Darryl C. Casanueva

In this marital dissolution case, Mr. Bushong sought full discovery of financial documents from multiple professional employer organizations that he and Ms. Peel had operated together, which he claimed were marital assets valued over $20 million, in order to resolve issues of equitable distribution and alimony. Although the companies were titled solely in Ms. Peel's name due to Mr. Bushong's prior felony conviction and licensing concerns, the circuit court granted protective orders limiting discovery to documents tied only to Ms. Peel's financial interest and to one company in which Mr. Bushong had established ownership. The appellate court granted the petition for writ of certiorari, quashed the protective orders, and remanded with instructions to allow the requested discovery. It reasoned that the prior cases relied on by the circuit court were factually distinguishable, that Mr. Bushong had demonstrated a substantial equitable interest in the companies as marital assets, and that denial of the discovery would cause material harm not remediable on appeal.

family lawprocedure

Swope Rodante, P.A. sued Thomas Harmon and his firm alleging tortious interference with a client representation contract, breach of an oral agreement regarding settlement funds, and entitlement to a constructive trust over disputed fees. The trial court dismissed the entire complaint with prejudice for failure to state claims. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the first two counts, holding that the complaint alleged facts supporting the elements of tortious interference and breach of an oral contract sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, including the right to at least nominal damages. It affirmed dismissal of the constructive trust count on the ground that a constructive trust is an equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Whitehall v. State, the defendant was initially charged with fleeing to elude as a third-degree felony after a police chase, but after the 175-day speedy trial period expired the State filed a superseding information amending the charge to a second-degree felony version involving high speed or wanton disregard. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for discharge based on speedy trial violations, allowed the new charge, and entered a conviction after trial. On appeal the court reversed the conviction, reasoning that the State may not add a new offense arising from the same conduct after the speedy trial period expires absent a waiver by the defendant, no such waiver was shown on the record, and the rule's recapture period applies only to the original charges.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved J.D.M., a juvenile, appealing the trial court's revocation of his probation and resulting disposition orders after violations including new marijuana possession offenses and absconding from supervision. The trial court had placed him on probation for burglary and marijuana-related charges, later adjudicated him delinquent upon finding the violations proven, and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice until age nineteen. The appellate court affirmed the adjudications of delinquency and the felony dispositions, determining there was sufficient evidence to support the probation revocation. It reversed the misdemeanor disposition because the term exceeded the maximum adult sentence permitted by statute and remanded for a written revocation order specifying the conditions violated.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph and Janet Agate, who transferred over $300,000 to Ronald Clampitt, a mortgage broker, starting in 1996 based on his oral promises to fund mortgages and provide interest returns, though no written agreement was made. When the returns fell short, the Agates filed a seven-count complaint in 2004; the trial court dismissed it with prejudice under the Statute of Frauds and denied their request to add a quantum meruit claim. On appeal, the court reversed the dismissal, ruling that the Statute of Frauds does not bar count three alleging violation of the mortgage broker licensing statute (Fla. Stat. § 494.0025) because no writing between the parties is required, nor does it apply to the Agates as creditors rather than debtors under the credit agreement statute (Fla. Stat. § 687.0304). The court also directed that the amendment to add quantum meruit be allowed on remand, as it arises from the same transactions and would not prejudice the defendant.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Barile v. Gayheart, Tonya Gayheart petitioned for an injunction against repeat violence against her former employer Joseph Barile. The trial court instead entered an injunction against domestic violence after determining during the hearing that the evidence did not support the repeat violence claim. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that Mr. Barile was denied due process because the trial court unilaterally switched the basis of the injunction without prior notice, without allowing an amendment to the petition, and without confirming that Mr. Barile had an opportunity to prepare or object. The appellate court did not reach the other issues raised regarding the statutory requirements for either type of injunction.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In 2006, Jireh Kleppinger filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) to correct his 1997 sentences for crimes committed in 1996 as a juvenile, including a natural life term for kidnapping a law enforcement officer, arguing the departure sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, and alternatively that Graham v. Florida rendered the life sentence unconstitutional. The postconviction court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed the denial on Apprendi and Blakely grounds because the sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum and Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases final before its issuance. However, the court reversed on the Graham claim, holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender and that the defendant was entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release, vacating only the kidnapping sentence and remanding for resentencing under current law including Apprendi and Blakely. The core reasoning centered on the timing of the direct appeal's finality for Apprendi/Blakely applicability and the direct fit of Graham's prohibition to the juvenile's nonhomicide life sentence.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Roberto Denizard appealing his sentences for multiple counts of armed robbery, burglary, and related offenses across several cases, after the trial court denied his motion to correct illegal sentences. The court affirmed most of the convictions and sentences but reversed the thirty-year sentence for one count of attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon, finding it was improperly reclassified as a first-degree felony when the use of the weapon was an essential element of the offense, limiting it to a maximum of fifteen years as a second-degree felony. It also reversed the imposition of consecutive ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for two counts arising from the same criminal episode, citing precedent prohibiting such consecutive sentences when a firearm is used but not fired in a single episode. The court affirmed the trial court's discretion in considering prior record for sentencing and directed corrections to a written sentencing document that mismatched the oral pronouncement.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, partial owners of a note and mortgage on property owned by ISRA Homes sought an assignment of rents during a foreclosure action, despite other owners refusing to join. The trial court granted the assignment, but the appellate court reversed, holding that under Florida law, when a note is payable to multiple persons not alternatively, enforcement requires all payees. The court reasoned that the appellees, holding only about 78% interest, lacked authority to enforce provisions like rent assignment without the remaining owners.

propertyprocedure

This case arose from a divorce proceeding in which Mrs. Riveiro retained two law firms to represent her but later settled directly with her husband without their involvement, leaving substantial unpaid attorneys' fees. The firms sought a charging lien against assets Mrs. Riveiro received in the dissolution judgment, and the trial court imposed a lien for $76,357.61 plus interest on both her real and personal property. On appeal, the court affirmed the lien as to personal property, finding that the requirements for an equitable charging lien were met under precedents like Sinclair v. Baucom, but reversed the lien on real property due to differing legal requirements for that type of asset. The court also reversed the fee amount because the trial court failed to make required findings on reasonable hourly rates and hours expended, and remanded for those determinations.

family lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved the State appealing a trial court's grant of immunity to Alphonse Olando Gallo from prosecution for second-degree murder after a fatal shooting during a street confrontation and gunfight outside a nightclub. Gallo sought immunity under Florida's Stand Your Ground statute, section 776.032, following an evidentiary hearing where the trial judge weighed conflicting evidence and determined by a preponderance that Gallo had used deadly force in a manner authorized by the law. The appellate court affirmed the immunity ruling, finding no legal error in the trial court's procedures or factual determinations, which were supported by substantial competent evidence.

criminal lawguns

Charles Mapp was convicted of burglary of a conveyance and grand theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (HFO) with substantial restitution orders in two cases. He filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) to strike the HFO designations because the state had not provided timely notice before his pleas and to amend the restitution. On remand from the Florida Supreme Court, the appellate court affirmed denial of relief on the restitution claim, holding it was not cognizable on a rule 3.800(b) motion, but reversed on the HFO claim, directing the trial court to reinstate the order striking the HFO designations from the sentences while leaving the original restitution and non-HFO sentencing structure intact.

criminal lawprocedure

Luther T. Sasser was convicted of one count of simultaneous possession of mullet exceeding the recreational daily bag limit along with a gill or entangling net, and one count of improper carriage of a proscribed net across Florida waters. The appellate court reversed both convictions and remanded for discharge, ruling that the trial court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal. The State failed to prove that Sasser had actual or constructive possession of the net found on a separate green boat, that the two vessels were operated in coordination, or that Sasser aided another person as a principal under either statute.

criminal law

The case concerned a post-divorce dispute in which the mother filed contempt motions to enforce visitation after the father failed to comply with court orders, leading the trial court to transfer primary residential custody of the children to her following a nonevidentiary hearing. The appellate court reversed the custody modification order and directed that primary custody be returned to the father. It held that a change in custody is not an appropriate sanction for contempt without a finding that the modification serves the children's best interests, that the father received no notice that custody was at issue in violation of due process, and that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Fidensio Gallegos's appeal from the denial of his postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to multiple second- and third-degree felonies and a misdemeanor. The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that the pleas were not knowing and voluntary. During the plea colloquy, the trial court informed Gallegos of the standard maximum penalties for the offenses and mentioned possible enhancements under habitual felony offender and violent career criminal statutes but did not specify the extent of those enhancements, such as doubling the sentences on third-degree felonies from five to ten years. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172 requires the court to ensure a defendant understands the maximum possible penalty before accepting a plea, and the court found that the limited warning was insufficient to meet this standard. The matter was remanded to allow Gallegos to withdraw his pleas.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hayward v. State, the defendant was tried on a single count of felony driving under the influence and took the stand to explain his refusal of a breath alcohol test by stating he had heard tests can go wrong. The trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence of the defendant's 1992 DUI conviction for impeachment, ruling that his testimony opened the door to such evidence under Florida evidence rules. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the testimony did not open the door because it was not misleading and did not place the nature of any prior conviction at issue. The court reasoned that evidence of unconnected prior crimes is generally inadmissible, that section 90.610 permits only limited impeachment with qualifying convictions without specifics unless the defendant is untruthful, and that the concept of opening the door requires a need to qualify or correct incomplete or misleading testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gallegos v. State, the defendant appealed his criminal judgments and sentences while a motion to correct sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) was pending in the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgments and sentences without addressing their merits. It held that the trial court's January 2011 order granting relief on the motion was entered well after the rule's sixty-day deadline and was therefore a nullity that must be stricken on remand, citing precedent that untimely orders on such motions lack legal effect.

criminal lawprocedure

In this dissolution of marriage case, Louis Orloff appealed the final judgment, challenging the trial court's handling of equitable distribution of assets—primarily the classification and valuation of Matrix Group Ltd., Inc., a company he formed before the marriage—and the award of permanent alimony. The court affirmed that the trial judge exercised independent decision-making but reversed the equitable distribution scheme, holding that Matrix was a nonmarital asset under Florida statute because it was acquired prior to the marriage and remained solely owned by Mr. Orloff, with the same classification applying to the portion of its stock transferred to the GRAT. Any post-marriage enhancement in the company's value attributable to marital labor or funds could be treated as marital, but the trial court's errors required remand to recalculate the overall distribution. The reversal also rendered the alimony award moot, directing the trial court to reconsider it along with attorney's fees and costs based on the corrected distribution.

family lawproperty

Reginald L. Smith was convicted of driving without a valid license and possession of cocaine after an undercover officer recovered crack cocaine from a pill bottle he discarded near a motel. On appeal, Smith raised multiple issues, primarily that the trial judge erred by having him strapped into an extraction chair with his arms and legs immobilized in view of the jury on the second day of trial after delays caused by his medical complaints and refusal to enter the courtroom. The appellate court concluded that the judge abused her discretion in ordering the visible restraints because Smith had not engaged in disruptive or violent behavior in the courtroom, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. The opinion also briefly addressed potential errors regarding witness lists and renewal of offers of counsel that might recur on retrial.

criminal lawprocedure

Cederic Lovell Armstrong was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card after using Dana Lewis's card and PIN without authorization to make withdrawals from her home equity line. At trial, the State introduced printouts of Lewis's account transactions that she had downloaded from her bank's website, over the defense's hearsay objection that the records lacked authentication by a custodian or affidavit. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the printouts were inadmissible hearsay not qualifying for the business records exception, and that this evidence formed the sole basis for the prosecution's case, consistent with controlling precedent in Medlock v. State.

criminal lawprocedure