Joy Moore

In Ladd v. Ladd, the dispute centered on whether assets owned by Jesse Ladd at his death were part of a revocable living trust he created before marrying Mary Ladd or instead belonged to his probate estate, where Mary could claim a share through her dower rights and renunciation of the will. The McCracken Circuit Court granted declaratory judgment largely in Mary's favor, finding that Jesse had not transferred most assets into the trust and that Mary had not violated the trust's no-contest clause. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings that certain assets remained outside the trust because Jesse retained possession and control and that Mary's request for judicial interpretation did not trigger the no-contest provision, but reversed other portions of the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court applied Kentucky trust law principles requiring actual transfer of property into the trust and strictly construed the no-contest clause to permit construction of its terms without breach.

family lawproperty

In Taylor v. King, the Estate of Christina Vertz sued a bar and its owner under Kentucky's Dram Shop Act after a patron who had been served large quantities of alcohol caused a fatal car crash. The trial court dismissed the Estate's claim for punitive damages against the bar, relying on prior precedent interpreting the Act as barring such recovery. The appellate court agreed that the statute implicitly prohibits punitive damages but concluded that this limitation violates the jural rights and separation-of-powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. The court therefore held the Dram Shop Act unconstitutional to the extent it prevents punitive damages and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.

torts & liability

The case involved a medical services provider, William C. Eriksen, P.S.C., who filed a counterclaim against Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company seeking interest on allegedly late personal injury protection payments under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act after the insurer sued to recover an overpayment. The Hardin Circuit Court dismissed the counterclaim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Eriksen lacked standing to bring a direct action under the MVRA. The court reasoned that, following the 1998 repeal of the assignment provision and the precedent in Neurodiagnostics, Inc. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., medical providers are incidental beneficiaries without a direct cause of action against insurers, even when seeking statutory interest penalties rather than benefits assignment. The cross-appeal was dismissed as interlocutory.

procedurehealthcarebusiness & regulatory

In Rollins v. Commonwealth, the defendant pled guilty to multiple arson and related charges in 2000 and was sentenced to ten years, with the judgments noting that the amount of restitution would be determined later. Nearly seven years after sentencing and after the defendant had completed his sentence, the Commonwealth moved to set restitution at over $183,000, which the trial court granted without a full evidentiary hearing or compliance with statutory timelines. Rollins appealed, contending the court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution at that late date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that KRS 532.032 and 532.033 require the amount of restitution to be set at the time of sentencing and that any post-sentencing restitution must follow the strict procedures of KRS 431.200, including a verified petition within ninety days, which the Commonwealth did not do. The court further determined that the omission in the original judgment was a substantive judicial error rather than a clerical one correctable at a later time.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Arvid Howell, who was indicted for first-degree robbery after an incident at his workplace where he kicked a co-worker while wearing steel-toe shoes during a dispute over stolen items. The trial court instructed the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of first-degree robbery, and the jury convicted Howell of second-degree assault. On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that second-degree assault was not a lesser-included offense under the circumstances because the indictment did not allege use of a dangerous instrument and the statutory elements of the two crimes do not overlap in a way that permits the instruction. The court found the erroneous jury instruction constituted palpable error resulting in manifest injustice, as it allowed conviction on an unindicted charge without proper basis.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, David Hamilton was convicted by a jury of wanton first-degree assault after his infant son suffered subdural hematomas and retinal hemorrhaging, which the Commonwealth attributed to shaken baby syndrome based on expert testimony. The trial court admitted the SBS evidence without holding a Daubert hearing to evaluate its scientific reliability, despite the defendant's pretrial motions and supporting materials questioning the methodology, and it also instructed the jury on second-degree assault as a lesser-included offense. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the failure to conduct the Daubert hearing was error and that the lesser-included instruction was improper because second-degree assault requires intent while the charged offense was based on wanton conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

In Veltrop v. Commonwealth, the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to first-offense DUI under KRS 189A.010 after a breath test taken about 71 minutes after she stopped driving showed an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. She challenged the constitutionality of KRS 189A.010(2), arguing that the statute's provisions on the admissibility of test results taken more than two hours after driving violate separation of powers by improperly amending the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Veltrop lacked standing to raise the constitutional claim because her test result fell well within the two-hour window, so subsection (2) had no application to her case and caused her no injury. The court explained that a party must suffer a concrete, particularized injury traceable to the challenged statutory provision to have standing under Kentucky and federal precedents.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two sisters, Diana Smith and Denica McCurdy, over whether Diana was entitled to a share of the proceeds from a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit against a nursing home for the alleged maltreatment of their deceased mother. Denica, as executrix of the mother's estate, had filed and settled the suit, which included claims for wrongful death and personal injury, but Diana received none of the proceeds. The court affirmed the dismissal of Diana's claim, reasoning that under Kentucky law only the personal representative can maintain a wrongful death action, with limited exceptions not applicable here, and that the settlement did not establish a recoverable wrongful death claim that would require distribution to beneficiaries like Diana.

family lawproceduretorts & liability

In Bailey v. Bailey, a divorcing couple disputed the duration of a maintenance award after settling other issues, with the trial court extending maintenance for four years beyond the child's high school graduation, conditioned on the child attending college full time. The Court of Appeals held that this extension was improper and vacated the final four years of the award. The core reasoning was that parents have no legal obligation under Kentucky law to support an emancipated child, including for college expenses, and that maintenance duration cannot be based on such expenses any more than the amount of maintenance can, as established in Atwood v. Atwood. The court affirmed the monthly maintenance amount and the initial eight-year duration tied to the child's minority.

family law

The case involved Kenneth Capshaw's appeal of his convictions on five counts each of second-degree rape and second-degree sodomy, stemming from a sexual relationship with a twelve-year-old victim. The Monroe Circuit Court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison after a jury trial. Capshaw challenged the admission of certain evidence under KRE 412, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and claimed insufficient evidence, but the appellate court found no reversible errors in the trial proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence, including DNA analysis linking Capshaw to the offenses, was sufficient to support the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure