M Yvette Miller

In Moore v. Stewart, Ronald and Debra Moore, as guardians for Tracy Ann Boone, sued William Stewart for negligence after Boone suffered disabling injuries in a three-vehicle collision, alleging that Stewart’s rear-end collision with Boone pushed her into oncoming traffic. A jury returned a verdict for Stewart, and the trial court denied the Moores’ post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial under OCGA § 5-5-20. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of judgment n.o.v. because the Moores had not moved for a directed verdict at trial, rendering that motion procedurally barred, and because evidence—including expert testimony that Boone caused the initial collision—supported the verdict. It vacated the denial of the new-trial motion, however, and remanded the case, holding that the trial court failed to exercise its independent discretion to determine whether the verdict was contrary to the evidence and the principles of justice and equity, instead improperly deferring entirely to the jury’s credibility findings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a 2009 car collision in which Angela Broadnax was injured by Sebastian Mendoza while he was driving to obtain a ladder for window-washing work at the home of Randall and Kathy Daniel. Broadnax sued the Daniels on theories of vicarious liability under respondeat superior and direct liability for negligent hiring and supervision, but the trial court granted the Daniels summary judgment, finding either that Mendoza was an independent contractor or that he was acting outside any employment relationship at the time. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence created genuine issues of material fact on both points. The record showed the Daniels set Mendoza’s tasks and hours, paid him hourly (including for the residence work), could fire him, and supplied equipment, supporting a possible employee relationship; it also indicated that on the day of the accident Mendoza was en route to retrieve a ladder for a work task requested by Mr. Daniel rather than on a purely personal errand.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Wright v. Apartment Investment & Management Co., the AIMCO Group sued former employee Garland Wright, his wife, and their company S&D Associates for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy, alleging that Wright accepted kickbacks from a contractor he recommended for multimillion-dollar projects and failed to ensure subcontractors were paid, resulting in liens and over $2 million in damages. After a jury found for the plaintiffs and the trial court denied the defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, the defendants appealed. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for AIMCO, holding that evidence of Wright’s large unexplained cash deposits, luxury purchases, and role in awarding contracts supported the jury’s findings of fraud and fiduciary breach, but reversed the judgment for OP Property Management because that entity lacked an independent underlying tort claim.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

Kenyatta Stevenson sued the City of Doraville after a police officer failed to redirect traffic around his stalled car on Interstate 285, resulting in Stevenson being struck by another vehicle while standing outside his car. The trial court granted the City summary judgment, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the public duty doctrine barred liability because municipalities are generally not liable for failures to provide police protection to individuals unless a special relationship exists, which requires an explicit assurance of aid, knowledge that inaction could harm the plaintiff, and justifiable reliance. Here, the officer's activation of flashing lights did not constitute such an assurance, Stevenson's decision to remain in his vehicle stemmed only from his own belief that help was coming, and the facts showed no active negligence or identifiable crime victim. The ruling concluded that the officer's conduct involved a general public duty to manage traffic rather than a specific duty to Stevenson.

torts & liability

In this case, Reliance Trust Company, as co-trustee of a marital trust created by Claire Candler, authorized over $1 million in distributions from the trust corpus to her widower, Buddy Candler, under an encroachment clause allowing payments only if his income proved insufficient for his support. After Buddy’s death, the eight grandchildren (remainder beneficiaries appointed under his will) sued Reliance for breach of trust and related claims, alleging improper invasions that reduced the corpus from $2.1 million to about $838,000. A jury returned a verdict for the grandchildren, and the trial court entered judgment and awarded interest. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the verdict (rendering the earlier summary-judgment denial moot), that the jury instructions on trust terms were proper, and that charging legal interest from the dates of the encroachments was correct under Georgia law.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Kirkland v. State, David Kirkland and Rickey Bailey were jointly tried and convicted of armed robbery after approaching a victim in his driveway, striking him with a gun, and taking $216 in cash; Bailey was also convicted of aggravated assault. Both defendants appealed the trial court's denial of their motions for new trial, raising claims including insufficient evidence, improper peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky, admission of hearsay and physical evidence, prosecutorial comments on their silence, violations of the continuing witness rule, unauthorized bailiff communications with the jury, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, holding that the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict—was sufficient to identify Kirkland and Bailey as participants, based on the victim's testimony, Kirkland's flight and possession of a bloody $100 bill matching the stolen funds, their false alibis, and Bailey's admissions to others. The court further concluded that the remaining claims either lacked merit, were not preserved, or did not require reversal.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In a medical malpractice and wrongful death suit, Neubauer sued Laurel Baye Healthcare after the company filed an untimely answer to the complaint following a stipulated extension. Over 18 months later—during which the parties conducted discovery, filed motions to compel and extend discovery deadlines, and otherwise litigated the case—Neubauer moved for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion and denied Laurel Baye's request to open default, but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that Neubauer had impliedly waived her right to default judgment through conduct inconsistent with promptly asserting that right, including prolonged participation in merits-related proceedings without raising the default issue. The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

Amtrust sued James Smith to recover additional workers’ compensation insurance premiums allegedly owed after audits revealed payroll to uninsured contractors during two policy periods issued through Georgia’s assigned risk plan. The trial court granted summary judgment to Smith and denied Amtrust’s partial motion, ruling that no enforceable contract existed because Smith had not signed any agreement and Norris Strickland & Associates was not his agent. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Smith, holding that the undisputed evidence showed Norris Strickland submitted the application as Smith’s authorized agent under the assigned risk plan, thereby binding him to the policy terms once approved. It affirmed the denial of Amtrust’s motion, however, because Amtrust’s second audit was only an estimate rather than a completed review, leaving a factual dispute over the amount of any additional premiums owed.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

In this products liability case, Rhonda and Gary Fields sued multiple manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products, including Union Carbide, Georgia-Pacific, CBS-Westinghouse, and Kuhlman, alleging that Mrs. Fields developed peritoneal mesothelioma from childhood exposure through her father’s work clothes, joint compound used in home construction, and family brake repairs. The defendants sought to apportion fault to 51 nonparty entities under OCGA § 51-12-33 to reduce their potential liability, but the trial court granted the Fieldses’ motion for partial summary judgment barring that defense; it also denied Union Carbide’s separate motion for summary judgment on causation. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. It held that the defendants had not met the statutory requirements of timely, specific notices identifying nonparties and providing a factual basis for their alleged fault, and that expert testimony created a triable issue on whether Union Carbide’s product could have contributed to the disease when combined with other asbestos fibers.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this workers’ compensation case, employee Terrell Ross injured his back on the job, sought benefits including temporary total disability payments and medical treatment, and prevailed at a hearing before an administrative law judge after his employer Ready Mix and its insurer Liberty Mutual failed to appear or respond to discovery; the ALJ’s award, including attorney fees, was adopted by the Board’s Appellate Division and later affirmed by operation of law when the superior court did not rule timely. Ready Mix and Liberty Mutual appealed, arguing they received inadequate notice of the hearing, that the ALJ improperly admitted medical records and denied their motion to withdraw admissions, and that fees were unwarranted. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the award, holding that competent evidence supported the ALJ’s findings on notice (via mailed service to the address of record), disability, and entitlement to benefits, that any evidentiary issues were harmless because other proof was sufficient, and that the statutory requirements for fees were met once notice was established.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Johnson v. DeKalb County, property owners sued DeKalb County for erosion damage caused by its stormwater drainage system discharging onto their land, seeking injunctive relief and damages. After mediation and email exchanges, the county offered to pay a total of $35,000 and implement a Concept Plan to repair the drainage and properties; the owners accepted those terms in writing, though later disputes arose over whether additional conditions from earlier proposals were included. The trial court granted the county’s motion to enforce the settlement, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying de novo review akin to summary judgment standards, the court held that the record showed a binding agreement with no triable issues on essential elements, as the owners’ responses confirmed acceptance of the county’s offer without the disputed extra terms. The appeals court rejected arguments that the agreement was unenforceable or violated the Statute of Frauds.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose after Summit purchased property at a foreclosure sale for $1.1 million following Becker’s default on promissory notes secured by the property, then sought judicial confirmation of the sale under OCGA § 44-14-161. The trial court denied confirmation after a hearing at which the parties’ appraisers offered conflicting valuations of the property’s true market value on the sale date—$1.1 million from Summit’s experts, who inspected only the exterior and underestimated square footage, versus $1.425 million from Becker’s expert, who measured the interior. The court found Becker’s appraisal more credible, concluded the property had not sold for its true market value, and determined that good cause existed to order a resale. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion under the statute, properly weighed the evidence as the trier of fact, and correctly refused to reopen the record for additional evidence on issues outside the confirmation proceeding’s limited scope.

propertyprocedure

In Rowe v. State, Steven Rowe was charged with trafficking in cocaine after an officer discovered approximately one kilogram of the drug during a traffic stop on Interstate 20; Rowe moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion and that the officer improperly extended the detention beyond its original purpose. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The court held that the initial stop was lawful because the officer observed Rowe driving slower than the posted speed limit in the left lane, impeding other traffic in violation of OCGA § 40-6-184(a)(2). The continued detention, including the request for consent to search and deployment of a drug-sniffing dog, was justified by the totality of circumstances creating reasonable articulable suspicion of other criminal activity, including the smell of burnt marijuana, extreme nervousness by Rowe and his passenger, an overdue rental car agreement listing neither as an authorized driver and restricting use to other states, and conflicting accounts of their travel plans.

criminal lawprocedure

Michael D. Peck sued Lanier Golf Club, Inc. for a declaratory judgment and injunction, claiming an implied easement or restrictive covenant that would require the adjacent golf course property to remain used only as a golf course after Lanier announced plans to close it and redevelop the land. The trial court granted Lanier’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that no express restrictions existed after 1977, and Peck could not establish an implied easement or covenant because the golf course had been developed years earlier by separate, unrelated parties with no common scheme tying it to his subdivision; his purchase documents and closing addendum explicitly disclaimed any membership or use rights in the golf course; and any oral assurances were not reasonably relied upon as a matter of law. Summary judgment was therefore proper because the record presented no genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of Peck’s claims.

propertyprocedure

In Bentley v. State, Jerry Wayne Bentley was convicted by a jury of child molestation for rubbing the genital area of his thirteen-year-old daughter in a car near a church in Yorkville. He appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the State failed to prove the crime occurred in Paulding County and that his trial counsel was ineffective for introducing evidence of his recent release from prison. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that venue was established by the victim's testimony identifying the location and a Paulding County officer's confirmation that the church was within the county, along with the involvement of local officers. On the ineffective assistance claim, the court found that counsel's decision was a reasonable trial strategy aimed at showing the mother's alleged motive to make false accusations tied to threats of returning Bentley to prison, and thus did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.

criminal lawprocedure

In Perry v. State, Benjamin Perry was convicted by a jury of selling cocaine based on an undercover controlled buy in which a confidential informant purchased crack cocaine from him; the State also introduced evidence of his prior drug convictions. On appeal, Perry argued that the trial court wrongly admitted his prior possession-of-cocaine convictions as similar-transaction evidence because only certified copies were offered without supporting testimony, that the State’s similar-transaction notice was untimely and incomplete, and that his trial counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of two prior possession convictions was error because the State failed to present sufficient proof of similarity at trial beyond the convictions themselves. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the conviction, ruling the error harmless because it was highly probable that it did not contribute to the verdict, the notice objections lacked merit or prejudice, and no actual conflict of interest existed to support the ineffective-assistance claim.

criminal lawprocedure

In Smith v. State, a jury convicted Raymond Smith of false imprisonment after the 20-year-old victim testified that Smith, her mother's longtime partner whom she viewed as a stepfather, blocked her from leaving her bedroom while naked following an alleged confrontation over missing money. Smith denied blocking her and claimed he only sought to question her about a suspected theft, but the trial court denied his motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the victim's testimony alone established the elements of false imprisonment under OCGA § 16-5-41(a) and that Smith lacked legal authority for any citizen's arrest because he was not present during the alleged theft and had no immediate knowledge of it. The court further ruled that the jury instructions adequately defined the offense and the "legal authority" element, and that trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to request additional instructions, as that choice aligned with the defense strategy of denying any confinement occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

In Martinez v. State, Santiago Ramirez Martinez was convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1) after a buy-bust operation involving a confidential informant and his co-defendant, Albertino Garcia-Soto. Martinez appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that his custodial confession should have been excluded because his Miranda rights were not properly administered or recorded. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence— including surveillance linking Martinez to Soto, the recovery of 110.75 grams of cocaine, Soto’s identification of Martinez as the supplier, a large amount of cash found on Martinez, a drug dog alert on his vehicle, and his own confession that he supplied the cocaine—was sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court further ruled that Martinez’s statement was admissible because he was read his Miranda rights in Spanish by a bilingual officer, confirmed his understanding, and gave a voluntary confession without coercion while appearing sober and coherent, and the lack of a signed waiver or recording did not render it involuntary.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Hipp, defendant Mark Allen Hipp was charged with aggravated assault and simple battery after a fight in which he used a knife; he sought pre-trial dismissal on grounds of self-defense immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, but the trial court denied the motion after finding the evidence suggested mutual combat. At trial the State presented eyewitness testimony that Hipp initiated the attack, the jury rejected his self-defense claim and convicted him, yet the trial court later granted a new trial on the ground that the pre-trial evidence had established immunity by a preponderance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute requires an immunity ruling before trial begins and that once a jury has found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the immunity issue is no longer available for post-conviction re-litigation by the court. The appellate court further noted that the trial court’s conflicting findings—guilt beyond a reasonable doubt versus self-defense by a preponderance—could not stand.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sky King 101, LLC's challenge to a Georgia Department of Labor determination that Joseph Anduze, a pilot it used on an as-needed basis, was an employee entitled to unemployment benefits, making Sky King liable for related taxes. An ALJ and superior court had both upheld the agency's finding that Anduze qualified as an employee under the Employment Security Act because Sky King failed to prove he was free from its control. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Sky King satisfied the statutory exemption in OCGA § 34-8-35(f)(1) by showing both that Anduze was engaged in an independently established profession and that he was in fact free from Sky King's significant control or direction. The court reasoned that Anduze could accept or reject assignments without consequence, set his own schedule, work for others, and faced no minimum hours or geographic limits, while any supervision stemmed from FAA rules rather than the company.

labor & employmenttaxesbusiness & regulatory