David Jay Richman

This case involved a worker terminated under his employer's zero-tolerance drug policy after a positive test for marijuana, who then sought unemployment compensation benefits. The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the denial of benefits under the state statute disqualifying claimants who test positive for controlled substances during working hours. The court reasoned that although article XVIII, section 14 of the Colorado Constitution exempts registered medical marijuana users from state criminal prosecution, it does not override employment drug policies or create an exception to the unemployment disqualification statute. The decision emphasized that the constitutional provision addresses only criminal liability and does not protect against private employer rules or related benefit denials.

labor & employmentcriminal law

In People v. Martinez, defendant Steve Martinez, Jr. was convicted of vehicular homicide while driving under the influence after a crash that killed his passenger, C.B., with evidence including blood alcohol test results from a private laboratory showing levels above the legal limit at the time of the incident. The trial court admitted the lab reports under Colorado statute section 16-3-309(5) without requiring testimony from the testing technician, and imposed an eight-year prison sentence. On appeal, the court held that the statute applies to reports from private criminalistics laboratories, not just state-run ones, and that the defendant waived his confrontation rights by failing to request the technician's testimony at least ten days before trial. The court also found the sentence was within the presumptive range and based on appropriate considerations, with no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved rural Colorado restaurant and hotel owners challenging the constitutionality of Amendment 42, a voter-approved measure that raised the state minimum wage to $6.85 per hour with annual inflation adjustments based on the Consumer Price Index used for Colorado. Plaintiffs argued the provision was unconstitutionally vague because no Colorado-specific CPI existed, that the Department of Labor exceeded its authority by using the Denver-Boulder-Greeley CPI, and that this application violated equal protection by disadvantaging rural businesses. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the amendment's language reasonably allowed the agency to select an appropriate CPI index, that the choice was not arbitrary, and that the provision created a workable standard. The decision upheld the agency's interpretation under principles of administrative deference and rational basis review.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Ruth Koehler, an elderly disabled woman receiving Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services (HCBS) benefits while her husband resided in a nursing home and received Medicaid assistance. The Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing terminated Koehler's HCBS benefits based on a state regulation that denied her a community spouse monthly income allowance (CSMIA) under the Medicaid Catastrophic Care Act because she herself was receiving HCBS. The district court upheld the termination, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the state regulatory definition was inconsistent with the federal statutory purpose of preventing pauperization of community spouses. The court reasoned that federal law permits states to treat HCBS recipients as institutionalized spouses for spousal impoverishment provisions and that the regulation improperly extended beyond congressional intent by precluding the allowance in this situation.

healthcarefederal power

The case involved Emilio Paredes suing Air-Serv Corporation and United Airlines for negligence after he was injured twice while receiving wheelchair assistance during a flight layover at Denver International Airport, first when the wheelchair caught on the jetway and later when it collapsed in the terminal. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the state-law negligence claim was preempted by the Federal Aviation Authority Authorization Act provision barring enforcement of state laws related to air carrier services. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the FAAAA does not preempt common-law personal-injury claims because Congress did not clearly intend to displace traditional state tort remedies, the statute's savings clause preserves existing common-law remedies, and no federal remedy exists for such injuries.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved defendant Aaron Samuel Trujillo, who pleaded guilty to incest and was sentenced to Sex Offender Intensive Supervision Probation (SOISP) for an indeterminate term, to run consecutive to the incarceration portion of a prior sentence but concurrent with its parole period. After violations occurred in 2008 and 2009 while the defendant was on parole from the other case, the trial court revoked the SOISP and imposed an indeterminate prison term of seven years to life. The defendant appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to revoke because his SOISP had not yet commenced. The court affirmed, holding that the plea agreement clearly established the SOISP began upon parole release, rendering the violations subject to revocation proceedings, and that trial courts have authority to structure probation sentences consecutively to incarceration components of separate sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns a scrap metal recycling company's challenge to two Colorado statutes (sections 42-4-2202 and 42-5-105) that require dealers to follow holding periods, recordkeeping, and identification checks when accepting motor vehicles or parts to deter theft. Plaintiff Metal Management West argued that a stripped van shell it accepted did not qualify as a 'motor vehicle' under the laws' definitions and that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as applied to scrap operations. The district court granted summary judgment to the state defendants, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that section 42-5-105's daily record requirements apply only to intact motor vehicles as defined in the Automobile Theft Law rather than all vehicle parts or shells. The court remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment on that statutory interpretation while upholding the other statute's application and rejecting the vagueness claims.

business & regulatorycriminal law

The case involved Jamie Snell appealing a summary judgment granted to Progressive Preferred Insurance Company on claims for breach of contract and bad faith denial of underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits. Snell had added a second vehicle to her existing auto policy in January 2008 after Colorado amended its UIM statutes effective that date to alter the definition of underinsured vehicles and eliminate certain coverage limits and offsets; she sought to apply the new rules to stack coverage after an accident. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the statutory amendments did not apply because adding a vehicle did not constitute issuance or renewal of a policy within the meaning of the legislation's effective-date provision. The core reasoning relied on Colorado precedent holding that such a change was not a material variation requiring treatment as a new policy, leaving the prior statutory definitions and limits in effect.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant Dirk Reeves, who was convicted after a jury trial of one count of possessing more than one gram of a schedule II controlled substance (oxycodone) and three counts of possessing one gram or less of schedule IV controlled substances, based on pills found during a search incident to arrest on an unrelated matter. Reeves appealed his convictions, arguing that the jury instruction on the schedule II count was erroneous because it allowed conviction based on the total weight of the tablet rather than the pure weight of the oxycodone, and that the prosecutor's rebuttal comments improperly shifted the burden by highlighting the absence of any prescription evidence. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the statute defines the offense by reference to the weight of any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any quantity of the controlled substance, making the instruction accurate, and that the prosecutor's remarks were permissible comments on the lack of evidence supporting the defense theory. The court did not reach the sentencing challenge because it had become moot after the sentences were served.

criminal lawprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Vincent Franz challenged an order directing a change in his treating physician after a medical utilization review (MUR) committee found his authorized treating physician had been overprescribing narcotics. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and administrative law judge upheld the change, rejecting claims of due process violations and disqualifying conflicts of interest by MUR committee members affiliated with the insurer or a provider network. The court affirmed, holding that the MUR process is a records review not requiring discovery or an evidentiary hearing, that applicable regulations did not bar the physicians' participation, and that the MUR is not a quasi-judicial proceeding implicating protected property interests. The court also found the claimant failed to overcome the MUR findings by clear and convincing evidence.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Vincent Franz sought review of an order denying his request for attorney fees after his employer requested a hearing on selecting a new authorized treating physician (ATP) following a medical utilization review (MUR) that directed a change in providers. The court affirmed the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's decision upholding the denial of fees, concluding that the employer had not violated the statute prohibiting requests for hearings on issues not yet ripe. The core reasoning was that the MUR process became final upon the Division's identification of a replacement ATP who then declined treatment, rendering the issue of selecting a new provider appropriate for adjudication at the time the hearing application was filed. The court also found no due process violation in how the issues were framed or decided.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, claimant Vincent Franz, who was permanently and totally disabled from a 1989 work injury, challenged an administrative order changing his authorized treating physician after a medical utilization review (MUR) determined that he was being severely over-medicated with narcotics. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and lower tribunals upheld the change, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the MUR process did not violate the claimant's due process rights by denying discovery or a hearing and that the reviewing physicians had no disqualifying conflicts of interest from their affiliations with the insurer or its provider network. The court reasoned that the MUR is a limited records review to assess whether care meets professional standards, not a quasi-judicial proceeding affecting protected property interests, and that the applicable regulations permitted the physicians' participation. The court also found the final order sufficiently clear and rejected arguments for remand.

labor & employmentprocedurehealthcare

In Noble Energy, Inc. v. Colorado Department of Revenue, the taxpayer sought refunds of sales taxes paid on fracturing materials (fluids and sand) used in oil and gas well stimulation services and on separators that sort well streams into oil, water, and gas. The district court granted the refunds, ruling that the sand was not taxable tangible personal property because it became permanently embedded in the realty, that the transactions were primarily for services rather than goods, and that the separators qualified for the manufacturing machinery exemption. On appeal, the court affirmed the refund for the fracturing materials on the grounds that the true object of the transactions was the service of enhancing well productivity and any materials were incidental or not personal property, but reversed as to the separators, holding that mere separation of components does not constitute manufacturing a new product under the statutory definition and construing the exemption narrowly against the taxpayer. The case was remanded to adjust the judgment accordingly.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether defendant James Henry Hunter, convicted of second-degree burglary and sexual assault against his neighbors, qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Colorado statute section 18-3-414.5, which requires among other things that the victim be a stranger to the offender or a person with whom the offender established a relationship primarily for sexual victimization. The trial court found Hunter met the SVP criteria by treating the victims as strangers because they did not recognize him during the masked assault. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Hunter was not a stranger under the statute because the victims knew him as their neighbor beforehand, and the SVP determination must turn on the pre-existing relationship rather than the victims' awareness at the time of the offense.

criminal law

The case involved Darcie Lynn Crawford, who was convicted by a jury of theft by receiving stolen property valued between $500 and $15,000 after she attempted to sell or pawn items taken from a residential burglary. Crawford appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to aggregate the values of multiple stolen items rather than requiring proof of a single item meeting the value threshold, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the value finding. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the theft by receiving statute permits aggregation of values because references to "the thing involved" encompass multiple items, and that competent testimony established the value of the recovered items exceeded $500.

criminal law

Heidi Hauser intervened in a declaratory judgment action filed by Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company against its insured, Mulligan's, Inc., her former employer, to determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify Mulligan's for a default judgment Hauser obtained against it. Hauser had sued Mulligan's for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of a manager who sexually assaulted her, resulting in a damages award of over $873,000. The trial court granted summary judgment to Mountain States, finding no coverage under the policy. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the policy provisions did not apply to the claims, there was no duty to defend based on the complaint allegations, and no adjudicated claim such as false imprisonment supported indemnity.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Justin Tucker, a law student intern, who was convicted by a jury of attempt to influence a public servant, forgery of a government-issued document, impersonating a peace officer, criminal impersonation to gain a benefit, and theft under $100 after he drafted and sent a forged letter on District Attorney letterhead to his Montana attorney, threatening a Montana judge involved in his domestic relations and stalking cases. The trial court denied Tucker's motion to exclude the letter and related testimony under attorney-client privilege and also excluded proposed expert testimony on professional conduct rules. On appeal, the court affirmed the convictions, holding that the letter was not a privileged client communication because it purported to come from the District Attorney rather than Tucker, and that the expert testimony was properly excluded as irrelevant since there was no evidence Tucker relied on the ethical rules. The court found no error in these evidentiary rulings or in treating the evidence as not qualifying as res gestae.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Norma Jean Maggard challenged her termination from the Department of Human Services as a certified nursing assistant for attendance issues, failing to provide a doctor's excuse, and unprofessional interactions with staff and supervisors. An administrative law judge found that some but not all of the alleged acts occurred and that termination was not within the reasonable range of discipline due to mitigating circumstances, but the State Personnel Board upheld the termination by a split vote without explaining its rejection of the ALJ's conclusion on the appropriate penalty. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the Board's order and remanded for reinstatement of the ALJ's initial decision, concluding that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to give candid consideration to the evidence or provide reasons for its differing conclusion on the range of reasonable discipline, in violation of the court's prior remand instructions.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved defendant Patricia Jagielski Ragusa, who was charged and convicted by a jury of multiple counts of theft, attempted theft, computer crime, and attempted computer crime for allegedly stealing about $1.2 million from her employer through unauthorized wire transfers. The trial court held two in camera proceedings outside the defendant's presence, during which her attorneys disclosed privileged communications, expressed strong disapproval of her decision to reject plea offers, and voiced concerns about her criticisms of their defense strategy. On direct appeal, the court held that these proceedings violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to conflict-free counsel, to be present at critical stages of the trial, and to counsel of her choice, as the attorneys' statements created a conflict of interest and the defendant was kept unaware of the disclosures. Because these violations constituted structural error, the court reversed the convictions, vacated the sentences, and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Kent Lambert's complaint alleging that the Bill Ritter for Governor Candidate Committee and the Ritter Inaugural Committee violated Colorado campaign finance laws through improper contributions from inaugural event funds that may have covered campaign expenses, as well as failures to register and report. The administrative law judge dismissed the claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), finding them time-barred by the 180-day filing deadline or unsupported by the Patten Report attached to the complaint, and awarded attorney fees to the committees. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, concluding that the $350 payment to the campaign manager within the filing window could support viable claims for contribution limits, corporate contribution bans, and reporting violations, and vacated the fee award before remanding for further proceedings.

electionsprocedure