The case involved a contract dispute over construction of a cannabis cultivation facility, in which the general contractor sought arbitration for alleged nonpayment and an order allowing it to suspend performance. The arbitrator issued an interim order granting preliminary injunctive relief, but the Superior Court judge denied confirmation on the ground that only final awards are confirmable under the Massachusetts Arbitration Act. A single justice of the Appeals Court vacated that ruling, concluding that courts have authority to confirm certain interim arbitration orders, and remanded for further consideration. The Appeals Court dismissed the property owner's appeal, ruling that the single justice's interlocutory remand order was not appealable to a full panel.
In this case, plaintiffs Paul and Joyce Aspell sued their neighbors, the Raads, seeking to claim title by adverse possession or alternatively a prescriptive easement over a strip of land between their properties in Natick, Massachusetts. After a jury-waived trial where the parties waived detailed findings of fact, the trial judge ruled that the Aspells had established adverse possession only over a small triangular portion near their swimming pool but not over the larger disputed area, and denied the prescriptive easement claim entirely. The Aspells appealed, arguing the decision lacked a rational basis in the evidence. The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment, holding that under the deferential standard of review applicable due to the waiver of findings, the record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's determinations regarding the elements of adverse possession and prescriptive easement.
The case Commonwealth v. Carlos Cuba concerned whether fingerprint evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and breaking and entering a motor vehicle. The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, holding that a single partial fingerprint on the victim's car doorframe was sufficient to prove identity because the evidence permitted the inference that the defendant left it during the crime and ruled out any reasonable possibility that he touched the car at another time. The court further concluded that the expert witness's testimony, which improperly described the fingerprint match in terms of scientific certainty, did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in light of the extensive cross-examination addressing the limitations of fingerprint analysis.
The plaintiff, a student with learning disabilities, sued Ross University School of Veterinary Medicine after his dismissal from the veterinary program, claiming that the school had promised but failed to provide required accommodations during his clinical rotations at a partner institution. He asserted claims under the Consumer Protection Act (G.L. c. 93A), for misrepresentation, and for breach of contract. A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to Ross, finding the 93A and misrepresentation claims barred by the statute of limitations and no evidence of a breached contract. The Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal of the 93A and misrepresentation claims because they accrued no later than the 2017 dismissal and were filed in 2022, but reversed on the breach of contract claim, holding that the plaintiff's evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ross had promised accommodations that extended to the clinical year.
The case involved Sunpin Energy Services seeking a special permit from the Petersham Zoning Board of Appeals to construct a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system on private land, which required clearing about 14 acres of forest. The board denied the permit by a 2-1 vote, with the dissenting member citing incompatibility with the town's general welfare and state policies discouraging solar projects in forests, despite the project complying with zoning bylaws. The Land Court upheld the denial on summary judgment, but the Appeals Court reversed, holding that the board exceeded its authority because the use is protected under G.L. c. 40A, §3, permitted by special permit, and meets all local requirements, making the denial improper.
The case involved Kristian Maraj's appeal from his Superior Court conviction for reckless operation of a motor vehicle, which stemmed from a high-speed police chase that ended in a crash into a house. Maraj challenged the trial judge's refusal to exclude the sole Black juror from the random selection of alternates, arguing it violated his constitutional rights to a fair jury, and also claimed error in the jury instructions describing two elements of the offense as self-explanatory. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, holding that state law under G.L. c. 234A, § 68 mandates random selection of alternates without judicial discretion to deviate based on race, and that this process did not infringe on the right to a jury from a fair cross-section of the community. The court further found no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice from the instructions, given the overwhelming evidence that Maraj operated a vehicle on public ways.