Tobias Barry

The case involved a petition by the State to involuntarily admit respondent John N. to a mental health facility and to administer psychotropic medication. Emergency medical personnel transported the respondent to the facility along with a police officer, but one of the medical personnel signed the petition instead of the officer. The trial court granted both the involuntary admission and the medication orders. On appeal, the court reversed both orders, holding that the statute requires a peace officer who transports the subject to complete the petition and that noncompliance renders the admission order invalid as a matter of law. The medication order was also reversed because it depended on the respondent qualifying as a recipient of services through the admission.

healthcareprocedure

Michael Watson sued Waste Management of Illinois, the Kankakee County Board, and the County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the claim that a 2001 county ordinance changing the method of electing board members from multi-member districts to single-member districts without a countywide referendum violated Article VII, Section 3(b) of the Illinois Constitution, rendering the board improperly constituted and without authority to accept or decide a landfill siting application under the Environmental Protection Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint under section 2-615, ruling that the exclusive remedy was a quo warranto action. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that quo warranto is not the exclusive remedy when the complaint primarily challenges the constitutionality of an ordinance and that declaratory and injunctive relief may be pursued instead.

electionsprocedureenvironment

In People v. Hinton, the defendant was charged with aggravated and domestic battery, waived his right to counsel, and entered a fully negotiated guilty plea; after sentencing, he filed a pro se motion to withdraw the plea, but the trial court did not appoint counsel and dismissed the motion. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court violated Supreme Court Rule 604(d) by failing to appoint counsel for the postplea motion, while the State claimed the prior waiver of counsel extended to those proceedings. The appellate court held that the defendant's earlier waiver of counsel did not apply to the postplea stage because the trial court had specifically admonished him under Rule 605(b) that counsel would be appointed if indigent, and Rule 604(d) requires the court to determine representation and appoint counsel for indigent defendants filing such motions. The court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings with appointed counsel, absent a knowing new waiver. The topics are criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a beneficiary's lawsuit against co-trustees of a testamentary trust created by her late husband's will, alleging breach of fiduciary duty through unsuitable investments that caused trust losses and self-dealing via unauthorized personal loans from trust funds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the relevant counts, finding no evidence of bad faith as required by the trust terms. The appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's affidavits presented facts creating genuine issues of material fact about bad faith and self-dealing, including failure to make required distributions and misleading statements about the loans. The court noted that the trust instrument did not sanction the type of conflicts at issue, and discovery should not have been stayed before resolving the motion. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

property

The case involved David Beard, who was terminated by Sprint after a background check showed he had not disclosed on his job application a prior guilty plea to a public morals charge that resulted in court supervision, which Sprint's application defined as a conviction. Beard filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights under the Illinois Human Rights Act, alleging improper use of arrest records, but the Department dismissed it for lack of substantial evidence and the chief legal counsel affirmed. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Act does not bar employers from defining convictions to include guilty pleas and supervision, permits use of information showing actual criminal conduct, and that the termination was based solely on the undisclosed conviction rather than arrest records.

labor & employmentcriminal lawcivil rights

In this divorce case, William and Catherine Murphy disputed the validity of their antenuptial agreement signed just before their 1988 wedding and the amount of maintenance payments following the 2003 dissolution judgment. The trial court upheld the agreement and ordered William to pay Catherine $15,000 per month in maintenance through May 2007. Catherine appealed, arguing the agreement was invalid due to the circumstances of its execution and that she needed a higher, indefinite maintenance award given her lifestyle and lack of employment. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Catherine could achieve self-sufficiency through employment at her prior salary level, renting out her properties, and investing her $826,000 property award, that the awarded maintenance plus over $450,000 in legal fees paid by William was adequate, and that she was not entitled to permanently maintain the marital standard of living.

family law

The case involved the State of Illinois filing a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent J.T., identified as the father of minors A.M. and E.M., after the children were found neglected due to their mother's conduct and the father's unknown status at the outset. The trial court determined the father was unfit based on a statutory presumption of depravity arising from his multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions, rejected his evidence of rehabilitation such as educational certificates earned in prison, and concluded that termination served the children's best interests given their need for a stable home and the father's ongoing incarceration. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the unfitness finding and termination order. The core reasoning centered on the State's clear and convincing evidence of depravity through the criminal record and the best-interest factors outlined in the Lutheran Social Services report, which highlighted the children's behavioral issues and lack of viable placement options with either parent.

family lawcriminal law

The case involved Donelmo Goodum, who was charged with Class 4 felony retail theft after police recovered stolen items during a search at a gas station. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing an improper stop and frisk, but the trial court denied the motion; following a stipulated bench trial, he was convicted and sentenced to probation. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial, holding that officers conducted a valid Terry stop based on an outstanding warrant for the car's owner, developed reasonable suspicion for a protective frisk due to the defendant's nervousness, bulges in his coat, and possible false identity, discovered a crack pipe in plain view and by feel to establish probable cause for arrest, and then performed a valid search incident to arrest that uncovered the evidence. The incremental escalation from stop to frisk to arrest to search was deemed justified under Fourth Amendment standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Kline, the defendant was charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis on school grounds after an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip led a police officer and school dean to remove him from class for questioning. The trial court granted Kline's motion to suppress the resulting evidence, finding that the removal constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion and that the uncorroborated tip did not provide it. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, affirmed, holding that the involvement of a police officer meant the reasonable suspicion standard applied under the Fourth Amendment and that the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability because it was not corroborated by observation of suspicious behavior or physical evidence. The court noted that Kline was simply attending class when approached and that neither the officer nor dean had verified the tip's details beforehand. A concurring opinion agreed with the result due to police participation but suggested a different standard might apply if only school officials had acted.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In People v. Wicks, the defendant was convicted of two counts of resisting a peace officer after refusing officers' requests for identification during a traffic stop, placing his hands in his pockets, and struggling with them during the arrest process, which involved pepper spray and physical force by the officers. The appellate court affirmed both convictions, ruling that the trial court correctly denied a self-defense jury instruction because the evidence showed no indication the defendant acted from fear for his safety and that two separate convictions were proper because the resistance consisted of distinct acts against two officers. The court reasoned that a person can be convicted of multiple counts of resisting a peace officer when resisting multiple officers performing authorized duties, even if the acts are interrelated.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a prisoner, Johnnie Flournoy, suing Ameritech for fraud and negligence, claiming that the phone company's practice of prematurely terminating his collect calls caused his family to be charged multiple initial fees and surcharges. The trial court dismissed the complaint under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the claim was for civil damages rather than reparations and thus within the circuit court's jurisdiction, not exclusively the Illinois Commerce Commission's. The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not challenge the rates themselves but the deceptive practice of call terminations, adequately stating a consumer fraud claim, and that the voluntary payment doctrine did not bar the action due to the alleged deception.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In the case In re Marriage of Adams, the ex-wife petitioned to increase child support after the ex-husband left the military and his income rose, also seeking attorney fees for the modification effort. The trial court found a substantial change in circumstances and raised the support obligation to $287.03 every two weeks while awarding $250 in fees. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the support increase, reasoning that the child's needs are presumed to rise with age and cost of living and that the father's ability to pay had grown, but it vacated the fee award because the ex-wife had the means to cover her own costs. The opinion also addressed a vacated default judgment stemming from a scheduling dispute between counsel.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Kurtis Smith, who was convicted after a stipulated bench trial of indecent solicitation of a child under section 11-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Smith had engaged in an online chat with an undercover officer posing as a 15-year-old boy, arranging to meet for oral sex, and was arrested upon arrival at the agreed location. He challenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing it was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, unconstitutionally vague, and violated equal protection, but the trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was not substantially overbroad because any potential applications to protected speech were minimal relative to its legitimate scope, that Smith lacked standing to raise vagueness or equal protection claims because his conduct clearly fell within the statute's proscription and it did not infringe First Amendment rights, and that the statute could be constitutionally applied to him.

criminal lawfree speech

In People v. Ward, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of distributing harmful material to a minor under Illinois law for placing an envelope containing sexually explicit photographs in the possession of her ex-boyfriend's 12-year-old daughter, who opened it. The Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, affirmed the conviction and sentence of one year's conditional discharge plus jail time. The court held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly transferred possession of the materials to the child, satisfying the statutory definition of distribution, as the trial judge credited the child's testimony over the defendant's account of indirect delivery. The majority interpreted "possession" according to its ordinary meaning of holding or control, rejecting arguments that the transfer was too limited or conditional to qualify.

criminal law

In this case, James Lee was convicted of unlawful possession of cocaine and possession with intent to deliver after police arrested him under a Joliet municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering for drug-related activity, based on observations of him and others on a street corner known for drug activity. Lee appealed, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest, which led to the discovery of the drugs during a search incident to arrest. The court reviewed the ordinance's language, which requires conduct manifesting an intent to engage in drug activity and lists non-exclusive criteria for officers to consider, and determined that the ordinance provided sufficient notice and guidance to be constitutional. However, the court concluded that the facts did not establish probable cause because the officers observed no overt acts showing the required intent, such as an exchange or other listed behaviors, and merely saw the men conversing near a briefly stopped van. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a mother's appeal of a trial court order finding her two children neglected due to an injurious environment from drug-related incidents in the home, initially placing them under DCFS guardianship, and later terminating that guardianship to award custody to their respective fathers. The appellate court affirmed, ruling that section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act did not require a criminal background investigation of the fathers before discharging DCFS guardianship, since the neglect findings did not stem from the fathers' acts or omissions. The court also held that the mother failed to provide a sufficient record of the discharge hearing, requiring the presumption that the trial court's order was proper and supported by the evidence.

family lawprocedure

In Nussbaum v. Kennedy, plaintiff Jay Nussbaum was injured when a wall fell on him during construction of a home as part of a project involving defendants Michael Kennedy, Thomas Gutowski, and Dave Tkac; he sued them for negligence and violations of the Structural Work Act. The trial court permitted a joint-venture defense, the jury found the parties were joint venturers and returned verdicts for the defendants, and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction over Gutowski and Tkac because the notice of appeal omitted them, but ruled that the existence of a joint venture does not bar one venturer from suing the others for personal injuries. The court reasoned that the negligence claim was an independent tort not imputable among the venturers and that the trial judge therefore erred in instructing the jury that a joint venture would bar recovery. It reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Caterpillar Finance Corporation brought a tax protest action after the Secretary of State rejected its attempt to reduce paid-in capital from $56 million to $1,000 via a liquidation distribution, which would have lowered its annual franchise tax from $56,000 to the $25 minimum under the Business Corporation Act of 1983. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the company and ordered a refund, but the appellate court reversed. The court held that the Act permits reductions in paid-in capital only in connection with the reacquisition and cancellation of shares, as evidenced by the 1987 repeal of the prior provision allowing reductions through liquidating distributions. It further reasoned that the statute provides no mechanism for reductions based on future or unexecuted plans to cancel shares, which would create unworkable administrative issues.

business & regulatorytaxes

The case involved the State appealing a circuit court order that rescinded the statutory summary suspension of Robert L. Sarver's driver's license after he was charged with driving under the influence and refused a breathalyzer test. Sarver petitioned to rescind the suspension, claiming improper arrest and lack of reasonable grounds, and the trial court granted the petition because the officer's sworn report did not include the factual basis for the arrest. The appellate court reversed, holding that the summary suspension statute does not require the sworn report to detail grounds for arrest. It further reasoned that due process was satisfied because the driver had the opportunity for a presuspension hearing under the Vehicle Code, which occurred before the suspension took effect. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Bruce Rackouski sued defendants Donna and John Dobson alleging that their barn and fence encroached on his adjacent property and seeking their removal. The Dobsons filed a third-party complaint against their title insurer, Stewart Title, claiming it had a duty to defend and provide coverage under their policy for the encroachment dispute. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the insurer was obligated to defend because the policy deleted the standard exclusion for encroachments and boundary disputes, and the alleged encroachment rendered the title unmarketable by creating a likelihood of litigation. The court reasoned that the policy's coverage for unmarketable title applied, as reasonable buyers would not purchase property requiring removal of part of a building or defending a lawsuit, and ambiguities were construed in favor of the insured.

property