Warren King

The case involved L.C., a fourteen-year-old convicted after a bench trial of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree child sexual abuse arising from an alleged assault on a ten-year-old girl at a public swimming pool. L.C. appealed on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted the victim's out-of-court statements to a counselor, camp director, and nurse under the report-of-rape hearsay exception, which he contended does not apply in bench trials. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the exception applies in bench trials to the same extent as in jury trials. The court reasoned that the exception counters assumptions about how sexual assault victims naturally behave, assumptions that judges as well as jurors may hold, and that prior decisions had already applied the rule without distinction in bench trials.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Angel Saad, an attorney licensed in the District of Columbia, who pleaded guilty in 2011 to the New York felony of grand larceny in the third degree for stealing property valued over three thousand dollars. After notification of the conviction, the D.C. Court of Appeals suspended Saad and referred the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility, which recommended disbarment. The court ordered Saad disbarred from practicing law in D.C., effective immediately, with the disbarment period to begin upon filing of the required affidavit. The core reasoning was that a valid guilty plea establishes the conviction, grand larceny has been previously determined to involve moral turpitude per se, and D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) mandates disbarment for such offenses.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings against Michael A. Kaplan following his one-year suspension by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which was stayed in favor of probation. The court had previously ordered Kaplan to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed in this jurisdiction. Kaplan failed to file any response to the show cause order. Based on that failure and the statement from Bar Counsel, the court ordered that Kaplan be suspended for one year, all stayed in favor of a one-year probationary period subject to the conditions imposed in New Jersey.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves reciprocal attorney discipline for Robert Teir, who received an eighteen-month suspension from practicing law in Texas that was stayed in favor of probation. The D.C. court reviewed the Texas judgment, the respondent's response to an order to show cause, and Bar Counsel's statement to determine whether identical discipline should be imposed. Finding that the reasons offered by the respondent did not fall within the exceptions listed in D.C. Bar Rule XI § 11(c), the court ordered the same eighteen-month suspension, stayed for an eighteen-month probationary period subject to conditions that Teir not engage in professional misconduct or violate any state or federal criminal statutes. The ruling rests on the application of reciprocal discipline rules when no qualifying exceptions are shown.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concerning Mark A. Key. After the North Carolina Bar suspended Key from practicing law for ninety days, the D.C. court directed him to explain why equivalent discipline should not apply, but he did not respond or submit the required affidavit under D.C. Bar Rule XI. The court therefore imposed a ninety-day suspension with a fitness requirement for reinstatement, which will not commence until Key files a compliant affidavit.

procedure

This case involves reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings against Gabriel I. Martin following his three-year suspension from practicing law in Florida by the Supreme Court of Florida. The D.C. court issued an order to show cause why a similar three-year suspension should not be imposed in the District of Columbia. Martin consented to the reciprocal discipline and filed the required affidavit under D.C. Bar Rule XI § 14(g). The court therefore suspended Martin from practicing law in D.C. for three years, effective nunc pro tunc to August 29, 2011.

procedure

The case concerned the appeals of Adrian Ball and Christopher Jackson from their convictions after a high-speed police chase and foot pursuit in which Ball possessed a firearm and pointed it at an officer while both men fled. Jackson argued that his charges were improperly joined with Ball's, while Ball challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony assault on a police officer conviction, the imposition of separate sentences for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and the trial court's handling of certain prosecutorial statements. The court affirmed Jackson's convictions in full and most of Ball's convictions, remanding only Ball's case for further proceedings, on the grounds that the offenses were logically connected so as to permit joinder, that the evidence was sufficient under the applicable statutes, and that certain convictions merged for sentencing purposes.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In Hampleton v. United States, the appellant was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of armed robbery, three counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, following the denial of his motions to suppress evidence from a Terry stop. The case arose from a May 2006 armed robbery in Washington, D.C., where suspects fled police in a stolen vehicle, crashed, and scattered; about 30 minutes later, an officer stopped Hampleton nearby because he matched a lookout for the robbers, leading to his arrest and the discovery of incriminating items like cell phones and a bank card. On appeal, Hampleton argued that the show-up identifications and physical evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure and that his firearm possession convictions should merge. The court affirmed the convictions and the denial of suppression, holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances including the description, location, time, and Hampleton's appearance and behavior, but it agreed that the firearm counts merged and remanded for resentencing on that issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In Brooks v. United States, the appellant was convicted after a bench trial of possessing heroin in violation of D.C. Code § 48-904.01(d), based on drugs recovered from his pocket. He had expressly waived his right to confront the DEA chemist who analyzed the substance but later sought mid-trial to withdraw that waiver upon noticing possible discrepancies in lab numbers on the evidence packaging. The trial court denied the request, finding no doubt that the drugs in court were the same ones seized from the appellant, and the appellate court affirmed. The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, drawing analogies to withdrawals of stipulations or jury-trial waivers, and concluded that the chain-of-custody evidence was sufficient and that the judge had not relied on improper factors or overlooked relevant ones.

criminal lawprocedure

In Cesarano v. Reed Smith LLP, the appellant, a former associate at the law firm, sued her employer under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act alleging disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodations for her complex regional pain syndrome resulting from a hand injury, interference and retaliation related to her medical leaves, and wrongful termination. The trial court dismissed all claims as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the claims concerning denial of accommodations and leave status but reversed the dismissal of the wrongful termination claim, holding that it was timely filed, and remanded that claim for trial. The core reasoning focused on applying the Supreme Court's analysis from National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan to treat the termination as a discrete act separate from the earlier accommodation issues, making only the termination claim fall within the limitations period.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings against respondent Elmer D. Ellis. The D.C. Circuit had suspended Ellis for 120 days and required completion of twelve hours of continuing legal education on appellate practice and procedure. After this court issued an order to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed, Ellis did not respond or file the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). The court therefore ordered the same 120-day suspension with the CLE condition, applying precedents that call for identical reciprocal discipline in uncontested cases absent grave injustice. The suspension period for reinstatement purposes begins upon filing of the affidavit.

procedure

This case involved reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings against Kevin J. Flynn in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court suspended Flynn from practicing law for one year, with reinstatement conditioned on demonstrating fitness to practice, matching the discipline from New York where he was suspended. The decision was based on the certified order from New York's Appellate Division, Bar Counsel's recommendation for identical discipline, and precedents establishing that D.C. typically imposes the same sanctions as the original jurisdiction unless opposed.

procedure

This case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline in the District of Columbia after the Maryland Court of Appeals indefinitely suspended respondent Donald P. McLaughlin from practicing law. The DC court ordered that McLaughlin be indefinitely suspended with a fitness requirement for reinstatement and ruled he may not petition for reinstatement until five years have passed or he is reinstated in Maryland, whichever occurs first. The order was issued after McLaughlin failed to respond to a show cause order or file the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). The court applied the presumption in favor of identical reciprocal discipline in uncontested cases, citing prior decisions that support adopting the original jurisdiction's sanction under these circumstances.

procedure

The case involved sixteen individuals who had been indefinitely committed to mental health custody under the District of Columbia's prior Ervin Act and who sought dismissal of recommitment petitions filed after statutory amendments changed commitments to one-year terms and created new procedures. The trial court denied their motions to dismiss, which argued that the commitments had lapsed and that later curative amendments exceeded the Council's authority or violated due process. The appellate court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the denial of the motions to dismiss was a non-final order that did not satisfy the collateral order doctrine. It reasoned that the order did not irreparably affect the appellants' liberty interests, as the underlying recommitment petitions remained pending and any claims could be reviewed after a final judgment. The court therefore dismissed the appeals without prejudice.

procedurehealthcare

The case concerned Salvatore Gorgone's tenant's application for a certificate of occupancy to run a gourmet shop in the basement of a rowhouse in a residential zoning district where such commercial uses are not permitted as of right. The Zoning Administrator denied the application on grounds that any prior nonconforming use of the basement had been abandoned, and the Board of Zoning Adjustment affirmed that denial after finding that the use had changed from a traditional delicatessen to a Chinese carry-out operation involving on-site cooking, which violated the existing certificate and led to its revocation in 2005. The court affirmed the BZA's decision, holding that the three-year discontinuance of the original nonconforming use constituted prima facie evidence of abandonment under zoning regulations, and that the applicant could not rely on inconsistencies in the District's treatment of other food establishments to revive the lapsed right.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned a dispute between London Insurers and Ashland, Inc. over the terms of a 1998 Coverage-in-Place Agreement for asbestos claims against Ashland subsidiary Riley Stoker. The agreement included a $10 million annual payment cap under § 7(g) with excess amounts rolled forward and provisions for interest on late payments under § 7(f). Ashland demanded arbitration after the insurers invoked the cap and refused to pay interest on rolled-over amounts; the arbitrator interpreted the cap to require full payment of deferred sums the following year plus interest and awarded relief to Ashland. The trial court confirmed the award, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator acted within his authority because the interest issue was inextricably linked to the submitted cap dispute and presented a live controversy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Chimes District of Columbia, Inc. appealing an award of unemployment benefits to its former employee, Patricia O. King, who had taken leave due to her high-risk pregnancy. King exhausted her FMLA leave, briefly returned to work with restrictions, and then stopped working again in January 2006 without providing the required medical documentation for additional leave. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the decision granting benefits, holding that King failed to supply a sufficient medical statement as mandated by 7 DCMR § 311.7(e) to qualify for unemployment compensation. The court reasoned that without proper medical certification notifying the employer of the need for leave due to work-related health issues, the employee was not entitled to benefits.

labor & employment

In this reciprocal attorney discipline case, the court considered whether to impose disbarment on a lawyer who had been suspended for two years in Massachusetts for intentionally converting corporate funds as a fiduciary and fabricating documents to conceal it. The court accepted the Board's recommendation for disbarment, finding that the Massachusetts proceedings were valid and that the misconduct would warrant disbarment in the District of Columbia under Rule 8.4(b) because it reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty and trustworthiness, similar to prior cases involving misappropriation of non-client funds. The court reasoned that the facts were conclusively established and indistinguishable from cases like In re Slattery, where disbarment was imposed for comparable fiduciary breaches.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved thirteen-year-old Elijah Campbell, who was mauled by pit bulls owned by tenant Aaron Harris on property leased from landlord Raymon Noble. After obtaining a large default judgment against Harris that was likely uncollectible, Campbell and his mother sued Noble, arguing he had a duty to evict Harris or force removal of the dogs due to their known aggressive tendencies. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Noble, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that although Noble had notice of the dogs' behavior, the lease contained no "no pets" clause or other provision giving him authority to control the animals, and without such control, no duty arose to protect third parties from the tenant's dangerous condition.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved Jacqueline King’s complaint to the D.C. Public Service Commission alleging excessive electric charges by Potomac Electric Power Company. After the Commission dismissed her complaint, King appealed directly to the D.C. Court of Appeals instead of first filing a petition for reconsideration with the Commission as required by D.C. Code § 34-604(b). The court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Commission later dismissed King’s belated reconsideration petition as untimely. On appeal from that dismissal, the court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s interpretation of the statute made timely filing jurisdictional and entitled to deference, so the late petition was properly rejected.

business & regulatoryprocedure