Natalie Hudson

This case involved parents and children challenging the Minnesota Department of Health's collection, storage, and use of newborn blood samples for mandatory screening of genetic disorders without written informed consent. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the genetic privacy act as well as constitutional privacy and property rights, along with related tort claims such as intrusion upon seclusion and battery. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, and the court of appeals affirmed because the newborn screening statute authorized the department's actions, plaintiffs alleged no conduct outside that statute, and the claims depended on showing unlawful conduct that was not present.

healthcarecivil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved St. Croix Sensory Inc., a sensory laboratory that hires individuals as 'sensory assessors' to evaluate odors for its testing services, challenging a determination by the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development that these assessors were employees rather than independent contractors for purposes of unemployment taxes. The unemployment law judge had affirmed the department's finding that the company substantially controlled the assessors' work, but the court reversed on certiorari review. Applying a de novo standard to the undisputed facts, the court examined the totality of circumstances under traditional factors including the right to control the means and manner of performance, the right to discharge, provision of tools and premises, and mode of payment. It concluded that the assessors were independent contractors because they retained significant control over their work, selected their own sessions via an online system, were paid per session without hourly oversight, exercised independent judgment in evaluations, and the company faced liability upon early termination of sessions, outweighing countervailing factors like use of the company's facility and equipment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytaxes

In Nexus v. Swift, a nonprofit operating juvenile treatment facilities sued a local resident for defamation based on her public statements and online posts opposing the group's planned new facility, including claims that an employee had killed a youth in its care. Swift moved to dismiss under Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute, which shields speech aimed at influencing government action unless it amounts to a tort or constitutional violation. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the statute violated the plaintiff's rights to due process and a jury trial by requiring a pre-trial, pre-discovery determination of defamation by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court held that the anti-SLAPP statute is constitutional and does not infringe those rights, reversed the denial, and remanded for the district court to first assess whether the claims relate to protected public participation and then evaluate the defamation evidence under the proper standard for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.

free speechcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a general contractor who, after hiring a subcontractor for framing work on several projects, submitted fraudulent pay requests to lenders directing payments to his own separate entity instead of the subcontractor, resulting in the subcontractor not being paid. The subcontractor brought a civil action under Minn. Stat. § 514.02, subd. 1a, alleging theft of payment proceeds for improvements to real estate. The district court found liability after a bench trial and entered judgment for the subcontractor. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that the civil claim does not require a prior criminal conviction under the statute, applies even if the contractor owns the land, the funds received qualify as payments, and the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to the civil action.

business & regulatorypropertycriminal law

In these consolidated cases, defendants Knoch and Watson were each charged with fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine after police seized substances from their residences during searches. They jointly moved to dismiss the charges for lack of probable cause, arguing that positive results from field tests using the NIK Test U were insufficient without confirmatory laboratory testing. The district court denied the motion and certified the question to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that, depending on the facts of a case, evidence of a positive field test alone can establish probable cause for a controlled substance possession charge without a confirmatory test. The court reasoned that the sodium nitroprusside field test is a generally accepted scientific method for presumptive identification, with no indication of false positives in these circumstances and no legal requirement for a bright-line confirmatory testing rule.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Super, the defendant was convicted of second-degree intentional murder after a bench trial for shooting and killing a man during an altercation stemming from a romantic dispute. He appealed, claiming the district court violated his right to present a defense by refusing to grant use immunity to a key witness (who had invoked her Fifth Amendment rights) or to continue the trial pending her appeal, and that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove intent rather than an accidental discharge. The court held that the state committed no prosecutorial misconduct in declining immunity and that the witness's expected testimony would not have materially differed from her prior police statement, which was admitted at trial. It further found the evidence sufficient, as the circumstances proved—including the gun's strong trigger pull and safety features making accidental discharge unlikely—supported the inference of intentional firing from close range and were inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of accident. The conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, homeowner Troy Molde sued CitiMortgage after a foreclosure by advertisement on his Minnesota residence, seeking to void the sale on grounds that the attorney’s authority documents did not comply with recording requirements under Minn. Stat. § 580.05 and that CitiMortgage lacked the original note. The district court granted summary judgment to CitiMortgage, finding the foreclosure valid. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the 2004 Limited Power of Attorney recorded in Dakota County and the 2007 Notice of Pendency of Proceeding and Power of Attorney satisfied statutory requirements even though not filed in the tract index, and that Molde failed to raise genuine issues of material fact on the note or recoupment claims. The court also rejected the argument that additional discovery was required before summary judgment. The decision rested on de novo review of the record and interpretation of the foreclosure statutes.

propertyprocedure

This case involved claims by The Ryland Group, a home developer and general contractor, against Pioneer Engineering for professional negligence, contribution, and indemnification arising from alleged design and engineering defects related to drainage and water-table issues in homes built in the late 1990s; the homeowners association had sued Ryland, prompting Ryland's third-party claims against Pioneer. The district court granted Pioneer's motion for summary judgment but dismissed the claims without prejudice. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, holding that Ryland failed to establish a prima facie case because its expert affidavits did not adequately define or apply the applicable standard of care for engineers. It reversed the without-prejudice dismissal, however, reasoning that a merits-based summary judgment decision requires entry of judgment with prejudice, and remanded for that purpose.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Eller, the defendant was convicted after a stipulated-facts trial of gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI for refusal to submit to chemical testing and gross-misdemeanor fourth-degree assault, based on an April 2008 incident in which he drove at high speed through stop signs, swerved toward a squad car, struggled with and assaulted officers while intoxicated, and refused testing after a prior 2006 DWI conviction was noted. The district court found the defendant guilty on both counts and imposed sentence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence including the probable-cause section of the complaint was sufficient to establish the prior conviction as an aggravating factor and the refusal, that the sentence was not improperly influenced by extrajudicial statements, and that the record demonstrated proper application of the presumption of innocence and reasonable-doubt standard.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Timothy Grunow was eligible for unemployment benefits after quitting his parts-manager job at Walser Automotive Group to accept a similar position at another dealership. Grunow argued the new role offered substantially better terms, including no regular weekend work, overtime pay, a shorter commute allowing him to carpool with his wife, and the option to decline the employer's group health coverage. The unemployment-law judge and the court of appeals both concluded he was ineligible, holding that an objective comparison showed the new position paid roughly one dollar per hour less and required substantially higher monthly payments for family health insurance. The court emphasized that eligibility under the statute turns on objective employment terms and conditions, not on factors tied to an individual's personal or family circumstances.

labor & employment

The case involved Jeffrey Nelson challenging the revocation of his driver's license after a DWI arrest, where an initial blood sample was drawn using an expired test kit and the officer requested a second sample without providing another opportunity to consult counsel. Nelson argued that his limited right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution was violated by the denial of a third attorney consultation and that the implied-consent statute did not authorize a second blood draw. The court affirmed the revocation, concluding that Nelson's right to counsel had been vindicated by the two prior consultations provided and that the officer was permitted to request a second sample to address concerns about the expired kit's reliability. The reasoning relied on precedents holding that the right to counsel applies at critical stages before testing but does not require repeated consultations, and that additional testing is justified when the initial procedure is technically flawed without officer fault.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, appellant Carlos Dickerson, who was serving a federal prison sentence, challenged the denial of his postconviction petition after pleading guilty to first-degree assault in Minnesota state court. He argued that the state violated his rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) by not following its procedures when using a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to bring him to state court, and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise IAD claims. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the postconviction court's denial of relief, holding that the IAD did not apply because, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Mauro, a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer. The court reasoned that no detainer was filed, the proceedings were handled expeditiously without disrupting rehabilitation, and counsel could not be ineffective for omitting meritless arguments.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christopher Coker, who had been civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person, appealing a judicial appeal panel's denial of his petition for transfer, discharge, or provisional discharge from the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. Coker argued that the panel incorrectly required him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he met the criteria for release, rather than merely requiring him to introduce some evidence to shift the burden. The court held that under Minn. Stat. § 253B.19, subd. 2(d), the petitioner only bears the burden of going forward with evidence, after which the opposing party must show by clear and convincing evidence that commitment should continue. Because the appeal panel applied the wrong evidentiary standard, the court reversed the order and remanded for a new hearing applying the correct burden of production.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the mother appealed orders that reduced the father's monthly child-support obligation after their 2006 divorce, which had awarded her sole physical custody and set support at $1,107. The father sought modification under the revised child-support statute, which applies a parenting-expense adjustment based on each parent's scheduled parenting time under the existing court order. The court held that the statute counts parenting time according to the order's terms regardless of whether it is fully exercised, so the father's allotted vacation weeks were included, resulting in a 45-50% share that triggered a 50% adjustment and a guidelines amount of $760. The court also ruled that tax refunds are not added to gross income for support calculations. These changes created a presumption of substantially changed circumstances, justifying the downward modification, which the appellate court affirmed.

