Joseph Lewis

In Rosa v. Progressive Employer Services, a workers' compensation claimant challenged a judge's denial of temporary indemnity benefits and a ruling on his permanent impairment rating following an industrial accident while mounting a truck tire. The court reversed the order, finding that the permanent impairment rating issue was not properly before the judge as it had not been mediated or included in the pretrial stipulation, violating due process. Additionally, the court held that the finding of maximum medical improvement was inconsistent with awarding medical treatment expected to improve the claimant's condition, which precludes a determination of MMI and affects eligibility for temporary benefits. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the benefits claim.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Michael Golden, who entered a nolo contendere plea to aggravated battery and was sentenced to five years' probation in February 2010. After the trial court allowed withdrawal of the plea based on a motion filed by counsel in April 2010, Golden was convicted at trial of felony battery with great bodily harm and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. The appellate court reversed the convictions and the plea withdrawal order, remanding with instructions to reinstate the original probation sentence. The core reasoning was that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(i) imposes a strict 30-day jurisdictional deadline after sentencing for filing a motion to withdraw a plea, which had already expired before counsel's motion, so the trial court lacked authority to grant it.

criminal lawprocedure

In Peterson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, the case centered on whether the employer timely appealed an agency determination granting unemployment benefits to appellant Ouafae Peterson within the required 20-day period. The appeals referee orally found the appeal timely and later ruled on the merits in favor of the employer, a decision affirmed by the Unemployment Appeals Commission, but the record contained no postmark, fax confirmation, or other evidence verifying the filing date and instead showed the appeal stamped received after the deadline. The court reversed the final order, reasoning that the referee's timeliness finding was not supported by competent, substantial evidence, the referee failed to develop the record as required by administrative rules, and the employer provided no evidence at a subsequent hearing on remand. The court therefore remanded with instructions to dismiss the employer's appeal.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved existing Dodge, Chrysler, and Jeep dealers Ulm and Ferman challenging Chrysler Group LLC's establishment of a new dealership (North Tampa) in Tampa after the prior dealer (Wilson) went bankrupt and ceased operations. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles had ruled the new dealership exempt from statutory notice and protest requirements under section 320.642(5)(a)1, Florida Statutes, based on equitable tolling of the 12-month exemption period. The court reversed that order, holding that the exemption did not apply because the 12-month period began running no later than February 9, 2009 (when the bankruptcy stay was lifted), more than 12 months before North Tampa's license application on February 24, 2010. The core reasoning was that the statute and implementing rule tie the exemption period to the date the prior dealer ceases to be licensed, with no basis for further tolling, and that even assuming equitable tolling applied it would not extend the period long enough to cover the new application.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Majors v. State, the appellant challenged his convictions and sentences for trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm by a felon, and related offenses, contending that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained after police stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger. The court reversed the convictions and sentences, directing the trial court to grant the motion to suppress and discharge the appellant. The core reasoning was that officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as the 911 call described only vague suspicious behavior at a bank without any observed crimes or specific articulable facts, and the community caretaking doctrine did not apply because the stop was not based on facts showing a public safety need.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Robert McQuade, a correctional officer terminated by the Florida Department of Corrections, who appealed to the Public Employees Relations Commission claiming the agency violated section 112.532(6)(a) of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights by failing to complete its investigation within 180 days of receiving an internal incident report. The Commission dismissed the appeal after a hearing officer found just cause for discipline and ruled the statutory deadline inapplicable. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the 180-day limit applies only to external complaints from private citizens and not to internal agency-initiated matters. The court reasoned that the statute's language and context distinguish between complaint sources, with no requirement for reinstatement in internal cases.

labor & employmentprocedurecriminal law

In KJF v. State, a juvenile who pled guilty to sexual battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious exhibition, and false imprisonment appealed the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sexual offender after the court withheld adjudication of delinquency and placed him on probation. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, reversed the registration requirement. The court held that sections 985.4815 and 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2008), require an adjudication of delinquency for a juvenile to qualify as a "sexual offender" subject to registration, and that the plain language of the statutes does not treat a withhold of adjudication as equivalent. The court reached this conclusion after examining the statutory definitions of "sexual offender" and "convicted," confirming consistency with related provisions in chapter 985 that explicitly equate adjudication and withhold only when the Legislature so provides, and distinguishing the narrower registration category from the broader definition of "juvenile sexual offender" used for treatment purposes.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claimant who had resolved all pending benefit claims through mediation with the employer/carrier. The employer sought to compel the claimant to attend a neuropsychiatric independent medical examination based on concerns about his progress, which the Judge of Compensation Claims granted. The appellate court quashed the order, holding that no statutory dispute existed under section 440.13(5)(a) to authorize the IME, as the employer had not denied any request for benefits and mere concerns were insufficient. The court reasoned that section 440.13(2)(d) regarding transfer of care does not independently permit an IME without first establishing such a dispute.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves Acosta, Inc. and Acosta Sales, LLC seeking indemnification from liability insurers National Union Fire Insurance Co. and Arrowood Indemnity Co. for an underlying lawsuit brought against them by the Trustee of the Creditors’ Trust of Marketing Specialists. The insurers denied coverage based on a "prior litigation" exclusion in the policies, which barred claims arising from or related to prior litigation of which the insured had notice, specifically a 2001 turnover suit filed by Marketing Specialists against Acosta in bankruptcy court. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers, concluding that the underlying suit was sufficiently related to the earlier turnover suit to trigger the exclusion. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, determining that the complaints themselves showed the required relationship under the policy language, including shared facts about business transitions, employee transfers, and asset handling around mid-2001.

business & regulatory

The case involved the Florida Department of Financial Services, as receiver for two insolvent insurance companies, challenging trial court orders that allowed Branch Banking & Trust to offset funds in certificates of deposit pledged by the insurers against loans made to the insurers' affiliates and principals. The bank had filed notices of claim asserting rights to the CDs either as a secured creditor or via statutory offsets under section 631.281, while DFS sought to recover the funds and raised factual issues about the validity of the pledges. The trial court granted the offsets after a hearing limited to legal argument, without completing discovery or holding an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the orders violated DFS's procedural due process rights by resolving disputed factual and legal issues prematurely and, in one case, by granting unrequested relief.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a workers' compensation claim by Roberto Hernandez, a welder who suffered arm and wrist injuries preventing him from returning to his trade, seeking permanent total disability benefits after his employer and carrier disputed his employability. The Judge of Compensation Claims denied the benefits and excluded a timely disclosed vocational reemployment assessment report from the carrier's initial provider, which supported the claimant's unemployability, on the grounds that each party was limited to one vocational expert. The appellate court reversed the denial, ruling that the exclusion was an abuse of discretion because the report was relevant evidence under the Florida Evidence Code, not protected work product, and its exclusion violated due process by denying the claimant the right to present key witnesses on the disputed issue of his ability to secure sedentary work.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Robert Seneca's appeal of a final order from the Unemployment Appeals Commission affirming that he had voluntarily quit his part-time job without good cause attributable to his employer and was therefore overpaid $1,205 in unemployment benefits subject to recovery. Seneca had left a part-time position with CPE to start a full-time job at Century Kia, with no gap in employment, but was later laid off from the full-time role and received benefits; the agency and appeals referee determined the quit disqualified him under the statute. The court reversed the order, holding that the disqualification provision in section 443.101(1)(a) does not apply when a claimant leaves part-time work for full-time work without ever becoming completely unemployed. The decision relied on precedent from Doig v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission and the principle that the statute's disqualification provisions should be narrowly construed while liberally construing the benefits provisions in favor of claimants.

labor & employment

The case involved Ronald Wayne Hendricks appealing his convictions for one count of battery and two counts of sexual battery on a child under twelve by a person eighteen or older. The court addressed whether the trial court erred in excluding defense evidence of the defendant's reputation for sexual morality, whether it committed reversible error by not inviting objections after announcing its response to a jury request for transcript review, and whether it fundamentally erred by denying the jury's transcript request without advising that a read-back could be requested. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, holding that the reputation evidence was inadmissible under Florida evidence rules because the trait was not susceptible to proof by reputation and that there was no preserved or fundamental error in the handling of the jury's request.

criminal lawprocedure

In Pennington v. State, the appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the statutory maximum sentence of at least thirty-one years when discussing a plea offer of five years' imprisonment followed by probation; the offer was later withdrawn after the appellant rejected it on counsel's advice. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, finding counsel's performance reasonable and that the appellant had not shown prejudice. On appeal, the court held that counsel's failure to advise on the full statutory maximum was not within the range of competent performance and that the trial court inadequately addressed the prejudice prong by not resolving conflicts in the evidence regarding whether the appellant would have accepted the offer if properly informed. The appellate court therefore reversed the denial and remanded for additional findings on prejudice and entry of a new order.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Barnes, the State appealed a trial court order granting post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 to David Lee Barnes, who had been convicted of manslaughter after stabbing Michael Speights during an altercation. Barnes claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury instruction on the justifiable use of non-deadly force, which he argued would have supported his theory that the victim accidentally impaled himself on the knife. The appellate court reversed the grant of relief, concluding that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to pursue only the justifiable use of deadly force instruction based on Barnes' police interview statements claiming self-defense, conflicting trial evidence, and counsel's experience that accidental homicide theories often fail with juries.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Meigo Bailey's appeal of his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and attempted robbery, based on the trial court's admission of an audio-recorded hospital interview in which he made incriminating statements about a prior home-invasion robbery and murder. Bailey argued that his comment during the interview, "Man, I don’t really want to talk about that," was an invocation of his right to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings, requiring the officers to cease questioning. The court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the statement was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to silence in light of Bailey's prior waiver of Miranda rights via a signed form. The core reasoning rested on the court's review of the audio recording itself, which revealed the mumbled and hedged delivery of the words along with surrounding context indicating it did not clearly invoke the right.

criminal lawprocedure

In Easterly v. State, the appellant was convicted of engaging in sexual activity with his minor stepdaughter while in a position of familial or custodial authority under Florida law. He challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the second amended information for failing to narrow the alleged offense timeframe, the admission of similar fact evidence of prior incidents under the Williams rule, and a prosecutor's closing argument that the evidence had "torn away" the presumption of innocence. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the State had provided as much particularity as possible given the victim's testimony and the evidence of conception, that the similar fact evidence was properly admitted to rebut a potential defense of mistake or lack of knowledge, and that the prosecutor's comment was not fundamental error because it was tied to the strength of the evidence and any issue could have been cured by objection and instruction. The court found no abuse of discretion or fundamental error warranting reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved St. Johns Investment Management Company seeking to enforce noncompete provisions in a 2002 employment agreement against former CEO David Albaneze after he resigned in 2008 and began working for a competitor. The trial court denied St. Johns' motion for a temporary injunction, ruling that the noncompete covenants did not survive the expiration of the four-year employment term because the agreement lacked explicit survival language. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the plain language of Section 5(d)(i) created a condition precedent requiring Albaneze to complete the full term before the twenty-four-month restriction period could begin upon later resignation or termination. The court reasoned that the agreement's distinct restriction periods for different noncompete clauses demonstrated the parties' intent for subsections 5(c)(i), (iii), and (iv) to remain enforceable for twenty-four months after Albaneze's post-term resignation, and remanded for entry of the injunction.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involves appeals from a trial court's decision on a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.S. (mother) and B.A. (father) regarding their child L.A., who was adjudicated dependent due to hazardous home conditions and exposure to domestic violence. The trial court terminated the mother's rights but not the father's and placed the child in permanent guardianship. The appellate court reversed both orders, finding that the evidence did not support terminating only the mother's rights under the permanent guardianship disposition and that the trial court's findings regarding the father's compliance with the case plan and the child's best interests lacked specificity and completeness, requiring remand for further proceedings with proper findings.

family law

This case involves a medical malpractice action filed by Lynda and Rodney See against West Florida Regional Medical Center arising from alleged negligence during and after a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed by two doctors at the hospital. The hospital petitioned for certiorari review of trial court discovery orders requiring production of adverse medical incident records under Article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), credentialing files, and related documents, arguing that the orders violated statutory protections, work-product privileges, and federal constitutional provisions. The court denied the petition in most respects, upholding the orders to produce adverse incident records and a blank privileges application because Amendment 7 abrogates conflicting statutes and the blank form is not protected, but granted relief in part by quashing the order to produce evidence of the doctors' specific training on the ground that it was unrelated to any identified adverse incident. The core reasoning centered on the scope of Amendment 7's disclosure requirements and the limits of discovery when documents fall outside the constitutional mandate.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare