Stephanie W. Ray

In Srygley v. Capital Plaza, Inc., former titleholders appealed a summary judgment quieting title to a condominium unit in favor of the purchaser who obtained it through a tax deed sale after the owners failed to pay 2006 ad valorem taxes. The trial court ruled that the clerk had followed the statutory procedures in sections 197.512, 197.522, and 197.542, Florida Statutes (2009), by providing certified mail notice of the initial tax deed application and sale, publishing the required advertisements, and conducting only one additional advertisement for the rescheduled sale after the first high bidder defaulted. On appeal, the court held that the statutes require individualized notice only before the first sale and that a single newspaper advertisement suffices for any resale, satisfying due process because the owners had already been alerted to the pending tax deed proceedings and bore responsibility to monitor the outcome. The First District Court of Appeal therefore affirmed the judgment vesting title in Capital Plaza.

propertyproceduretaxes

In Smith v. Sylvester, appellants Merck and Ella Smith challenged a final order from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) that dismissed their petition for an administrative hearing as untimely after DEP rejected their motion for an extension to file an amended petition. The court reviewed de novo DEP's interpretation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.103 and reversed the dismissal, holding that the rule's plain language requires adding five days to the filing deadline when service occurs by regular U.S. mail, unlike more limited civil and appellate rules. DEP had set a 15-day deadline from the certificate of service date without applying the extension and argued the exception for notices under Rule 28-106.111 applied, but the court found the deadline arose from DEP's discretionary authority under section 120.569(2)(c) and was communicated by mail. The case was remanded for consideration of the extension motion.

procedureenvironment

In Jones v. State, the defendant was convicted by jury of first-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm on May 3, 2010, with a severed count of felon-in-possession of a firearm later resolved by plea on July 16, 2010; he filed a notice of appeal on July 28 referencing both judgments but raising issues only as to the May sentencing. The court held the appeal untimely with respect to the May 3 judgment and sentence under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(3), which requires filing within 30 days of rendition of the written sentencing order, and therefore limited review to and affirmed the July 16 judgment. The core reasoning was that, unlike certain civil cases involving interrelated claims, a final criminal judgment adjudicating guilt on some counts is immediately appealable even if severed counts remain pending, and no appellate rule permits a defendant to delay the appeal until all counts are resolved.

criminal lawprocedure

In Smith v. State, the appellant challenged his felony battery conviction arising from a domestic incident in which he and the victim gave conflicting accounts of who initiated the violence, with the defense asserting self-defense. The appeal raised two issues: alleged judicial bias before jury selection, which the court held was waived because the parties had agreed to proceed with that judge for voir dire, and erroneous jury instructions on self-defense. The court determined that the trial judge gave an inapplicable forcible-felony instruction that negated the self-defense theory and misread another instruction in a way that told the jury to convict even if it found the force justified, errors the court deemed fundamental because they denied a fair trial. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence were reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure