Nancy H. Vaidik

Andrew T. Masterson was serving a sentence for Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine when the trial court modified it in 2024 to allow community corrections placement, conditioned on his residence at a specific recovery house called Behind the Wire Ministries. After two contested positive drug screens at the facility led to his discharge—despite negative lab tests the next day—the State petitioned to revoke his placement, and the trial court found a violation based solely on his no longer residing there. Masterson appealed, arguing the violation finding was improper because the discharge was not his fault and the initial screens were unreliable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding under Woods v. State that lack of fault or volition is irrelevant to whether a violation occurred and bears only on the sanction; because the modification order required residence at the specific program and Masterson was discharged, the State proved a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In Clifford Vance v. State of Indiana, police officers conducted a late-night “knock and talk” at Vance’s motel room, entered after he consented, observed marijuana, and then obtained further consent to search by promising with “one hundred percent certainty” that he would not be arrested that night if he turned over everything; the search uncovered methamphetamine and other drugs, leading to Vance’s convictions for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and related offenses. Vance appealed, contending that the entry and search violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the search was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Applying the Litchfield factors, the court found the officers’ degree of suspicion low because they acted on an unverified tip after a multi-hour delay without seeking a warrant, the intrusion moderate to high given the 3 a.m. uniformed encounter with a flashlight and subsequent coercive assurances, and the law-enforcement need only modest for the same reasons; therefore the drug evidence should have been suppressed and the convictions could not stand.

criminal lawprocedure

In this high-conflict post-dissolution case, Mother Jennifer Goetz sought to modify the dissolution decree's requirement that the parties' four children (three with dyslexia and ADHD) remain enrolled in Avon public schools after she relocated outside the district, while also challenging the calculation of Father's child support obligation, the denial of her attorney fee request, and a contempt finding against her; Father cross-appealed the denial of his request for sole legal custody over educational decisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings denying Mother's motion to change school placement, its child support order (based on Father's documented income with an annual true-up), its contempt finding against Mother for involving the children in the dispute, and its denial of attorney fees. It reversed only the award of joint legal custody as to educational decisions, instead granting Father sole legal custody in that limited area, because the parents' persistent conflicts and inability to cooperate on schooling—evidenced by Mother's confrontations with school staff, the GAL's reports, and the children's exposure to the dispute—made joint decision-making untenable and contrary to the children's best interests, while the children had made academic progress in their current schools.

family law

The case involved Landis+Gyr Technology, Inc. seeking coverage under three excess liability insurance policies issued by North River Insurance Company (with claims handling by RiverStone) for roughly $7.6 million in costs to remediate TCE pollution at a former Indiana manufacturing site, where contamination had occurred over multiple years both before and during the 1976–1978 policy periods. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Landis for over $10 million, but the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and ordered summary judgment for the insurers on all claims. The court first found a conflict between Indiana’s “all sums” allocation rule (under which the insurer could be liable for the full amount up to policy limits) and New York’s “pro rata” allocation rule (under which the per-year share of costs fell below the policies’ $1 million attachment point, resulting in no coverage). It then held that Indiana’s choice-of-law analysis required application of New York law because the policies had been issued to a New York-based company, were brokered and delivered there, and listed New York as the primary insured location.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether B. Alice McCoy had the testamentary capacity to execute a revocable trust and related estate-planning documents in August 2012, after her 2009 Alzheimer’s diagnosis; her son Michael sought to set the trust aside after her death, arguing incapacity, while his brother Douglas defended its validity. The trial court upheld the trust after excluding two 2012 emails from the drafting attorney that contradicted his deposition testimony denying prior knowledge of Alice’s cognitive decline. The Court of Appeals vacated that judgment, holding as a matter of first impression that Indiana Evidence Rule 806 permits impeachment of a hearsay declarant’s credibility when their deposition has been admitted in lieu of live testimony, and that the emails were also admissible under Rule 703 to assist the court’s evaluation of expert opinions on capacity. Because the emails directly addressed the central disputed issue and the trial court never reviewed them before excluding them on hearsay grounds, the court remanded for admission of the emails, reweighing of the evidence, and a new determination.

family lawpropertyprocedure

Terry L. Hargis, Jr. was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury to his infant son and found to be a habitual offender, leading to a 52-year sentence. On appeal, Hargis challenged his trial in absentia, argued that the two neglect convictions violated double jeopardy, and claimed his sentence was inappropriate. The Court of Appeals held that Hargis was properly tried in absentia and that he waived the sentencing claim by failing to present a cogent argument. It concluded that the two neglect convictions, which arose from the same course of conduct during the charged period, constituted double jeopardy, so it vacated one conviction and its sentence. The court remanded with instructions to attach the habitual-offender enhancement to the remaining conviction, resulting in a 36-year sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

Robert A. Neace appealed his conviction for Level 4 felony child molesting, contending that the trial court improperly admitted vouching testimony from a forensic interviewer and a sexual-assault nurse examiner. The State maintained that Neace had opened the door to this testimony through questions and comments during voir dire about whether jurors would automatically believe a child. The Court of Appeals held that those limited voir dire remarks were insufficient to permit otherwise inadmissible vouching statements that the child showed no signs of coaching and was truthful during examinations. Because the child’s account at trial differed substantially from her earlier disclosures and there was no substantial independent evidence of guilt, the court concluded the error was not harmless. It therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, while cautioning against unwarranted use of vouching testimony in such cases.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Coby Maxwell filed a business dispute lawsuit in Morgan Superior Court against his sister Cori Sparrow, M & B Maxwell Farm, Inc., and the estate of their aunt, while simultaneously requesting assignment to Indiana’s Commercial Court Docket under Rule 4 of the Commercial Court Rules. The defendants did not file a timely Notice of Refusal to object to the assignment. The Morgan Superior Court later declined to transfer the case, prompting Maxwell’s appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendants’ failure to timely refuse waived any right to challenge the case’s eligibility for the commercial docket at any stage, including appeal. It therefore ordered the case transferred to the nearest commercial court, in adjoining Marion County.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved D.S., a child adjudicated as a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) due to mental health issues, after which the juvenile court awarded wardship to the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) and later modified the dispositional order to permit DCS to place her in a state psychiatric hospital for inpatient treatment under a statute allowing a “parent or legal guardian” to seek voluntary admission. D.S. appealed, arguing that the placement was unauthorized without a formal involuntary civil-commitment proceeding. The Court of Appeals reversed the modification, holding that DCS’s wardship is not equivalent to legal guardianship and therefore does not grant authority to apply for voluntary treatment under Indiana Code section 12-26-3-2. Because the admission was not voluntary and no civil-commitment process occurred in probate court, the juvenile court lacked authority to approve the placement in a state institution. The court remanded with instructions to initiate or refer the matter for a proper civil-commitment proceeding.

family lawhealthcareprocedure

In 2007, Bruce Mendenhall was stopped by Tennessee police at a Nashville truck stop, consented to a search of his semi-truck that uncovered blood-soaked women's clothing, and admitted he had picked up Carma Purpura at an Indianapolis truck stop the night before and shot her in the head. Indiana charged him with her murder in Marion County in 2008; after a pause for Tennessee proceedings on other cases, he was convicted in 2021. On appeal, Mendenhall argued the evidence failed to prove territorial jurisdiction because it did not establish the killing occurred in Indiana and that the trial court should have suppressed the Tennessee search results under Pirtle v. State because he was not advised of his right to counsel before consenting. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a reasonable inference from the evidence supported jurisdiction because Mendenhall killed Purpura at the Indianapolis truck stop rather than keeping her alive during the drive south, and that the search evidence was properly admitted because the Tennessee officer was investigating a local matter with no prior Indiana involvement, distinguishing the case from controlling precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a CHINS (Child in Need of Services) proceeding in which the Indiana Department of Child Services alleged that seven-week-old V.H. was a child in need of services after the infant was found to have multiple unexplained injuries, including fractures to the femur, tibia, fibula, humerus, and ribs, plus a subdural hematoma. The trial court applied Indiana’s Presumption Statute, which creates a rebuttable presumption of CHINS status when a child sustains injuries that would not ordinarily occur absent parental act or omission while in a parent’s care, and it found that Mother and Father failed to rebut the presumption after DCS presented evidence of the injuries and lack of credible explanation. On appeal, Mother argued that the evidence was insufficient because DCS did not prove she personally abused or neglected the child and that certain testimony should have been excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute does not require DCS to identify which parent caused the injuries or to prove abuse or neglect directly; it is enough for DCS to show the statutory elements, after which the burden shifts to the parents to rebut the presumption, which they did not do. The court also found no error in the admission of the challenged testimony.

family law

This case involved the Indiana Attorney General’s effort to recover nearly $850,000 in alleged excess public funds paid to former Munster school superintendent William Pfister and assistant superintendent Richard Sopko between 1999 and 2014. The State claimed the overpayments stemmed mainly from annuity contributions that compounded annually in violation of the officers’ contracts and constituted malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance under Indiana Code section 5-11-5-1(a). The trial court granted summary judgment to Pfister and Sopko, ruling that the statute did not authorize the action and that the contract language on annuity percentages was ambiguous. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute expressly permits recovery of misappropriated public funds and that the contracts unambiguously set fixed, non-compounding percentages (such as an additional 2% or 4% per year) without any provision for yearly multiplication. The court remanded the case for trial on remaining factual issues while leaving intact partial rulings that limited the liability of the surety companies.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Analise Parsley suing Ethan Marasco and his parents for tort claims including harassment, defamation, and negligent parental supervision, based on allegations that Ethan impersonated her on Snapchat for over five years to solicit explicit photos. Parsley first filed suit in federal court less than two weeks before the two-year statute of limitations expired, asserting diversity jurisdiction, but the defendants moved to dismiss because the complaint itself showed she and Ethan’s parents were all Indiana citizens, defeating complete diversity. After the limitations period passed, she filed an identical complaint in Indiana state court and dismissed the federal action. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on timeliness grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Indiana’s Journey’s Account Statute did not save the late state filing because filing a federal complaint that facially lacked subject-matter jurisdiction constituted negligence in prosecution, and equitable tolling was unavailable since the statute’s requirements were not met.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Andre D. Johnson, who was charged with Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death after Wes Johnson died from a fentanyl overdose following a drug transaction with the defendant. At trial, the court permitted the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy to testify remotely via videoconference because he had moved to Mexico, over Johnson’s objection that this violated his right to face-to-face confrontation under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the remote testimony did violate that right but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that other evidence—including text messages showing the drug purchase, the absence of messages or items indicating any other source of drugs, and the timing of Wes’s death—was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the fentanyl Johnson sold caused the death, and therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Eric J. Mapes sued Carroll County and its Treasurer, claiming they illegally garnished his federal disability income. The trial court dismissed the complaint because Mapes had not provided the required tort-claim notice before filing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on that procedural ground. It also remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to impose filing restrictions on Mapes, citing his long history of repetitive lawsuits, excessive motions, and abusive conduct toward court staff, which had continued despite prior warnings from the Indiana Supreme Court. The court explained that such measures were needed to protect judicial resources from further misuse.

proceduretorts & liability

In this negligence case, motorcyclist Garrett Norman sued multiple contractors and government entities involved in building Indianapolis’s Red Line bus route after he was seriously injured when driver Victoria Gaston made a prohibited left turn at an intersection and struck him. Norman alleged that inadequate pavement markings and traffic-control devices created an unsafe roadway; the defendants argued that Gaston’s conduct was an intervening, superseding cause. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after crediting selected portions of Gaston’s deposition testimony indicating she knew left turns were banned. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that conflicting statements by a non-party witness within the same deposition create genuine issues of material fact that a jury, not the court, must resolve, so summary judgment was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

Zaccheus Ward was convicted of domestic battery, interference with the reporting of a crime, and theft after he assaulted his girlfriend, took her phone to end her 911 call, and left with the phone. On appeal, Ward argued that his convictions for interference and theft violated double jeopardy because they arose from the same conduct involving the phone. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, applying a three-step double-jeopardy analysis under Indiana law. The court found that neither statute expressly permitted multiple punishments and that the charging information was ambiguous, but at the third step it concluded the acts were separate: ending the 911 call completed the interference offense, while subsequently leaving with the phone constituted a distinct theft.

criminal law

Richard Garrett was convicted of 21 offenses, including murder, after a weeklong series of shootings and other crimes in October 2019 along Indianapolis’s 38th Street corridor, during which he and accomplices used the same .45-caliber handgun in multiple incidents. He appealed, arguing that the trial court should have severed the charges for separate trials, that his convictions for battery with a deadly weapon and criminal recklessness violated double jeopardy, and that his four convictions for carrying a handgun without a license also violated double jeopardy. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the first two claims, holding that the offenses were properly joined as part of a connected crime spree and that the battery and recklessness convictions were distinct. On the handgun counts, however, the court found that Garrett’s continuous possession and use of the same firearm throughout the spree constituted a single transaction, so only one conviction was permitted. The court therefore affirmed the convictions and 194-year sentence in most respects but remanded for vacation of three of the four handgun convictions.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

This order from the Indiana Court of Appeals concerns a petition for rehearing filed by appellants Bryan Builders LLC and related parties after the court issued an opinion on September 30, 2025, in their case against The Cincinnati Casualty Company and other appellees. The court granted the petition, withdrew and vacated the September 30 opinion, and replaced it with an amended opinion issued on November 6, 2025. As a result, the time periods for filing any further petition for rehearing or a petition to transfer now begin on the date of this order. The court directed the clerk to file the order in the trial court record, remove the prior opinion from the court's website, and notify the parties and legal publishers. The order states that the actions follow the court's review of the rehearing petition but provides no further explanation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Amazon and contractor Bryan Builders entered a master construction agreement incorporating AIA forms that required Amazon to obtain all-risk property insurance covering the project and included a waiver of subrogation rights against each other and any subcontractors for damages covered by that insurance. After a fire caused repair costs below the policy’s high deductible (so the insurer paid nothing), Bryan Builders sought reimbursement from subcontractors Steel Services and Fair Family and their liability insurers. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the subcontractors and insurers, holding that the damage was still “covered by property insurance” within the meaning of the waiver because it fell within the policy’s terms, thereby barring Bryan Builders’ claims regardless of the deductible. The court reasoned that the contract’s risk-allocation scheme shifted such losses to the property insurer and released the other parties from liability.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability