urination, and disorderly behavior. Gabby's challenged the conditions, arguing that the city lacked statutory authority to impose them absent any violations or grounds to suspend or revoke the license and that the actions violated due process by relying on a vague "good cause" standard for customer conduct away from the premises. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the city's imposition of conditions violated Gabby's due process rights because the municipal code's good cause provision failed to provide adequate notice that off-premises patron actions could trigger adverse license action. The court further ruled that the city exceeded its express and implied legal authority, as no statute or ordinance permitted conditioning a previously issued license without a basis for suspension or revocation under state law. The decision was reversed, with other constitutional and MHRA claims deemed outside the scope of certiorari review.

business & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

In this tort case, Joan Krieger sued the City of St. Paul after tripping on a gouge in a temporary walkway at the North Dale Recreation Center, alleging negligence in maintenance and lack of warnings. The city moved for summary judgment based on recreational-use immunity under Minnesota statute, which generally shields municipalities from claims involving park and recreation property, subject to an exception for conditions that would make a private landowner liable to a trespasser. The district court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the gouge was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and whether the city had notice of the defect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a sidewalk gouge is not an inherently dangerous condition likely to cause death or serious bodily harm as a matter of law and that actual knowledge by the city was required but not shown, so the trespasser-liability exception did not apply. The court therefore remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the city.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved farmers who purchased a grain-moving system manufactured by Sukup from dealer Superior, experienced alleged damage to their corn, and faced a 2003 mechanic's lien action by Superior that was resolved through a settlement dismissing all claims between them. The farmers subsequently sued Sukup in 2007 on claims including breaches of warranties, negligence, strict liability, fraud, and violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act. Sukup obtained summary judgment from the district court on the ground that the prior settlement released it from liability as a joint tortfeasor, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Minnesota law requires the settlement to manifest an intent to release other tortfeasors and that a factual dispute existed over whether the farmers received full compensation for their injuries.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Portrice Williams was charged with second-degree assault and terroristic threats based on allegations that she drove at another woman in a parking lot while making threats. She rejected a plea bargain and instead entered a Norgaard plea to both charges, resulting in concurrent twenty-one-month sentences that were stayed with probation and workhouse time. Williams later petitioned for plea withdrawal on grounds that it was inaccurate, involuntary, and unintelligent, and alternatively sought to modify the sentence from a stay of execution to a stay of imposition. The court affirmed the denial of both requests, concluding that the record established a strong factual basis and Williams's acknowledgment of sufficient evidence for accuracy, no improper pressures for voluntariness, and her understanding of rights and consequences for intelligence, while finding no authority or facts justifying further sentence modification.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Andre Gilmore suing Walgreen Co. for negligence after he tripped over an empty pallet left near the customer-service counter in a store, sustaining injuries. The district court granted summary judgment to Walgreens on the ground that the evidence did not establish a duty to prevent the harm. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The court reasoned that a possessor of land owes invitees a duty to anticipate harm from a known or obvious condition if the possessor should expect that invitees might be distracted, and the evidence permitted a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that Walgreens employees should have anticipated the risk and taken preventive steps.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Sara Peck was charged with first-degree controlled-substance crime after police found 37.17 grams of bong water containing methamphetamine in her home, along with a small bag of the drug. The district court dismissed the first-degree charge for lack of probable cause, concluding that the bong water's weight could not be used to meet the statutory threshold of 25 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine. On the state's pretrial appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal. The court reasoned that Minnesota's controlled-substance statutes use a market-oriented mixture-weight system that applies to substances prepared for drug distribution or sale, not to post-use byproducts like bong water, which therefore does not qualify as a "mixture" under Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a.

criminal law

In State v. Campbell, the State of Minnesota appealed a district court ruling that dismissed charges against respondent Timothy Campbell for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1) (2002), after finding the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to his use of funds from joint accounts he held with his mother, who had been diagnosed with dementia. The case arose after Campbell, who held power of attorney allowing self-gifting, depleted the accounts, prompting charges that he intentionally failed to use the funds for her care. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair warning of prohibited conduct and includes an explicit mens rea requirement that the actor act intentionally. The court also declined to apply the rule of lenity, concluding the statute's language is not ambiguous as applied to the alleged conduct. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal law

The case involved a 15-year-old appellant who was driving a stolen vehicle and was charged with felony illegal possession of a firearm after a loaded revolver was found in the back seat and he admitted to briefly handling it. The appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession and that any contact was too fleeting to qualify as a crime under Minn. Stat. § 624.713. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Minnesota law does not recognize a fleeting-possession defense to illegal firearm possession and that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find knowing possession or dominion and control over the gun.

criminal lawguns

The case involved a challenge by Friends of the Riverfront and other plaintiffs to a proposed athletic facility on Nicollet Island, asserting claims under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), a contract claim based on a lease, and a request for declaratory judgment to disqualify the city-council president due to an alleged conflict of interest. The district court dismissed the suit, and the court of appeals affirmed. The MERA claim was barred by collateral estoppel because the same issues had been litigated and decided in prior city-council proceedings that were affirmed on certiorari review. The contract claim was not ripe because the city had not made an unconditional repudiation of the lease terms. The declaratory-judgment claim failed as a matter of law because Minnesota precedent requires a direct pecuniary interest for disqualification and because the claim rested on remote contingencies.

environmentprocedure

Jennifer Anderson was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct after pleading guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of other charges stemming from sexual contact with a minor she had counseled in a juvenile program. She appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty plea should be withdrawn because it was not voluntary and intelligent. The court determined that the district court did not impermissibly interject itself into plea negotiations and rejected certain ineffective-counsel claims, but held that counsel's advice to defer moving to withdraw the plea until after sentencing fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced Anderson by triggering a stricter post-sentencing review standard. The court therefore reversed and remanded to allow Anderson to pursue a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw her plea under the more lenient fair-and-just standard.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether the statute of limitations barred the state from prosecuting David Soukup for first-degree criminal sexual conduct based on acts committed against his stepdaughter between 1984 and 1987. The district court dismissed the complaint, interpreting the limitations statute to require an earlier report by the victim and finding that the charges violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the 1995 version of Minnesota Statutes section 628.26 applied and that the term "report the offense" referred to notification to law enforcement authorities, so the three-year extension after the 2006 report allowed timely prosecution. It further held that charging Soukup under the 1984 version of the criminal statute created no ex post facto violation despite a drafting error in the complaint's penalty reference.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved attorney Kevin Giebel filing financing statements claiming attorney liens on settlements of former clients represented by his ex-partner, seeking fees from the partnership split. The district court, applying Minn. Stat. § 545.05, removed the liens, barred Giebel from future filings, and awarded attorney fees to the clients. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 545.05 applies only to liens under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court reasoned that attorney liens, being created by statute rather than contract, are not governed by Article 9 and thus not subject to the expedited review process.

procedureproperty