Peter B. Krauser

The case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit by Joao Barbosa and his wife against Dr. Tanisha Osbourne, alleging that the doctor negligently cut Mr. Barbosa's bile duct during gallbladder removal surgery. Dr. Osbourne raised a contributory negligence defense based solely on Mr. Barbosa's delay in seeking treatment for his symptoms before receiving any care from her or other providers. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred in allowing this defense, in instructing the jury on contributory negligence, and in using a special verdict sheet that included it, because a patient's pre-treatment conduct is irrelevant to whether a physician breached the standard of care. The court further ruled that these errors were not harmless and required reversal, remanding the case for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved charges against Donte Graham for possession and attempted distribution of cocaine in Baltimore City. After Graham requested discovery regarding drug testing records from the Baltimore City Crime Lab in District Court and the case was transferred to Circuit Court upon his jury trial demand, the circuit court dismissed the charges on the trial date due to the State's failure to provide the requested discovery. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ruled that while the circuit court had discretion to impose sanctions for the discovery violation under Maryland Rule 4-262, it abused that discretion by choosing the drastic remedy of dismissal instead of a less severe sanction like a continuance, and therefore vacated the judgments and remanded the case.

criminal lawprocedure

Curtis Maurice Lopez entered Alford pleas to the robbery and first-degree murder of Jane McQuain and the kidnapping and first-degree murder of her eleven-year-old son William. He received multiple sentences including two consecutive life terms without parole. On appeal, Lopez argued that the State failed to provide adequate notice under Maryland Rule 4-342(d) of the evidence it planned to present at sentencing and that the court erred in allowing a victim-impact music and video slideshow depicting the victims' lives. The Court of Special Appeals held that the State's disclosure was inadequate but caused no unfair prejudice to Lopez at sentencing, and that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video. The court therefore affirmed the judgments.

criminal lawprocedure

Jan Crystal sued Midatlantic Cardiovascular Associates, St. Joseph Medical Center, and Dr. Mark Midei for medical malpractice, intentional misrepresentation against Dr. Midei, and fraudulent concealment against SJMC, alleging that a stent implanted in his left anterior descending coronary artery was unnecessary. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the fraud claims for lack of supporting evidence and then dismissed the malpractice claims as time-barred under the statute of limitations, since the fraud allegations did not toll the period. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that Crystal presented no evidence of fraudulent statements or concealment that could sustain the fraud claims or extend the limitations period for malpractice.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Kevin Collini, who was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County of first- and second-degree assault arising from a physical altercation with his neighbor. On appeal, Collini challenged the trial court's remedy for a Batson violation during jury selection—seating a properly struck prospective juror rather than the improperly struck one—and raised a sentencing issue regarding consideration of his invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to silence. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court erred in its chosen remedy for the Batson violation. The court reasoned that alternative remedies were available, such as seating the improperly struck juror, restarting the jury selection process, or impaneling a new venire, and that seating a properly struck juror impaired the defendant's right to exercise peremptory strikes, constituting reversible error. This ruling rendered the sentencing issue moot.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether CashCall, Inc. and its president operated as a 'credit services business' under the Maryland Credit Services Business Act (MCSBA) by marketing, facilitating, and ultimately purchasing high-interest loans for Maryland consumers from out-of-state banks. The Commissioner of Financial Regulation investigated consumer complaints, determined that CashCall had arranged over 5,000 such loans without a required license and in violation of state interest rate limits, and issued a cease-and-desist order plus civil penalties. The circuit court reversed the Commissioner's order, but the Court of Special Appeals reinstated it. The appellate court reasoned that CashCall qualified as a credit services business because it assisted consumers with loan applications and received direct compensation through origination fees ultimately paid by those consumers, regardless of the intermediary bank structure used to originate the loans.

business & regulatory

This case concerned whether a 22-year-old adult living in the policyholder's household qualified as an "insured person" under the policyholder's Allstate personal umbrella policy after negligently causing a car accident that injured the appellants. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued a declaratory judgment that the individual was not covered, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The court interpreted the policy's definition of "insured person," which included "any dependent person in your care, if that person is a resident of your household," and applied factors such as the individual's age, full-time employment, lack of legal or supervisory responsibility from the policyholder, and temporary living arrangement to conclude he was neither a dependent nor in the policyholder's care. The decision rested on the plain meaning of the policy language and the factual record from depositions and discovery.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a long-term tenant in federally subsidized housing whose landlord sought to terminate her lease for violations and evict her via a breach-of-lease action in district court. After the tenant demanded a jury trial in circuit court on grounds that the amount in controversy exceeded $15,000, the circuit court struck the demand, calculated the value of her possessory interest based only on the remaining months of her current lease term, and remanded the case. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that because the lease automatically renewed for successive one-year terms unless terminated for good cause, the tenant's right to possession was indefinite. The court therefore ruled that the amount in controversy must be measured by multiplying the annual fair market rent by the tenant's remaining life expectancy, which exceeded the $15,000 threshold and entitled her to a jury trial.

propertyprocedure

The case involved two competing restaurant chains, where A Guy Named Moe, LLC challenged the Annapolis Board of Appeals' approval of Chipotle's application for a special exception to open a restaurant nearby. Moe's petition for judicial review in circuit court was dismissed on the ground that Moe's lacked standing as it did not pay taxes on its leased property. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that Moe's, as a foreign LLC whose right to do business in Maryland had been forfeited, was barred from maintaining any suit in the state under Corporations and Associations Article §4A-1007(a) during the entire 30-day period for filing under Maryland Rule 7-203(a), rendering its petition void. The court further noted that even if Moe's qualified as a person aggrieved under Land Use Article §4-401(a), the filing deadline had expired before its rights were restored.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Jones v. State, Tyshon Jones was charged with first-degree murder, armed robbery, robbery, use of a handgun in a felony, and second-degree murder with intent to inflict serious bodily harm for his alleged role in the robbery and shooting death of Julian Kelly. A jury acquitted him of first-degree murder, second-degree murder with intent to inflict serious bodily harm, armed robbery, and robbery, but could not reach a verdict on first-degree felony murder and the handgun charge, leading to a mistrial on those counts. The State then sought to proceed on second-degree felony murder based on first-degree assault plus the handgun charge, and the trial court ruled over Jones's objection that these were pending charges. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that second-degree murder with intent to inflict serious bodily harm and second-degree felony murder based on first-degree assault constitute the same offense under the required evidence test for double jeopardy purposes because all elements of the former are included in the latter.

criminal lawprocedure

In this consolidated criminal case, Dijon McClurkin and Tavon Jackson were jointly tried and convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of attempted first-degree murder and related offenses, including handgun violations and conspiracy to murder, arising from a shooting incident and subsequent efforts to influence the victim's testimony via recorded jail calls. The Court of Special Appeals addressed claims that admission of the jail call recordings violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, that one call constituted inadmissible hearsay against McClurkin, that evidence was insufficient for Jackson's convictions, and that sentencing errors occurred regarding merger of reckless endangerment and multiple conspiracy counts. The court held that the calls were nontestimonial and thus did not violate confrontation rights, that any hearsay error was harmless, that evidence supported Jackson's convictions for attempted murder, handgun use, reckless endangerment, and firearm possession, and that only one conspiracy existed. It affirmed all of McClurkin's convictions but vacated Jackson's sentence for reckless endangerment and two of his three conspiracy convictions and sentences, leaving intact his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to murder.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a Baltimore City employee, Stinyard Blue, who was injured by a coworker, Antonio Arrington, while both were on the job performing city duties. Blue received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed a negligence lawsuit against Arrington in circuit court, but the court granted a motion to dismiss based on a provision of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (CJP § 5-302(c)) that bars local government employees from suing co-employees for tortious acts within the scope of employment when the injury is compensable under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. On appeal, Blue challenged the statute on equal protection grounds under the U.S. Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights, as well as under Article 19 (access to courts) and its interaction with Labor and Employment § 9-902(c), but the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The court reasoned that the provision does not violate equal protection because it applies uniformly to the class of local government employees and serves a rational purpose of protecting taxpayers, reasonably restricts but does not abolish court access given the workers' compensation alternative, and that Blue failed to properly brief any argument regarding statutory ambiguity or conflict.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a medical malpractice claim by Philip Powell, as personal representative of Beatrice Powell's estate, against radiologist Dr. Alex Wurm. Powell alleged that Dr. Wurm failed to exercise appropriate care during an inferior vena cava filter placement procedure, perforating the vein wall and depositing the filter outside the vessel, which required additional surgery. The circuit court dismissed the action, finding the expert report insufficient under the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, which requires a certificate of qualified expert and an accompanying report. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the certificate and report could be considered together and that they adequately identified the physician, stated the breach of the standard of care, and explained how it proximately caused the injury with sufficient detail.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over child custody and visitation rights between divorced parents Michael D. and Roseann B. regarding their daughter Emily. After the mother alleged sexual abuse by the father during supervised visits, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found by a preponderance of the evidence that the father had sexually abused the child, awarded sole custody to the mother, and denied the father any visitation. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held that the preponderance standard was appropriate for such findings under Family Law § 9-101 and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying even supervised visitation based on the evidence of abuse and credibility determinations.

family law

This case involved David Bord suing Baltimore County and two police officers after they allegedly damaged his collection of firearms and a cannon while executing a search and seizure warrant at his home. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the officers due to immunity absent malice and granted judgment for the county based on governmental immunity, finding the claims were common law torts. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that Criminal Procedure Article § 1-203(d) does not provide a civil cause of action for money damages for property damaged during warrant execution, and that governmental immunity applied to bar the claims. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying amendment of pleadings or imposing discovery sanctions.

criminal lawprocedurepropertytorts & liability

In State v. Jones, the Court of Special Appeals addressed whether Corey Jones could vacate his 1999 guilty plea to using a minor to distribute heroin through a 2012 writ of error coram nobis petition, after that conviction had served as a predicate for a federal enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act for firearm possession by a felon. The circuit court granted the petition and vacated the conviction, finding the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The appellate court reversed, ruling that laches barred the petition because Jones had unreasonably delayed seeking relief during the nine years he remained eligible for post-conviction remedies, resulting in prejudice to the State by impairing its ability to respond or retry the case.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Jones, Corey Jones filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in 2012 seeking to vacate his 1999 guilty plea in Maryland circuit court to using a minor to distribute heroin, claiming the plea was not knowing and voluntary; the conviction had been used as a predicate to enhance his federal sentence for firearm possession under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The circuit court granted the petition and vacated the conviction, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed on the State's appeal. The court held that laches barred relief because Jones unreasonably delayed challenging his plea for over thirteen years after his conviction and sentence, despite having been eligible for post-conviction relief during that time, and the delay substantially prejudiced the State by impairing its ability to retry the case due to faded witness memories and lost evidence. The opinion distinguished prior precedent on the timing of post-conviction statutes and noted that unjustified delay in pursuing available remedies can support a laches bar to coram nobis.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Seward, the defendant was convicted in 1985 of first-degree rape and related offenses following a bench trial; more than 25 years later, after prior postconviction efforts were denied, he filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered payroll records that he claimed undermined the victim's identification. The circuit court granted the petition and ordered a new trial. On the State's appeal, the Court of Special Appeals first held that the State possesses a statutory right to appeal from the grant of an actual-innocence petition. It then vacated the lower court's order, ruling that the circuit court had applied an incorrect standard and that Seward had not exercised due diligence, because the records could have been obtained through a subpoena duces tecum at or shortly after trial or within the time permitted by Maryland Rule 4-331. The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Mario Sibug was charged in 1999 with multiple counts of assault and related handgun offenses arising from an incident involving his children. After being found incompetent to stand trial and committed for treatment, he was later deemed competent, entered a plea resulting in conviction (later vacated), and was retried and convicted in 2008. On a belated appeal, Sibug argued that his due process rights were violated because the trial court failed to formally determine his competency before the retrial and erred in finding him competent at sentencing. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that no judicial competency determination was required under Maryland law since the issue was not raised before or during trial, and that the court properly addressed the matter at sentencing based on the record and observations. The core reasoning centered on the application of Criminal Procedure Article sections 3-104(a) and (c), which limit mandatory competency hearings to situations where the issue is timely raised.

criminal lawprocedure

In 1999, Mario Sibug was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with multiple counts of assault, reckless endangerment, and related handgun offenses arising from an incident involving his children. After initially being found incompetent and committed for treatment, he was later deemed competent, entered a plea, had his conviction vacated on post-conviction grounds, and was retried and convicted in 2008. On belated appeal, Sibug contended that his due process rights were violated by the lack of a formal competency determination before the retrial and that the trial court erred in finding him competent at sentencing. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that no pretrial judicial determination was required because competency was never raised before or during trial under Md. Code Crim. Proc. § 3-104(a), and that the sentencing court properly considered the record, prior evaluations, and its own observations before concluding Sibug was competent.

criminal lawprocedure