family law

In State v. Lussier, the State appealed the district court's suppression of evidence in a prosecution for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping, where police responded to a report of a naked, injured woman who identified the suspect and location. Officers entered the suspect's residence without a warrant after observing signs of a struggle in a nearby garage and fearing destruction of bodily-fluid evidence, arrested respondent Lussier, obtained a spontaneous statement from him in a squad car, and conducted a warrantless sexual-assault examination at the hospital. The court of appeals held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless home entry, so the squad-car statement was admissible and not the fruit of an unconstitutional search, but the genital examination was not a valid search incident to arrest and its results remained suppressed. The decision reversed the suppression order in part, affirmed it in part, and remanded the case.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Sopko, the defendant, a janitor, was charged with seven counts of gross-misdemeanor interference with privacy after installing a hidden video camera in a women's college locker room shower area that captured images of seven unclothed women. The district court convicted him on all seven counts following a stipulated-facts trial and imposed consecutive sentences. On appeal, the defendant argued that the statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.746, subd. 1(d), criminalizes only the single act of installing the device and thus supports only one conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute's plain language and purpose—to protect individual privacy in places of expected privacy—permit a separate conviction for each victim whose privacy is intruded upon, even when the installation occurs once. The court further noted that Minnesota law allows multiple convictions arising from a single behavioral incident when there are multiple victims, provided the sentences are not disproportionate to the culpability.

criminal law

The case involved a homeowner suing contractors for negligent construction leading to water damage and mold in his home. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the claim time-barred under Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations for construction defects, which began running when the plaintiff discovered the issues in 2002. The court also awarded sanctions against the plaintiff and his law firm for discovery misconduct, such as failing to properly disclose an earlier expert report that indicated potential problems. The appellate court affirmed these decisions, holding that the statute of limitations barred the claim and that the sanctions and costs awards were appropriate and within the district court's discretion.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case involved Ryan Turnbull, who was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 624.713 of being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm after a conservation officer saw him carrying one during hunting season; his ineligibility stemmed from a 2004 juvenile delinquency adjudication for dangerous-weapons offenses. Turnbull appealed, claiming the statute violated the Second Amendment and that his prior adjudication without a jury trial could not trigger the lifetime firearm ban. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the Second Amendment restricts only the federal government and does not apply to state statutes, and that Minnesota law expressly permits using non-jury juvenile adjudications to establish firearm ineligibility. The court noted that Turnbull had received all required constitutional protections in the juvenile proceeding, including notice, counsel, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

gunscriminal lawfederal power

The case involved a criminal charge against James Jay Gradishar, owner and manager of a bar, for carrying a pistol in a public place while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.7142. The district court dismissed the charge, interpreting 'public place' to exclude a person's place of business by adopting a definition from a related statute. On the state's appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the term 'public place' under section 624.7142 is ambiguous but should be given a broader meaning to include one's own business. The core reasoning focused on statutory construction principles, including legislative intent to promote public safety by limiting intoxicated firearm carrying, the rule of lenity, and the unreasonable consequences of a narrow exclusion that would undermine the statute's goals.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

In State v. Lopez, the defendant was charged with a first-degree controlled-substance offense and aiding and abetting kidnapping after a drug transaction involving a confidential informant and a juvenile led to their alleged confinement in a garage until a debt was paid. He pleaded guilty to the drug charge in exchange for dismissal of the kidnapping charges, but the district court later required him to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota Statute § 243.166 because the conviction arose out of the same circumstances as the kidnapping charges, which the court found were supported by probable cause. The defendant appealed, arguing that the charges did not share the same set of circumstances and that probable cause was lacking. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the broad statutory language of “arising out of the same set of circumstances” was satisfied by the connected events of the drug sale, debt collection, and confinement, and that the district court did not clearly err in finding probable cause for the kidnapping charges based on evidence of involuntary detention and the defendant’s participation.

criminal lawprocedure