Stevan T. Northcutt

In DM v. State, a juvenile appealed from disposition orders adjudicating him delinquent on charges of lewd or lascivious molestation and harassing a witness after he entered guilty pleas, as well as from the denial of his post-disposition motions to withdraw those pleas. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to the disposition orders, finding the notice of appeal untimely because motions to withdraw pleas are not authorized after disposition under the juvenile rules and thus did not toll the appeal deadline. The court reversed the denial of the motions to withdraw, however, directing that they be stricken as unauthorized, while noting that the juvenile could challenge the voluntariness of his pleas through a habeas corpus petition and that any such petition should receive an evidentiary hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

In this Florida paternity case between unmarried parents, the mother (a military member who had relocated from Florida to California) and father disputed the time-sharing schedule for their young son after the father objected to the move and petitioned for paternity, parental responsibility, time-sharing, and support. Following a temporary rotating schedule and a final hearing, the trial court found that the child lacked continuity and stability from cross-country travel, that it was in his best interests to spend primary time with the mother, and that frequent flights were not beneficial, but nonetheless ordered an alternating six-week schedule with each parent. The appellate court reversed the time-sharing portion of the judgment, concluding it was an abuse of discretion because the decision was illogical and unjustified in light of the statutory best-interests factors and the trial court's own findings under section 61.13, Florida Statutes. The court affirmed the child support award but remanded for the trial court to revisit the schedule and support with updated evidence of the parties' circumstances.

family law

The case arose from Ed Gollobith's lawsuit against architect Stephanie Ferrell over a house design contract, after Gollobith settled related claims with the general contractor through arbitration. Ferrell moved to enforce an alleged settlement agreement under which Gollobith would dismiss his claims against her, asserting that her unpaid assistance during the arbitration served as consideration for the dismissal. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the suit at a nonevidentiary hearing, finding that the assistance constituted valid consideration. The appellate court reversed, ruling that disputed facts regarding the timing of any promise to dismiss and the existence of legal consideration required an evidentiary hearing before enforcement.

procedure

In this case, Anthony D’Arcangelo sought certiorari review after the circuit court denied his motion to determine his competency and stay proceedings on his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief from his 1982 first-degree murder convictions. The motion was based on newly discovered information discrediting comparative bullet lead analysis testimony presented at trial, and it raised questions about whether D’Arcangelo could be exposed to the death penalty on retrial despite the original life sentence. The court initially considered the competency issue under Carter v. State but ultimately denied the petition after the State conceded on rehearing that double jeopardy principles would bar imposition of the death penalty in any future retrial, rendering the petition moot. The reasoning centered on the fact that the jury's tie vote and the trial court's life sentence created a double jeopardy bar, eliminating any factual decision for D’Arcangelo regarding risk to his life sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

Frederick Heustis was charged with three counts of aggravated assault and entered a negotiated no contest plea to one count of aggravated assault and two lesser counts of improper exhibition of a firearm, resulting in adjudication of guilt and three years of probation. He later moved to withdraw the plea after sentencing, alleging it was involuntary because his attorney affirmatively misadvised him that the plea would not cause him to lose civil rights such as the right to vote. The circuit court denied the motion on the ground that loss of voting rights was a collateral consequence of the plea. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that a plea can be involuntary when based on counsel's misadvice regarding even collateral consequences.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a minor, D.A.S., appealing a final injunction for protection against dating violence that had been granted to his former girlfriend, A.M.P., after her father filed a petition on her behalf. The petition and hearing evidence described the teenagers' past relationship and one uninvited appearance by D.A.S. on A.M.P.'s porch months after the relationship ended, but included no allegations or proof of violence, threats, or repeated stalking. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the injunction, holding that the petition and evidence failed to meet the statutory requirements under section 784.046 for dating violence or stalking, which demand reasonable fear of imminent violence or repeated acts causing substantial emotional distress. The court noted that a single incident does not satisfy the definitions of stalking or harassment in the relevant statutes. The injunction was therefore unsupported as a matter of law.

family law

The case was a paternity action in which the mother appealed a final judgment ordering the father to pay retroactive child support. The trial court had calculated the support amount without including the mother's child care costs. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that Florida Statutes section 61.30(7) requires the inclusion of seventy-five percent of qualifying child care expenses incurred due to employment, job search, or education when determining the basic child support obligation. The court noted that this statutory error was apparent on the face of the judgment and could be addressed even without a transcript of the lower court proceedings.

family law

The case involved an eleven-year-old boy who was severely burned when vapors from a can of fuel for a remote-controlled model vehicle ignited during an attempt to start a fire with his brother. The boy's parents sued the fuel and can manufacturers, including Traxxas Corp. and Powermaster Hobby Products, Inc., claiming negligent defective design among other theories. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the appellate court reversed on the negligent design claim. The court reasoned that conflicting expert opinions on whether the fuel can's design without a flame arrestor caused a preventable flashback explosion created genuine issues of material fact, distinguishing the case from prior precedent requiring specific product testing.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved S.G., a child found in indirect criminal contempt for violating a truancy order and sentenced to five days in secure detention. S.G. petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the detention, though he had already been released; the court addressed the merits because the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review. The opinion explains that a child found to be habitually truant is classified as a child in need of services rather than a delinquent child, and the applicable statutes exclude such children from the delinquency definition and prohibit secure detention as a contempt sanction. Instead, the statutes permit placement only in a staff-secure shelter or appropriate mental health or substance abuse facility. The court concluded that the secure detention sentence was unauthorized and therefore illegal, granting the habeas petition.

criminal lawfamily law

J.A.M. was charged in a juvenile delinquency petition with trespass on school property under section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes, after attending a homecoming dance while subject to an out-of-school suspension for possessing a weapon. The district court reversed the circuit court's order finding him guilty, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was currently under suspension when he entered the campus. The written referral form explicitly set the suspension dates as October 12 through October 26, and the assistant principal's contrary testimony was deemed mistaken, so the October 10 dance fell outside the suspension period. The court therefore directed dismissal of the charge on remand.

criminal law

The case involved Charles Jones, who was charged with fleeing to elude and obstruction without violence, and who told the trial court on the morning of trial that he wanted to discharge his appointed counsel and obtain different representation. The court denied the request without inquiring into Jones's reasons, as required by the Nelson procedure, and the trial proceeded with appointed counsel representing Jones after he left the courtroom; he was convicted in absentia and sentenced as a habitual offender. On appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. The core reasoning was that the failure to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the request to dismiss counsel was a structural defect violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and self-representation, as recognized in Florida case law.

criminal lawprocedure

Daniel Labombard pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sexual offender and later filed motions alleging errors in his sentencing. The court considered his claims that extra points were wrongly added to his sentencing scoresheet under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(12) because his offense was ranked at level seven rather than level eight or higher, and that he was sentenced by a successor judge. It determined that the scoresheet error required reversal and resentencing with the improper points removed. Regarding the judge, the court held that the issue could not be raised for the first time in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion without an objection at sentencing, but Labombard could assert the right at resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

Wayne Zuehlke sought additional jail credit under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in two DUI cases, claiming he was entitled to 296 days rather than the lesser amount awarded based on a later capias execution date. The postconviction court had denied extra credit in case 2009-CF-017259 after Zuehlke bonded out and the capias was not executed until December 2009, while granting full credit in the other case. On appeal, the court held that credit began accruing once Zuehlke's bond was revoked on September 3, 2009, after he was taken into custody on the second case, even before the capias was executed. It reversed and remanded to award the additional 96 days from September 3 to December 7, 2009, in case 2009-CF-017259.

criminal lawprocedure

In Coral Wood Page, Inc. v. GRE Coral Wood, LP, a landlord sued tenants of a restaurant space and their personal guarantors for eviction and damages including unpaid and accelerated rent under the lease. The tenants asserted affirmative defenses alleging that the landlord breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by using security officers to harass customers and claiming a set-off for a tenant improvement allowance the landlord allegedly owed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the landlord on damages after the tenants did not file opposing affidavits, but the appellate court reversed because the landlord's motion and affidavit failed to address or factually refute the affirmative defenses as required under Florida summary judgment standards.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Steven Tidwell was originally designated a youthful offender when sentenced for lewd battery and later violated the terms of his probation. The circuit court found the violation, revoked probation, and imposed a ten-year prison sentence. On appeal, the court reviewed an Anders brief, determined the sentence was permissible under the youthful offender statute because Tidwell committed a new offense, and affirmed the sentence. However, the written sentencing documents omitted the youthful offender designation, which cannot be revoked even after a probation violation, so the court remanded solely to correct the documents to reflect that the designation continues.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Alejandro Ferrer, who was convicted of second-degree murder with a weapon as a lesser-included offense after a jury trial on first-degree premeditated murder charges. Ferrer filed a petition alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the standard manslaughter-by-act jury instruction, which required proof of an intent to kill. The court granted the petition, reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for a new trial. It reasoned that the instruction was fundamentally erroneous under State v. Montgomery because it imposed an extra element, and counsel should have raised the issue on direct appeal given the timing of the Florida Supreme Court's review of the instruction. The court noted that both second-degree murder and manslaughter are category-one lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder, requiring proper instructions on each.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Stephen Colletti's conviction for third-degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being grand theft of items including a wall safe, DVR, laptop, and phone from a victim's residence. After an initial trial resulted in acquittals on other charges and a hung jury on the felony murder count, the State retried him solely on that charge. The appellate court reversed the conviction and directed Colletti's discharge, holding that the evidence was insufficient because the State presented no proof of the property's value meeting the $100 threshold required for grand theft under Florida law. The court reasoned that, per the theft statute and the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Marrero v. State disapproving prior precedent, a jury cannot infer a minimum value unless it is impossible to ascertain the actual market or replacement value, which the State did not demonstrate here.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a paternal grandmother's petition under Florida Statutes chapter 751 for temporary custody of her grandchild A.M.M., alleging the mother's consent was absent and her whereabouts unknown, though the mother was personally served at the grandmother's address. The circuit court entered a default against the mother and granted the petition after she appeared without counsel and objected but filed no further pleadings. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the order, ruling that child custody cannot be decided on default and that the grandmother had not pleaded or proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abused, abandoned, or neglected the child as required by sections 751.03 and 751.05, nor had the court made the necessary statutory findings of parental unfitness or addressed visitation.

family law

In Parrish v. Price, Jon Parrish appealed two ex parte temporary injunctions against domestic violence entered against him under Florida's domestic violence statute, section 741.30, based on petitions filed by his former wife on behalf of their minor children. The court affirmed the temporary injunctions, concluding that the ex-wife had standing to petition as a "next friend" under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(b) because minors cannot sue on their own behalf and the statute protects children as family members. It further held that the sworn allegations in the petitions, though largely hearsay, were sufficient to support the ex parte temporary orders based on an immediate danger of domestic violence, while expressing no view on whether permanent injunctions were warranted.

family lawprocedure

The case involved the State appealing the dismissal of a felony DUI charge against Farrah Fitzgerald, who was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a parked car with its lights on at an intersection and keys in her hand. The circuit court had dismissed the case after concluding the State could not prove she was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that Florida law defines actual physical control to include being physically in the vehicle with the capability to operate it, as shown here by her position behind the wheel and ready access to the keys, and that the statute covers this scenario to prevent potential driving while impaired.

criminal law