Michael P. Boggs

Gary Gibson was convicted after a bench trial of deposit account fraud under OCGA § 16-9-20 for writing a check on a closed account to a construction rental company. The company had rented him heavy equipment, performed repairs, and presented a single invoice covering the full amount upon completion of the rentals and repairs; Gibson tendered the check immediately upon receiving that bill. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence allowed a rational trier of fact to find the check was given in exchange for “present consideration” as required by the statute. The court reasoned that the rental obligation qualified under the Code’s definition of present consideration and, alternatively, that the entire sequence formed a single contemporaneous transaction because the amount due was not finalized and invoiced until the equipment was returned and repairs completed.

criminal law

The case involved Minnie Hearn’s claim that Dollar Rent A Car, DTG Operations, and York STB breached a $20,000 settlement agreement arising from a 2002 car accident by issuing a check that named Medicare as an additional payee, contrary to what Hearn’s attorney said the parties had orally agreed. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants and awarded attorney fees against Hearn and her lawyer under OCGA § 9-15-14. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment only as to Dollar, reversed it as to the other defendants, and vacated both fee awards. It held that the record presented a genuine factual dispute about whether the adjuster and Hearn’s counsel had agreed to exclude Medicare from the check because no reimbursement demand had been received, so the breach claim could not be resolved on summary judgment. The fee awards were vacated because the trial court failed to make the required findings identifying sanctionable conduct or apportioning fees.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved the State's appeal of a trial court's decision to suppress evidence from a 2010 traffic stop of Douglas Brown at a Cobb County roadblock, where officers discovered marijuana after stopping his vehicle, leading to charges including DUI and drug possession. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the suppression, holding that the roadblock satisfied the constitutional standards under LaFontaine v. State. The court reasoned that a supervisor implemented the checkpoint in response to a citizen complaint about traffic issues, with the primary purpose of roadway safety rather than general crime detection; all vehicles were stopped, the checkpoint was clearly marked, delays were minimal, and the screening officers were qualified, while additional details like exact advance planning or minimum staffing levels were not required by the Fourth Amendment.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the Morgan County Department of Family and Children Services took custody of two young children after finding them deprived due to the mother's drug use and unstable living situation, and the father's incarceration along with later-documented issues including domestic violence, lack of stable housing or employment, and failure to complete required services. The juvenile court approved a case plan requiring the father to complete drug and alcohol treatment, secure stable housing and income, attend parenting classes, and address domestic violence concerns, but found he did not comply despite multiple opportunities and explanations. Following a termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights, a decision the father appealed after his motion for new trial was denied. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that clear and convincing evidence showed the father's ongoing failure to address the causes of deprivation, lack of visitation and support for over five months before the hearing, and the likelihood of serious harm to the children from continued deprivation, while the children were bonded with foster parents planning to adopt them.

family law

In Matthews v. Dukes, a biological father sought to legitimate a child born during the mother's marriage to another man, after years of secret contact and an extramarital affair, while the husband had raised the child as his own in an intact family. The trial court denied the legitimation petition, ruled that the biological father had abandoned his opportunity interest in the child and that legitimation was not in the child's best interest, issued a no-contact order, and required the biological father to pay child support. The appeals court affirmed the denial of legitimation and the no-contact order, holding that the biological father had failed to timely pursue a relationship with the child of a married couple and that the statutes do not allow substituting or adding a second legal father to an existing legitimate family. It reversed the support order, concluding there was no legal basis for imposing support obligations on a biological father whose legitimation petition had been denied.

family law

In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs appealed a jury verdict for the defendant physician, arguing that the trial court wrongly excluded part of the medical examiner’s testimony from the autopsy on their decedent. The medical examiner had been disclosed only as a fact witness on the cause of death (MRSA pneumonia), not as an expert who could opine, based on a hypothetical, that the pneumonia was likely present and detectable during the decedent’s office visit two days earlier. The trial court found this violated pretrial discovery rules requiring disclosure of expert opinions, excluded the testimony, and offered the plaintiffs either a mistrial or the chance to proceed without it; they chose to continue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the opinion had not been disclosed and was cumulative of testimony from another expert witness.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between Gwinnett County and Old Peachtree Partners over a 2007 option agreement for the County to buy land for a road project and a later 2009 settlement agreement intended to resolve related litigation, including claims of breach, specific performance, and inverse condemnation. The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, finding factual issues about the option agreement and ruling that the settlement required further Board approval at a public meeting. On appeal, the court held that the settlement agreement was enforceable because the Board had authorized the county attorney to make an unconditional counter-offer that Old Peachtree accepted, and the Board's later public vote against completing the land purchase did not invalidate it. As a result, the court reversed the denial of Old Peachtree's summary judgment motion on the settlement claim and dismissed the County's appeal regarding the option agreement as moot.

propertyprocedure

This case concerns a mother's appeal from a Georgia superior court order that terminated her parental rights to her two-year-old twins and allowed their foster parents to adopt them, after the juvenile court had already granted custody of the children to their maternal aunt and uncle until age 18. The Court of Appeals of Georgia vacated the superior court's termination and adoption order. The court held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to decide termination because a termination petition had first been filed and litigated in juvenile court, which had already addressed related issues of custody, reunification, and the children's best interests by placing them with relatives and declining to terminate rights. The ruling was based on principles that once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over termination, a superior court cannot exercise concurrent authority over the same question.

family lawprocedure

In Pistacchio v. Frasso, a breach of contract case, the trial court entered judgment for defendant Jerry Frasso after a jury verdict against plaintiffs Michael Pistacchio and Mary Lou Harris. The plaintiffs appealed and requested the transcript of proceedings, including a March 2010 hearing on their motion for new trial, but the transcript was not filed until nearly three months after the May 2010 notice of appeal. On remand from a prior appeal, the trial court dismissed the appeal after finding the delay unreasonable, inexcusable, and caused by the appellants; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that Georgia law (OCGA §§ 5-6-41, 5-6-42, and 5-6-48) requires the appellant to file the transcript within 30 days absent an extension, that a longer delay creates a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, and that the appellants caused the delay by failing to promptly identify and order the transcript from the correct court reporter or seek a statutory extension. The remaining time for preparation after proper ordering was not attributable to the appellants, but this did not overcome the presumption regarding the earlier delay.

procedure

The case involved Carolyn Coker’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under a Bituminous Insurance policy after her husband was killed when his loaded tractor-trailer allegedly swerved and shifted its cargo after an unknown driver stopped suddenly ahead of him and then drove away without contact. Bituminous moved for summary judgment on the ground that OCGA § 33-7-11(b)(2) requires an eyewitness (other than the claimant) to corroborate the claimant’s description of how an unknown motorist caused the accident when there is no physical contact. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that Bituminous was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no witness confirmed the existence or causative role of the phantom vehicle as Coker described it; the available testimony addressed only the aftermath, sounds, or lack of contact.

proceduretorts & liability

In Royal v. State, an interlocutory appeal, Luther Royal challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, special demurrer, motion to quash, and plea in bar on sixteen counts of insurance fraud and one count of theft by taking. He argued that the four-year statute of limitations had run because the victim insurance company had actual knowledge of the crimes following a May 2006 employee tip, more than four years before his July 2010 indictment, and that Count 19 failed to state a factual basis for the theft charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the statute-of-limitations claims, holding that the tolling provision of OCGA § 17-3-2(2) ended only when the company acquired actual knowledge of the specific criminal acts on July 5, 2006, after its investigator obtained corroborating documents and interviewed witnesses, making the indictment timely. The court dismissed Royal’s separate challenge to Count 19 as moot because the State had already entered a nolle prosequi on that count before the appeal was filed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Barnett, the State appealed the trial court's grant of a motion to suppress evidence from a no-knock search warrant executed at a Fayetteville residence, where officers found marijuana and charged the three defendants with misdemeanor possession. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order. The court held that the no-knock provision lacked support from particularized facts showing danger, futility, or risk of evidence destruction, relying instead on boilerplate language about general drug-investigation experience and five-month-old information about a firearm that was considered stale. No exigent circumstances were shown at the suppression hearing to justify bypassing the knock-and-announce requirement, rendering the warrant's execution unlawful.

criminal lawprocedure

Corey Lakes was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated sodomy, financial transaction card theft, and identity fraud after evidence showed he and an accomplice abducted an intoxicated woman from her car in Atlanta, used her ATM card, and then he raped and sodomized her before abandoning her. On appeal, Lakes argued that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a similar prior incident involving another intoxicated victim, denying a mistrial, giving an inapplicable jury instruction on victim intoxication, denying his ineffective-assistance claims, and allowing prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the convictions, holding that the similar-transaction evidence was admissible to show a common scheme, that any errors regarding the mistrial, jury charge, and counsel’s performance were either harmless or strategic, and that the remaining claims lacked merit given the DNA match, multiple eyewitness identifications, and other overwhelming evidence against Lakes.

criminal law

Eldrick Tiller was convicted of aggravated assault, battery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after confronting a man he believed had been involved in a prior fight, shooting at him multiple times outside a convenience store, and then striking him in the eye. Tiller appealed, claiming insufficient evidence supported the assault and battery convictions, that the trial court erred in its battery jury instruction, and that his counsel was ineffective. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the convictions. It held that the victim’s testimony identifying Tiller as the shooter and describing his swollen eye provided sufficient evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, that any inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve, and that a reckless-conduct instruction was not warranted because no evidence supported a negligence theory. Although the trial court’s battery charge improperly included “substantial physical harm” language not alleged in the indictment, the court found no reversible plain error when viewing the instructions as a whole.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

Bernard Harrison III was convicted of misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer and interference with government property after he fled from deputies executing an arrest warrant, struggled with them at a pool, and caused damage to the officers’ department-issued cell phone and walkie-talkie. He appealed only the interference conviction, contending that the trial court gave an erroneous proximate-cause jury instruction, wrongly denied a motion in limine, and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the charge was proper because OCGA § 16-7-24(a) requires no specific intent to damage property and the damage was a reasonably probable consequence of Harrison’s flight, that the evidence issues did not require reversal, and that counsel’s decisions, including not objecting to injury photographs, were reasonable strategic choices that contributed to acquittal on the felony obstruction charge.

criminal lawprocedureproperty