Judge, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2025-08-28
The case involved a mother who left her four-day-old twins at a hospital under Maryland's Safe Haven Act, directing that they be placed out of her care and declining to provide her name. The local department took custody and petitioned the juvenile court to find the twins children in need of assistance (CINA) based on neglect. The mother argued that her actions did not constitute neglect and that the Act's immunity from civil liability prevented such a finding. The juvenile court rejected these arguments, found the twins to be CINA after a disposition hearing, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The court reasoned that neglect occurred when the mother failed to make herself available to care for the twins at discharge, and that the Safe Haven Act's immunity provision did not preclude a CINA neglect determination because doing so would eliminate the legal mechanism for providing required care and services to the children.
family law
Cutchember v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2025-06-02
In this case, Lance Cutchember was stopped by police in January 2023; based solely on the odor of cannabis, officers searched his vehicle and found MDMA and related paraphernalia, leading to charges and a conditional guilty plea after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. The new statute CP § 1-211, effective July 1, 2023, bars vehicle searches based only on cannabis odor and excludes resulting evidence, but the search here predated that date while the suppression hearing occurred afterward. The Appellate Court affirmed the denial of suppression, holding that the statute applies only prospectively and that the operative date for its applicability is the date of the search rather than the later hearing. The court reasoned that the statute creates a new substantive right against such searches along with an exclusionary remedy expressly tied to violations of that right, so no violation could occur before the right existed, consistent with its prior decision in Kelly v. State.
criminal lawprocedure
Lewis v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2024-06-27
The case involved Cameron Darnell Lewis, who was convicted after trial of drug possession with intent to distribute and related offenses stemming from a traffic stop. On appeal, Lewis challenged the jury verdict's validity due to the use of 'yes' rather than 'guilty' or 'not guilty' on the verdict sheet, the trial court's refusal to ask a proposed voir dire question about medical conditions, the delivery of an accomplice liability jury instruction, and the qualification of a police officer as an expert on drug slang and street value. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the convictions, determining that the verdict was properly announced, polled, and hearkened; the voir dire issues were either unpreserved, covered by a catch-all question, or harmless; evidence supported the accomplice instruction as an alternate theory; and the officer's training and experience qualified him as an expert.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Fabien
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2023-09-05
The case involved Kory J. Fabien, who was charged with multiple counts including manslaughter by vehicle under CR § 2-209 after causing a head-on collision while driving under the influence of alcohol, resulting in the stillbirth of a viable fetus carried by a passenger in the other vehicle. The trial court dismissed the charges related to the death of the fetus, and the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed that dismissal. The court held that CR § 2-103, which governs manslaughter of a viable fetus, applies to prosecutions under CR § 2-209 but requires the state to prove that the defendant knew or had reason to know the victim was pregnant, an element the state could not establish based on the undisputed facts. The court also rejected the defendant's challenge to the timeliness of the state's appeal, ruling that no thirty-day limit applied to entering a nolle prosequi when some but not all counts had been dismissed.
criminal lawprocedure
Hinton v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2023-03-29
In Hinton v. State, the defendant, while on probation from a prior armed robbery conviction, was arrested on firearm possession charges and entered a nolo contendere plea to an amended count in Prince George’s County Circuit Court. The Montgomery County Circuit Court then held a violation of probation hearing, admitting docket entries and a transcript from the plea proceeding, and found that Hinton had violated probation conditions by failing to obey all laws and obtain permission to possess a firearm, resulting in revocation and a six-year sentence. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed, holding that although the nolo contendere plea itself and the defendant’s statements during the plea process are inadmissible in a probation revocation hearing, other evidence such as the prosecutor’s proffer of facts constitutes admissible hearsay that can support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. The court reasoned that probation revocation proceedings are not bound by the reasonable doubt standard or strict evidentiary rules, and the trial court did not rely on the improperly admitted plea, making any error harmless. The decision also clarified that a nolo contendere plea does not immunize a probationer from violation findings based on properly admitted evidence from the proceeding.
criminal lawprocedure
Brown v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2021-09-02
The case involved Dru Darren Brown, who was convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor and thirty-one counts of second-degree sexual offense, second-degree rape, and third-degree sexual offense for repeatedly assaulting his girlfriend's teenage daughter in their Maryland home. Brown appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of force or threat of force for the assaults after the first one and that his incriminating statements to Tennessee detectives should have been suppressed as involuntary under Maryland common law because they were induced by improper promises. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported a finding of threat of force for all assaults because the perpetrator's repeated modus operandi, combined with his role as a father figure, physical size, and the isolated setting, was reasonably calculated to create a genuine and reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm in the victim's mind. The court further held that the detectives' statements offering to "help" and indicating Brown would not be arrested by them did not constitute improper promises of special consideration or no prosecution, so the statements were voluntary and properly admitted.
