Craig H. Nakamura

This case involves claims by the estates of Rosalinda Iturralde and Arturo Iturralde against Hilo Medical Center, Hawaii Health Systems Corporation, the State of Hawaii, Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, and Dr. Robert Ricketson, arising from medical treatment and related equipment. The specific opinion addresses Medtronic's motion seeking reconsideration of the Intermediate Court of Appeals' March 30, 2012 decision. After reviewing the motion, case records, and files, the court denied the motion for reconsideration.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

In Fukusaku v. State, petitioner Raita Fukusaku, convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, challenged the Hawaii Paroling Authority’s (HPA) decision after resentencing to raise his aggregate minimum term of imprisonment from 40 to 50 years. The Circuit Court had resentenced him to consecutive life terms without the original mandatory minimums (vacated on appeal because the jury had not found firearm use), yet the HPA increased his minimum terms from consecutive 20-year to 25-year periods, citing only the “Nature of Offense” and no new information or changed circumstances. Fukusaku filed a petition arguing the HPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious; the Circuit Court denied it without a hearing. The appellate court vacated that denial and remanded, holding that the petition stated a colorable claim because the unexplained increase after a successful challenge to the sentence could reflect vindictiveness or violate HPA guidelines requiring uniform, justified minimum-term decisions.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Higa, defendant Matthew Higa was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree murder for throwing a 23-month-old child to his death from a freeway overpass while under the influence of methamphetamine and amphetamine. On appeal, Higa raised issues concerning his privately retained counsel's potential conflict of interest stemming from a power of attorney that gave the attorney control over Higa's structured settlement funds, questions about Higa's competency to execute or waive that arrangement while his fitness to proceed was under review, and the admissibility of his statements to police. The circuit court addressed the conflict through a waiver declaration signed by Higa, transfer of the power of attorney to a third-party attorney, and input from disciplinary counsel; it also found the statements admissible as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary after proper Miranda warnings. The appellate court examined the related findings of fact and conclusions of law on these points, along with the attorney's continued representation despite the court's earlier concerns.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brooks, defendant Curtis Ray Brooks and co-defendant Sistine Rangamar were charged with the murder, kidnapping, and robbery of Ted Arifuku; Rangamar gave a police statement admitting his own involvement while implicating Brooks in the crimes, then committed suicide before trial. Brooks sought to introduce only the self-incriminating portions of the statement under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest to support his defense that Rangamar acted alone, while the State contended that the rule of completeness (HRE Rule 106) required admission of additional portions implicating Brooks if the statement was used at all. The trial court ruled that Brooks’s tactical choice to introduce selected excerpts would waive or forfeit any Confrontation Clause objection to the State’s responsive use of completing portions, and it permitted the State to introduce those excerpts at trial after Brooks proceeded with his plan; the jury convicted Brooks of manslaughter, kidnapping, and robbery. On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the selective introduction of the statement risked misleading the jury and that Brooks’s affirmative choice to present the evidence forfeited his Crawford-based confrontation claim as to the limited, context-restoring portions admitted under Rule 106.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over Marie Minichino's cancellation of a real estate purchase agreement with David Low, where Low sued for breach after Minichino failed to complete the purchase due to financing issues; the matter was sent to binding arbitration, which ruled in Low's favor based on findings that Minichino had not properly terminated the contract or kept Low informed. Minichino moved to vacate the award, alleging it was procured by fraud through Low's perjured testimony denying receipt of her termination emails, and she later located copies of those emails after the hearing. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erred in summarily denying the motion to vacate and confirming the award without an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. The court reasoned that Minichino had presented a prima facie case of fraud through newly available evidence of the emails, which required a hearing to evaluate whether the perjury met the criteria for vacating an arbitration award, such as whether it was material and could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence.

propertyprocedure

In this case, public employee Amy Lee sued her employer, the State of Hawai'i Department of Public Safety, for allegedly breaching a collective bargaining agreement through her wrongful termination, and sued her union, United Public Workers AFSCME Local 646, for breaching its duty of fair representation by declining to pursue her grievance to arbitration. Lee filed this hybrid action directly in circuit court without first seeking relief from the Hawai'i Labor Relations Board. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Hawai'i Supreme Court affirmed, holding that HRS § 89-14 grants the HLRB exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies involving prohibited practices under collective bargaining agreements, including hybrid claims of this type, and that federal precedents like Vaca v. Sipes did not apply to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the courts. The court also upheld the circuit court's partial award of attorney's fees related to the default judgment proceedings.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Kevin Nesmith, who was charged by complaint with operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII) under Hawaii Revised Statutes § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3) as a first-time offender. Nesmith moved to dismiss the complaint prior to trial, arguing it was insufficient because it failed to allege the required mens rea (that he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly) as an essential fact. The district court denied the motion, Nesmith was convicted after trial, and he appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a complaint charging OVUII under these subsections need not allege a mens rea to be sufficient: subsection (a)(3) creates an absolute liability offense that does not require proof of mens rea, while mens rea for subsection (a)(1) is not an essential element and can be inferred from the complaint's allegations, which otherwise stated all required elements and provided fair notice.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Hawaiian Properties, Ltd., as managing agent for a housing cooperative, seeking a judgment for possession and writ of possession to remove Regina Tauala from her cooperative unit in district court via a summary possession action. Tauala moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing her status as a cooperative member gave her more than a mere possessory interest. The court concluded that, under the statutory limits on district court civil jurisdiction as construed by the Hawai’i Supreme Court, Tauala’s right to occupy her unit as a cooperative member could not be cancelled or terminated in such a proceeding. Accordingly, the Judgment and Writ were vacated and the matter remanded.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned Dr. Robert V. Justice's request under Hawaii's Uniform Information Practices Act to inspect and copy President Barack Obama's original birth certificate from the Department of Health to verify eligibility for the presidency. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that the only basis asserted by the plaintiff, the provision requiring disclosure of government records in compelling circumstances affecting health or safety, applies to medical or safety emergencies and does not cover the plaintiff's request regarding presidential eligibility.

electionsfederal powerprocedure

This case concerned the Family Court of the First Circuit's decision to terminate Mother-Appellant's parental rights over her child TW and award permanent custody to the Department of Human Services after Mother failed to appear at one scheduled hearing following eighteen months of consistent participation. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai`i held that the family court abused its discretion by entering default against Mother and granting the permanent custody motion without allowing her to contest it on the merits. The court reasoned that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children, which cannot be terminated without an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, and that a single nonappearance did not justify default under the circumstances. The appellate court reversed the default judgment and denial of the motion to set it aside.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved an appeal from a divorce decree in the Family Court of the First Circuit between Gary Sidney Baker and Lucyna Bielski, formerly Baker. The family court granted the divorce, ordered Baker to pay alimony to Bielski for six months, divided the parties' assets and debts, and required each to cover their own attorneys' fees, with a minor exception. Bielski appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by failing to properly classify and divide marital assets such as real estate commissions and premarital property contributions, by not equalizing assets and debts correctly, and by making evidentiary errors in admitting an exhibit. The appellate court reviewed the family court's decisions under an abuse of discretion standard, findings of fact for clear error, and conclusions of law de novo, while applying statutory factors for property division under HRS § 580-47(a). The court ultimately addressed each contention regarding asset categorization, equalization calculations, and procedural rulings in the context of the divorce proceedings.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved Kee Sun Kim, who was injured in a car accident and sought review of her insurer Liberty Mutual's denial of payment for acupuncture treatments received more than three and a half months after the accident. The Insurance Commissioner dismissed Kim's administrative challenge, relying on Wilson v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co. to hold that she was not a real party in interest entitled to pursue the claim on behalf of her medical provider. The circuit court reversed, finding that 2006 legislation (Act 198) had clarified the law to allow such actions. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Act 198 and its legislative history established an insured claimant's interest in enforcing medical providers' claims for payment of no-fault benefits, making Kim a real party in interest who could proceed with the administrative review.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

The case involved defendant Erin E. Bryan, who was charged with two counts of Operating a Vehicle after License and Privilege have been Suspended or Revoked for Operating a Vehicle under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVLPSR-OVUII) under HRS § 291E-62 but whose prior qualifying convictions were not alleged in the complaints. After Bryan pleaded no contest, the circuit court sentenced her as a third-time offender with enhanced penalties despite the lack of allegations regarding the priors. The appeal raised whether those prior convictions constituted an essential element that must be alleged in the charging instrument to support enhanced recidivist penalties, as well as whether the charges sufficiently alleged operation of a vehicle upon a public way, street, road, or highway under the standard from State v. Wheeler. The court held that prior convictions are an essential element that must be alleged, drawing on precedents construing the similarly structured OVUII statute, and that under a liberal construction one charge was sufficient while the other was not. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Angel Dayoan remained entitled to ongoing wage loss benefits under a personal auto insurance policy issued by First Insurance Co. of Hawaii following a 1998 motor vehicle accident that left him disabled. The policy, purchased in February 1998, provided optional wage loss coverage that continued after two years if a physician certified disability from suitable employment and terminated only upon the insured's death. First Insurance appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Dayoan, arguing that later 1997 and 1998 amendments to Hawaii's no-fault insurance law should limit or alter the benefits, and also challenged the award of attorneys' fees at $250 per hour. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the statutory provisions and policy language in effect at issuance control the contract and that subsequent amendments do not apply retroactively to reduce coverage obligations already undertaken.

business & regulatory

The case involved defendant Bullard’s conviction for the criminal offense of excessive speeding under HRS § 291C-105, based on an officer’s speedometer reading that was supported by a speed check card admitted at trial. Following the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Fitzwater, the court held that the speed check card lacked sufficient foundation and that its admission required vacating the excessive speeding conviction for insufficient evidence. The court rejected Bullard’s argument that a non-criminal speeding infraction under HRS § 291C-102 cannot be treated as a lesser included offense, but it also rejected the State’s view that remand for judgment on regular speeding was automatic; instead, it required that the evidentiary error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the lesser infraction. Because the error was harmless here, the court remanded the case for entry of judgment on the regular speeding infraction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Gary Suzuki's personal injury lawsuit against Castle & Cooke Resorts after a truck owned by the company rolled into him while he performed masonry work at a CEO's home; Suzuki had already received workers' compensation benefits under a self-insured plan covering the defendant, its parent, and related subsidiaries. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant on grounds of immunity under Hawaii's workers' compensation exclusive remedy statute. The appellate court vacated that judgment and remanded, ruling that the defendant had not established it was Suzuki's statutory employer under the three-prong test or his actual employer under the control test, and that a shared insurance policy alone does not confer tort immunity between parent and subsidiary entities.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, a law firm sued a former client to recover unpaid attorney fees, costs, and taxes from prior representation in a criminal matter, and after the client defaulted, the district court entered judgment for the principal amount but denied the firm's request for attorney fees incurred in litigating the collection action under HRS § 607-14. The Intermediate Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute permits such an award even when an attorney employed by the law firm represents the firm itself. The court reasoned that the statute's broad language, its legislative history, and Hawaii case law support recovery of reasonable attorney fees in assumpsit actions without requiring independent outside counsel, distinguishing it from cases interpreting statutes with narrower 'incurred' language or different policy concerns.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Bert and Darnell Yogi suing Hawaii Medical Service Association (HMSA) for breach of contract, bad faith, and emotional distress claims after HMSA denied coverage for a medical procedure recommended for Bert Yogi's pain treatment. HMSA moved to compel arbitration based on a provision in their Preferred Provider Plan, but the circuit court denied the motion. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, concluding that the arbitration clause did not clearly encompass these claims and was ambiguous in light of a governing law provision indicating that disputes would be litigated in state or federal courts.

healthcareprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, defendant Mark Char was convicted after a jury trial of negligent injury in the first degree based on a motor vehicle accident. Char appealed his probation sentence, arguing that the trial court wrongly barred him from cross-examining the prosecution's key eyewitness about the witness's pending criminal charges and possible bias or motive to cooperate with the state. The Intermediate Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred under Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 609.1 by precluding this cross-examination, as evidence of bias, interest, or motive is always relevant to credibility, especially where the witness faced charges in the same prosecutor's office and was still under a deferral period during his testimony. The court concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the conviction, and remanded for a new trial without reaching the separate claim about waiver of the right to testify.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved defendant James Carvalho Apo's appeal from his convictions in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit for kidnapping under HRS § 707-720(1)(d) as a class A felony and sexual assault in the third degree under HRS § 707-732(1)(f), for which he received concurrent prison sentences. Apo argued that the evidence showed he voluntarily released the victim, which should have reduced the kidnapping charge to a class B felony, and that the two offenses should have merged under HRS § 701-109(1)(e) as part of an uninterrupted course of conduct. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, finding substantial evidence that the release was not voluntary because it occurred only after intervention by a third-party witness and while Apo still posed a threat to the victim. The court also held that the offenses did not merge because they involved distinct acts, completed at different times, and were motivated by different intents, consistent with precedents like State v. Hoopii and State v. Decenso. The decision rejected any double jeopardy violation on the same grounds.

criminal law