Frank E. Schwelb

In 2010, attorney John J. Zodrow pleaded guilty in federal court to the felony of knowingly making a false oath in a bankruptcy petition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). After receiving notice of the conviction, the D.C. Court of Appeals suspended Zodrow and directed the Board on Professional Responsibility to determine whether the offense involved moral turpitude under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a). The Board recommended disbarment, and the court agreed, holding that bankruptcy fraud inherently involves moral turpitude based on its elements, which triggers mandatory disbarment without examining the specific facts of the case. The court therefore ordered Zodrow disbarred from practicing law in the District of Columbia, effective immediately, with his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a 2004 traffic collision in which Detective Rauf rear-ended Steven Tulin's car, leading to Tulin's arrest for reckless driving by Officer McKoy; Tulin was later acquitted at trial. Tulin then sued Rauf for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sued the District of Columbia for negligent supervision of McKoy. The jury found Rauf liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the District liable for negligent supervision, awarding $450,000 in damages, while rejecting the other claims. On appeal, the District and Rauf argued that the evidence was insufficient to support negligent supervision and that the verdicts were inconsistent with the jury's other findings. The court affirmed, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient and that the verdicts could be reconciled under the trial court's instructions.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case involves reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings in the District of Columbia. Edward M. Fink had been disbarred by consent from the practice of law in New Jersey by order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Following an earlier D.C. suspension and an order to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed, the court considered Fink's response along with Bar Counsel's statement. The D.C. court ordered Fink disbarred from practicing law in the District of Columbia, applying D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(c) and precedent from In re Addams, with the disbarment effective as of the date of the prior suspension.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Byrd v. Voca Corp. of Washington, DC, three former employees who were union members covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with their employer sued for wrongful termination after they complained internally and to D.C. officials about deficiencies in group homes for developmentally disabled residents. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, ruling that the claims were preempted by § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act because they were inextricably tied to the CBA's 'just cause' termination provision and also that the employees failed to exhaust arbitration remedies under the CBA. On appeal, the court affirmed dismissal of one employee's claim on preemption grounds, finding that resolving it would require interpreting the CBA, but remanded the other two employees' cases for further proceedings after determining their public-policy claims could potentially stand independently of the CBA. The decision rests on federal preemption principles from cases like Lingle v. Norge, which hold that state-law claims are preempted only if they necessitate construing the collective bargaining agreement.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case involved MPD Sergeant Buddy Smallwood's appeal of an agency ruling that classified minor injuries he sustained while off-duty in Maryland—during an attempted robbery where he identified himself as an officer and exchanged gunfire—as not incurred in the performance of his duties, thereby denying him workers' compensation benefits under the Police and Firefighter’s Retirement and Disability Act. The Superior Court had affirmed the Metropolitan Police Department's determination, and this court reviewed the matter under the same standards, assessing whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law. The court affirmed the ruling, relying on precedent from Rife v. District of Columbia Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Relief Board, which held that an off-duty officer killed in a similar out-of-state robbery attempt was not acting in the performance of duty. It rejected Smallwood's arguments that statutes or his status as a potential Special Deputy U.S. Marshal granted him authority to act in Maryland, finding no police powers applied there and that the agency's classification was rational and not arbitrary.

labor & employment

Mason pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Nine years later, facing deportation proceedings, he petitioned for a writ of coram nobis to withdraw the plea on the ground that the trial court had not given the immigration-consequences advisement required by D.C. Code § 16-713. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Mason’s sworn statement at the plea hearing that he was a U.S. citizen judicially estopped him from asserting non-citizenship or claiming entitlement to the statutory warning.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

This case involved Ronda Dixon challenging the District of Columbia's attempt to recover unemployment benefits that were paid to her after an initial eligibility determination but before it was reversed on appeal. The Office of Administrative Hearings affirmed the overpayment determination of $1,988, and Dixon petitioned for review arguing unfairness. The court denied the petition, holding that the Department of Employment Services is authorized by D.C. Code § 51-119(d) to recover such overpayments to preserve the unemployment fund, and there was no abuse of discretion in doing so. The policy requires prompt payment of benefits upon initial finding but allows recovery if later reversed.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Maxine Grayson appealing her conviction for second-degree theft after taking a leather jacket from Veretta Swann's apartment. The trial court found Grayson guilty, crediting Swann's testimony that no permission was given and noting a supposed confession by Grayson, along with changes in her story indicating consciousness of guilt. The appellate court held that the trial judge erroneously believed there was a confession, which was not supported by the record, and thus vacated the conviction and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the evidence and render a new verdict without relying on the mistaken finding. A dissenting judge argued the evidence was insufficient even without the confession and would have reversed for acquittal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sandra Butler-Truesdale's appeal of a denial of unemployment compensation benefits after she resigned from her job at an independent living facility. The Office of Administrative Hearings determined she had voluntarily quit without good cause connected to her work, but the court found that the Administrative Law Judge only addressed one of the three grounds she raised for good cause—personal safety concerns—and failed to consider her claims of management negligence and changes in job responsibilities. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that agencies must make factual findings on all contested issues of material fact.

labor & employment

In Cook v. United States, the appellant challenged the denial of his motion under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 to reduce a 12-year sentence for unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute, which was within the 30-year statutory maximum; he argued the sentence was excessive compared to later voluntary guidelines and violated the Eighth Amendment as disproportionate. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial, holding that sentences within statutory limits are generally unreviewable absent constitutional claims and that the guidelines were not in effect or binding at the time of sentencing. The court further ruled that the Eighth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not raised on direct appeal and no cause was shown for the omission, and that even on the merits the sentence was not grossly disproportionate under precedents like Harmelin v. Michigan and Ewing v. California given aggravating factors. The concurring opinion expressed reluctance but agreed the claim failed under current standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In Purcell v. Thomas, Marva Thomas sued her former employer Fedora, Inc. and its principal George Purcell for sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging repeated inappropriate sexual comments and advances that led to her termination and emotional harm. A jury found in Thomas's favor and awarded damages, and the trial court denied the defendants' post-trial motions. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, finding no error in the trial court's handling of statute of limitations issues, jury instructions, motions for judgment as a matter of law or new trial, and determining that individuals can be held liable under the DCHRA.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

In Dennis v. Jones, a patient sued her plastic surgeon for medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent after experiencing severe complications from abdominoplasty surgery, which she attributed to the doctor's inadequate warnings about risks associated with her smoking, obesity, and high blood pressure. The surgeon appealed the jury verdict against him, arguing that the trial court should have instructed the jury on assumption of risk in addition to contributory negligence based on the patient's continued smoking. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that any error in refusing the assumption of risk instruction was harmless because the jury's rejection of contributory negligence indicated it would not have found assumption of risk either. The court reasoned that the two defenses were closely related on the facts of the case, particularly regarding the patient's knowledge and conduct concerning smoking.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a tenant who sued his apartment management company in small claims court for damages arising from intense weekday construction noise in his apartment and the company's use of his private roof deck for scaffolding and equipment storage during building repairs. The trial court denied all relief after a bench trial, concluding that the noise and intrusion did not violate any applicable legal principles. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, ruling that the trial court had too narrowly construed the landlord's implied obligations under the lease. Drawing on Javins v. First National Realty Corp. and related precedents, the court held that modern landlord-tenant law treats leases as contracts that include implied covenants protecting the tenant's permissible use of the premises from unreasonable interference by the landlord.

property

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against District of Columbia attorney Brian O. Godette, who allegedly abandoned a client's civil matter and then failed to respond to the client's ethics complaint or to seven letters, a motion to compel, and a Board order from Bar Counsel over many months. The Board on Professional Responsibility found clear and convincing evidence that Godette violated Rule 8.1(b) (failure to respond to a disciplinary authority), Rule 8.4(d) (interference with justice), and D.C. Bar R. XI § 2(b)(3) (noncompliance with a Board order), and recommended a 30-day suspension plus conditions that he respond to the complaint and complete six hours of ethics CLE before resuming practice. Bar Counsel urged an additional requirement that Godette prove fitness to practice as a condition of reinstatement, but the Board rejected this after concluding there was no substantial evidence he had deliberately evaded service. The court held that the record contained ample evidence of evasion and therefore remanded for the Board to reconsider the fitness requirement on a corrected factual basis.

procedure

The case concerned an employer's petition for review of a District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) final order that awarded unemployment compensation benefits to former employee Vonda Prince after the employer, Kidd International Home Care, was defaulted for non-appearance at a scheduled hearing. The OAH had reversed a claims examiner's denial of benefits based on alleged gross misconduct, but the court found that Prince had not served her appeal on the employer and that the OAH scheduling order was mailed to an incomplete address lacking the employer's suite number. The court reversed the default order and remanded for a hearing on the merits, holding that the notice deficiencies meant the employer had not received notice reasonably calculated to afford an opportunity to be heard, consistent with due process requirements. The court noted the absence of any proof or description of proper mailing procedures and the employer's undisputed claim of non-receipt.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Dorothy Thorn appealing the denial of her motion for a new trial after the trial court ordered specific performance of a contract to sell her home to James and Erika Walker. The trial court had found a valid contract and granted specific performance, but Thorn sought a new trial based on an affidavit suggesting issues with the buyers' financing pre-approval letter. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot because Thorn had already sold and conveyed the property to the Walkers, who had taken possession and paid the purchase price, making any relief impossible. Additionally, the court noted that the affidavit did not qualify as newly discovered evidence since Thorn could have investigated the lender earlier with due diligence, and it did not prove fraud or misconduct by the Walkers.

propertyprocedure

In Ackerman v. Genevieve Ackerman Family Trust, the appellant sued to reform his mother's revocable trust, seeking an accounting, removal of the trustee, and removal of a Delaware condominium from the trust assets on grounds of mistake or improper inclusion. The trial court denied relief after finding no evidence of mistake and, on the trustees' counterclaim, enforced the trust's no-contest clause to declare that the appellant had forfeited all interests under the trust and his mother's will. The appellate court affirmed, holding that District of Columbia law recognizes such clauses as valid and enforceable without a good-faith or probable-cause exception, that the appellant's reformation action clearly contested the validity of trust provisions and asset transfers, and that the trial court's factual findings supported enforcement. The core reasoning rested on precedent treating no-contest clauses as unambiguous expressions of the settlor's intent that courts must apply as written.

family lawproperty

This case involved Timothy Hairston, who was convicted by a jury in the District of Columbia of conspiracy to assault and murder, first-degree murder while armed, assault with intent to kill while armed, and related firearm offenses stemming from a violent neighborhood dispute in 1997. Hairston appealed his convictions and the denial of his motion to vacate sentence based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing errors in failing to suppress his confession due to Miranda violations, denying an evidentiary hearing, insufficient evidence on conspiracy, and improper prosecutorial comments. The court affirmed the trial court's decisions, holding that the confession was properly admitted under the totality of circumstances and Missouri v. Seibert, there was sufficient evidence, no substantial prejudice from comments, and no need for a hearing on the ineffective counsel claim.

criminal lawprocedure

In this juvenile delinquency case, R.K.S., a fourteen-year-old, was charged in the District of Columbia Superior Court with unauthorized use of a vehicle and receiving stolen property after he and his brother were apprehended following a police chase in a stolen car. The trial court adjudicated him delinquent on both charges. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that R.K.S. was denied his constitutional due process right to the effective assistance of counsel, as well as his statutory right and rights under Superior Court Juvenile Branch rules, because his appointed counsel failed to provide adequate representation at trial. The court remanded the case for a new trial on the charges.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

This case concerned an employer's appeal from an Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of its challenge to a District of Columbia unemployment compensation award to a former employee. The ALJ had ruled the appeal untimely under the ten-day jurisdictional deadline, based on a notation in the claims examiner's determination indicating it was mailed to the employer on a specific date. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the agency record contained no certification, description of mailing procedures, or other proof that notice was actually sent, so the employer could not be barred from appealing due to non-receipt.

labor & employmentprocedure