Robert J. Danhof

This case concerned whether Scio Township's vote to incorporate as a charter township under 1947 PA 359 automatically allowed the township board to levy up to five mills in property taxes pursuant to the charter township act, or whether the Headlee Amendment (Const 1963, art 9, § 31) required a separate voter approval to exceed the township's prior 1.16-mill limit. The township placed two ballot proposals before voters: one on incorporation and a second purporting to cap the new charter township's millage at 1.16 mills. The Court of Appeals held that approval of incorporation alone adopted the five-mill authority and rendered the second proposal invalid; because the invalid second proposal was so closely linked to the first that it likely misled voters about the tax consequences, the court voided the election results on both proposals. The majority reasoned that the natural meaning of the Headlee Amendment and the charter township act did not require an additional vote to authorize the statutory rate upon incorporation, and that the misleading ballot language necessitated setting aside the entire election rather than severing only the second proposal.

taxeselections

This case concerned a post-divorce dispute in which the mother sought a change in physical custody and child support for the parties' son after he moved in with her shortly before turning 18, while the father argued that support could not extend past the age of majority. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order requiring the father to pay $500 per month in support until the child graduated high school, as well as the change in custody. The majority held that the original divorce judgment was defective for failing to specify support obligations, that MCL 552.17a expressly permits support beyond age 18 in exceptional circumstances, and that the Age of Majority Act does not override that authority. The court further ruled that any procedural errors in the ex parte orders were harmless because the father received a full hearing afterward. A dissent would have followed prior precedent barring post-18 support.

family law

The case involved a former high school student suing her teacher for damages from a sexual relationship that occurred while she was a student between 1970 and 1974. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the limitations period is tolled under Michigan's insanity provision when the victim repressed memories of the abuse such that she could not comprehend her legal rights and there is corroborating evidence like the defendant's admission of the relationship. The court reasoned that this narrow rule balances concerns about stale claims with the need to allow valid actions to proceed when repression and corroboration are shown.

proceduretorts & liability

In Castillo v. Alexander, the plaintiff sued for serious impairment of body function from a 1983 multicar collision, the case was mediated under MCR 2.403 yielding a $2,000 award accepted by all parties, and the plaintiff soon sought to revoke her acceptance and proceed to trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for entry of judgment based on the mediation award. The court reasoned that MCR 2.403 allows 28 days for parties to consider and notify the clerk of their initial acceptance or rejection, but does not permit rescission of an acceptance once filed, as principles of finality make the original election binding; any premature notice of unanimous acceptance by the clerk was harmless error that did not affect the parties' decisions.

proceduretorts & liability

In People v. Richard Johnson, the defendant was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery and pleaded guilty to being a third-felony offender; the sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing his prior convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and assault with intent to commit murder to be used for impeachment if he testified. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was preserved for review and that the trial court did not err under MRE 609 and the standards from People v. Allen. The majority reasoned that the probative value and prejudicial effect of the convictions were relatively balanced, the convictions were only somewhat similar to the charged offense, and the defendant's version of events was adequately presented through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses without his testimony. A dissent argued that the prejudicial effect was high given the assaultive nature of the priors and that the defendant's testimony was important to his fabrication defense, warranting reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether school maintenance and custodial employees were eligible for unemployment benefits during a one-week layoff from December 26, 1982, to January 1, 1983, a period when they had previously worked under their collective bargaining agreement even though students were on break. The Michigan Employment Security Commission Review Board denied benefits under MCL 421.27(i)(2)(b), finding the layoff occurred during an established and customary vacation or holiday period, but the circuit court reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding that the statutory denial period applies only when employees lack a tradition or contractual obligation to work during the period in question, and that the employees' reasonable expectation of employment meant their layoff did not qualify as an established vacation or recess under the statute. The court distinguished prior precedent and construed the disqualification narrowly in favor of claimants who had worked the prior week and returned immediately after the layoff.

labor & employment

The case involved a dispute over a plaintiff's entitlement to a share of an October 1985 lottery jackpot after the Bureau of State Lottery changed its game from weekly Saturday drawings to twice-weekly drawings, which caused his subscription for fifty-two drawings to expire before the winning draw. The plaintiff claimed breach of contract, arguing that the membership card's stated ending date of November 23, 1985, created a binding term for Saturday-only drawings that could not be unilaterally altered without consent. The court affirmed summary disposition for the Bureau, holding that the subscription contract provided for a fixed number of drawings rather than specific dates or formats, that changes to game rules were authorized by statute and binding on all participants, and that the plaintiff received the full benefit of fifty-two consecutive drawings as agreed. The court further reasoned that the ending date was merely for player convenience, the rule change was prospective and not unconscionable, and attempted notice to the plaintiff's address satisfied the Bureau's obligations.

business & regulatory

In Collins v. Department of Corrections, an inmate sought a declaratory judgment applying Martin v. Dep’t of Corrections retroactively to invalidate his prior final major misconduct adjudications and appealed a pending misconduct violation based on a policy directive. The court affirmed limited retroactive application of Martin, which held that prisoners are members of the public so prison disciplinary directives must be formally promulgated as rules under the Administrative Procedures Act. It rejected full retroactivity because Martin was not a new rule requiring only prospective effect, the rule's purpose did not necessitate invalidating past adjudications to protect against wrongful findings, reliance interests and the disruptive impact on the administration of justice (including effects on good-time credits for thousands of prisoners) weighed against it, and due process considerations prevented recharacterizing the pending charge under other rules.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a divorce proceeding between the plaintiff wife and defendant husband, where the wife appealed the trial court's judgment that awarded no alimony to either party. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision on alimony, holding that it should have been awarded to the plaintiff, and remanded the case for a determination of the appropriate amount. The court reasoned that the relevant factors, including the plaintiff's limited earning capacity due to health issues and lack of recent employment, the disparity in the parties' incomes, the standard of living during the marriage, and the defendant's violent conduct during the marriage, all weighed in favor of awarding alimony to the plaintiff.

family law

The case involved a dispute over assets in the estate of William J. McNerney, where his daughter, as personal representative, sued his second wife to recover life insurance proceeds and credit union funds allegedly obtained through undue influence, while the wife counterclaimed for various spousal allowances and status as a pretermitted spouse under the probate code. A jury found undue influence, leading the probate court to include the assets in the estate, grant the wife pretermitted spouse rights and certain allowances, but deny a widow's allowance and prejudgment interest. The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the central issue of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the probate court had concurrent jurisdiction under MCL 700.22 to resolve title disputes and undue influence claims when ancillary to estate settlement, expanding beyond prior limits in the probate code. The court also clarified rules on interest awards under MCL 700.767, finding they apply only to claims and counterclaims, and rejected offsets between unrelated requests for interest and allowances.

family lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Fremont Township and property owners over whether a zoning ordinance permitted a single mobile home to be placed on five acres of commercially zoned land for residential use. The township sought to enjoin the defendants from maintaining the mobile home, arguing it violated commercial district restrictions that only allowed mobile home parks. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary disposition in favor of the township, holding that a general provision in the ordinance allowing one mobile home on five acres meeting size requirements applied to commercial districts due to language referencing exceptions "as otherwise provided in this Ordinance." The court reasoned that this interpretation gave effect to all provisions and resolved ambiguities in favor of the property owner.

property

The case involved a medical malpractice claim by plaintiff Hazelton against defendant Lustig for alleged misdiagnosis of an arteriovenous malformation in the thoracic spine. The circuit court granted summary disposition to Lustig under MCR 2.116(C)(7), concluding that the two-year statute of limitations under MCL 600.5805 and MCL 600.5838 had expired because Lustig's last professional treatment occurred on February 11, 1981, making the May 1983 complaint untimely. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, determining that affidavits and documentary evidence created a material factual dispute over whether Lustig provided additional treatment or consultation in June 1981, which would have rendered the filing timely. The court remanded for further proceedings on that factual issue and on whether treatment by a codefendant could be imputed to Lustig based on partnership or agency principles.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff injured in a motorcycle collision with an uninsured driver who sought uninsured motorist benefits under his mother's insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau. The insurer denied coverage under the policy's owned-vehicle exclusion, arguing that the plaintiff's motorcycle was an uninsured automobile he owned. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, concluding that a motorcycle was not an automobile under the exclusion. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the policy broadly defined automobile to include a motorcycle as a land motor vehicle and that the exclusion was clear, unambiguous, valid, and enforceable. The case was remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the insurer.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In People v. Benda, the defendant pleaded guilty to the unlawful manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a mixture containing 50 to 225 grams of cocaine under Michigan law. The trial court imposed a sentence of life probation that included a condition of one year in county jail. The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority by adding the jail term. The court reasoned that MCL 771.3(3) expressly bars the application of general probation conditions, such as jail time under subsection (2), to sentences of life probation, and that the statute's specific prohibition controls over any broader grant of judicial discretion in subsection (4). The case was remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, parents David and Yasmin Proffitt sued Dr. Bartolo, alleging that his failure to properly diagnose and inform them about rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy prevented them from choosing to terminate the pregnancy, resulting in the birth of their daughter Maya with severe congenital defects including microcephaly, blindness, and mental retardation. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims, including the parents' wrongful birth claim for their expenses and emotional distress as well as the child's wrongful life claim for her own damages. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, allowing the parents' wrongful birth claim to proceed because such claims have been recognized in Michigan since 1981 and remain valid absent legislative or Supreme Court action, while affirming the dismissal of the child's wrongful life claim on the grounds that creating such a cause of action is more appropriately left to the Legislature or the Supreme Court.

healthcareabortionfamily lawtorts & liability

The case arose when several counties applied to the Secretary of State for certification as self-insured entities under the no-fault insurance act but were denied because they owned fewer than twenty-six vehicles, a threshold drawn from the financial responsibility act. Plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, later forming a group self-insurance pool under 1982 PA 138 and seeking only a declaration that the vehicle minimum did not apply to no-fault self-insurance. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, ruling that the two statutes were not to be read in pari materia and that an actual controversy existed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutes share the common purpose of ensuring compensation for accident victims, must be construed together, and therefore require compliance with the twenty-six-vehicle minimum for individual self-insurance certification under the no-fault act; it also found that declaratory relief was appropriate because an actual controversy remained.

business & regulatory

The case involved a corporation suing its fire insurer after a fire destroyed its inventory, with the insurer refusing payment on grounds that the president and largest shareholder had set the fire. The jury returned a verdict for the insurer, finding that the president was involved in the arson and that his control over the corporation allowed his actions to be attributed to it, barring coverage. The court affirmed this decision, holding that an insurer may deny a claim where the arsonist shareholder exercises complete dominance and control over the corporation, even without sole ownership, based on principles that prevent profiting from wrongdoing and allow piercing the corporate veil when appropriate. The evidence supported findings of the fire's incendiary origin, the president's motive and opportunity.

business & regulatorycriminal lawproperty

This case involved a plaintiff who became totally and permanently disabled from muscular dystrophy while working as a carpet cutter and who sought disability pension benefits from an ERISA-governed pension fund after his claim was denied for insufficient employer contributions under the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The trial court granted summary disposition to the defendant, ruling that benefits were not due under the plan's express terms, that fiduciary-duty claims belonged exclusively in federal court, and that estoppel was unavailable. On appeal the plaintiff challenged only the estoppel ruling; the court held that state courts lack jurisdiction over equitable-estoppel claims to recover ERISA benefits because such claims fall outside the narrow concurrent-jurisdiction exception in 29 USC 1132(a)(1)(B) and instead arise under provisions granting exclusive federal jurisdiction. The decision rested on ERISA's broad preemption clause, its allocation of jurisdiction, and the need to safeguard plan solvency by preventing circumvention of federal standards. The portion of the judgment denying benefits under the plan terms was left undisturbed.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

The case involved the termination of parental rights of Vincent Keifer's biological father, respondent Phillip Dick, after the child had been placed in the care of the Department of Social Services following abandonment reports and prior termination of the mother's and legal father's rights. The probate court granted permanent custody to the state and terminated the respondent's rights based on evidence presented at hearings in 1984 and 1985. The appeals court reversed the termination order as to the respondent, holding that clear legal error occurred when he was not advised of his right to counsel at the initial adjudicative hearing he attended and when counsel was not appointed for him during the subsequent evidentiary hearings on the permanent custody petition, in violation of mandatory juvenile court rules. The court noted that the respondent never waived his right to counsel and that his eventual appointment of an attorney came after the key hearings where evidence was taken.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted after a second trial of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and unarmed robbery, stemming from an incident where he assaulted a woman who had accepted his offer of help with a disabled car and then took her money and paycheck. The defendant argued on appeal that the jury instructions on unarmed robbery were flawed because they did not require the jury to find larcenous intent at the time of the force or assault and did not clarify that force used only for the sexual assault would not suffice if the taking was an afterthought. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that, because the defendant did not object to the instructions at trial, reversal was appropriate only upon a showing of manifest injustice, which was not established, and therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal law