Thomas Giles Kavanagh

This case involved a brokerage firm suing its customers to recover losses from selling stock on margin after the customers failed to meet a margin call. The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to federal securities laws and counterclaimed for damages claiming the broker should have sold earlier. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, holding it was a common-law debt action not subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, and that the broker's leniency on margins did not create liability to the customers who were responsible for monitoring their speculative account.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Donald Emmons, who was convicted of perjury after signing an assumed name certificate with a false name and swearing to its truth before a notary public. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the conviction on appeal. The court explained that perjury under the relevant statute requires an oath that is authorized or required by law, as established in prior precedents. It determined that neither the assumed name certificate statute nor its prescribed form requires or authorizes any such oath regarding the certificate's truth. As a result, the false statement could not support a perjury charge.

criminal law

This case involved furniture manufacturers from the Grand Rapids, Michigan area and their association suing a Warren, Michigan retail furniture store for unfair competition and infringement of a common-law trade name. The plaintiffs claimed that 'Grand Rapids' in connection with furniture had acquired a specific meaning denoting products from their factories, and sought to stop the defendants from using the name. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the defendants had engaged in unfair competition by misleading the public about a connection to Grand Rapids furniture makers. The court upheld an injunction limiting the defendants' use of the name unless they sold a substantial stock of actual Grand Rapids-area furniture, relying on prior precedent recognizing the trade name's value, a state statute prohibiting misleading corporate names, and equitable principles of fair competition that apply even to non-corporate entities and in the absence of direct competition for well-known names.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case arose from a 1964 car accident in which the defendant's truck struck a vehicle, killing Hattie Howell and injuring her daughter Anna Sue Collins; the decedent's husband, as administrator, brought a wrongful death action in Michigan circuit court seeking damages. Prior to this suit, the daughter obtained a federal court judgment against the same defendant for her personal injuries, establishing the defendant's negligence on identical facts. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on the negligence issue via collateral estoppel, but the trial court granted it only as to the daughter's interest and denied it for the remaining claims, citing lack of mutuality and privity. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial judge was not bound by strict mutuality requirements and instead had discretion to apply collateral estoppel based on equitable principles of justice, requiring consistent application across all parties if used at all; it therefore remanded for reconsideration of whether estoppel should bar relitigation of negligence for the entire wrongful death claim.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether the Detroit Department of Street Railways (DSR) was entitled to a refund of Wayne County property taxes on its facilities located outside Detroit city limits following a 1965 statutory amendment that eliminated the requirement to pay county taxes on acquired transportation utilities. The DSR sought refunds for portions of its 1964 taxes (paid before the amendment's effective date) and all of its 1965 taxes (assessed before but payable after that date), while the county argued that the amendment did not affect assessments made prior to its effective date and that a 1941 statute fixing tax status as of the assessment date controlled. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the DSR was not entitled to a refund of taxes paid before the amendment became effective but was relieved of liability for taxes that became payable afterward, even if the assessment date preceded the amendment. The court reasoned that the 1965 legislature intended to provide immediate relief from future tax payments and that prior legislation did not restrict the power of later legislatures to alter tax exemptions. The court also rejected the county's interpretation of the 1941 provision as applying only to changes in ownership or property status, not to new statutory exemptions.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a real estate broker suing the owners of a bar for a $5,000 commission under an exclusive listing agreement that expired on January 11, 1964. The broker produced a buyer whose offer differed on lease cooperation, non-compete terms, and payment amounts, but the parties met after the expiration date and the buyer dropped the first two objections; the deal failed only over the monthly payment schedule. A jury found for the broker, and the trial court denied the sellers' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sellers' own testimony showed they had waived or extended the deadline by arranging the meeting to complete the deal, that time was not expressly of the essence, and that the jury could properly resolve the remaining contractual dispute over payment terms. The court also noted that no directed-verdict motion had been made, so the JNOV ruling was procedurally proper.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In this case, plaintiff John Erickson sued Goodell Oil Company for negligence after being injured on the premises of a service station in 1964, alleging the company failed to maintain safe conditions. The defendant moved for accelerated judgment, arguing that it had absorbed the station's operations from Stuart Goodell and that Erickson was therefore its employee, making workers' compensation his exclusive remedy and barring the tort suit. The Michigan Court of Appeals majority reversed the trial court's grant of the motion, holding that no implied contract of hire existed because Erickson had not been notified of the business transfer and there was no evidence of his knowledge or consent to the change in employer. The court reasoned that an employment relationship under the workers' compensation statute requires mutual assent, which cannot be imposed unilaterally by an undisclosed transfer, leaving the defendant potentially liable as a third-party tortfeasor. The case was remanded for trial on the merits.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case arose from a 1959 rear-end car collision in which the defendant admitted liability, leaving only the amount of damages for property loss and personal injuries to be determined at trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,000, but the plaintiff appealed, challenging defense counsel's cross-examination and closing argument, the trial court's exclusion of oral testimony about medical expenditures for lack of receipts, the refusal of a jury instruction on lost earning capacity, and the denial of rebuttal medical testimony. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the exclusion of the plaintiff's testimony on medical costs was error because the best-evidence rule does not bar oral proof of expenditures that exist independently of any writing, while finding no reversible error on the remaining issues due to lack of timely objections and the trial court's proper exercise of discretion. The court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to the medical-expenditure question.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved defendant Eoger Johnson, an inmate at Jackson State Prison, who was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for stabbing fellow inmate Frank Clark; Johnson admitted the stabbing but claimed self-defense. On appeal, the court addressed claims of error in evidentiary rulings and the prosecutor's closing argument. The court held that it was improper to admit evidence of the defendant's prior prison infractions and misconduct, as the defendant had not placed his character in issue and specific acts of misconduct cannot be used to prove bad character or disposition. It was also error for the prosecutor to argue, and for the jury instructions to suggest, that the defendant bore the burden of proving all elements of self-defense, as this improperly shifted or minimized the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff employee who sued his employer for damages after being laid off, alleging that the layoffs resulted from the company subcontracting work to another firm in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that evidence of subcontracting was properly admitted and relevant, that the reason for subcontracting was irrelevant to the issues of whether subcontracting occurred and caused the layoff, that the plaintiff's amendment to the complaint related back to the original filing and was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that challenges to jury selection and the trial judge's impartiality lacked merit. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a prima facie case linking the subcontracting to the layoffs.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from an automobile accident lawsuit in which the plaintiff moved for a new trial after discovering that one of the jurors had given false answers on his voir dire questionnaire about prior family accidents, arrests, and lawsuits. The trial court denied the motion after questioning the juror, concluding that the plaintiff had not shown the juror held any preconceived prejudices or other disqualifying interests that impaired his ability to render a fair verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial, ruling that proof of false answers alone is insufficient and that the moving party must demonstrate either actual prejudice or that the juror would have been successfully challenged for cause or peremptorily excused had the truth been known. The court noted that the trial judge's factual findings on the juror's credibility were entitled to deference absent such a showing.

proceduretorts & liability

The case consolidated appeals from multiple defendants convicted of the misdemeanor of accosting and soliciting after bench trials in which the court did not advise them of any right to counsel. The defendants argued that the trial court had a duty to inform them of their right to counsel and to appoint counsel if they were indigent. The court held that neither the Michigan Constitution, statutes, nor court rules impose such a requirement in misdemeanor cases, unlike in felonies, and that no constitutional violation occurred by the failure to advise or appoint counsel for trial. It affirmed the convictions, noting that prior precedent addressed only appellate counsel and did not extend to trial representation in misdemeanors cognizable by a justice of the peace.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned several defendants who entered a Michigan State University building during a career carnival to distribute anti-Vietnam War literature and signs near a Marine Corps booth; after refusing a university official's order to remove their materials, they were convicted under Michigan's trespass-after-warning statute and a university ordinance prohibiting obstruction of facilities. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trespass convictions, holding that the statute requires an order to depart the premises entirely and does not apply when the objection is only to the defendants' signs and activities while their presence remains welcome. The court noted that the warning explicitly permitted the defendants to stay as guests if they ceased the prohibited conduct, distinguishing the facts from cases involving sit-ins or denial of access. A dissent argued that the order was reasonably understood as requiring departure and that the convictions should be affirmed.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved the second-degree murder conviction of Marvin Brannon for the killing of Ray Revels, which occurred after a gathering where alcohol and poker were involved. On appeal, Brannon argued that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence photographs of the victim's body taken in an alley, claiming they were immaterial and overly gruesome. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the photos were material to establishing the victim's death and that it resulted from unnatural causes, that they were not inflammatory, and that their admission fell within the trial court's discretion even if alternative evidence existed. The court noted that the defendant had not disputed those elements at trial and that the judge's instructions could mitigate any potential prejudice.

criminal law

The case involved a property owner in Warren, Michigan, who was assessed $4,762 as part of a special assessment district to fund off-street parking facilities and who paid the first installment under protest before suing the city for a refund and an injunction against further collections. The trial court granted the city accelerated judgment based on a charter provision requiring written notice of intent to sue within 60 days after confirmation of the assessment roll and commencement of suit within 90 days. The appellate court reversed, holding that the city's 60-90 day limitation was invalid because it conflicted with state statutes, including the general property tax law's requirements for protesting and suing within 30 days after payment and the six-year statute of limitations for personal actions under CLS 1961 § 600.5813. The court reasoned that municipalities lack authority to impose their own shortened limitations periods on access to courts without express statutory authorization, following precedents like Northrup v. City of Jackson.

propertyproceduretaxes

In Wells v. City of Southfield, the plaintiff challenged a special assessment for sewer installation that was confirmed by the city in December 1964, seeking to have the assessment declared invalid and to recover payments made under protest after the project was completed. The trial court granted the city's motion for accelerated judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to give written notice of intent to sue within 30 days and commence suit within 60 days after confirmation, as required by section 9.26(c) of the Southfield city charter. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial, holding that those charter provisions were invalid under the precedent of Smuczynski v. City of Warren and thus did not bar the suit. A dissent maintained that the validity issue had not been properly raised in the lower court.

procedureproperty

In Fisher v. Johnson Milk Co., the plaintiff sued the defendant milk company for negligence and breach of implied warranty after he slipped on ice while carrying milk bottles in a wire carrier purchased from the defendant, causing a bottle to break and cut his hand; he alleged the carrier was defectively designed without a false bottom to cushion impacts and that the defendant failed to warn of risks on slippery surfaces. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the facts did not create a jury question on improper design or proximate cause. The appellate court reversed, holding that the obligation to warn or safeguard against dangers from product use is tied to the standard of care and is generally a factual issue for the jury rather than a legal question resolvable on summary judgment, as reasonable minds could differ on the conclusions from the facts viewed favorably to the plaintiff.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved siblings suing their brother and sister-in-law to cancel a deed transferring their parents' farm, claiming it was procured through undue influence. The trial court set aside the deed, finding a confidential relationship that raised a presumption of undue influence which defendants had not rebutted, partly because their evidence about the deed's execution was excluded under the dead man's statute. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the dead man's statute does not apply in this context because the transaction was akin to a will contest and defendants must be permitted to introduce testimony about the circumstances to meet their evidentiary obligation. The court reasoned that applying the statute to bar such evidence while requiring defendants to disprove undue influence would lead to unfairness, especially given a subsequent statutory amendment limiting the rule's scope.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a garnishment action by Shelby Mutual Insurance against United States Fire Insurance to determine if a homeowners' policy covered parents' statutory liability under Michigan law for up to $500 in damages caused by their minor son's malicious acts. The son had stolen and damaged a car, leading to a judgment against the parents, but the insurer denied the claim based on policy exclusions for automobile use and property in the insured's control. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that coverage applied because the policy provided separate protection to each insured, so the exclusion was tested only against the parents' statutory liability rather than the son's direct conduct. The court reversed the trial court, reasoning that the parents' liability arose independently via statute and that exclusionary language must be strictly construed to favor coverage.

torts & liabilityfamily law

The case concerned the Michigan State Highway Commission's authority to sell excess land acquired for highway purposes while imposing restrictive covenants prohibiting billboard advertisements on the property. Plaintiff Central Advertising Co., an outdoor advertiser, challenged the restrictions as exceeding the commission's statutory powers under laws authorizing the sale of unneeded land 'on whatever terms' deemed proper. The court held that the commission lacked authority to impose such covenants, as the statutes granted power to convey fee simple title to the land itself but not to retain negative easements or lesser rights in the conveyed property, and a separate statute specifically addressed billboard regulation to meet federal requirements. The decision reversed the lower ruling, finding the restrictions unenforceable without explicit or implied statutory support.

business & regulatorypropertyfederal power