Stephen H. Glickman

The case involved three real estate trade associations challenging the D.C. Council's transfer of over $3.2 million from the Real Estate Guarantee and Education Fund—a special fund financed by licensee fees to compensate victims of unlawful real estate practices—to the District's General Fund as part of emergency measures to balance the Fiscal Year 2009 budget amid revenue shortfalls. The associations argued that the transfer, along with resulting supplemental assessments on licensees, violated the Home Rule Act and the 1982 Real Estate Licensure Act that created the fund, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief to reverse it. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the District, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. The appeals court held that the Home Rule Act grants the Council broad authority to manage District finances and redirect monies from special funds to the General Fund, even when statutes designate those funds for specific purposes, and that the Licensure Act contained no language prohibiting such legislative action or creating vested rights in the fund's balance.

business & regulatoryfederal power

Denise Scott, a caregiver at a residential facility for disabled adults run by Behavioral Research Associates, Inc. (BRA), was fired after being unable to complete an in-person interview as part of BRA’s investigation into a resident-on-resident fight she had witnessed and reported. A claims examiner and an Administrative Law Judge denied her unemployment benefits on the ground that her non-cooperation amounted to gross misconduct. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding that the record did not support a finding of gross misconduct because Scott had promptly filed a written report, made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to reschedule the interview, and visited the regulatory agency herself to give a statement, while BRA never informed her of the five-day deadline or returned her calls. The court further noted that unresolved factual disputes remained about whether Scott’s conduct constituted “simple” misconduct, which carries a lesser disqualification from benefits, and therefore remanded the case for additional findings on her eligibility.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Diggs v. United States, Gonzales Diggs and Odell Griffin appealed their convictions for second-degree murder while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and related offenses stemming from a 2000 shooting in Southeast Washington, D.C., in which one victim was killed and another wounded during an attack on occupants of a stolen Jeep. The appellants primarily challenged the admission of a witness’s out-of-court statements to police and grand jury testimony, arguing that the witness’s claimed memory loss from brain damage rendered him unavailable for cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause and made the statements inadmissible hearsay; they also raised claims regarding limits on cross-examination, admission of documents without live testimony, severance, and (for Diggs) speedy trial violations from a seven-year delay. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the witness’s statements were properly admitted because he was available for cross-examination despite his memory issues, and it rejected most other claims of error. The court affirmed the judgments except for reversing Diggs’s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license, which the government conceded was admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause due to lack of testimony from the document’s preparer.

criminal lawprocedure

In B.F. Saul Co. v. Tiefenbacher, a landlord appealed a Superior Court order denying its motion to release funds that tenants had paid into the court registry under a protective order during a pending suit for possession based on nonpayment of rent; the funds remained held while tenants pursued related administrative challenges. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the order was not an appealable interlocutory ruling under D.C. Code § 11-721(a)(2) or as the practical equivalent of an injunction. The court reasoned that, although such protective-order rulings can resemble injunctions, the landlord had not demonstrated the “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence” required by the two-prong Carson test applied in McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co. to justify immediate review before final judgment. This was the first time the court had addressed whether denial of a landlord’s motion to withdraw registry funds in these circumstances qualifies for interlocutory appeal.

propertyprocedure

In Smith v. United States, Michael Smith appealed his convictions for carrying a pistol without a license, possessing an unregistered firearm, and related ammunition and firearm charges after police recovered a gun from a bicycle he had been holding during a 2008 encounter in Washington, D.C. The trial court excluded testimony from Smith's proposed fingerprint expert, who would have stated that police violated an MPD Special Order by using a powder method rather than the required Superglue fuming technique to lift prints from a gun not found on Smith's person, and that the alternative method was superior. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the exclusion constituted reversible error because the testimony was relevant to rebut the government's evidence on fingerprint recovery and to support a reasonable-doubt defense. The court reasoned that the expert evidence would have directly challenged the inference that the crime-scene officer performed her work adequately, consistent with precedent allowing such testimony when the government presents fingerprint evidence, and that its exclusion impaired Smith's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

In the case of In re Theodore S. Silva, Jr., the D.C. Court of Appeals addressed disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who neglected a client's real estate easement agreement, then forged signatures and notarizations on a fake document, falsely represented to his client and law partner that it had been properly executed and recorded, and later made misrepresentations under oath during the disciplinary process about his cocaine addiction. The Board on Professional Responsibility found violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct, including criminal acts and intentional dishonesty, and recommended a three-year suspension with a fitness requirement for reinstatement. Bar Counsel urged disbarment instead. The court adopted the Board's recommendation, citing the strong presumption afforded to Board sanctions, consistency with prior cases involving document falsification and client deception that resulted in suspensions rather than disbarment, and the view that the misconduct did not rise to the level of "flagrant" dishonesty warranting permanent removal from the bar. The suspension period was set to begin on the date the respondent fully complied with the affidavit and notice requirements of D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14.

criminal lawproperty

In this reciprocal attorney discipline proceeding, the D.C. Court of Appeals addressed whether to impose an 18-month suspension on a lawyer already suspended by Virginia courts for multiple violations of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, including failures to communicate with a client about case status and settlement offers, providing unauthorized financial assistance, forging the client's signature on documents, and falsely notarizing a settlement agreement. The court imposed identical discipline in the District of Columbia, concluding that the attorney had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the misconduct warranted substantially different discipline under D.C. rules, even setting aside the financial assistance violation due to differences in the jurisdictions' rules. The core reasoning was that the remaining uncontested violations, such as unauthorized settlement and document forgery, were serious enough that an 18-month suspension would be appropriate even as original discipline in D.C., and reciprocal discipline was therefore required under D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11.

procedure

This case involved D.F., the biological father of D.T., appealing the denial of his claim that his court-appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance during proceedings to waive his consent to R.E.S.'s adoption of D.T. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rejection of the ineffectiveness claim. The court reasoned that even assuming deficient performance by counsel in not arranging for D.F.'s participation or calling proposed family witnesses, D.F. failed to show prejudice because there was no reasonable probability that the adoption decision would have differed given his incarceration and the lack of viable alternative placements by family members. The decision applied the Strickland standard to evaluate the claim in the context of parental rights termination.

family law

The case involved appellant Deandre Hobbs' convictions for first-degree murder while armed and related firearm and ammunition offenses arising from the shooting death of Aaron Teeter in Washington, D.C. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by designating Juror 180 as an alternate and replacing her after the close of evidence without finding that she was unable or disqualified to serve as required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 24(c). The core reasoning was that the juror's statements about needing medication, being hard of hearing, and having problems with police officers' truthfulness did not establish grounds for removal under the rule, and the error was not harmless because the government's case depended heavily on the credibility of witnesses whose testimony the removed juror might have viewed skeptically.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, K.H. appealed his delinquency adjudication for armed robbery and possession of an imitation pistol, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained after police made a warrantless entry into an apartment where he was an overnight guest. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the adjudication and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that the prosecution failed to prove probable cause or exigent circumstances to justify the intrusion, as the detective's hearsay testimony was insufficient and the entry was non-consensual based on the resident's account of officers banging on the door and threatening to force entry. The fruits of the illegal entry, including K.H.'s statement and the victims' identifications, were not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Dave Magnus pleaded guilty in 1996 to charges of carrying a pistol without a license, possessing an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition based on handguns found in his home. Following the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which recognized an individual Second Amendment right to possess handguns in the home, Magnus sought to vacate his convictions and withdraw his pleas, arguing they were invalid because the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to his conduct. The trial court denied relief, holding that the unconditional guilty pleas waived any Second Amendment claims and that no manifest injustice or fundamental error warranted post-conviction remedies like coram nobis. On appeal, the court held that while guilty pleas waive non-jurisdictional defects, a defendant may still challenge the plea's validity as involuntary or unintelligent, and Magnus could potentially overcome procedural default by showing a miscarriage of justice. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on these issues.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved tenant Matt Banks challenging three rulings in eviction proceedings brought by Eastern Savings Bank after it foreclosed on a single-family dwelling: the sufficiency of a notice to vacate the basement unit he occupied, enforcement of a pre-foreclosure lease, and denial of his motion to intervene in eviction proceedings against the upstairs tenant. The court reversed the non-redeemable judgment of possession for the basement unit, reversed the order releasing Banks' lis pendens notice, and affirmed the denial of intervention. It reasoned that the notice was invalid for failure to deliver a copy to the Rent Administrator within five days as required by regulation, that foreclosure under D.C. Code § 42-522 extinguished the prior lease and converted Banks to a tenant at will whose interest supported the lis pendens filing, and that tenancies at will are not assignable so Banks acquired no interest permitting intervention under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 24. The court applied strict compliance standards to eviction procedures and D.C. Code provisions governing real property interests.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Kevin Herrington's 2006 conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition under D.C. Code § 7-2506.01, based solely on evidence that he possessed handgun ammunition in his home. The conviction followed a trial where the government was not required to prove the absence of a valid firearm registration certificate. After the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, which invalidated the District's ban on handgun possession in the home, Herrington argued that his conviction violated the Second Amendment. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the statute could not constitutionally apply to such possession and reversing the conviction on plain error review.

gunscriminal law

Michael Enders sued the District of Columbia for false arrest after a traffic incident involving a collision with another driver, leading to his warrantless arrest on charges including assault with a dangerous weapon. The jury returned a verdict for the District, but Enders appealed, arguing that the trial court's jury instructions incorrectly allowed justification of the arrest based on probable cause for any crime rather than limiting it to felonies or qualifying misdemeanors under D.C. Code § 23-581. The court agreed that the instructions were prejudicially erroneous, rejected the District's alternative arguments for affirmance based on pre-litigation notice requirements and probable cause for a felony, and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial. The core reasoning centered on the distinction in arrest authority between felonies and misdemeanors, the lack of evidence supporting probable cause for the felony as a matter of law, and the potential impact of the flawed instructions on the jury's verdict.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

Samuel Franco sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District's eminent domain taking of his property for redevelopment of the Skyland site violated his constitutional rights because the asserted public purpose was pretextual and the taking was solely for private benefit. The trial court granted summary judgment to the District on the ground that a ruling rejecting a similar pretext defense in a separate condemnation case (DeSilva) collaterally estopped Franco from litigating the issue. On appeal, the court held that collateral estoppel did not apply because Franco was neither a party to the DeSilva case nor in privity with any party to it. The court declined to affirm on alternative grounds not considered by the trial court and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

propertycivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a fee dispute between A1 Team USA Holdings, LLC and its former law firm Bingham McCutchen LLP, which proceeded to binding arbitration under the District of Columbia Uniform Arbitration Act; the arbitrator rejected claims of conflict of interest but reduced the firm's computerized research charges and ordered A1 to pay roughly $48,870. A1 moved to vacate the award, contending that a new statutory provision permitting vacatur on "other reasonable ground" authorized de novo judicial review of the arbitrator's findings. The trial court rejected that interpretation, applied the traditional limited standard of review, and confirmed the award. On appeal, the court held that the amendment did not expand judicial authority to conduct merits review or alter the extremely limited scope of review under the Act, and affirmed the judgment.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this juvenile delinquency case, sixteen-year-old T.L. was adjudicated for disorderly conduct under D.C. Code § 22-1321 and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after a police officer seized his money without legal basis, prompting T.L. to yell loudly in protest and call for his mother at night in a residential area, which drew onlookers and led to his arrest and a subsequent drug search. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the adjudications on both counts. The court held that T.L.'s conduct did not threaten a breach of the peace or show intent to provoke one, so the police lacked probable cause for the arrest and the drugs should have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful search incident to arrest. The evidence at trial was also insufficient to support the disorderly conduct charge.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kaliku v. United States, appellants Joseph Desmond Kaliku and David Matthews were convicted after a jury trial on multiple counts including armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping while armed, first-degree sexual abuse while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, stemming from a 2006 incident in which they robbed a man and sexually assaulted a woman at gunpoint in Washington, D.C. The appellants raised various constitutional, evidentiary, and other challenges to their convictions, including issues related to DNA evidence preservation, show-up identifications, and trial procedures. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgments, concluding there was neither reversible error nor abuse of discretion in the proceedings. The court's reasoning focused on the lack of bad faith in evidence handling, the reliability of identifications under applicable standards, and the sufficiency of the trial court's discretionary rulings on evidentiary matters.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Kendrick H. Gaines, convicted by a Superior Court jury of two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana after officers stopped him for a hands-free cell phone violation, he fled on foot, and they recovered a dropped bag of drugs. On appeal, Gaines argued that the trial court wrongly restricted cross-examination about the officers' alleged pretextual motives, racial bias in enforcement against black males, and selective use of minor traffic stops to search for drugs; he also challenged an unbalanced flight instruction and the admission of expert testimony on intent to distribute. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error because limitations on bias cross-examination were proper, any flaw in the flight instruction was harmless given the evidence and defense arguments, and allowing the expert opinion was not plain error under local evidence rules.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Martin v. United States, the appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault while armed and assaulting a police officer, stemming from an incident in which an officer approached the vehicle the appellant was driving and a struggle ensued after the appellant and his passenger claimed they believed the officer was a carjacker. The trial court ordered the appellant, who was testifying, not to speak to anyone—including his attorney—about his testimony during a weekend recess that interrupted his cross-examination. The appellate court ruled that this sequestration order violated the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as established in cases like Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke, because defendants are entitled to unrestricted access to their lawyers during significant recesses even when it may touch on ongoing testimony. The court held the violation to be plain error requiring reversal, regardless of any showing of prejudice or the defendant's failure to object at trial.

criminal lawprocedure