Bruce M. Snell jr

In Larsen v. Oakland Community School District, a probationary art teacher and coach appealed the termination of his contract by the school board at the end of the 1984-85 school year, arguing that the board missed statutory deadlines under Iowa Code section 279.16, lacked impartiality due to prior observations of his teaching, and failed to provide sufficient evidence for its budgetary rationale. The district court upheld the termination, and the appellate court affirmed after reviewing the record for errors of law under Iowa Code section 279.18. The court found the board complied with required timelines and procedures for the private hearing and decision, showed no evidence of bias, and noted that for probationary teachers the board's decision is final unless it violates constitutional or public employee rights, which the teacher did not allege.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a court could order mandatory income withholding for delinquent alimony payments under Iowa Code chapter 252D when the recipient also had custody of the couple's minor children. The trial court refused to quash the withholding order, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that the statute's definition of "support" includes spousal support if it is contained in a child support order, distinguishing this situation from a prior case where no children were involved. The parties' 1985 dissolution decree had granted physical care of four children to the wife along with child support and alimony payments from the husband.

family lawprocedure

This case was a declaratory judgment action by AMCO Insurance against policyholders Randy and Rhonda Stammer over coverage for fire damage to their home under a casualty policy that excluded coverage for intentional concealment or misrepresentation. The fire was caused by arson, and AMCO alleged the Stammers' involvement and fraud in the claim; the Stammers counterclaimed for breach of contract and torts. The district court denied the Stammers' motion for partial summary judgment on Rhonda's contract claim, dismissed the tort claims on summary judgment, excluded late-disclosed expert testimony as a discovery sanction, and entered judgment on a jury verdict for AMCO. On appeal, the court affirmed, ruling that Rhonda's affidavit denial failed to show the absence of genuine factual issues, that the sanction was within the trial court's discretion because the witness qualified as an expert and supplementation was untimely, and that no other errors warranted reversal.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved plaintiffs, who were farmers and their business, suing a law firm and attorney for alleged legal malpractice and negligence arising from a conflict of interest. The firm had performed legal work for the plaintiffs, including drafting incorporation papers and a cattle feeding contract tied to a debt restructuring with a bank, but the attorney also served on the bank's board and voted to terminate the plaintiffs' line of credit and pursue foreclosure shortly after. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing genuine issues of material fact existed on the attorney-client relationship and the firm's conduct. The appellate court affirmed, holding that no attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the specific acts at issue and that summary judgment was proper as a matter of law under Iowa standards for reviewing such motions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned applications to modify a 1982 Iowa dissolution decree, with the mother seeking increased child support and the father requesting physical care or joint legal custody of their child. The trial court raised support to $60 per week, denied any custody change, and awarded the mother attorney fees and costs. On de novo review, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statutory change favoring joint custody constituted a material change in circumstances but that clear and convincing evidence of the parents' ongoing lack of cooperation showed joint custody would be unreasonable and not in the child's best interest. The court also upheld the support modification as equitable and found the fee award proper after examining the parties' finances and the results of the applications.

family law

The case involved Loren Ripperger, who was convicted of lascivious acts with a child under Iowa Code § 709.8 based on allegations that he committed the offense against his five-year-old step-granddaughter. The primary issue on appeal was the admissibility of expert medical testimony indicating that the victim's physical condition was consistent with repeated digital penetration, which the defendant argued constituted improper evidence of prior bad acts under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the testimony was admissible either as direct corroboration of the charged incident or under the recognized exception to rule 404(b) for evidence showing a passion or propensity for illicit sexual relations with the particular victim in sex crime cases. The core reasoning was that the evidence was relevant to facts of consequence in the case and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs appealing a trial court judgment in favor of defendant doctors in a medical malpractice action stemming from a laminectomy surgery that allegedly caused neurological deficits known as cauda equina syndrome. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence by the defendants as a matter of law under the applicable standard of review for cases tried to the court without a jury. The court reasoned that appellate interference is unwarranted unless the evidence overwhelmingly compels a finding in favor of the party bearing the burden of proof, and here the trial court's findings on lack of causation from any negligence were supported without requiring a higher standard of proof. Additionally, no abuse of discretion or prejudice was found in the trial court's handling of cross-examination or comments during trial.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved Alan Frederick Maurer, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) under Iowa Code section 321.281 after a jury trial in Muscatine County. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's rulings allowing an arresting officer to testify that he believed beyond any reasonable doubt the defendant had committed the offense and excluding testimony about the intoxilyzer machine's condition weeks later. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the officer's testimony improperly opined on the ultimate fact of guilt by addressing both elements of the OWI offense and invoking the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The court held that witnesses may not express opinions on mixed questions of law and fact reserved for the jury and found the defendant's objection sufficient to preserve the error, without reaching the second issue.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the dissolution of the marriage of Douglas and Cyndra Gratias, with disputes over physical custody of their two young daughters, child support obligations, property division, and attorney fees. The district court granted joint legal custody with physical custody to Cyndra and visitation to Douglas. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the award of physical custody to Cyndra, finding that she had been the primary caregiver and could provide a stable environment, while considering but not finding her interference with visitation sufficient to change custody. The court modified certain aspects of the support and visitation provisions and denied Cyndra's request for appellate attorney fees, assessing costs equally.

family law

The case involved Michael Nicholson, who was charged with first-degree theft by misappropriation under Iowa law and sought to introduce evidence of diminished responsibility to rebut the mens rea element. The district court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that the diminished responsibility defense applies only to specific intent crimes, and Nicholson was convicted after trial. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the restriction did not violate due process because the insanity defense remained available to introduce similar mental health evidence, and precedent limited diminished responsibility to specific intent offenses. The court noted that theft by misappropriation is a general intent crime and that Nicholson had chosen not to pursue an insanity defense. A dissent argued that barring the evidence denied constitutional rights to present a defense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a defendant charged with involuntary manslaughter who moved to dismiss the charges after more than one year had passed since arraignment, citing Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(c)'s requirement that criminal cases be brought to trial within one year. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case, finding the speedy trial period had expired without a waiver by the defendant or good cause shown by the state. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant did not waive the right and that delays from the state's unpreparedness at hearings, extensions during appeal, and a late amendment to the trial information were attributable to the prosecution rather than the defendant. The court noted that the total time exceeded the limit even after accounting for periods on appeal and limited continuances, and the state failed to meet its burden to justify the delay.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, IMT Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment that its automobile policy did not cover damages from an accident because Greg Roberts drove without a reasonable belief he was entitled to do so, as his license was suspended and family members had not given valid consent under Iowa law. The district court denied a jury trial request, tried the case to the court, and ruled that the policy provided no coverage or defense for Greg and that no consent had been given. On appeal, the court held that the issues involved legal questions under an insurance contract, including consent and reasonable belief, which are fact questions ordinarily decided by a jury in an action at law. It further determined that the appellants had not waived their timely jury demand by proceeding after the denial and that concerns about injecting insurance into the case did not justify denying the right. The appellate court reversed the denial of a jury trial, vacated the district court's findings and judgment, and remanded for a jury trial.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Richard Carpenter's claim for unemployment benefits after his discharge from an assembler position for using vulgar language toward two supervisors following disputes over time off to repair home plumbing. The Iowa Department of Job Service denied benefits on the ground that the conduct constituted disqualifying misconduct under Iowa Code section 96.5(2). The Court of Appeals of Iowa affirmed the denial, applying the substantial evidence standard and concluding that the record supported the agency's finding of a deliberate disregard of the employer's legitimate expectations. The court relied on established criteria distinguishing isolated vulgarity from misconduct that impairs workplace operations or involves refusal to follow directives.

labor & employment

In this case, warehouse supervisor Steven Justus was injured when stacks of paper products fell on him and sued co-employee Duane Marvick for gross negligence in redesigning the storage system under an exception to Iowa's workers' compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court found Marvick grossly negligent, dismissed other defendants, and awarded damages, but the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required elements of gross negligence. The court applied the three-part test from Thompson v. Bohlken, concluding that while Marvick knew of potential dangers from leaning stacks, there was no substantial evidence he knew injury was probable rather than merely possible. A dissent maintained that the trial court's findings, based on the defendant's observations and the obvious peril, were supported by substantial evidence and should stand.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In State v. Richardson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree and second-degree robbery based on two incidents at a Davenport service station in which the perpetrator used a gun and bound the attendant with a telephone cord. On appeal, Richardson argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about two similar prior robberies at a local Ramada Inn, claiming the evidence violated Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was not relevant to identity or plan and was unduly prejudicial. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the prior crimes were admissible under the identity exception to Rule 404(b) due to their strikingly similar circumstances—including the use of phone cords to restrain victims and repeated targeting of the same locations—and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a 1982 Iowa dissolution decree that required Manuel Serrano to name his ex-wife Marlene as primary beneficiary of his $90,000 employment life-insurance policy for as long as he owed her support, which was to continue until she died, remarried, or turned 65. Manuel died in 1985 without changing the beneficiary from his daughter Joan Hendricks, so Marlene sued to claim the proceeds that the insurer had paid into court. The district court construed the decree as making the insurance merely security for ongoing support payments rather than a property award, and it ordered Marlene to receive $300 monthly from the proceeds until the support obligation ended, with the balance going to Hendricks. On appeal the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the decree’s language and context showed the insurance was intended only to secure support, that the trial judge’s own construction deserved substantial weight, and that state insurance-exemption statutes did not bar the court’s disposition of the proceeds.

family lawproperty

In State v. Brown, the defendant was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse based on allegations that he abused his 32-year-old stepdaughter, who has Down's Syndrome. On appeal, Brown challenged the trial court's rulings that the victim was competent to testify, that certain prior statements by the victim were admissible as non-hearsay, and that the evidence sufficiently established the time and place of the offense. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the victim competent under Iowa Rule of Evidence 601 because she demonstrated the capacity to understand questions and the obligation to tell the truth. The court further concluded that the challenged testimony qualified as a prior consistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut claims of improper influence, and that the date and location were not material elements of the offense so long as the statute of limitations and venue requirements were met.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over the termination of a father's child support obligation for his adult daughter Janee, who was attending college, under the terms of her parents' 1978 divorce decree that ended support once she became self-supporting. After the mother sought an increase in support and the father counterclaimed for termination, a declaratory judgment action resulted in a ruling that support had ended in 1982 based on Janee's statements about her living and financial situation. Janee petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing the district court exceeded its authority by using declaratory relief to modify the decree retrospectively, override a prior judge's decision, and proceed without necessary parties. The court of appeals sustained the writ, finding the declaratory judgment constituted an improper modification of the dissolution decree rather than a mere interpretation of existing rights and that it improperly addressed accrued support obligations.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation dispute where petitioner Milton Dickenson sought additional permanent partial disability benefits after a 1981 lung injury from ammonia fumes at his job with John Deere, following termination of healing period benefits. The industrial commissioner and district court ruled that interest on the award began on the date of the deputy industrial commissioner's decision in the review-reopening proceeding. The Iowa Supreme Court modified that ruling to start interest payments on August 19, 1982, the date Dickenson filed his petition for review-reopening. The court based this on Iowa Code sections 85.30 and 85.34, which govern compensation schedules and the start of permanent partial disability payments, while aligning with section 535.3 on interest accrual for judgments and balancing incentives for quick resolution with fairness to claimants.

labor & employmentprocedure

Charles Reese was convicted of first-degree murder after a 1978 retrial and later sought postconviction relief, claiming that the trial court denied his right to self-representation, that admission of a prior witness's testimony violated his confrontation rights, and that his arrest lacked probable cause with resulting statements being inadmissible fruit of that arrest; he also asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise these issues on direct appeal. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of relief, finding that Reese had not clearly invoked self-representation during a pretrial hearing on counsel substitution, that the State met its burden to show the witness's unavailability, and that Reese presented no evidence of an illegal arrest while any statements to the witness were voluntary and attenuated from the arrest. The court applied the Strickland standard and concluded that counsel's performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights