John M. Ferren

This case involves disciplinary proceedings against attorney David H. Safavian after his federal convictions for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Following an initial conviction that was reversed on appeal and a subsequent conviction that was affirmed, the Board on Professional Responsibility determined that the offenses constituted crimes of moral turpitude per se under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) and recommended disbarment. The court adopted the recommendation, ordering disbarment and specifying that for reinstatement purposes the disbarment period runs from the date of Safavian's first affidavit in 2006 but excludes the interval when his interim suspension had been lifted. The ruling rests on the principle that obstruction of justice inherently involves moral turpitude, triggering mandatory disbarment when any conviction meets that standard, while allowing credit for periods of actual suspension consistent with standard nunc pro tunc practices.

criminal law

The case involved Andre M. Jones's appeal from his bench-trial conviction for misdemeanor assault on a police officer under D.C. Code § 22-405(b), arising from a July 2008 encounter in which police officers pursued a suspect near Jones's home, he yelled profanities and refused orders to stay on the sidewalk, and accounts differed over whether he shoved an officer or took a fighting stance. Jones argued that the conviction might rest on invalid legal theories, including noncriminal conduct such as shouting or failing to comply with orders. The court remanded the case to the trial court for clarification of the verdict, citing the conflicting witness accounts, the government's presentation of three theories of guilt (two of which could not support conviction), the absence of an explicit credibility finding or specific factual findings by the trial judge, and the need to ensure the conviction rested only on conduct meeting the statutory requirement of active opposition to an officer's duties.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gilmore v. Atlantic Services Group, the petitioner sought review of an OAH decision upholding DOES's denial of unemployment benefits, which had initially found he voluntarily quit without good cause due to job abandonment after failing to report to work following a brief incarceration. OAH affirmed on alternate grounds, determining that the claimant's three days of no-call/no-show constituted misconduct under D.C. regulations. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that OAH's findings were flawed because they failed to clearly distinguish between gross and simple misconduct, relied on unadmitted evidence regarding employer policies, did not resolve inconsistencies in testimony about whether the employer was notified of the incarceration, and lacked a precise statement of any applicable job abandonment rule.

labor & employment

The case involved Percy Jordan's convictions for first-degree felony murder while armed with aggravating circumstances, second-degree murder while armed, robbery of a senior citizen, conspiracy to commit robbery, and multiple counts of credit card fraud, stemming from the 2006 robbery and killing of David Rosenbaum during a walk in Northwest D.C. Jordan appealed, claiming errors including the trial court's refusal to clarify the jury instruction on whether "cause" meant physically striking the victim, limits on cross-examining the key eyewitness about his police interrogation, the prosecutor's closing argument allegedly shifting the burden of proof, and the inclusion of an alias in the indictment. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions after finding no merit in these claims, while remanding for amendment of the judgment to account for merged offenses. The court reasoned that the jury instruction was adequate as given, cross-examination was not unduly restricted, the closing argument did not impermissibly shift the burden, and the alias did not prejudice the defense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a District of Columbia government employee who claimed work-related carpal tunnel syndrome and sought temporary total disability benefits through the Disability Compensation Program. After the program denied her claim, she filed multiple hearing applications with the Department of Employment Services (DOES), and an administrative law judge ultimately awarded benefits. The Department of Mental Health appealed, arguing that DOES failed to rule on its motion to dismiss the claim as untimely and that the agency used an incorrect standard of proof for causation. The court reversed and remanded, holding that DOES was required to address the timeliness issue raised in the motion to dismiss and to apply the proper standard without a presumption of compensability under the relevant statute. The court did not reach the sufficiency of the evidence.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Melendez v. United States, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a prohibited weapon, based on evidence that he beat one victim to death and struck another with a baseball bat. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by barring cross-examination of a defense witness, William Luna, regarding potential bias stemming from a New York sentencing order and possible hope of favorable treatment from prosecutors. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court committed no error in limiting the examination of Luna's alleged bias. The decision rested on the conclusion that the proposed line of questioning did not establish a sufficient basis for exploring bias under the circumstances presented.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Howard University Hospital v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, the court reviewed a Compensation Review Board decision upholding concurrent workers' compensation awards to a claimant injured while working as a housekeeper: ongoing temporary total disability benefits for a back impairment and permanent partial disability benefits for impairments to both legs caused by the same injury. The court affirmed the awards. It reasoned that prior precedent supported schedule awards for impairments to scheduled body parts resulting from injuries to non-scheduled parts, that the statute permits concurrent benefits by providing that schedule awards shall be "in addition to" temporary total disability compensation, and that substantial evidence supported the finding of separate and distinct disabilities.

labor & employment

In the case of In re D.E., a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent in the District of Columbia Family Court for aggravated assault arising from a group attack on a teenage girl on a bus. The appellant challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding the victim's injuries, the exclusion of a defense witness's testimony, and her assignment to a specialized "girls' court" on equal protection grounds. The court found sufficient evidence for the assault charge and did not fully resolve the equal protection issue but determined that the trial court erred in excluding the witness, an error that was not harmless, leading to reversal of the delinquency adjudication and remand for a new hearing. The court also suggested that the Family Court consider reassigning the case to another judge to avoid any potential bias from prior proceedings.

criminal lawfamily lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Achraf Baba's civil suit against Andrew Goldstein for assault and battery arising from a June 2007 incident; after Baba filed the complaint shortly before the statute of limitations ran, he missed the 60-day service deadline under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(m), leading to dismissal without prejudice. Judge Beck initially vacated the dismissal upon a showing of good cause under Rule 41(b), but after the case was reassigned, Judge Long granted Goldstein's motion to dismiss with prejudice, finding insufficient justification for the service delay. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by unduly narrowing its analysis and failing to consider all relevant good-cause factors from Cameron and related precedents, including the defendant's alleged evasion of service and the prejudice to Baba from the running of the limitations period.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved respondent Richard W. Allison Jr., a member of the D.C. Bar, who pled guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud arising from a scheme to defraud homeowners and mortgage lenders. After receiving notice of the conviction, the D.C. Court of Appeals temporarily suspended Allison and referred the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility to assess whether the offense involved moral turpitude. The Board determined that the offense constituted moral turpitude per se, as mail fraud has been consistently recognized as such under D.C. precedent, and recommended disbarment; neither party objected. The court adopted the Board's recommendation, holding that D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) mandates disbarment upon presentation of a certified conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude, and ordered Allison disbarred effective upon filing of the required affidavit.

criminal law

The case involved a landlord suing her former tenants for damage to a stove, microwave oven, and hardwood kitchen floor that occurred during their four-year tenancy. The trial court awarded damages based on the full replacement cost of the appliances and the cost of refinishing the entire first floor to match. The appellate court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court applied the wrong measure of damages by awarding replacement cost for the appliances rather than their fair market value at the time they were damaged, and that the evidence did not support holding the tenants liable for the full floor refinishing costs because some damage predated their tenancy or resulted from an unrelated leak they reported. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to recalculate the damages using the proper standards.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Dewand Sutton's appeal of his convictions for armed carjacking, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use of a vehicle arising from two incidents in which he and accomplices robbed victims of cash and cars at gunpoint. Sutton challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the armed carjacking conviction, claimed error in the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction, and argued that the receiving-stolen-property and unauthorized-use convictions merged. The court reviewed the full trial record and found sufficient evidence that the victim retained immediate actual possession of his vehicle when the carjacking occurred. It further held that any instructional error did not rise to plain error and that the two property convictions did not merge. The court therefore affirmed all convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Smith v. United States, the defendant challenged his convictions for carrying a pistol without a license, felon-in-possession of a firearm, and marijuana possession on the ground that police lacked probable cause to arrest and search him after an encounter on a public street. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded, ruling that the officer’s interpretation of the defendant’s “yeah” reply as an admission of marijuana possession was not objectively reasonable. The court explained that the officer’s second question had been phrased in the negative, the literal answer was therefore a denial, and the cited body language and tone were insufficient to convert that denial into probable cause for arrest under the totality of the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

Dorchester Associates LLC sought a special exception from the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) to subdivide a lot and construct thirteen single-family homes in an R-1-A zoning district covered by the Chain Bridge Road/University Terrace Tree and Slope Protection Overlay. The BZA denied the application after extensive hearings focused on the adequacy of the proposed storm water management system, tree protection measures, and the project's potential adverse effects on neighboring properties and the neighborhood's character. Dorchester challenged the denial, claiming factual and legal errors by the BZA. The court affirmed the BZA's decision, finding no legal error or abuse of discretion in the agency's application of zoning regulations to the evidence.

business & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

In this case, homeowner Peter Choharis sued his insurer State Farm after water damage from a radiator leak led to disputes over coverage for repairs, temporary housing, living expenses, and mold remediation under his homeowner’s policy. Choharis alleged bad faith handling of claims and sought to assert tort claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages on his contract claims, while also seeking to amend his complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm on all issues, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that District of Columbia law does not recognize an independent tort of bad faith in first-party insurance claim handling because contract remedies are sufficient, that the alleged misrepresentations did not support separate fraud or negligent misrepresentation claims, and that punitive damages are unavailable in pure contract actions without an independent tort. It also held that the proposed amendments would not add viable new theories.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved Shawn Burgess's appeal of his criminal convictions for multiple robberies, where the primary issue was the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to introduce expert testimony on psychological factors affecting eyewitness memory and perception, with emphasis on cross-racial identifications. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion. The reasoning centered on the insufficiency of Burgess's proffer, which failed to name the expert, detail qualifications, or specify the opinions and their bases, falling short on the second factor of the Dyas test for expert admissibility.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a property dispute in which Solid Rock Church claimed ownership by adverse possession of a portion of land that Friendship Public Charter School acquired from the District of Columbia in 2000, after Solid Rock had fenced the area since 1981. The trial court granted summary judgment to Friendship. On appeal, the court partially affirmed, ruling that adverse possession cannot be asserted against District property designated for public use such as education. The case was remanded to determine the exact boundaries and ownership of the disputed portion based on survey records and deeds.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a negligence claim by Starr L. Murphy against Nancy Schwankhaus after Murphy slipped and fell on an ice patch on the sidewalk in front of Schwankhaus's apartment building, fracturing her leg and ankle. The fall occurred after a tenant had shoveled snow from the sidewalk, allegedly leaving a concealed ice patch. The trial court granted summary judgment to Schwankhaus, finding no breach of duty, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the ice had formed before the shoveling, the tenant's actions did not increase the existing hazard from snowy conditions, and pedestrians are expected to exercise caution in such weather, with no material facts in dispute requiring a jury trial.

torts & liabilityproperty

This case involved an appeal of a criminal contempt conviction for violating a civil protection order (CPO) that prohibited contact with the petitioner and required staying 100 feet away from her. The appellant, appearing pro se, had agreed to the CPO terms in court and was later accused of violating the no-contact provision by saying words like 'watch it' or 'watch out' to the petitioner while both were still in the courtroom immediately after the order was issued. The trial court found him guilty based on that statement and his proximity, interpreting it as willful contact. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for acquittal, holding that neither the CPO terms nor the trial court provided sufficient notice on how to comply with the order in the courtroom, where literal adherence to the distance requirement was impossible, and the evidence did not clearly establish willful contempt.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved Jose Castellon, who was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree sexual abuse while armed and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence based on evidence obtained from a search of his apartment and an incriminating statement made to police. Castellon appealed the convictions, claiming the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress the evidence and statements because his consent to the search was not voluntary and was obtained in violation of the Interpreter Act, and because excusing a subpoenaed witness violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the consent to search was voluntary after Castellon received a Spanish translation of the consent form and was informed of his right to refuse, that his Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary, and that any Interpreter Act issues did not affect the voluntariness determination. The court also rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on the record presented.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights