Corinne K.A. Watanabe

In this case, Jacqueline Overturf appealed the denial of her Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief, challenging her 2001 no-contest pleas to two counts of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, unauthorized entry into a motor vehicle, and criminal property damage in the fourth degree. She argued that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by pressuring her into the pleas and that the pleas were not voluntary or informed, including claims that the court failed to advise her of potential out-of-state incarceration. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii affirmed the circuit court's denial of the petition, holding that Overturf failed to demonstrate specific errors by counsel reflecting a lack of skill or diligence, and that the extensive plea colloquy showed her pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, with no manifest injustice warranting withdrawal. The court noted that unchallenged findings of fact bound the parties and applied standards from cases like Briones v. State and State v. Cornelio. Topics include criminal law and procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

Stop Rail Now and affiliated groups and individuals submitted a petition signed by over 49,000 voters proposing an ordinance to prohibit trains or rail transit in Honolulu and sought to place the measure on the 2008 general election ballot through the initiative process under the Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu. The City Clerk declined to accept and process the petition due to timing restrictions on special initiative elections, prompting Stop Rail to file suit in circuit court seeking mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief. The circuit court ordered the petition filed and processed but, after further proceedings, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the signature requirements. The court held that the charter provisions were ambiguous, that section 3-402 sets the applicable threshold signature requirement for initiative petitions, and that section 3-404(3) could not be read to override that threshold; because the petition did not meet the section 3-402(1) requirement, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the City Clerk on the remaining claims and declined to order the measure on the ballot.

elections

This case involved a dispute between the law firm Kemper & Watts and client Gordon Ching, individually and as personal representative of his mother's estate, over unpaid legal fees and costs. After the parties agreed to arbitrate under Hawaii State Bar Association rules, an arbitrator awarded the firm approximately $99,748.73, which the circuit court confirmed in an amended judgment. Ching appealed, challenging the existence of an arbitration agreement, a claimed public policy violation, and the arbitrator's calculation of fees, while the firm cross-appealed the denial of its request for attorney fees incurred in confirming the award. The Intermediate Court of Appeals rejected Ching's arguments, finding consent to arbitration, no established public policy breach, and that the arbitrator acted within his authority. The court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for the circuit court to explain its denial of confirmation-related fees under HRS § 658A-25.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned minority shareholders' challenge to the 2000 acquisition of cash-strapped Grove Farm Company by ALPS Acquisition Sub, Inc., a company owned by the son of a partner in the law firm advising Grove Farm, with claims including breaches of fiduciary duty, fraud, conspiracy, and conflicts of interest by directors and the firm. The circuit court entered judgments in favor of defendants on multiple counts of the second amended complaint through rulings such as summary judgment for Daniel Case, judgment on the pleadings for Grove Farm, judgments as a matter of law for former directors on fraud and punitive damages claims, and dismissal of certain plaintiffs' claims. On consolidated appeals, the appellate court reviewed challenges to the application of the business judgment rule, evidentiary exclusions, jury instructions, dismissals, and cost awards under HRCP Rule 54(d). The court addressed these based on Hawaii corporate statutes, including exculpatory provisions limiting director liability for duty-of-care breaches under HRS § 415-48.5, and procedural standards for motions and judgments.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved Jonathan Lee Townsley appealing his conviction for Theft in the Third Degree under Hawaii law after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. Townsley argued that the trial court improperly admitted his statement "Can you just trespass us?" as evidence, along with a witness's opinion on it, claiming violations of hearsay rules, relevance standards, undue prejudice, and prohibitions on character evidence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii reviewed the record, briefs, and applicable law, determining that these claims of error lacked merit. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence.

criminal law

This case involves consolidated class actions by substitute teachers against the Hawaii Department of Education alleging underpayment of wages in violation of statutory and contractual obligations, with claims for back pay spanning from 1996 onward. The court addressed multiple interlocutory orders on issues including sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations under HRS §§ 661-1 and 661-5, class modification, intervention, and prejudgment interest. It held that claims for pay prior to November 8, 2000, were barred by the statute of limitations, but claims from that date through June 30, 2005, were not, that sovereign immunity did not bar the breach-of-contract claims, that HRS § 302A-624(e) provided a basis for jurisdiction as a pay-mandating statute, and that the DOE had violated its obligation to pay the prescribed per diem rate during the allowable period; it also upheld denials of class modification, intervention, and prejudgment interest. The reasoning centered on interpretations of Hawaii Revised Statutes governing state contract claims, periodic pay accrual for limitations purposes, and procedural rules for amendments and class actions.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the discovery of human skeletal remains during construction of a Wal-Mart retail complex in Honolulu and whether the City and County of Honolulu violated HRS § 6E-42 by granting grubbing, grading, and building permits without first obtaining review and comment from the State Historic Preservation Division on potential impacts to burial sites. Plaintiffs argued that the statute mandated pre-approval consultation for any project that might affect historic properties or burials, but the circuit court ruled that consultation is required only when the agency knows or has reason to suspect such impacts. The appellate court affirmed, holding that because multiple prior environmental and archaeological assessments of the long-developed urban site had found no evidence of burial or historic sites, the City had no obligation to seek SHPD review before issuing the permits.

environmentproperty

In this case, defendant Paul Stukin was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant after a traffic stop by a Maui police officer who observed Stukin's vehicle approaching rapidly from behind, screeching its tires, and stopping just short of the officer's car. Stukin moved to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the streets involved were not proven to be public highways. The district court denied the motion as to the stop itself but granted it regarding blood test results, and Stukin entered a no-contest plea while appealing the denial. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer's observations of speeding, tire screeching, and near-collision provided objectively reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, that the relevant streets could reasonably be viewed as public, and that an officer need not articulate every element of a suspected offense at the time of the stop.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Thornton, the defendant was stopped for an expired vehicle tax and consented in writing to a police search of his car and its contents specifically for firearms and ammunition. During the search, an officer opened a closed wallet on the driver's seat and found another person's driver's license, leading to charges including unauthorized possession of confidential personal information. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, but the appellate court reversed the conviction, concluding that the search of the wallet exceeded the limited scope of consent because the officer's observations did not reasonably indicate ammunition could be inside and the license was not in plain view.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Dionicio Tangonan appealed the denial of his HRPP Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief from his 1999 conviction for Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, which had been affirmed on direct appeal in 2003. Tangonan raised two claims: inadequate interpretation services at trial and the trial court's failure to conduct a proper colloquy under Tachibana v. State regarding his right to testify. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that both claims were waived under HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) because they could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, and Tangonan failed to show extraordinary circumstances or rebut the presumption of waiver. The court rejected Tangonan's argument that his trial counsel's service as appellate counsel excused the waiver, noting that the Briones v. State exception applies only to ineffective assistance claims, which Tangonan did not assert. The order denying relief was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a mother's appeal from a Hawaii family court decision awarding permanent custody of her infant child, J.J., to the Department of Human Services, along with related findings and a permanent plan. The underlying facts centered on the child's injuries, which the family court determined were caused by shaken baby syndrome while in the parents' care, not by a near-automobile accident or genetic disorder as the parents claimed. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the parents' refusal to acknowledge abuse meant they could not demonstrate benefit from services or provide a safe family home within a reasonable time, even with a service plan, rendering the permanent custody orders proper.

family law

The case involved Eric K. Beyer, who was convicted in district court of excessive speeding under Hawaii Revised Statutes based solely on a police officer's laser gun reading of 70 mph in a 35 mph zone. Beyer appealed, arguing among other things that the State failed to lay adequate foundation for admitting the laser gun evidence. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, applying the Hawaii Supreme Court's recent ruling in State v. Assaye that required proof the laser gun was tested per manufacturer procedures and that the officer's training met manufacturer specifications. Without that foundation, the speed reading was inadmissible and insufficient evidence remained to support the charge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Renato Ancheta's appeal of convictions for first-degree burglary, using a firearm in commission of a felony, place to keep an unlicensed pistol or revolver, first-degree terroristic threatening, and violation of an order for protection, all arising from his entry into his former spouse's residence while armed in September 2006 despite a protective order requiring him to stay away. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reviewed claims that the two firearm-related counts were barred because HRS § 134-6 had been repealed months earlier, that a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence was imposed without proper notice or legal authority, and that the jury should have received a specific unanimity instruction on the conduct violating the protective order. The court applied plain-error review to the unpreserved challenges, examined the recodification of firearm statutes under Act 66, and addressed standards for charging documents, sentencing enhancements under HRS § 706-660.1, and Arceo-type jury instructions.

criminal lawgunsfamily lawprocedure

The case involved the County of Maui filing a complaint for declaratory judgment against Steve Lundborg after Lundborg applied for a firearm permit in 2005, which was not accepted due to his 1986 misdemeanor conviction in Colorado for reckless endangerment involving a firearm; the county sought a ruling that the police chief had properly exercised discretion under HRS § 134-7 in denying the permit. Lundborg moved to dismiss, conceding the propriety of the 1999 denial but arguing no jurisdiction existed for declaratory relief. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the county, holding that HRS § 632-1 did not confer jurisdiction because there was no substantial controversy on the uncontested 1999 denial and the relief granted would not terminate uncertainty or prevent future litigation over Lundborg's current eligibility or due process claims. The court reasoned that declaratory relief requires an actual controversy or antagonistic claims that the judgment would resolve, which was absent here as the issues of past and present permit eligibility were distinct.

gunsprocedure

In this case, defendant Sydney Nobuto Tokunaga was convicted in circuit court of Abuse of Family and Household Members and Violation of an Order for Protection after an incident in which he entered the complaining witness's apartment and struck her. Tokunaga appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support either conviction and that his consecutive sentence was illegal under Apprendi and related cases. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the complaining witness's testimony, corroborated by a roommate, provided substantial evidence of physical abuse and knowing violation of the protection order despite Tokunaga's self-defense claim. The court also rejected the sentencing challenge, concluding that consecutive sentences do not require jury fact-finding under Oregon v. Ice and State v. Kahapea. The judgment was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved the Hawaii Department of Human Services seeking permanent custody of child R.R. after the parents' severe mental health issues and the father's ongoing anger-management and domestic-violence problems prevented safe reunification despite three years of services. The family court granted permanent custody to DHS, and father appealed, arguing that he posed no threat to the child, had stabilized his condition, and had complied with all requirements. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that the family court's finding of clear error was not shown because substantial evidence supported the conclusion that father remained unable to provide a safe family home, including his failure to acknowledge harm from his behavior and the alienation of support systems. The court noted that compliance with service plans does not require returning a child when a parent cannot ensure safety, and the family court's credibility determinations and reliance on the social worker's opinion were reasonable.

family law

The case involved defendant Robert Canencia's appeal from his conviction for third-degree assault arising from a fight between two families, where prosecution witnesses said he struck the complaining witness and Canencia testified he did not. Canencia argued the trial court should have dismissed the case under Hawaii's speedy-trial rule (HRPP Rule 48) because of pretrial delays and should have granted a short continuance so a percipient defense witness could testify. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that the period when Canencia appeared without counsel was properly excluded from the Rule 48 calculation, so denial of the motion to dismiss was correct, but concluded that refusing the continuance for an undisputedly exculpatory and material witness was an abuse of discretion; it therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Rita Makekau's appeal from her conviction in Hawaii circuit court on eight counts of second-degree assault and one count of abuse of a family or household member, following a conditional no-contest plea. Makekau argued that the court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction because she is a member of the sovereign nation of Hawaii and holds the title of "Her Highness" in the Kingdom of Hawaii. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the claim was without merit under the precedent of State v. Lorenzo, which found no factual or legal basis for treating the Kingdom of Hawaii as a sovereign state with attributes such as defined territory, government control, and capacity for international relations. The court noted that the State had met its burden to establish jurisdiction over all areas within Hawaii's territorial boundaries and that Makekau had not presented evidence supporting any immunity defense.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ko, the defendant was convicted of excessive speeding after a police officer testified that he paced her vehicle at sixty miles per hour using his speedometer. The defendant appealed, arguing that the officer's testimony and the speed check results were improperly admitted without proof of the speedometer's accuracy and in violation of her right to confrontation. The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that while the officer could testify based on his observations, the prosecution failed to introduce evidence establishing the accuracy of the speedometer, resulting in insufficient evidence of the defendant's speed. The court did not address the confrontation claim due to its resolution of the sufficiency issue.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a petition by P.N. and J.N. to adopt a child born in Hawaii to a Native American mother who had initially consented to the adoption. The mother later revoked her consent under the Indian Child Welfare Act before any final decree was entered, leading the Hawaii family court to dismiss the adoption proceeding despite the child having been taken to Germany and a German court denying return under the Hague Convention. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii affirmed the dismissal, first confirming that the family court had jurisdiction because the child was born in the circuit. The court held that the ICWA provision allowing withdrawal of consent at any time prior to finalization was controlling and required dismissal, and that the German ruling did not override the Hawaii court's authority on the adoption petition itself.

family lawfederal powerprocedure