criminal lawprocedure
Meek v. Linton
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2020-04-29 · cited 1×
The case concerned a dispute over guardianship for Lois Hansen, an elderly woman with dementia, after her daughter Marybeth Meek sought to move her to a long-term care facility using powers of attorney, prompting her son Thomas Linton to petition for guardianship of the person and property. The circuit court found no less restrictive alternative existed that was consistent with Hansen's welfare and safety, determined good cause to bypass Meek's statutory priority, and appointed Linton as guardian of the person and a neutral third party as guardian of the property. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed these rulings, defining good cause as a substantial reason that the lower-priority appointee would better serve the ward's best interests and concluding that the trial court's factual findings on family conflicts and financial transactions were supported by the record.
family lawproperty
Lasko v. Lasko
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2020-04-01
In this divorce case, husband Andrew Lasko filed for absolute divorce and related relief, while wife Amanda Lasko filed an answer requesting that the court determine and value marital property and grant her all relief to which she was entitled under the Family Law Article. The trial court granted Amanda a $35,000 monetary award, but Andrew appealed, arguing that Amanda had not properly pleaded a request for such an award. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that Amanda's answer sufficiently set forth a claim for a monetary award under Md. Code § 8-205(a) by explicitly seeking valuation of marital property and all available relief under the Family Law Article, thereby providing Andrew with notice. The court further noted that under Md. Rule 2-323(g), a claim placed in an answer may be adjudicated if justice so requires, and observed that Andrew had used nearly identical language in his own amended complaint.
family lawprocedure
Conagra Foods RDM, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2019-06-27 · cited 2×
This case concerned whether Maryland could tax the income of ConAgra Foods RDM, Inc., a non-domiciliary corporation and wholly owned subsidiary (Brands), based on its parent company's business activities in the state. The court upheld the tax assessment, finding substantial evidence that Brands lacked economic substance as a separate entity under the four factors from Gore and SYL: dependence on the parent for income, circular cash flow, reliance on the parent for core functions, and absence of meaningful separate activity. It affirmed the Comptroller's use of a blended apportionment formula under TG § 10-402 to reflect income attributable to Maryland rather than the standard three-factor formula, which would have yielded zero. The court also upheld the Tax Court's waiver of interest on the unpaid taxes, concluding that uncertainty in the evolving case law from 2003 to 2014 provided reasonable cause supported by affirmative evidence.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
ConAgra Brands v. Comptroller
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2019-06-27
The case involved a challenge by ConAgra Brands, a foreign wholly owned subsidiary, to a Maryland income tax assessment on its royalty income derived from trademarks licensed to its parent and related entities doing business in the state. The court upheld the assessment, finding that Brands lacked economic substance as a separate entity based on its dependence on ConAgra for income and functions, a circular flow of funds, and absence of independent substantive activity, consistent with precedents in Gore and SYL. It further held that the Comptroller properly modified the standard three-factor apportionment formula to a blended one to accurately reflect Maryland income and that the Tax Court acted within its discretion in waiving interest due to uncertainty in the applicable case law from 2003 to 2014.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
Campbell v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2019-03-29
The case concerned Clyde Campbell's criminal trial in which his family was excluded from the courtroom for three to three-and-a-half hours during part of voir dire and the entire jury selection and swearing-in. The Court of Special Appeals held that this closure was not de minimis under the three-factor test from Kelly v. State, implicated the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, and was not justified because the trial court failed to consider alternatives under Waller v. Georgia; it therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. The court also ruled that the defendant's Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary, holding that awareness of all possible subjects of questioning is irrelevant to that determination under Colorado v. Spring.
criminal lawprocedure
Campbell v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2019-03-29
In Campbell v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by excluding his family from the courtroom during a portion of voir dire and the entire jury selection and swearing-in process, which lasted three to three and a half hours, and that his Miranda waiver was invalid because he was not informed of all possible subjects of questioning. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Applying the three-factor test from Kelly v. State, the court found the closure was not de minimis because of its length and the importance of jury selection proceedings to public confidence and fairness, and it was not justified under the Waller v. Georgia test since the trial court considered no alternatives; the Miranda claim was rejected under Colorado v. Spring, as awareness of all questioning topics is irrelevant to a knowing and voluntary waiver.
criminal lawprocedure
Syed v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2018-03-29
The case concerned Adnan Syed's post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses in the 1999 death of Hae Min Lee, based on claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to contact alibi witness Asia McClain and by not adequately challenging cell tower location evidence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial, but on the ground that counsel's failure to investigate the potential alibi witness violated Syed's Sixth Amendment rights, rather than on the cell tower claim. The court also held that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the proceedings or exceeding the scope of the prior remand order, as doing so served the interests of justice and judicial economy under Maryland law. The decision emphasized the presumption of reasonable trial strategy but concluded Syed met his burden on the alibi issue.
criminal lawprocedure
Syed v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2018-03-29 · cited 9×
This case involves Adnan Syed's post-conviction petition challenging his convictions for first-degree murder and related offenses in the 1999 killing of Hae Min Lee, based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of a new trial, though on different grounds: it held that counsel's failure to contact potential alibi witness Asia McClain constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington that prejudiced Syed, while rejecting the cell-tower evidence claim and finding no abuse of discretion in reopening the post-conviction proceedings. The court reasoned that the remand order permitted consideration of additional claims and that Syed overcame the presumption of reasonable trial strategy regarding the alibi investigation. It emphasized that the interests of justice supported hearing all related claims together.
criminal lawprocedure
Grandison v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2017-11-29 · cited 1×
In 1983, Anthony Grandison was convicted in Maryland state court of two counts of first-degree murder and related charges arising from a contract killing, resulting in death sentences, and he also received a federal life sentence for related offenses. After Maryland abolished the death penalty in 2013 and Governor O'Malley commuted the death sentences to life without parole in 2015, Grandison filed motions to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the commutations exceeded the governor's authority under the Maryland Constitution, lacked proper application or notice, and violated the state ex post facto clause. The circuit court denied relief, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the governor's pardon power under Article II, Section 20 is plenary (except in limited cases like impeachment), that the notice requirement is not a condition precedent, and that the commutation did not increase the sentence or effect a retroactive change in law under statutes in effect at the time of sentencing. The court rejected other claims as not cognizable in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
criminal law
Grandison v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2017-11-29
The case involved Anthony Grandison, who was convicted in 1984 in Maryland state court of two counts of first-degree murder and related charges stemming from a 1983 contract killing, resulting in death sentences plus consecutive terms of life and twenty years. After the state repealed the death penalty in 2013, Governor O'Malley issued a 2015 executive order commuting the death sentences to life without parole; Grandison then filed successive motions under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) to correct what he claimed were illegal sentences, arguing the governor lacked authority to commute without an application, violated notice rules in the state constitution, and infringed ex post facto protections. The Court of Special Appeals held that the governor's pardon and commutation power under Article II, Section 20 of the Maryland Constitution is plenary (except in impeachment cases), that the constitutional notice provision is not a condition precedent, and that the commutation did not increase Grandison's punishment or effect any retroactive statutory change that would violate Article 17. The court therefore affirmed the circuit court's denial of relief on both motions.
criminal lawprocedure
Duffy v. CBS Corp.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2017-05-31 · cited 8×
In Duffy v. CBS Corp., the personal representative of James F. Piper sued CBS Corporation, successor to Westinghouse, alleging that Piper's mesothelioma resulted from asbestos exposure while working near the installation of a turbine generator at a Maryland power plant in 1970. CBS moved for summary judgment, arguing that Maryland's statute of repose barred the claim because more than twenty years had passed since the turbine became operational. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the motion, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that the statute of repose prevents claims accruing after the twenty-year period, Piper's claim accrued upon his 2013 diagnosis, and the later-enacted manufacturer's exemption could not revive the already-barred claim without violating CBS's vested constitutional rights.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Brice v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2015-11-25 · cited 12×
Jovan Maurice Brice was convicted in the Circuit Court for Harford County of illegal possession of a regulated firearm after a traffic stop led to a search of his vehicle and residence, during which a handgun was recovered. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to ask prospective jurors specific questions about police witnesses during voir dire. The court also ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause because the officer observed Brice turn without signaling while the officer was directly behind him. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, with guidance provided on the remaining issues for retrial.
criminal lawgunsprocedure
Immanuel v. Comptroller of the Treasury
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2015-11-25 · cited 1×
This case involved Henry Immanuel's Maryland Public Information Act request to the Comptroller of the Treasury for a sorted list of the top 5,000 unclaimed property accounts held for 24 months or more. The Comptroller denied the request as prohibited disclosure of individual financial information under GP § 4-336(b). After an initial circuit court order and a prior appeal in Immanuel I directing compliance with the Abandoned Property Act's disclosure rules, the circuit court on remand ordered a modified request limited to accounts received within 365 days valued at $100 or more, without value sorting or other financial details, and vacated its prior sealing order. Immanuel appealed, arguing the circuit court failed to follow the appellate mandate and erred in unsealing the record. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the modified order aligned with the prior mandate and that unsealing was proper under the presumption of open records, lack of required findings in the seal order, and the decision to publish Immanuel I.
business & regulatoryprocedureproperty
Mason v. State
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · 2015-11-24 · cited 2×
The case involved Sharon Marie Mason's conviction for perjury in a bench trial after she testified falsely at her fiancé's DUI trial that she had been driving the vehicle when stopped by police and that they had switched seats. The circuit court found her guilty based on the trooper's testimony that the fiancé was driving, supported by dashboard camera video showing no seat switch and the fiancé exiting the driver's side. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence satisfied Maryland's two-witness rule for perjury because the trooper provided direct contradictory testimony corroborated by independent video evidence. The court distinguished prior cases requiring stricter corroboration and concluded the material facts were sufficiently proven without needing a second witness.
criminal lawprocedure