Tom Emberton

The case concerned Arnold W. Carter's appeal from the Bourbon Circuit Court's denial of his motion to intervene as a matter of right under CR 24.01 in a lawsuit filed by Jamie D. Smith against the Bourbon County Board of Education alleging multiple violations of the Open Meetings Act. The underlying suit challenged actions at a December 19, 2002, meeting where the Board accepted Carter's resignation as superintendent and entered a consulting contract with him, and the circuit court had issued a temporary injunction blocking further payments under that contract. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial, ruling that the motion was timely filed, that the action could practically impair Carter's ability to protect his contractual interests, and that neither Smith nor the Board adequately represented those interests.

procedure

Dan Hallahan sued The Courier-Journal under Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 344 for disability discrimination after he developed a back injury from new physical duties involving lifting newspaper bundles following a 1998 restructuring of delivery operations. Hallahan claimed the employer failed to accommodate his restrictions, denied him promotions, issued reprimands, and ultimately took adverse actions against him due to his condition. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the employer and dismissed the complaint, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Hallahan failed to establish a prima facie case because he did not prove he was disabled under the statute, as his impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity such as working, even under either the direct-evidence or McDonnell Douglas circumstantial-evidence frameworks.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned whether a domestic violence order (DVO) under Kentucky law could be reissued after expiration without evidence that new acts of domestic violence or abuse had occurred during the prior period. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed the circuit court's decision and held that a DVO may be reissued under KRS 403.750(2), which permits renewal for additional periods up to three years with no limit on the number of reissuances. The court reasoned that the statute does not require proof of subsequent acts of abuse and instead allows parties to present testimony regarding the significance of any lack of incidents during the order's effectiveness, while the original finding that abuse may recur can support renewal. The district court had reissued the DVO based on the petitioner's ongoing fear and the history of severe prior abuse and violations, which the appeals court found sufficient.

family law

In Marksberry v. Chandler, an inmate at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex challenged a prison disciplinary finding that he committed physical action against another inmate, resulting in 15 days of disciplinary segregation, by filing a petition for declaration of rights alleging due process violations under the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions, including insufficient evidence from confidential sources and denial of a witness. The Oldham Circuit Court dismissed the petition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Marksberry lacked a protected liberty interest because, under Sandin v. Conner, short-term disciplinary segregation does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life, and prison regulations did not create a liberty interest in this context. The decision relied on precedents establishing that such penalties and related procedural claims do not trigger due process protections absent a qualifying liberty interest.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a foreclosure action filed by Citizens Bank of Northern Kentucky against the Bennetts and their property after they defaulted on a loan; Citizens Bank named PNC Bank as a defendant because PNC held a prior recorded mortgage on the same property. After serving the complaint on a branch manager at PNC's Northern Kentucky location, PNC failed to respond, leading the trial court to enter a default judgment that declared PNC's lien null and void and ordered the property sold. PNC later moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing improper service, but the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that service on the branch manager qualified as proper service on a managing agent under Kentucky civil rules because it was reasonable to expect the manager to handle the legal papers. The court also found PNC was the correct successor entity and had received adequate notice.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case Patterson v. Estate of Boone involved the interpretation of KRS 396.055 on the allowance and disallowance of claims by personal representatives of an estate. Claimants filed a timely statement of claim for contingent liabilities arising from a guaranty agreement, but the estate took no action within sixty days, resulting in an automatic allowance under the statute; after investigation, the estate later petitioned to disallow the claim. The district court denied the petition, but the circuit court reversed and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, ruling that the statute permits disallowance before payment upon a showing of cause and that the estate had demonstrated sufficient cause due to the claim's complexity and the need for document review. The court held the claim disallowed without requiring a remand for further findings on the merits.

procedureproperty

In this case, James Fields pled guilty to third-degree burglary and receiving stolen property after unlawfully entering his workplace and taking items including a handgun and tools. The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison and ordered him to pay nearly $140,000 in restitution to his employer and employees, based on a list of losses provided by the Commonwealth. Fields objected to the amount and requested an opportunity to cross-examine the claimants, but the court denied this and imposed the restitution without a detailed factual record or verification. The appellate court vacated the restitution portion of the sentence, holding that the trial court failed to establish an adequate factual predicate for the award and denied Fields a meaningful opportunity to contest the claims, contrary to due process standards for sentencing under KRS 532.032. The matter was remanded for further proceedings to address the restitution claims properly.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved former Mayor Carol Dean Walters, who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against city commissioners seeking to block a removal hearing and alleging violations of state law, due process, and First Amendment rights related to voting procedures on misconduct charges. Walters prevailed in part by obtaining injunctive relief allowing mutual voting on the charges, which was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The trial court awarded her $19,500 in attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a prevailing party but reduced her claimed amount. On appeal, the court affirmed the prevailing party determination because she achieved a significant benefit on a central issue, but vacated the fee award and remanded, ruling that the trial court had not provided a sufficient explanation for reducing the lodestar calculation under federal standards.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved Larry Yelder, who was charged with second-degree rape in district court; after his attorney requested a competency evaluation, which suspended district proceedings, a grand jury still indicted him in circuit court. Yelder moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that RCr 8.06 required all proceedings to be postponed until competency was determined under KRS 504.100. The circuit court granted the dismissal, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the indictment. The court reasoned that grand jury actions are independent proceedings in circuit court, distinct from district court matters, so the stay under RCr 8.06 applies only to proceedings before the specific court that ordered the evaluation.

criminal lawprocedure

Joyce Fields sued the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) and GTE South, Inc., after falling on a defective public sidewalk abutting GTE's property. The trial court granted summary judgment to LFUCG on grounds of sovereign immunity and to GTE based on precedent holding that abutting landowners have no duty to maintain sidewalks. The appeals court affirmed, reasoning that LFUCG, as an urban county government formed by merger, retains the sovereign immunity of a county rather than a city and thus cannot be sued under the principles applied in prior city cases. It further held that Schilling v. Schoenle directly precludes liability for the property owner and that constitutional jural rights provisions do not override sovereign immunity.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice suit by Robert and Yvonne Hawkins against Dr. Philip Rosenbloom after elective laparoscopic gallbladder surgery in 1994 resulted in a bowel perforation, infection, a temporary colostomy, and additional surgeries. The Hawkinses alleged lack of informed consent and negligence, but a jury found for the doctor. The trial court had excluded informed consent evidence and jury instructions due to lack of expert testimony and permitted the defense to cross-examine the plaintiffs' expert with an undisclosed letter from another physician. On appeal, the court affirmed the exclusion of informed consent issues and other rulings but reversed and remanded, holding that the letter's use was prejudicial error because it constituted undisclosed hearsay testimony on the standard of care that was not subject to cross-examination.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, the employer petitioned for review of a Workers’ Compensation Board decision affirming an ALJ’s award of benefits to employee Charles Stapleton for a 7% occupational disability (enhanced to 10.5%) stemming from a 1997 work-related knee injury. The court held that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including Dr. Siegel’s medical opinion on the injury and its impairment rating, and that the ALJ properly determined the period of temporary total disability payments based on the lack of available modified work and Stapleton’s work history. The court also ruled that the 1996 amendment to KRS 342.281 revived the requirement from Eaton Axle that a petition for reconsideration must be filed to preserve issues for appeal, but found no error in the Board’s application of the law or evidence assessment.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether a married 17-year-old minor could validly execute a release and settlement agreement for personal injury claims arising from a car accident. The trial court upheld the agreement on the ground that marriage had emancipated the minor and removed any contractual disability. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the release remained voidable by the minor. The court reasoned that while marriage emancipates a minor from parental control, it does not eliminate the general rule that contracts made during minority are avoidable, a protection based on presumed lack of maturity that applies even to emancipated minors. The opinion noted that Kentucky statutes provide for appointment of a conservator to safeguard a married minor’s interests but do not bind the minor to unapproved contracts.

family lawtorts & liability

In Anderson v. Parker, an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary appealed the Lyon Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment, which sought meritorious good time credits under Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 15.3 and claimed the policy was unconstitutionally vague while violating due process and equal protection rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the regulation grants prison administrators full discretion in awarding such credits pursuant to KRS 197.045(3). The court reasoned that no protected liberty interest exists because the credits are a privilege rather than a right, the inmate alleged no facts demonstrating entitlement or abuse of discretion, and no evidentiary hearing was required. The petition was joined with similar filings but class certification was denied, and only Anderson pursued the appeal.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dispute over possession of a mobile home between the Hiers, who leased real property to the original owners and claimed an interest under the recorded lease terms upon the owners' deaths, and Bank One, which held a promissory note and security agreement from one owner secured by the mobile home. The Pike Circuit Court ruled that Bank One was entitled to possession due to its perfected security interest, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects, including denial of damages on the cross-appeal. The court reasoned that under KRS Chapter 186A, a security interest in a mobile home is perfected exclusively by notation on the certificate of title filed with the county clerk, and this method prevails even if the home is permanently affixed to real estate; the lease agreement did not qualify as a valid financing statement because it lacked a description of the mobile home. The decision rejected arguments that affixation converted the property out of the title system and found no conversion by the Hiers.

property

This case involved Gary Franklin Adams appealing his convictions in Boyd Circuit Court for third-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second-degree possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana, with all sentences enhanced under KRS 218A.992 due to his possession of a firearm during the offenses. Adams challenged the trial court's denial of his motions to dismiss (arguing the arresting officer lacked authority under KRS 431.005) and to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of an abandoned bank bag and his vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentences, reasoning that the officer qualified as a peace officer authorized to arrest, the enhancement statute was neither vague nor an unconstitutional double jeopardy violation because firearm possession merely affected punishment without creating a separate offense, and the searches were valid since Adams had no privacy expectation in the discarded bag and the vehicle search met the requirements of United States v. Ross.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Carlos Johnson, who was convicted of first-degree assault for beating, squeezing, and dropping his two-month-old son, causing serious injuries including skull fracture, broken bones, and brain bruising. Johnson appealed, arguing that his hand was not a dangerous instrument under the law, the child's injuries did not qualify as serious physical injury, and he should have received jury instructions on criminal abuse charges. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that a hand can constitute a dangerous instrument depending on the circumstances and victim, the injuries created a substantial risk of death, and criminal abuse was not a lesser included offense in this context.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved Floyd Walker, who was injured when Brandon Mattingly punched him in the face after an altercation involving a school bus and threats; Walker sued Mattingly, his grandmother (the policyholder), and her insurer Economy Preferred for damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding no coverage under the policy's personal liability provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the policy's exclusion for bodily injury expected or intended by the insured applied because Mattingly's act of punching Walker in the face was inherently injurious, allowing the court to infer intent to injure as a matter of law under precedents like Brown Foundation and Thompson, despite Mattingly claiming he did not intend the specific harm. The court distinguished cases involving self-defense or accidental acts and enforced the plain meaning of the insurance contract's exclusion.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a dispute between the Hardin County Fiscal Court and the Hardin County Board of Health over authority to set a special ad valorem public health tax rate under Kentucky statutes. The Board of Health, created by operation of law under KRS 212.750, sought to raise the rate from 1.76 to 2 cents per $100 assessed value and submitted the request after cabinet approval, but the Fiscal Court declined to include it in the county levy. The trial court ruled that the Fiscal Court was required to impose the Board's requested rate, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The core reasoning was that KRS 212.755 uses permissive language (“may”) for districts established under KRS 212.750, in contrast to the mandatory “shall” in KRS 212.725 for voter-referendum districts under KRS 212.720, and statutory construction requires giving effect to that distinction.

taxeshealthcare

This case was a wrongful death action brought by Sandra Nantz, as administratrix of her husband's estate, against Green River Electric Corporation after John Nantz was electrocuted when his head contacted a low-hanging 7200 kv power line while pushing a wheelbarrow at a playground. Green River had detected a fault on the line hours earlier but re-energized it without inspection. The jury found Green River 100% liable and awarded $480,307 in damages. On appeal, Green River argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the decedent's prior workers' compensation settlement (including a 50% permanent partial disability rating from a 1989 work injury) that was relevant to his earning capacity. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the specific settlement figure and disability percentage were not relevant to the vocational expert's conclusions on loss of earning power, that settlement agreements are generally inadmissible, and that only evidence of the underlying injury (not the settlement terms) could be introduced.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment