Herbert E. Phipps

John Austin II pled guilty to felony theft by taking and received a probated sentence that included an order to pay restitution for unrecovered items including a pistol and coin collection. After a hearing, the trial court set restitution at $20,500 based on the victim's testimony about replacement cost for the pistol and a $20,000–$30,000 range for the coins. Austin appealed, arguing the amount lacked sufficient evidentiary support. The Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded the case, holding that restitution must reflect fair market value rather than replacement cost and that the victim's testimony failed to provide a fact-based foundation—such as details on age, condition, or comparable sales—for determining that value under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved a mother's appeal of a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two young children after they were removed from her care in 2008 due to neglect, lack of supervision, and her financial inability to provide for them. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the termination, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's findings by clear and convincing evidence. The court reasoned that the mother had failed to complete key reunification case plan goals—such as maintaining stable income and housing for six consecutive months, cooperating with a parent aide, attending visits consistently, and addressing mental health issues—despite having consented to an initial deprivation order and participating in plan development. It further found that the causes of deprivation were likely to continue, given the mother's pattern of instability, including moving out of state without notice and missing visits, and that termination was in the children's best interests. The appellate court deferred to the juvenile court's factual findings and credibility determinations without reweighing the evidence.

family law

In this case, Georgia Casualty paid out policy limits to Coachcraft and others after a 2004 gas explosion, then sued Atmos in subrogation to recover those amounts; Coachcraft and MacDonald intervened and later sued Georgia Casualty, alleging breach of the insurance policy and bad faith for settling the subrogation claims without first ensuring the insureds were made whole for their excess losses. The trial court granted Georgia Casualty summary judgment on the bad faith claim but denied it on the breach claim. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Georgia Casualty was entitled to summary judgment on both claims. The court reasoned that the made-whole doctrine did not bar the insurer’s contractual subrogation rights once it had fully paid the available policy limits, the insureds had been given the chance to pursue their remaining claims separately against Atmos, and the settlement did not inequitably compete with or prejudice those claims.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from the end of Sheila Ridley’s employment and consulting relationship with Sovereign Solutions, LLC (and its affiliate), governed by a Separation and Services Agreement that allowed either party to terminate with 30 days’ notice; after termination, Sovereign sued Ridley for unpaid equipment lease payments and alleged loan advances, while Ridley counterclaimed for defamation and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court struck most of Ridley’s affidavit, refused to consider a late third-party affidavit, granted Sovereign summary judgment on all claims, and denied Ridley’s cross-motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that Ridley had waived any challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings by failing to enumerate error or present argument on the motion to strike, leaving only limited affidavit paragraphs for review, but that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on at least one of Sovereign’s claims and required further proceedings on Ridley’s counterclaims.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

Dorothy Huggins, as administrator of Vernon Powell’s estate, sued multiple defendants including the Hilltop entities, J & A Group, and Calloway Title & Escrow, alleging that Powell’s heirs had fraudulently conveyed the decedent’s 20 percent interest in real property after his 1996 death and seeking recovery of the property to satisfy estate debts and her lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Hilltop defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds, granted summary judgment to the J & A defendants for insufficient evidence, and denied Calloway’s motion because of deemed admissions. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the J & A defendants on the fraudulent-conveyance claims because the evidence did not show a fraudulent transfer, affirmed summary judgment for the Hilltop defendants because the four-year limitations period under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act had expired, reversed the denial of summary judgment to Calloway on the same limitations ground, and reversed summary judgment on Huggins’s separate individual levy claim because that issue presented a jury question.

propertyprocedure

Middle Georgia Management Services (MGM) sued Brandy McCrary, seeking a constructive trust over life insurance proceeds paid to her as beneficiary after her mother, Barbara Morris—an MGM employee—embezzled nearly $2 million and then died by suicide following an internal inquiry. McCrary countersued for wrongful death and attorney fees. The trial court denied McCrary summary judgment on MGM’s claim but granted MGM summary judgment on the counterclaim; on appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the first ruling and affirmed the second. The court held that OCGA § 33-25-11 shields life-insurance proceeds for a designated beneficiary from creditors unless the policy was assigned to the creditor or purchased with intent to defraud that creditor—neither of which occurred here—so MGM could not impose a trust. On the counterclaim, MGM was not liable for wrongful death because the regional manager’s interview and Turner’s personal accusation were not the proximate cause of the suicide and were not attributable to MGM within the scope of employment.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In the Interest of R.W., a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in Georgia for participating in the burglary of an Evans County pharmacy, during which approximately 27 guns were stolen, and was ordered into restrictive custody. R.W. appealed, arguing that the accomplice's testimony was insufficiently corroborated, that extraneous prejudicial material tainted the proceedings, that the court was predisposed toward restrictive custody and relied on facts not in evidence, and that the commitment order failed to properly analyze required statutory factors. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the adjudication and disposition, holding that the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated by circumstantial evidence including R.W.'s flight from police and his unexplained possession of multiple guns shortly after the burglary. The court further determined that any procedural irregularities or unsupported findings in the commitment order were harmless and did not constitute reversible error, as the record supported the overall outcome under the applicable statutes.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance v. Gordon, an insurer filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to void two consecutive liability policies issued to attorney Gordon, alleging material misrepresentations in her applications; the policies related to claims arising from Gordon’s role as closing agent in a 2005 real-estate transaction, after the insurer had initially defended her under a reservation of rights and then unilaterally denied coverage and declared the policies void. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that declaratory relief is available only when a party faces uncertainty about future conduct that a judicial declaration would resolve, not to ratify or obtain approval for actions already taken such as the insurer’s denial of coverage; because the complaint, even as amended, sought only declaratory relief and did not properly plead rescission, the claim became moot once the insurer acted.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Gilmore v. State, Kyle Gilmore and Christopher Young were convicted of multiple felonies, including burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault, arising from two home invasions in Louisville, Jefferson County, based on the testimony of B.M., a 16-year-old accomplice who had accepted a plea deal and identified the defendants as participants. The Court of Appeals reversed both convictions, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient under OCGA § 24-4-8. The court reasoned that an accomplice’s testimony identifying a defendant must be corroborated by independent evidence connecting the accused to the crimes, yet no victims, investigators, or physical evidence (such as recovered guns or stolen property) had identified or linked Gilmore or Young to the offenses, and none of the other co-defendants testified. Because B.M.’s uncorroborated identification testimony was the sole basis for the guilty verdicts, the judgments could not stand.

criminal lawprocedure

In Simmons v. State, Jonathan Simmons appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2011 motion to withdraw a 2004 negotiated guilty plea to possession of hydrocodone, marijuana possession, and an improper turn, arguing that a later void sentence preserved his right to withdraw the plea and that the plea itself was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea, holding that it was filed years after the term of court in which the plea was entered and that first-offender probation status did not extend the right to withdraw the plea as a matter of right. However, the court found that the ten-year probation sentence imposed in 2007 for the hydrocodone count exceeded the five-year statutory maximum under OCGA § 16-13-30(g) and was therefore void. Because a void sentence may be corrected at any time, the court remanded the case for resentencing on that count alone while leaving the remaining convictions and the denial of plea withdrawal intact.

criminal lawprocedure

Harriet Whitener Boatright sued the Glynn County School District and its superintendent after her termination as a paraprofessional, alleging violations of her procedural due process and liberty rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments because she received no pre-termination notice or hearing despite being a classified employee who could be fired only for cause. After an initial federal suit was dismissed, she filed this state action seeking damages, reinstatement, expungement of her personnel file, and other relief; she later received a post-termination hearing and reinstatement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Boatright failed to state a viable constitutional claim because Georgia law provided adequate post-deprivation remedies, such as mandamus, to address any procedural shortcomings, and the existence of those remedies meant no due-process violation occurred even if the initial termination process was flawed; her remaining claims were either moot or barred by res judicata.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In White v. State, siblings Lloyd White and Capucine White were jointly tried and convicted of armed robbery after evidence showed they participated in a masked gunpoint theft from an apartment, along with others including a woman named Davisha. On appeal, Lloyd challenged the admission of certain evidence and comments by the trial judge, while Capucine challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of accomplice testimony, and the denial of her motion to sever the trials. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, holding that the appellants had not demonstrated any reversible error. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the verdicts, including testimony from the cooperating accomplice Davisha and her sister, plus a similar transaction involving Lloyd, and determined that evidentiary rulings and other trial procedures were proper or did not affect the outcome.

criminal lawprocedure

Christopher Tiegreen was indicted on multiple felony charges, including aggravated assault and sexual battery, arising from a single 2009 incident. He entered a plea of mental incompetency to stand trial based on a traumatic brain injury sustained years earlier, and a special jury was convened to decide the issue. The jury found Tiegreen competent, and the trial court entered judgment on that verdict. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, permitted a rational jury to conclude that Tiegreen had failed to prove incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence under the constitutional standard. The court also found no reversible error in the trial court’s jury instructions on competency.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kitchens v. Ezell, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for injuries and death from a 2009 car accident, after which the defendants sought to enforce an alleged settlement reached through State Farm, the at-fault driver's insurer, while the plaintiffs denied any agreement existed and moved for partial summary judgment on the settlement defense. The trial court granted the motion to enforce, denied the plaintiffs' motion, and awarded attorney fees against their counsel under OCGA § 9-15-14. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no enforceable settlement was formed because State Farm's proposed releases did not match the plaintiffs' specific offer to release only the insureds for bodily injury claims (while preserving uninsured motorist claims and addressing property damage separately); instead, the releases were broader and inconsistent, the plaintiffs promptly rejected them by returning the checks, and there was thus no meeting of the minds. The court further held that the fee award lacked any statutory basis once the underlying enforcement ruling was set aside.

torts & liabilityprocedure

John T. Ruff sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia for breach of contract, seeking a refund of fees paid for his son's university study-abroad programs after the son was barred from traveling due to probation violations. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by sovereign immunity because no written contract existed. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that sovereign immunity is waived only by a written contract, and the record contained no such contract between Ruff and the Board; the son's application and the university's refund policy did not constitute one. The court therefore ruled that the suit could not proceed.

procedure

Vinson Lloyd Farley was convicted by a jury of terroristic act and aggravated stalking after he returned to his former partner’s home in violation of a temporary protective order, poured gasoline on the house and surrounding materials, and attempted to ignite it before being stopped by witnesses. On appeal, Farley challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged multiple trial errors, including the admission of hearsay, limits on cross-examination, denial of his request to recall certain witnesses, and the failure to instruct the jury on admissions, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence—eyewitness accounts, physical evidence of gasoline, Farley’s statements at the scene, and the protective order—was sufficient to prove the statutory elements of both offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further concluded that the challenged evidentiary rulings were either proper exercises of discretion or did not affect the outcome, that no timely or meritorious request for an admissions instruction had been made, and that trial counsel’s performance met constitutional standards.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In Bright v. State, Roy Bright was convicted of burglary after police found him and another man hiding in a vacant, newly constructed condominium unit that contained tools not present during an earlier security check; the state introduced evidence of two prior similar incidents in which Bright was linked to burglaries of other vacant homes under construction, including one involving matching shoe prints. Bright appealed, claiming error in the admission of the similar-transaction evidence, improper admission of hearsay, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the similar-transaction evidence was admissible to show a common scheme or plan, that any notice deficiencies were harmless because the defense received adequate pretrial information, and that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of unlawful entry with intent to commit theft.

criminal lawprocedure

In Harris v. State, Lewis Harris was arrested in May 2006 on charges including aggravated assault on a peace officer and was not indicted until March 2010; he moved to dismiss the indictment in July 2010 on constitutional speedy-trial grounds, and the trial court denied the motion after a hearing. The Court of Appeals vacated the denial and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had not properly applied the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo. The appellate court found that the trial court correctly identified the more-than-five-year delay as presumptively prejudicial but failed to weigh the length of the delay as a distinct factor in the full analysis, and it also erred in assigning the post-indictment portion of the delay to neither party while under-weighting the state's negligence in the pre-indictment period. These deficiencies required a fresh balancing of the Barker factors, including the defendant's assertion of the right and any prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

A jury convicted Sherman Robinson of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm during a crime, and related offenses, based on evidence that police found cocaine and a gun in his girlfriend’s apartment after she consented to a search and gave a statement implicating him. On appeal, Robinson argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the statutory elements of the housing-project charge and the other offenses, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held the evidence sufficient, reasoning that testimony about the publicly owned and operated housing complex, the girlfriend’s prior statement placing the drugs and gun with Robinson that morning, and the lab results met the elements under OCGA § 16-13-32.5(b) and allowed a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Robinson’s appellate counsel first raised ineffective-assistance claims on appeal, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on those claims while affirming the convictions.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The State of Georgia appealed a trial court order that dismissed with prejudice the pending charges against James McCarter for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and firearm offenses, on the ground that the prosecution had violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the dismissal was premature. Under the IAD, the 180-day period for bringing a prisoner to trial begins only when the prisoner’s custodian properly delivers the required written notice and custody certificate to the prosecutor and court by certified mail; that delivery occurred on October 19, 2010, so the period had not yet expired when the trial court acted on April 12, 2011. The court also rejected arguments that the State had waived the issue or that the order could be upheld as “right for any reason,” noting that the 180-day clock is tolled once charges are dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure