The case involved Daniel Kelliher's claims against Target National Bank for allegedly violating the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act by sending monthly billing statements containing debt collection language and by retaining a third-party debt collector without informing it that Kelliher was represented by counsel, after Kelliher had notified Target of his representation. Target moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that federal law required the statements and that it had no duty to notify the collector. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the allegations, taken as true, stated plausible claims under the FCCPA because the statements and indirect collection efforts could constitute prohibited communications, and federal requirements did not necessarily shield the conduct.
This case concerned an appeal by the State of Florida Department of Revenue from a bankruptcy court order that enjoined the State and the debtor's ex-spouse from enforcing a claim for unpaid child support against the debtor after confirmation of his Chapter 11 plan. The bankruptcy court had determined that the confirmed plan, which included provisions treating late-filed claims as adjudicated on the merits, barred enforcement of the support obligation. The district court reversed, holding that domestic support obligations are nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code regardless of plan confirmation or discharge language, and that a bankruptcy court's rulings on the amount or existence of such obligations do not bind state courts in post-discharge enforcement proceedings under Eleventh Circuit precedent such as In re Diaz. The court noted that the State had actual notice of the bankruptcy but did not participate before the claims bar date or confirmation, yet this did not alter the nondischargeable nature of the debt.
In this case, Verizon Trademark Services, LLC and Verizon Licensing Company, Inc. sued Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., directNIC, LLC, and Domain Contender, LLC for cybersquatting under the Lanham Act, alleging unauthorized registration and use of Verizon-related domain names. The defendants, Louisiana entities, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in the Middle District of Florida. After the defendants submitted affidavits contesting any Florida contacts, the court granted the motion, holding that Verizon failed to establish jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute or to show that exercising jurisdiction would comport with due process. The court's reasoning centered on the absence of systematic and continuous business activity or an office in Florida by the defendants, along with minimal forum-state interest in the dispute.
This case involves a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Suomen Colorize Oy, a Finnish corporation, against DISH Network L.L.C. and related entities in the Middle District of Florida, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,277,398 concerning methods for providing services in telecommunications networks. The defendants moved to transfer the case to the District of Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that Colorado is the center of gravity for the litigation due to the location of relevant witnesses, documents, and operations. The court granted the motion to transfer, concluding that the convenience of the parties and witnesses, access to sources of proof, and interests of justice strongly favored transfer to Colorado over the plaintiff's choice of forum in Florida. The decision was based on declarations showing that the bulk of evidence and key personnel are located in Colorado.
This case involves a dispute between borrower CFBP, LLC and lender U.S. Bank over a commercial mortgage agreement on an industrial warehouse property in Florida. After a 2008 fire damaged part of the building, the parties disagreed on the handling and disbursement of approximately $7.8 million in insurance proceeds for restoration, with CFBP alleging the Bank breached by failing to release funds and the Bank counterclaiming for breach of the mortgage terms. The court denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment on CFBP's claims and its own counterclaims. The core reasoning was that genuine issues of material fact remain, including whether the Bank committed the first material breach of the agreement's insurance proceeds provisions and whether CFBP satisfied conditions for fund release, and the Bank did not address CFBP's affirmative defenses.
This case involves plaintiff Douglas, who was born abroad to non-citizen parents, became a lawful permanent resident, and obtained derivative U.S. citizenship in 1981 when his mother naturalized while he was a minor. Despite this, ICE detained him in 2006 for removal proceedings based on prior criminal convictions, after agents reviewed his A-file and criminal records showing him as an alien and after he had previously conceded alien status in earlier proceedings. Douglas sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging false imprisonment, claiming he informed agents of his citizenship but was still held without legal authority. The court granted summary judgment to the United States on the relevant counts, finding that Douglas failed to show a triable issue that the detention lacked legal authority because ICE agents had probable cause to believe he was removable based on available records and the circumstances at the time. The decision rested on the conclusion that the agents' actions were supported by objective facts indicating removability, even if later evidence confirmed his citizenship.