In State v. Andres, defendant Ray Cardona Andres was convicted by a jury of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Second Degree, a class B felony, and challenged the circuit court's decision to sentence him as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5 based on his 1991 federal conviction for attempting to possess crystal methamphetamine for distribution. The circuit court granted the State's motion for repeat-offender sentencing and imposed a mandatory minimum term, which the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The court interpreted the statutory phrase "maximum term of imprisonment possible after a prior felony conviction of another jurisdiction" to mean the maximum sentence authorized by the federal statute of conviction itself, rather than the specific range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that applied to Andres (121-151 months). Relying on the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in State v. Heggland, the court concluded that Andres committed the new offense within the applicable period measured by the federal statutory maximum, making the repeat-offender provisions applicable.
This case concerned a labor arbitration dispute between the United Public Workers union and the County of Hawai'i over whether Unit 1 employees on unpaid leave were entitled to holiday pay and benefits under the parties' 2003 collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator ruled for the union and issued a final award granting back pay and other relief; the First Circuit Court confirmed the award, and the County appealed while the union separately challenged a subsequent stay of enforcement. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the confirmation, holding that the First Circuit was the proper venue, the award did not violate public policy under HRS § 89-9(d)(7), and the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by addressing collateral estoppel. The court reviewed the circuit court's decision de novo but applied an extremely narrow and deferential standard to the arbitration award itself.
The case concerned a father's conviction in family court for Abuse of Family or Household Member after he pushed and struck his eleven-year-old son on the leg following the child's repeated denial of causing a closet door to stick during chores. Dowling appealed, arguing that the State failed to disprove his parental discipline defense under HRS § 703-309(1), that any mental distress did not meet the statutory threshold, and that the force used was proportional and necessary. The Intermediate Court of Appeals examined the evidence regarding the force's relation to the child's welfare under subsection (1)(a) and whether it created a risk of extreme pain or mental distress under subsection (1)(b). The court concluded that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence only to disprove the defense under (1)(a) and not under (1)(b), leading to the conviction being vacated and the case remanded for retrial limited to the (1)(a) issue.
The case involved a father appealing an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) and subsequent order issued by the family court that prohibited contact with his minor child based on the mother's petition alleging physical hitting and emotional abuse. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court found the material allegations proven and extended the TRO until its expiration date. The father, appearing pro se, challenged the constitutionality of Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 586 as infringing parental rights and due process, claimed gender bias in the ex parte process, and argued the court abused its discretion in finding abuse. The appellate court affirmed the orders, concluding the father's arguments lacked merit because the statutes properly balance emergency protection needs against due process by allowing ex parte relief for imminent harm while providing prompt post-deprivation hearings, and the evidence supported the findings of recent abusive acts.
The case concerned a charitable gift of land to the Hawaiian Humane Society under deeds restricting its use to an educational preserve for flora and fauna, with an alternative distribution to the State of Hawaii for a public park if the restriction could not be met. After finding the original purpose impracticable due to cost, access issues, and neighborhood impact, the Society petitioned the Probate Court to apply the cy pres doctrine and approve a three-way land exchange that would transfer interests to the State and a private partner while using sale proceeds for the Society's educational programs. The Probate Court denied the petition, concluding that cy pres did not apply because the deeds created a specific rather than general charitable intent and the proposed transaction did not match the stated purpose. The appellate court reversed, holding that the deeds evidenced general charitable intent, the designated use had become impossible or impracticable, and cy pres therefore permitted modification to fulfill the donor's broader purpose; it vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to approve the exchange.
The case concerned a challenge by the State of Hawaii to orders by the Public Utilities Commission finding that a 1961 agreement requiring free sewerage services to certain schools and parks was unenforceable to the extent it conflicted with the tariff rates of Hawaii-American Water Company, the successor to the original sewer provider. After private sewer companies were brought under PUC regulation by 1974 legislation, the Commission had approved a tariff requiring all customers to pay approved rates and had imputed revenue from the free services when setting those rates. The court affirmed the Commission's orders, holding that the filed-rate doctrine requires the utility to charge only the Commission-approved tariff rates and renders inconsistent contract terms unenforceable.
