This case involves an appeal by an employer and carrier challenging a judge's award of permanent total disability benefits to a claimant under Florida's workers' compensation law. The court reversed the award and remanded the case because it was unclear whether the judge applied the correct statutory standard for proving entitlement to such benefits when the injury is not one of the enumerated catastrophic injuries. Specifically, the judge's findings referenced the claimant's inability to engage in the "full range of sedentary activities," which aligns with a prior standard rather than the current requirement to show inability to engage in at least sedentary employment within a 50-mile radius. The court directed the judge to apply the proper test from Blake v. Merck & Company, focusing on whether physical restrictions combined with vocational factors preclude at least sedentary employment.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved MVP Health, Inc.'s request for attorney's fees after it prevailed in an administrative challenge against the Agency for Health Care Administration's (AHCA) withdrawal of its home health care facility licensure application. The court reversed the fee award, holding that AHCA was not required to pay fees because its actions were substantially justified under section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The core reasoning was that at the time of the withdrawal, AHCA had a reasonable basis in law and fact due to ongoing litigation over MVP's ownership and imminent loss of accreditation, even though the application was later deemed complete and approvable.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

Eugene McCoskey was arrested for driving under the influence in Florida and petitioned for certiorari after the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, reversed a trial court order allowing him to present evidence of his lack of intent to drive. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that the circuit court had not departed from the essential requirements of law. Florida's DUI statute makes it a general intent crime to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired or with a prohibited blood or breath alcohol level, and the statute contains no element of intent to drive. Evidence of the defendant's subjective intent, such as calling for a ride and waiting in the car, is irrelevant to the actual physical control element and could confuse the jury or improperly suggest that intent is required.

criminal lawprocedure

In Davis v. State, the defendant pled no contest to charges of lewd or lascivious battery and child abuse by impregnation involving sexual conduct with a minor, then sought to depose the victim before sentencing to gather evidence of consent for potential mitigation under Florida sentencing guidelines. The trial court granted the State's motion for a protective order, ruling that defendants have no right to discovery after a plea but before sentencing. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying a blanket prohibition on post-plea discovery, as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 permits discovery at critical stages including sentencing, though witness categorization rules like Category A apply primarily to the guilt phase and do not grant an absolute right here. The court affirmed the sentence and denial of the deposition because the error was harmless, as the record already contained sufficient evidence of consent from the victim's statement and the defendant's testimony. The decision clarifies that discovery disputes at sentencing must be evaluated on their merits rather than categorically denied.

criminal lawprocedure

In Sentry Insurance Co. v. Hamlin, a workers' compensation claimant sought benefits after being injured in his employer's parking lot while retrieving personal items from his car during a repossession by his lender. The court reversed the lower tribunal's finding of compensability, determining that the injury did not arise out of the claimant's employment as required by section 440.09, Florida Statutes. The core reasoning was that the claimant was on a purely personal mission with no relationship to his work, so the risks causing the injury were not work-related or created by the employment, even though the incident occurred on the employer's premises during paid time and was implicitly permitted. The court further held that the retrieval did not qualify as an emergency under section 440.092(3) because it was not an objectively recognized exigency under ordinary standards of humanity.

labor & employment

This case concerned a certified teacher whose educator certificate was permanently revoked by the Education Practices Commission under a 2008 amendment to section 1012.795(l)(n), Florida Statutes, which mandated revocation for any conviction of misdemeanor battery on a minor; the revocation was based on a 2006 incident for which the teacher had previously pled guilty but which an earlier Commission decision had found insufficient to warrant discipline. The court reversed the Commission's decision. It held that the legislature did not clearly intend the statute to apply retroactively and that retroactive application would violate constitutional principles by impairing the teacher's vested property interest in the certificate through new legal consequences attached to pre-enactment conduct.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

The case was an appeal filed by Edward M. Mitchell against BWARE, L.L.C., Edwin N. West, Jr., and Peter Boulware in the Florida District Court of Appeal. The court dismissed the appeal in a per curiam decision. The core reasoning was that the appeal presented no justiciable issue for the court to decide.

procedure

In K.G. v. Florida Department of Children & Families, the mother petitioned for certiorari after a trial court issued a shelter order placing her newborn child with the maternal grandmother without allowing her to present evidence or be heard at the shelter hearing, despite her attorney's attempt to speak. The court held that the mother was denied her due process rights under section 39.402(8)(c)(3), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.305(b)(4), which require parties at shelter hearings to have an opportunity to be heard and present evidence. This denial constituted both irreparable harm not remediable on appeal and a departure from the essential requirements of the law, as established by prior case law treating such violations as per se reversible error. The appellate court granted the petition, quashed the shelter order, and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on whether the child should be detained, while clarifying that the decision addressed only the procedural manner of the hearing and not the merits of the placement.

family lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a juvenile defendant appealing a conviction for trespass on school grounds under section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes, after a school board police officer ordered him to leave the property. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense. The court noted that the arguments were unpreserved but addressed them as fundamental error due to a complete lack of evidence. Specifically, the statute requires that the order to leave come from the school principal or a designee, but the officer testified he acted independently with no connection to the principal's office. The appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the absence of proof on this element constituted fundamental error.

criminal law

In Daniels v. State, the defendant appealed a circuit court order that denied his third and fourth amended motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, as well as his motion to voluntarily dismiss the third amended motion without prejudice. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the trial court was not obligated to grant the dismissal. The core reasoning is that under Spera v. State, defendants receive only one opportunity to amend facially insufficient postconviction claims; once that opportunity has been provided—as it was here through prior orders—the decision on a subsequent motion to dismiss without prejudice falls within the trial court's discretion to avoid prolonging the process.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a paternity action filed by the biological father against the legal father (the mother's husband at the time of the child's birth) seeking parental rights and custody of the child after the mother's death. The trial court granted the petition and awarded rights to the biological father. The appellate court reversed, holding that Florida statutes such as sections 742.011 and 742.10, along with established case law, bar biological fathers from bringing paternity suits concerning children born during an intact marriage, as paternity is considered established by law in those circumstances. The court determined this was a fundamental error that could be addressed on appeal even if not raised below, and remanded the case for dismissal of the suit.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a claim by a boat slip lessee against a marina under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, alleging sexual harassment and discrimination when she sought to extend her lease. The Florida Commission on Human Relations denied the charge on the ground that the marina was not a public accommodation under the statute. The court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the marina could qualify as a public accommodation if the restaurant and tiki hut mentioned on its website are located on its premises and it holds itself out as serving their patrons, but further fact-finding was required on those issues.

civil rights

This case concerned whether claimant Stacey Craven was entitled to unemployment benefits after quitting her job as a meteorologist due to sexual harassment at WJHG-TV. The Unemployment Appeals Commission upheld a referee's denial of benefits on the ground that Craven had not given her employer a reasonable opportunity to address the harassment before resigning. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that several of the agency's fact findings lacked support from competent substantial evidence in the record and that the findings omitted critical testimony regarding the timing of reports to management and an offer of re-employment. The court noted that accurate and complete findings were necessary to determine both eligibility for benefits and the effect of the refused re-employment offer under the applicable statute.

labor & employment

The case involves a husband's challenge to a final order of dissolution of marriage regarding the apportionment of liabilities, denial of a motion to vacate a temporary alimony award, and an award of attorney's fees to the wife. The appellate court agreed that the trial court's fact findings were insufficient to support these rulings. However, the husband did not preserve the issues for review by filing a motion for rehearing or other post-judgment pleading to challenge the lack of findings. As a result, the court affirmed the final judgment of dissolution.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether defendant Edenfield made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before pleading no contest to a DUI charge in county court. Edenfield had viewed a pre-recorded video explaining constitutional rights, including the right to counsel and risks of self-representation, signed written plea and waiver forms acknowledging those rights, and answered the judge's questions under oath confirming his understanding and desire to proceed pro se. The court held that these steps provided sufficient grounds under Florida law and Rule 3.111(d) to find a valid waiver, even without additional inquiries into factors like age or education, and therefore denied the petition challenging the conviction. The decision emphasized that written forms and the defendant's affirmations were probative of a knowing waiver so long as the court did not rely on them exclusively.

criminal lawprocedure

In Pleas v. State, the appellant filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.700, 3.800(a), 3.800(b), and 3.850 to challenge his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), arguing that his prior prison release predated the PRR statute and thus could not be used to enhance his sentence for a later robbery conviction. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the cited rules were inapplicable because they either do not permit postconviction relief, cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute, apply only during an appeal, or were untimely filed years after the 2000 judgment became final. On the merits, the court rejected the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, relying on precedent that the PRR statute applies to new offenses committed after its effective date even if the prior release occurred earlier.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appellant challenging the denial of his postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court affirmed the denial without reaching the merits because the motion was filed nearly 19 years after the conviction became final, making it untimely under the two-year limit, and no exceptions were alleged. The court also determined the appeal was frivolous and recommended disciplinary sanctions against the appellant by the Department of Corrections.

criminal lawprocedure

In Payne v. State, the appellant challenged his resentencings in two consolidated cases, arguing that he was denied counsel at those hearings. The court vacated the sentences in both cases and remanded for new resentencing hearings, with instructions to use a proper scoresheet. The court reasoned that resentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings at which due process requires the appointment of counsel, and that denying counsel in this context amounts to fundamental error. On remand, the trial court may impose any lawful sentence, including the terms originally given.

criminal law

In this direct criminal appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, arguing that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury on an uncharged alternative theory of the crime under section 784.045, Florida Statutes (2008). The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute creates only two distinct aggravated battery offenses—one focused on the victim's harm (great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement) and one on the use of a deadly weapon—rather than four separate crimes. The court reasoned that the information sufficiently notified the defendant of the charged conduct, the evidence supported a finding of great bodily injury as alleged, the standard jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error, and any potential error was invited because the defendant twice agreed to the instructions without objection.

criminal lawprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, the claimant challenged an employer/carrier's attempt to recover overpaid benefits by recalculating a Social Security offset, raising equitable defenses including laches, estoppel, and detrimental reliance. The employer/carrier sought production of the claimant's financial documents, including joint accounts, arguing they were relevant to those defenses, and the judge of compensation claims granted the motion in part without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted the claimant's petition for certiorari and quashed the production order, holding that the documents were irrelevant as a matter of law because workers' compensation rights and offsets are purely statutory and legal in nature, with no role for equitable principles, and the statute already provides a remedy limiting repayment to 20% of future benefits. The court noted that financial information could not affect the parties' substantive legal rights under the statutory scheme.

labor & employmentprocedure