In this case, surface property owners sued the holder of severed mineral rights and its lessee for declaratory relief, to quiet title, to enjoin trespass, and for damages after the lessee removed sandstone from the land, damaging trees and creating roads. The 1928 deed reserved to the grantor “coal, oil, gas and any and all other minerals,” and the defendants claimed this included sandstone; the plaintiffs contended it did not. The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their first three counts and dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim, holding that sandstone is a rock or stone rather than a mineral under the deed’s plain language and ordinary definitions. It denied the defendants’ summary-judgment and amendment motions and reserved ruling on damages pending resolution of the remaining claims.
This case involves Patricia Tolliver suing her former employer, Children's Home-Chambliss Shelter, a non-profit shelter for children, for age and sex discrimination, retaliation, and related employment claims, primarily concerning unequal pay and cleaning assignments compared to male employees. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on most claims, including retaliation and those related to cleaning tasks, but denied it on the disparate pay claims. The decision was based on the presence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff was paid less than similarly situated male employees due to sex or age, while finding insufficient evidence to support the other allegations.
Plaintiff Ralph Freeman, a police officer, sued Wal-Mart for damages after a store greeter briefly touched his shoulder while requesting a receipt following activation of the store's EAS alarm; Freeman shoved the greeter, leading to an altercation captured on video that was later publicized and caused him embarrassment, though he suffered no physical injury. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, which Freeman did not oppose. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and that Freeman could not establish the required elements of his claims, including breach of duty, severe emotional injury, or expert proof for negligent infliction of emotional distress, resulting in dismissal of the case.
The case involved Defendant Toney Robinson, who was indicted in April 2010 on charges including possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine after a 2009 search of his residence uncovered 21 grams of crack and firearms; he pleaded guilty in July 2010, but his sentencing occurred after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) took effect in August 2010. The FSA raised the threshold for the five-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams of crack, meaning Robinson would face a 10-year mandatory minimum under the prior law but none under the new thresholds. The court granted Robinson's request to apply the FSA, holding that its reduced mandatory minimums are retroactive to offenders whose conduct predated the Act but who had not yet been sentenced. The reasoning centered on the FSA's purpose to reduce sentencing disparities, the Sentencing Commission's conforming guideline amendments effective for post-enactment sentencings, and indications of congressional intent supporting application to pending cases.
This case involves the U.S. government's motion to garnish assets held by Benton Bancshares, Inc. on behalf of defendant Jimmy L. Goddard, who was convicted of misapplication of bank funds and ordered to pay $1,185,328 in restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The assets, consisting of cash, stock liquidation proceeds, and future dividends, were held jointly by Goddard and his wife in a tenancy by the entirety; Mrs. Goddard intervened and conceded the government's interest but sought to limit it to a share of the property. The court granted the motion in part, authorizing garnishment of one-half of the assets. It reasoned that MVRA restitution liens are treated like tax liens and can reach entireties property, but the non-debtor spouse retains an equal interest, and the government failed to present evidence sufficient to support an equitable adjustment favoring a larger share.
In Taylor v. Duncan, plaintiff Shirley Taylor sued the Office of Representative John J. Duncan, Jr., alleging that her 2009 termination from her position as an assistant staffer violated the Congressional Accountability Act through age and perceived disability discrimination under the incorporated ADEA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting absolute immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause because some of her duties involved legislative matters. The court denied the motion after converting it to summary judgment, holding that Taylor's core duties consisted of non-legislative constituent services and administrative tasks, that the termination decision was administrative rather than legislative, and that she had presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie case to proceed.
This case involved disciplinary proceedings against attorney James A.H. Bell following his criminal contempt conviction for conduct during his representation of defendant Johnny Martin in a federal drug conspiracy case. The show cause order alleged that Bell made misrepresentations to the court about a prior representation and conflict of interest involving potential witness Joe Cofer, including claims of confidential communications and an ongoing relationship that justified withdrawal. After a hearing where Bell presented evidence and witnesses, the court found he had engaged in unethical conduct violating the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. The court decided to publicly admonish Bell and order him to deliver ten lectures on ethics and civility within two years, with semiannual compliance reports, determining this sanction appropriate after considering mitigating factors like remorse.
In this ERISA case, plaintiff Abraham Park sued Unum Life Insurance Company and Unum Group for long-term disability benefits under a group policy provided through his former employer, after the insurer denied his claim for lack of medical support. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the suit was barred by the policy's three-year contractual limitations period, which began running after proof of claim was due and was tolled only during a reassessment process. Plaintiff did not contest the timeline but argued the limitations clause was ambiguous or unreasonable. The court held that the provision was clear and enforceable because it allowed the plaintiff ample time to file suit after the denial and reassessment, making the action untimely. It therefore granted summary judgment and dismissed the case.
The case involved Dr. William Alexander suing Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company over the denial of long-term disability benefits under a policy originally obtained through his former employer, Arthur S. Keats, M.D. Associates. Plaintiff asserted state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, while Defendant contended the policy was an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan that preempted those claims. The court granted Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion, holding that the policy remained subject to ERISA because it originated under an employer-sponsored group arrangement with Risk Group Number 25325, partial premium contributions by the employer, and continuation rights tied to the original group terms. The core reasoning examined the Salary Allotment Agreement, the employer’s role in billing and discounts, and the fact that post-employment individual payments preserved the same policy without creating a new individual contract outside ERISA coverage.
In United States v. Sanders, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to steal and possess stolen U.S. mail after admitting to cashing stolen checks as part of a scheme with two codefendants. She pleaded guilty in May 2009 but had sold hydrocodone pills two days earlier, with no further criminal activity after the plea. The court addressed whether this unrelated pre-plea conduct should bar the two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG § 3E1.1. The court granted the reduction, holding that subsequent criminal conduct unrelated to the charged offenses warrants more lenient treatment when it occurs before the guilty plea and does not continue afterward, consistent with the defendant's timely admission of guilt and cooperation.
This case involved a claim by S.K. Services, a janitorial services company, and its owner against FedEx for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after the owner complained about alleged race-based mistreatment and exclusion of an African-American employee at FedEx's facility. The court addressed an issue of first impression regarding whether and how an independent contractor could bring a § 1981 retaliation claim on behalf of his employee against a third party. The court held that the plaintiff must show the complaints were directed toward protecting the contractual rights between the contractor and the employee. It sustained the defendant's objection to evidence of the complaints because they failed to connect the alleged race-based animus to interference with those specific contractual rights, as opposed to rights between the employee and FedEx.
