Vanessa Ruiz

In Eady v. United States, Carlos Eady appealed his convictions for carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm, and possession of ammunition, which carried sentencing enhancements due to a prior felony conviction and the fact that the offenses were committed while on release in another case. The trial judge read the unredacted indictment to the jury, instructed the jury on and allowed the prosecutor to reference Eady’s prior felony and release status, and provided the jury with written copies of stipulations admitting those facts. Eady argued this exposed the jury to unnecessary and prejudicial details about his criminal history. The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the jury had been improperly informed of the prior conviction and release status in violation of rules limiting such evidence, and therefore reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Victor Onyeoziri’s challenge to the foreclosure sale of his District of Columbia property by trustees Spivok and Collins on behalf of lender BB&T. Onyeoziri had obtained a $125,000 business loan secured by the property; after he defaulted, the trustees proceeded with a foreclosure auction despite his claim that he had a pending contract to sell the house for $280,000. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on the federal Truth in Lending Act and D.C. Home Loan Protection Act claims, holding that the loan was a commercial transaction outside the statutes’ consumer protections and that an exculpatory clause in the forbearance agreement further barred those claims. The court reversed and remanded on the tortious interference claim, concluding that Onyeoziri had presented sufficient evidence of a specific, nearly finalized sales contract and questions of fact about notice and the trustees’ conduct to create a triable issue.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In Jones v. United States, a jury convicted Ricardo Jones of first-degree murder while armed and related weapons offenses for fatally shooting David Valentine during a confrontation in Washington, D.C., on July 6, 2005, as well as escape; Jones appealed, challenging the trial court's admission of evidence from a subsequent armed robbery in North Carolina, expert testimony on firearm and toolmark identification, and limits on cross-examining government witnesses for bias. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The court held that the North Carolina evidence was properly admitted as it corroborated Jones's identity as the shooter, his possession and use of the specific .45-caliber pistol, and other details through independent witness accounts and physical evidence, with its probative value outweighing any prejudice; it also found no error in allowing the expert testimony or restricting the cross-examination, and no other grounds for reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a medical malpractice action in which patient Rosalee Blue sued surgeon Dr. Ronald Kurstin and anesthesiologist Dr. John Lordan as joint tortfeasors for injuries caused by administration of Lovenox during hernia repair surgery. Blue settled with Lordan for $2 million under an agreement that dismissed all claims against both doctors but expressly reserved Lordan’s right to pursue contribution from Kurstin, with any recovery to be assigned back to Blue; the malpractice trial was then converted to a bench trial on the contribution cross-claim. The trial court found Kurstin had breached the standard of care, was a joint tortfeasor, and ordered him to pay Lordan $1 million as pro rata contribution. Kurstin appealed, arguing the settlement released all claims including contribution and that the claim was an improper attempt by Blue to recover more than her damages. The appellate court affirmed, concluding the settlement language validly preserved the contribution claim and that District of Columbia law permits such reservation and assignment even when proceeds ultimately benefit the original plaintiff.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Evans v. United States, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault while armed after a jury trial in which he claimed self-defense in stabbing the victim during a street fight. He appealed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial or curative instruction after the government referenced in its opening statement a false exculpatory statement by the defendant to police that was not later introduced at trial, which in turn prompted the defense to reference a related exculpatory statement it could not introduce. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because any error was harmless and the government's opening remark did not warrant the requested remedies. The court reasoned that the defense's reliance on the government's opening did not create unfair prejudice requiring a mistrial or special instruction, especially given the strength of the other evidence and the fact that the defendant did not testify.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether D.C. Code § 12-309 barred John Barnhardt’s tort claims against the District of Columbia for negligence and conversion after police destroyed property confiscated during his 2005 arrest. Barnhardt did not learn of the destruction until 2007 and sent notice to the Mayor in 2008, well after the six-month period measured from the date of destruction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit certified the question to this court, which held that the statute does not bar the claims if the claimant lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the injury within six months. The court reasoned that the notice period presupposes the claimant’s awareness of injury or damage as a factual precondition, so the period does not begin to run until that awareness exists or reasonably should exist.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

This case concerns attorney Robert L. Berkebile, who filed an affidavit consenting to disbarment from the District of Columbia Bar under the applicable court rules. Upon review of the affidavit and the Board on Professional Responsibility's report and recommendation, the court ordered Berkebile disbarred by consent, effective immediately. The effective date for any future reinstatement purposes runs from the filing of his affidavit under D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g). The order also directs publication of the decision while keeping the affidavit confidential unless otherwise ordered, and notifies the respondent of post-disbarment rights and obligations.

procedure

This case arose from a workers' compensation claim by a housekeeper who injured her knee at work and sought approval for total knee replacement surgery to address aggravated preexisting arthritis. The employer contested the surgery's necessity and initiated the statutory utilization review (UR) process, which produced an adverse opinion on timing due to the claimant's weight; her treating physician received the report but did not request reconsideration. The Department of Employment Services (DOES) and its Compensation Review Board concluded that the UR process was nonetheless complete and allowed the claim to proceed to a formal hearing, where the surgery was approved as causally related and medically necessary based on the physician's testimony. The court affirmed, holding that the agency's interpretation of D.C. Code § 32-1507(b)(6)—treating the physician's reconsideration right as optional rather than mandatory for finality—was a permissible construction of the statute that did not conflict with its text or purpose.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned attorney Samuel Gen, who submitted an affidavit consenting to disbarment from the District of Columbia Bar under Rule XI following a misdemeanor conviction in New York and related reciprocal discipline proceedings. The court ordered Gen disbarred by consent effective immediately, with the date for reinstatement purposes running from December 15, 2005, the date he filed his required affidavit. It dismissed as moot the pending petitions for discipline based on the New York conviction and the reciprocal discipline matter from New York. The order included provisions for publication, nondisclosure of the affidavit, and notice to Gen regarding his rights and responsibilities as a disbarred attorney.

criminal law

The case involved Alfred Evans, who was jointly tried with another defendant for the murder of Reginald Brightheart and related charges. The jury acquitted Evans of second-degree burglary while armed but convicted him of first-degree felony murder while armed based on that predicate offense, creating inconsistent verdicts; after the trial court granted a new trial due to an evidentiary error during deliberations, Evans moved to dismiss the retrial on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion. The court reasoned that the doctrine of continuing jeopardy applies to retrials after a defendant's successful motion for a new trial, that inconsistent verdicts do not invalidate convictions or trigger collateral estoppel in this context, and that the prior acquittal on the predicate felony does not bar retrial on the compound felony murder charge.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a medical malpractice claim brought by a D.C. resident against a Virginia doctor for allegedly improperly prescribing the drug Abilify and failing to warn of its risks, after the plaintiff experienced serious complications. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the doctor's sole connection to the District—a single phone call to a local pharmacy to relay the prescription—did not satisfy the D.C. long-arm statute or due process requirements, as it did not amount to transacting business, contracting to supply services, or other qualifying contacts in the District. The decision emphasized that the contact was initiated by the patient and lacked the purposeful availment needed for jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a custody dispute over minor A.W. between his biological father Gary Mayo, who sought permanent custody, and his maternal great aunt Pamela Fields, who had cared for the child since 1997 and counterclaimed for custody. The trial court granted sole legal and physical custody to Mayo after weighing statutory factors under D.C. Code § 16-914(a)(3), applying a presumption that a child's best interests are served by a biological parent unless clear and convincing evidence shows detriment, and determining Fields had not met that burden despite the guardian ad litem's recommendation. On appeal, Fields challenged the presumption's application, the handling of the child's and mother's wishes, and the weight given to the guardian ad litem, but the court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's order.

family law

The case involved Portia Golding-Alleyne's claim for workers' compensation benefits for permanent partial disability of her left leg, following a 1993 work-related back injury at the Washington Hospital Center. After an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the claim, finding no medical evidence of a diagnosed left leg condition or its connection to the work injury, and the Compensation Review Board affirmed. The court upheld the decision, determining that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence, as the medical records primarily reflected the claimant's subjective complaints without objective test results or expert linkage to the injury. The court reviewed the matter under the substantial evidence standard applicable to administrative decisions.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a tenant, Deborah Redman, who refused to vacate her apartment after the owner, Potomac Place Associates, began converting the building to condominiums and issued a notice to vacate. Redman sought protection from eviction under a 2006 amendment to D.C. law that extended protections to disabled tenants, which became effective after the eviction proceedings had begun. The court ruled that the amendment did not apply to Redman because she was not in lawful possession of the premises at the time the statute took effect, as her tenancy had terminated upon the expiration of the notice period. The reasoning centered on the statutory requirements that protections apply only to tenants who qualified at the time of the tenant election for conversion and who remained in lawful possession, which Redman did not.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Bacchus v. United States, appellant Nathaniel Bacchus was convicted after a bench trial of simple assault, second-degree theft, and destroying property arising from a May 2006 altercation with his former romantic partner, Yolanda Deloatch, during which he allegedly pushed her, took cash from her purse, and smashed her cell phone. The trial court acquitted him of violating a 2005 civil protection order. On appeal, Bacchus challenged the admission of evidence about a prior 2005 arrest, the testimony of a government witness who had reviewed a grand jury transcript, and the sufficiency of evidence for the destruction of property charge. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the prior bad acts evidence was properly admitted to show motive and intent, that there was no plain error regarding the witness testimony, and that the victim's credible account alone sufficed to support the property destruction finding.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

In Diggs v. United States, the appellant was convicted after a bench trial of simple assault and possession of a prohibited weapon, specifically a hammer she used during a confrontation with a rent-to-own collections agent attempting to repossess a television. She did not challenge the assault conviction but contested the sufficiency of the evidence that the hammer qualified as a prohibited weapon under D.C. Code § 22-4514(b) and argued she was denied her right to a jury trial on the weapons charge. The court held that the evidence was sufficient because a hammer qualifies as an "other dangerous weapon" when wielded with intent to use it unlawfully against another person. However, accepting the government's concession, the court ruled that the appellant was entitled to a jury trial on the completed offense and therefore vacated that conviction while remanding for entry of judgment on the lesser-included offense of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon, which does not carry a jury-trial right.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a landlord and a long-term tenant over the tenant's right to purchase the rental property under the District of Columbia's Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the landlord's attempt to evict the tenant for personal use. The trial court ruled that the tenant had timely expressed interest in purchasing the property and that the landlord had waived the eviction notice by accepting rent after it expired. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the first ruling, holding that the tenant failed to provide the required written statement of interest within thirty days of receiving the offer of sale because the statement was not received by the deadline, but affirmed the second ruling that accepting rent waived the notice to vacate. The court reasoned that the statutory language requiring the tenant to "provide" the statement meant it must be received, not merely mailed, within the thirty-day period starting upon receipt of the offer.

property

The case involved claims by Langdon Johnson, a long-time employee of the Washington Convention Center Authority, against his employer and supervisor for age discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act, interference with rights under the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act, and unequal pay under the federal Equal Pay Act. A jury found in Johnson's favor on all three claims and awarded damages, but the trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law while reducing the damages and also denied Johnson's request for front pay. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment in most respects, upholding the liability findings based on evidence of age-related comments by the supervisor, the timing and handling of Johnson's medical leave, and pay disparities with a younger female colleague performing similar work. The sole exception was that the court reversed the damages calculation on the equal pay claim and remanded for recalculation to exclude certain periods or amounts.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned the conservatorship of elderly Ms. Mollie Orshansky after an initial probate court appointment of Harry Jordan as guardian and conservator was vacated on appeal for failing to follow statutory safeguards under the D.C. Guardianship Act, including inadequate notice and representation. Following remand, the niece appellant raised issues about Jordan's reappointment as special conservator to wind down the estate, his entitlement to compensation for court-requested services, and the probate court's calculation of fees and costs. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the reappointment question, held that compensation was due as a matter of law, and determined that the probate court acted within its discretion in setting the amount of fees, resulting in affirmance of the fee-related rulings.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned a dispute among the four Ingersoll siblings over the estate of their late mother, Loraine Boley Ingersoll, focusing on amendments to her trust and will executed shortly before her death, the creation of a family charitable foundation, and the distribution of residential and other property. The trial court had ruled in favor of daughter Barbara on claims of undue influence by brother William and tortious interference with her expected inheritance, while also addressing related counterclaims. On appeal, the court vacated the trial court's findings on undue influence and intentional interference as clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record, reversed the judgments on those counts, and directed entry of judgment for the brothers. It reversed the ruling on William's standing to pursue a conversion counterclaim but remanded for further consideration of the effect of the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act, while upholding the judgment on the counterclaim regarding the Dexter Street residence.

family lawpropertytorts & liability