The case involved the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission revoking Edgar Griffis's commercial saltwater fishing privileges and imposing a $5,000 penalty after he pled no contest to a grand theft charge. The court reversed the Commission's action, holding that the statute authorizing the penalties applies only to a judicial disposition on a charge of theft of or from a trap, which was not the case here since the specific trap-related counts were dropped and the plea was to a generic theft count. The decision rested on strict construction of penalty statutes in favor of the affected party, the principle that a defendant cannot be convicted of an uncharged crime, and the fact that the plea did not match the statutory requirements.
This case involved a dispute over a commercial lease for space in Sanford, Florida, intended solely for the tenant's check-cashing business. The lessor sued the tenant's guarantor for unpaid rent after the tenant terminated the lease and never took possession, citing the city's denial of necessary zoning approvals including a conditional use permit. The trial court ruled the lease invalid due to lack of consideration from the zoning frustration, but the appellate court affirmed on different grounds. It held that the parties had specifically addressed the zoning risk in an amendment with a termination clause, making the frustration doctrine inapplicable, and that the tenant had timely exercised its right to cancel within the provided timeframe after using best efforts to obtain permits. The court rejected the lessor's argument that termination had to occur strictly within 90 days regardless of pending applications.
The case involved a material supplier (Weatherking) that was not in direct privity with the general contractor and sought full payment on a performance bond posted under Florida Statute § 713.23, even though it had failed to serve timely notice to the owner as required by § 713.06(2). The trial court entered summary judgment for the supplier. The appellate court reversed, ruling that the bond statute expressly conditions recovery on compliance with the notice provision and that, under precedents such as Crane Co. v. Fine, a late-notice claimant must affirmatively prove the existence of available undistributed or misdistributed funds sufficient to satisfy its claim after accounting for priorities. Because the record contained no evidence on those factual prerequisites, the plaintiff had not carried its burden to obtain summary judgment, and the case was remanded for trial.
This case arose from a 1971 head-on truck collision on a Florida highway between Robert Watson, driving for Neway Uniform, and Alvan Clements, driving for Redwing Carriers, resulting in severe injuries to both drivers. Clements and his wife sued Watson and Neway, which settled for $40,000, and Watson then separately sued Redwing for his and his wife's damages. A jury found Watson 65% at fault, awarded him $560,000 and his wife $40,000, leading to a judgment against Redwing for $196,000 and $14,000 respectively. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that an accident reconstruction expert's testimony on evasive actions was admissible as it addressed physical possibilities based on eyewitness facts rather than impermissibly invading the jury's role. It reversed the trial court's grant of set-offs to Redwing for the prior settlement payments, reasoning that Redwing could not claim credit for amounts paid by Watson's insurer to Clements or for its own property damage recovery, consistent with Florida precedent on set-offs applying only to identical parties.
In Mendelson v. Mendelson, a plaintiff sued his brother for fraud arising from joint business ventures and obtained a jury verdict of $68,500. The trial court ordered a remittitur to $50,000 or a new trial if not accepted; the plaintiff appealed the order instead of filing the remittitur, leading to an affirmance treating it as granting a new trial. After the appeal, the plaintiff attempted to file the remittitur and obtain a reduced judgment, but the appellate court held that his prior appeal constituted an election of the new trial remedy. The court reasoned that principles of election of remedies prevented the plaintiff from pursuing the alternative after his appeal proved unsuccessful and the mandate affirmed the new trial order.
The case involved the estate of Charles A. Baird, whose original will could not be found after his death, leading to a presumption that he had revoked it by destruction. The trial court denied a petition by the heir-at-law to revoke the probate of an executed copy of the will, determining that the presumption had been overcome. The appellate court reversed, holding that the record contained no substantial evidence to rebut the presumption, as proof of possible access to the apartment by others, the decedent's expressions of fondness for the beneficiary, and his forgetfulness near death was insufficient under Florida law.