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Judge, Indiana Court of Appeals
Ed Carpenter Racing, LLC v. Milton "Todd" Ault, III
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2026-06-29
Ed Carpenter Racing, LLC sued Milton “Todd” Ault, III (a Nevada resident) and VForward2, LLC for $8.4 million, alleging breach of an unsigned personal guaranty by Ault, breach of an unsigned 2024 IndyCar sponsorship agreement by VForward2, or alternatively unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice against both defendants, finding lack of personal jurisdiction over Ault under Trial Rule 12(B)(2), failure to state a claim under 12(B)(6), and judgment on the pleadings under 12(C), primarily because the documents were unsigned, negotiations did not create binding contracts, and Ault lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Indiana. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in part, holding that Ault had no substantial connection to Indiana to support jurisdiction and that the unsigned agreements provided no basis for claims against either defendant. It reversed in part, ruling that the dismissal against Ault must be without prejudice because lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and the trial court lacked power to address the 12(B)(6) and 12(C) motions once jurisdiction was absent.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Jennifer Pennington v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. d/b/a Beacon Health and Fitness
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2026-06-05
The case arose after Jennifer Pennington suffered a head injury while swimming in a pool owned by Memorial Hospital of South Bend (Beacon), leading her and her husband to sue Beacon for negligence in the pool’s design, maintenance, and operation. Beacon sought to raise an affirmative defense blaming nonparties Spear Corporation and Panzica Building Corporation (the pool’s designers and builders) for any fault, but the trial court had previously granted summary judgment to those entities, a ruling later affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. On remand, the trial court allowed Beacon to amend its answer to reassert the nonparty defense and present evidence and argument at trial that Spear and Panzica were at fault. The Court of Appeals held that this was error, because a nonparty defense under the Comparative Fault Act requires proof of fault, and the prior adjudication had already determined that Spear and Panzica were not negligent; the court further concluded the error was not harmless given Beacon’s extensive focus on those parties at trial. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Velox Express, Inc. v. Darryl Brent Waltz, Jr.
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2026-02-16
Darryl Brent Waltz sued Velox Express, Inc., and its president James Gibson, alleging that Gibson had mismanaged the closely held logistics company and committed acts including breach of fiduciary duty, theft, fraud, and failure to pay dividends, which harmed both the corporation and Waltz as a co-owner and shareholder. Velox and Gibson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were derivative rather than direct and were therefore barred once the company formed a special litigation committee (SLC) to review them. The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion. It held that Waltz’s claims arose from his status as a shareholder and were derivative in nature, that the SLC (composed of a disinterested attorney and minority shareholders) had investigated in good faith and concluded that pursuing the claims was not in Velox’s best interest (except for one resolved matter), and that Indiana Code section 23-1-32-4(c) therefore precluded Waltz from litigating the claims independently. The court remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to Velox and Gibson.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Eric D. Wilson v. State of Indiana
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2026-02-16
In this case, Eric Wilson was convicted of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated after a traffic stop led to field sobriety tests and a blood draw showing amphetamine and methamphetamine in his system. Wilson appealed, arguing that the stop by a Morgan County sheriff’s deputy was unconstitutional because it lacked reasonable suspicion. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop violated both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The court reasoned that the deputy’s observations of Wilson’s “jerky” body movements, fidgeting, and unusual turns—without any erratic driving or traffic violation—amounted to no more than a hunch, insufficient for reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances, and that the Litchfield factors weighed against the stop’s reasonableness.
criminal lawcivil rights
Shepard Wrex Management, LLC v. The Estate of Betty M. Scott
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2025-11-07
This case arose from environmental contamination of commercial property in Anderson, Indiana, caused by tetrachloroethylene releases from a dry-cleaning business operated by William and Betty Scott until 2006; after Shepard Wrex Management, LLC acquired the property at a tax sale in 2019 and refused access, the Scotts sued for an injunction to continue an IDEM-approved remediation system, and Shepard Wrex counterclaimed for an Environmental Legal Action, civil and criminal trespass, and declaratory relief on abandonment of the system. The trial court denied the injunction request and Shepard Wrex’s counterclaims for ELA, trespass, and criminal trespass (while granting the declaratory judgment), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the trial court’s judgment was not contrary to law, reasoning that the Scotts retained a good-faith, bona-fide claim of right to access the property to fulfill their ongoing IDEM remediation obligations, which precluded liability on the counterclaims and showed no criminal intent for trespass.
environmentpropertytorts & liabilitycriminal law
Joshua S. Carter v. State of Indiana
Indiana Court of Appeals · 2025-10-16
Joshua Carter appealed his 24-year sentence after pleading guilty but mentally ill to multiple counts of Level 4 felony child exploitation and Level 5 felony possession of child pornography, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on improper aggravating factors and rejecting mitigators, that the sentence was inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), and that the court erred by merging rather than vacating certain convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the aggregate sentence, which consisted of consecutive terms after the trial court merged some counts, and remanded with instructions to vacate the merged convictions instead. The majority found that any misstatement about a prior conviction was harmless because a valid related prior offense supported the aggravator, that the trial court properly considered the nature of the offenses and other factors, and that the sentence was not inappropriate given the multiple victims and offenses. The court also held that merging convictions without vacating them was improper and required correction on remand.
criminal law