This case involved an appeal by Richard and Beverly Wanex challenging a garnishment proceeding in which Provident State Bank attached funds in a checking account to satisfy a judgment against them on defaulted business loans. The account was opened under a trade name for Richard Wanex's sole proprietorship selling and repairing tractor trailers, with his daughter Renee authorized to sign checks and make limited withdrawals despite receiving only a small salary. The Circuit Court for Dorchester County refused to quash the writ of attachment and entered a judgment of condemnation, which the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the account belonged solely to Richard Wanex as the business owner, with no vested ownership interest held by Renee based on her limited use of the funds and lack of personal deposits, and that the lower court's findings were not clearly erroneous under the applicable rules of procedure. It also addressed but rejected arguments regarding the need for prior service of process on the judgment debtors before garnishment.
The case concerned a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum served on Maryland National Bank for an individual's 1981 bank records as part of a Medicaid Fraud Control Unit investigation. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the subpoena because, under United States v. Miller, a depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records voluntarily conveyed to the bank. The court noted that Maryland precedent requiring banks to treat account information as confidential absent legal compulsion did not alter this result when a valid grand jury subpoena was involved.
The case involved an appeal by Gregory Bernard Roberts after his 1981 convictions in Kent County Circuit Court for first-degree rape, carrying a dangerous weapon, daytime housebreaking, and attempted theft. Roberts raised three issues: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance to allow additional testing, erred in admitting evidence from a dog scent lineup, and erred in refusing to compel production of certain laboratory reports. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the denial of a continuance did not meet the established criteria for an abuse of discretion, that the dog lineup evidence was reliable and properly admitted after a hearing, and that the discovery provided to the defense was adequate with no further compulsion required.
The case involved Terry W. Miller's appeal from his convictions for first-degree rape, robbery with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, and attempted first-degree sexual offense based on an incident in October 1980. Miller raised three issues on appeal: systematic exclusion of young adults from the jury panel violating his right to an impartial jury, failure to bring him to trial within 180 days as required by Maryland Rule 746, and admission of testimony from a witness whose name was not disclosed in advance under Rule 741. The court affirmed the judgments, determining that the trial began on the 180th day after defense counsel's appearance when properly computed under Rule 8, that the defense had sufficient opportunity to address the witness after a recess, and that the testimony was cumulative.
The case concerned whether a prior civil judgment against Irving and Ray Klein and their plumbing companies for unfair trade practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act barred a subsequent criminal prosecution of Ray Klein for bribing plumbing inspectors. The Circuit Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that bribery is not an unfair trade practice under the Act because the statute's detailed definitions of such practices do not mention or imply bribery or its elements. It further concluded that double jeopardy and res judicata did not apply, as the civil action did not decide any issues related to bribery and the two proceedings involved different offenses and facts.
The case concerned Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society's attempt to disclaim coverage for its insured, Dr. Gerald Miller, in a medical malpractice suit arising from lens implant surgery that left patient Mrs. Feulner blind in one eye; the insurer alleged breach of the policy's cooperation clause due to the doctor's backdating of informed consent forms and inconsistent statements. The Superior Court of Baltimore City ruled that the disclaimer was improper and ordered full coverage, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. The core reasoning was that Maryland law (Art. 48A, § 482) requires an insurer to prove actual prejudice from any lack of cooperation before disclaiming liability, which Medical Mutual failed to establish given its early knowledge of the facts and continued defense of the claim.
