Morris v. American Standard Insurance
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 2000-01-28 · cited 1×
This case concerned a dispute over which insurer must pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to a Missouri resident injured in a Kansas car accident. The nonresident plaintiff owned a vehicle insured under a Missouri policy that lacked Kansas-mandated PIP coverage; the vehicle was parked in Kansas at the time of the accident, but the plaintiff was driving a Kansas-insured vehicle when the crash occurred. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Kansas vehicle's insurer, American Standard, and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act requires nonresident owners to maintain continuous compliant insurance on their vehicles while in the state, making the plaintiff an owner of a vehicle for which coverage is required and obligating his own insurer to provide the benefits rather than the insurer of the vehicle he was operating.
business & regulatory
Elliott v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., Inc.
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 1999-12-30 · cited 10×
This case concerned the interpretation of wage loss benefits in an automobile insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau under the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act. Elliott sought 100% of his one-day wage loss from an auto accident, arguing the policy language allowed recovery up to 85% of monthly earnings, but the insurer paid only 85% of the actual loss as required by statute for nontaxable benefits. The trial court initially denied judgment on the pleadings but later reconsidered and ruled the policy matched the statutory 85% limitation, entering judgment for Farm Bureau. The appellate court affirmed, holding the policy was unambiguous, expressly aligned with K.S.A. 40-3103(b), and that the trial court properly exercised discretion to reconsider the issue before final judgment. The court rejected Elliott's alternative reading as ignoring the phrase 'loss of monthly earnings' and found no excess coverage granted by the policy terms.
business & regulatory
State v. Marble
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 1995-08-18 · cited 17×
In State v. Marble, the defendant appealed his jury conviction for aggravated criminal sodomy arising from a 1993 incident in which the complainant alleged he threatened her with a weapon and anally sodomized her, while he claimed the encounter involved an unconsummated act of prostitution and no sexual act occurred due to intoxication-related impotence. Marble raised four issues: improper prosecutorial cross-examination implying witness intimidation without supporting evidence, an ex parte judicial communication with a juror who recognized the victim, exclusion of impeachment evidence against the complainant, and denial of a sentencing departure. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination questions did not require reversal absent a demand for proof of foundation or bad faith, the juror communication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was unrelated to the case merits and did not influence deliberations, and the notice of appeal did not encompass the sentencing issue while the sentence itself was presumptively valid. The court also noted that any potential evidentiary exclusion was not shown to be reversible error on the record presented.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Caldwell
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 1995-08-11 · cited 13×
This case involved Tony Caldwell's appeal of his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault, one count of discharging a firearm at an occupied building, and one count of criminal possession of a firearm arising from a drive-by shooting at a Wichita residence occupied by three people. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed all convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the discharge conviction under the statute requiring proof that no occupant was placed in immediate apprehension of bodily harm, that limitations on cross-examination of a witness were within the trial court's discretion, and that the challenged jury instruction accurately stated the law. The court vacated the upward durational departure sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the trial court's cited factors were conclusory and failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons as required by the sentencing guidelines.
criminal lawprocedure
Lee v. Boeing Co.
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 1995-07-28 · cited 19×
The case concerned Anthony K. Lee's claim for workers' compensation benefits after he injured his back while working at Boeing using heavy tools. Lee returned to a light-duty position at a comparable wage until he was laid off for economic reasons in 1993, after which he earned substantially less in new employment. The Workers Compensation Board applied the statutory presumption of no work disability during the period Lee worked at Boeing but found the presumption rebutted after the layoff, awarding Lee a 37 percent work disability based on evidence of wage loss and reduced labor market access. Boeing appealed, arguing the presumption could not be rebutted by a later economic layoff, while Lee cross-appealed seeking a higher rating. The court affirmed the Board's decision, interpreting the statute to permit the presumption to apply to one time period and be overcome as to another, and finding substantial evidence supported the 37 percent award.
labor & employment
In Re the Marriage of Osborne
Court of Appeals of Kansas · 1995-07-28 · cited 5×
This case concerns a dispute over custody of two minor children following the death of their father, Manuel Osborne, in a Kansas divorce proceeding originally between Manuel and their mother, Patricia. The stepmother, Sharon Osborne, sought to intervene in the divorce case to request custody, alleging Patricia was unfit, but the district court denied her standing, granted immediate custody to Patricia, and suggested proceedings in Maryland. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by effectively denying intervention without allowing Sharon to present evidence on unfitness or extraordinary circumstances under the parental preference doctrine, and by imposing improper conditions on further proceedings.
family lawprocedure